NIGERIA:
ISSUES IN ECONOMY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Edited by

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The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung

Abuja, Nigeria

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About this Project

About The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung

PREFACE

The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation West Africa Roundtable Series in Nigeria began in 2017.

The objectives of the roundtables were to:

- . foster knowledge production on critical issues of development: politically, economically and socially.
- . strengthen platforms for critical thought on contemporary development issues in Nigeria.
- . foster active participation of the youth in political processes in consonance with the objectives of component A of the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung West Africa programme cycle for 2017-2019: Focus on *Young people and an open and peaceful political culture for a just society.*

Topics for public symposiums included international politics, peace, justice and security, human rights, economic alternatives, radicalization, non-violence, reconciliation, gender issues and history among others. For 2017, four pilot roundtables were held in collaboration with the Political Science and International Relations Department, University of Abuja.

In 2018, six round tables were organized in collaboration with the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja, Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and the African Centre for Media and Information Literacy (AFRICMIL).

In 2019, we further expanded the organizations we collaborated with and increased participation to more than double the 2018 figure. Thus, fourteen round tables were held with the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja, AFRICMIL, Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) Kano, Centre for Gender Studies, Bayero University Kano, Charis Healthcare Initiative Jos, and The Maroon Square Lagos.

The roundtables were successful, thanks to the commitment and active

participation of the students and stakeholders that participated in the debates. Special thanks to all the speakers at the twenty-four roundtables organized between 2017 and 2019.

Consultations with selected academics and civil society activists to identify partners for the proposed pilot roundtables began in March 2017.

We thank the following persons for their ideas and suggestions: Dr Kole Shetimma, MacArthur Foundation, Professor Alemika, Sociology Department University of Jos, Professor Dung Pam Sha, Political Science Department University of Jos, Mallam Yunusa Yau,Centre for Information Technology and Development Kano and, late Professor Abubakar Momoh, Political Scientist and Director General, Electoral Institute of Independent National Electoral Commission, Abuja.

Special thanks to Dr. Armin Osmanovic, Regional Representative of Rosa Luxemburg Foundation West Africa, who conceived and nurtured the implementation of the roundtable series in Nigeria and his successor, Dr. Claus Dieter Konig for assenting to the collation and publication of this reader.

The views and recommendations provided by the authors are their opinions and perspectives and do not represent the views of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation West Africa.

It is our hope that the research papers complied in this reader will provide useful analysis, recommendations and alternatives for overcoming the development challenges, Nigeria faces.

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INTRODUCTION

The Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung has over the years made very strident interventions in promoting progressive ideas and elevating social engagement and discourse towards the socio-economic emancipation of Nigeria. The efforts of the organisation to engage with different strata of society has been quite pivotal in agenda setting. This project and work on **Nigeria: Issues in Economy, Politics and Society, is the product of its recent project in the country.**

The Project was operated for about two years and was delivered through public lectures and discourses both on campus and in popular organized spaces such as the trade union movement. The issues discussed under the Project focused on political, economic and social developments in the Nigerian society.

The book, which is arranged in twelve parts could be described as a compendium of the issues with Nigeria from a historical, personal and research perspective. The authorship of the book is a beautiful blend of experience and youth as veteran activists through this project shared space with younger comrades.

Part One of the book deals with **"The Student Movement and Radicalism".** It comprises four chapters resourced by Ahmed Aminu Yusuf, Chibuike Mgbeahuruike, Usman Shehu, and Amina Salihu. The contributors tried to trace the history of student unionism and activism in Nigeria from the University of Ibadan up to the formation of the first umbrella body of university students in Nigeria – the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS) in 1956. The book also chronicled the events that led to the dissolution of NUNS after the famous "Ali Must Go" protest which rocked most the campuses in Nigeria in 1978. Also presented were the radical persuasions and organizations especially the Patriotic Youth Movement of Nigeria (PYMN) that facilitated the resurrection of NUNS as the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS).

The authors tried to draw a parallel between what clearly stood out as a revolutionary student union movement of the 1960s, 1970s and up to early 90s. The patriotic and ideologically clear response by then student union movement in Nigeria to the contradictions of governance of their day especially through well-articulated constitutions, charter of demands and resolutions stand in sharp contrast with the reactionary and opportunistic behaviours of the student union movement of today.

It is striking that it was the Nigerian student union movement that pre-empted the attempt to unseat Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings through a regional military force which was supposed to be mobilised from a staging base in Nigeria in the infant days of Rawlings government, precisely on 31st December 1981. The leadership of NANS under Chris Abashi organised a press conference and alerted the world to the plot which led to its unravelling and the collapse of the attempt to serve Jerry Rawlings from Patrice Lumumba's plate.

About two decades before this time, the NUNS was very pivotal in the cancellation and abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, precisely in 1962.

Contrast this with the student unionism of today which as a result of infiltration of its ranks by the state has lost it voice as the champion and defender of the aspirations and interest of students.

Coming to the aid of the beleaguered student union movement, Dr. Amina Salihu opined in her contribution in the book that caution should be applied while drawing a comparison between the student union movement of the 70s and 80s with the current crop of leaders in the Nigerian students' union movement. She was of the opinion that both existed under different shades of history. She pointed out that the revolutionary student union movement of the 70s and 80s existed during a period of great ideological divide as marked by the Cold War between the US and USSR.

She also pointed out that the standards of living and the conditions of university campuses in the 1980s and now are not the same. She cited dilapidated classroom, congested hostels, upsurge in campus violence, high school fees, and moral decadence especially as informed by exposure to the internet. Recommendations on recapturing a radical student union space includes mentoring, ideological nurturing and improved funding for education.

Part Two dealt extensively with the matter of **Farmer-Herder Conflict**, a matter that has gained prominence as one of the mortal security concerns under President Muhammadu Buhari's government. The discourse was shaped by contributions by Dr. Hussini Abdu, Eugune T. Aliegba, Y.Z Yau, Solomon Ogbu and Peter Adejobi. Each of the contributors agreed that the farmers-herdsmen conflict had been as old as Nigeria itself. While a section of the contributors blamed the media for misrepresenting the conflict in the colours of ethno-religious strife, another section blames government especially security

operatives for failing to secure lives and property and establish the peace. All the contributors seem to agree that the conflict is largely a resource conflict especially as aggravated by the climate change scourge.

It was Y.Z. Yau that provided a critical information about the herdsmen-farmers crisis in what he called the "de-herdmenisation of the Fulani" or herdsmen without herds. The 'de-herdmenisation' situation is the cashing in of the difficulties faced by traditional Fulani herdsmen by rich people in society who buy over their cattle herds for cheap and then turn the former herd owners into herd managers and on very poor wages. He also pointed out that some of the new herdsmen are not really interested in the business of cattle rearing but use it as a front for money laundering. For such unscrupulous businessmen, the more chaotic the business stays the better for the perpetuation of their devious intents. This side of things in the business of cattle rearing in Nigeria and the conflicts it attracts needs to be seriously engaged.

Dr. Eugene Aliegba in his paper pointed to the collapse of the traditional conflict settlement mechanism since year 2000 when armies of foreign Fulani nomads made a norm of moving in their cattle from all over West Africa to occupy farmlands of Nigerians. From verifiable personal accounts, these foreign Fulani unlike the regular Fulani herdsmen who mostly live peacefully with their host communities are said not to be interested in peaceful co-existence. They just move in with their cattle, devastate farms and disappear into thin air before they can be brought to justice.

There are not a few Nigerians who are wondering why the Fulani nomadic business cannot evolve or be reformed like other business cultures in Nigeria. Given the potent danger that conflict between herdsmen and presents farmers to national unity; it might be helpful to situate the herdsmen-farmers conflict within a holistic prism of resource agitation, economic deprivation, constitutional ambiguity, justice, equity and law and order.

Part Three deals with **Fundamentalism and De-radicalisation.** Just as the issues thrown up in Part 2 of the book, the definition given to fundamentalism brings further clarity. One of the contributors described fundamentalism as the belief that a religious or ethnic belief is inviolably valid, irrefutable, intrinsic, and inerrant truth that must be imposed on others through both violent and non-violent means.

In Nigeria, the ascendancy of Islamic fundamentalism is a cause of concern as it has proved to be the springboard for the emergence of very extreme sectarian groups of which many have evolved into full time terrorist groups. The contributors share the perspective that government and society have a responsibility to use both the carrot and stick approach to address the danger constituted by fundamentalism.

Part Four tries to answer the question of **Migration and Social Inequality in Africa.** The contributors linked the upsurge in outbound migration from Africa to other continents particularly Europe and America to socio-economic deprivation. This Part of the book also traced the same pattern of contemporary migration to the factors that precipitated migration from its origin in Africa more than seven hundred years ago. The contributors put a spotlight on the effect of economically induced migration in Africa which includes economic deprivation, psychological trauma and even what one of the contributors described as procreational genocide where imperialists and colonialists forcefully moved Africans to work as slaves in mines far away from home and did not allow their wives and families to migrate with them.

Part Five which was developed by seasoned contributors such as Osaze Lanre Nosaze, Sylvester Odion Akhaine and Onyeisi Chiemeke examined **Africa, China and Debt** with focus on Nigeria's debt burden and China's contribution to the new debt burden and debt blackmail on many African countries. All the contributors found a confluence in the fact that Africa has been at the receiving end of its exposure to the outside world especially the West and East. They posited that this contact has seen Africans poached during the slave trade, and its animals and mineral wealth plundered by imperialist colonialists and its soul tugged during the cold war.

Osaze Nosaze argued that in order to situate the motives behind China's economic interest in Africa, it is important to interrogate the ideological underpinning that characterise the Chinese State and economy. He identified two school of thoughts. The first school of thought believes that China's political and economic ideology is Socialism with a market. This is justified on the argument that the Chinese economy is centrally planned, an extensive and non-commercial system of public service delivery and the socialisation of the factors of production particularly land which is still vested in the state and with access to peasants for economic production. The other school of thought

believes that China is moving towards full blown capitalism with all the inherent identities of neo-imperialistic ambitions. Some of the characteristics used to justify this perspective includes the replacement of collective and public property with private property ownership, increasing wage disparity and the emasculation of workers from the benefits of surplus value.

To many keen observers, the clearest clue to the imperialistic nature of China's investments is the heavy chain of debt being put on many African countries. The World Bank recently warned Nigeria on the dangers of acquiring more loans given the contribution of such poorly planned loans to revenues decline, indebtedness, and budget deficits. One of the contributors warned that foreign loans are no solutions to the myriad of challenges facing Nigeria and other developing economies as it tends to create what he described as 'debt-endency' or 'debt-dependency'. A case was what made with the debt cancellation extended to Nigeria after a significant portion of its debt was paid back and the fact that the country's debt profile is worse now that before it enjoyed the debt amnesty. An example was also cited of a national apology made by a one-time Prime Minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra over

$12 billion IMF loans and the difficulties and strains it put the country through, vowing that Thailand would never touch any IMF loan with the longest pole.

Part Six of the book is about **Entrepreneurship and Employment.** Dr. Abdulganiyu Rufai Yakub, Dr. Asmau Mahmud Baffa and Professor Aisha Ismail made contributions to this discourse. In their perspectives, they identified entrepreneurship as offering a steady stream of business opportunities in the Nigerian economy and encouraged that government should invest in entrepreneurship. The point was also made that entrepreneurship requires innovation, creativity, risk-taking and self-determination for success. They identified social media as the new driver of entrepreneurship in Nigeria given its reach which is projected at 3.02 billion users globally as of 2021.

The contributors identified difficulty in accessing credit, unfavourable fiscal policy, policy inconsistencies on the part of government, poor infrastructural layout, restricted access to markets, obstacles in timely sourcing of raw materials, competition with cheaper imported products, and poor inter-sectoral linkages as some of the factors militating against entrepreneurship and the creation of decent employment in Nigeria. These challenges also contribute to high informality in the Nigerian economy. The persistence of these

challenges has given rise to a school of thought that believes government should approach entrepreneurship more holistically and address fundamental challenges militating against entrepreneurship in Nigeria rather than throwing money at the challenges and entrenching same.

Part Seven of the book deals with **Women and Political Participation**. The faculty on this discourse includes Barrister Ramatu Umar Bako and Professor Samuel Egwu. Ramatu warned that in an environment of depressed participation by women in politics cautioned should be applied to ensure that whatever percentage of women political participation is effective. She argued that such can only happen when women participation is guided by gender sensitive governance reform goals including responsiveness, accountable management of public resources and in ways that increase the capacity of the state to implement gender-friendly policies.

Professor Sam Egwu posited that the continued exclusion of women from mainstream politics in Nigeria is a fallout of the disparity between theory and practise. He says this in light of the numerous international conventions and protocols signed and ratified by Nigeria including the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which are mostly poorly implemented. Professor Egwu went on to argue that at the core of democratic politics and legitimacy is the extent to which it captures the diversity of society especially the female population in the society. He said that Nigeria's democracy fails this crucial test as it's electoral politics is gender-exclusive.

Part Eight engages the very important concern of **Youth, Leadership, Democracy and Development in West Africa.** Contributing to this discourse were Comrade Echezona Asuzu, Dr. Magdalene Agbor Igbolo, Dr. Oluranti Edward Ojo, Kachallom Best, Kpason Anne and Samson Itodo. The contributors looked at the question of youth, leadership, democracy and development from different prisms. A connecting view for the contributors is the shared perspective that Nigerian youths are disconnected from political leadership having been reduced to footnotes in the democratic development of the country. Available historical facts as submitted by Comrade Asuzu Echezona, Oluranti Ojo and Kachallom Best shows that the current displacement of young Nigerians from political leadership is a betrayal of history.

An exploratory inquiry into the history of African societies shows that young

people were at the very heart of societal development and leadership. As a matter of fact, young people in Africa's pre-colonial history were deliberately prepared to come into leadership through communal cultures such as rite of passage, age grade societies, masquerade cults and craft vocations. It is for this reason that many kings in Africa ascended the throne at very young ages including Mansa Musa touted as the richest man in history who was already a King in his thirties and controlled a vast empire in Mali.

Comrade Eche Asuzu discussing the coup de grace that has befallen Nigerians and by extension African youths posited that one can hardly discuss the youth question outside the context of forces that shape society and influence its development. He went on to submit that the emasculation of young people from leadership and the political process stems from the deconstruction of the institutional spaces that prepared young people for life-long responsibilities. Typical of these spaces is our educational institutions which has been in a state of serious perpetual crises for more than forty years now. Currently, Nigerian public universities have been on lockdown for more than six months owing to government's failure to honour commitments made to trade unions representing the interests of workers in our public universities.

Examining the strength of the youth, Kachallom and Igbolo averred that with a global population of 1.8 billion of which 87% is in developing countries, the youths have enough presence to regain strategic voice in the political leadership process.

Dr. Igbolo submitted that 60 percent of the population in Africa is below 25 years old making the continent one of the youngest in the world. Furthermore, it has been estimated that 50 percent of the Nigerian population are young people. Unfortunately, this strength has been wrongly stereotyped into a narrative of an army of election riggers, purveyors of violence and an entitled demography which expects power to fall on their laps instead of rising to fight for what they believe in.

Mr. Samson Itodo related the danger of the persisting narrative that regards and treats the youth as an economic liability. Overall, the contributors agreed that for young people to recapture the leadership space, they must be ready to disown the role of subservient tools in the hands of older politicians. They also posited the need for the revival of conscious intellectualism among the youth especially at university level where ideological based politics should drive

elections into student union bodies in our tertiary institutions. The role of mentoring, economic empowerment and effective socialisation through access to quality education and healthcare, are also deemed crucial for the upliftment of the youth in society.

Part Nine was a review of the **2019 Elections and the Electoral System.** Mr. Jide Ojo, Professor Abdulhameed A. Ujo, and Professor Y.A. Zoaka reviewed the different aspects of the 2019 general elections and made recommendations on the way forward.

Mr. Jide Ojo posited that the 2019 general elcetions was adjudged free and fair. This is despite some of the problems which he highlighted in the conduct of the election. Professor Abdulhameed Ujo identified election sequencing as a critical matter for electoral reforms. While advocating for single date elections as is the case in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, he opined that desperate politicians whose priority is self-survival over and above group interest have used the sequencing of elections in Nigeria to create a bandwagon effect for their electoral advantage. In his contribution, Professor Zoaka made a strong case for proportional representation over Majoritan voting system as he described the system of proportional representation as more inclusive and democratic given its low tolerance of vote wastage and its accommodation of diversity and inclusiveness in governance.

Part Ten is on **Political Education and Political Thinking**. The discourse was anchored by Ms. Goodness C. Michael, A.G. Umar Kari, Ernest Ereke, and Dr. Magdalene Igbolo. The contributors identified favouritism, political corruption, godfatherism, godmotherism, gangsterism, undulated playing field, and unfulfilled electoral promises as some of the major issues in Nigerian politics. They opined that these issues can be addressed through political education of the Nigerian electorate.

Goodness Michael and Dr. A.G Umar identified the role of social media in organising effective political education campaign. They described social media as an important tool for online engagement. It was however noted that effective political engagement through social media would be limited if government fails to play its role of agenda setting and orientation. Currently, poor agenda setting precipitates endless debates on political issues and makes consensus on solutions difficult. This situation is largely due to poor research by media anchors who sometimes are unable to tease out real concerns and project

them with relevant facts for focused public engagement. In the absence of such focused discussions, social media political education could quickly degenerate into tantrums, unpleasant comments, and negative socialisation.

Part Eleven speaks to **Corruption.** Professor Margareth Bahal and Dr. Adeyinka Samson Adeniji were the resource persons on this discourse. Margaret focused on whistle blowing which she described as receiving growing global attention in the last two decades as a tool for improving transparency and reducing official corruption. She traced the surge in public corruption to the Nigeria Civil War which threw up reactionary leaders whose interest was more about personal aggrandisement than public service.

She was, however, quick to note that corruption in Nigeria is as old as Nigeria itself tracing the roots to colonialism. She averred that because of the colonialists' corrupt intentions, motivations and actions of pilfering Nigeria's commonwealth without the consent of the people, the foundation for corruption was institutionalised. Thus, in the bid by the colonialist to exploit the state for their exclusive benefits, they liquidated or weakened social structures against corruption ingrained in the mores and culture of the African society especially through divide-and-rule politics and transformed these noble African traditional checks to serve their imperialistic goals.

Adeniji pointed out that whistle blowing require courage and the placement of public interest above private interest. This brings to the fore the current siege on whistle blowers in Nigeria and the need to strengthen the whistle blower laws to enable many more Nigerians volunteer to serve as whistle blowers. It is crucial to set up a structure within relevant governance spaces that caters for the security, remuneration and support systems for whistle blowers who offer authentic information.

Part Twelve of the book discourse is on **Crime and Mental Health.** Dr. Aishatu Yusha'u Armiya'u, Christopher Goson, Bwatyum Anna Gyang and Kingsley Mayowa Okonodo made contributions to the topic. Bwatyum defined health as a state of complete, physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of diseases or infirmity. Furthermore, mental health was described as a state of wellbeing where the individual realizes their fullest potentials, copes with normal life stresses, works productively and contributes meaningfully to their community.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2016 submitted that 1.1 billion people globally suffered mental, or substance use disorder. About 20-30% of Nigerians have mental disorder illness or challenges. Mental health was described by Dr. Kingsley Mayowa Okonodo as critical since we do not have health without mental health.

On the nexus between mental health, substance abuse and crime, Dr. Aishatu Yusha'u submitted that studies conducted in nine countries in Africa show that 37 percent of homicide cases were under alcohol in toxification while 48 percent had alcohol in their systems. A study in North Central Nigeria reveals that 60 percent of convicted and awaiting trial inmates had used alcohol or hard drugs. These hard drugs inhibit clear judgement and engender impulsivity, aggression, abusiveness, agitation and grandiosity. The burden of substance abuse in Nigeria especially among the ruling elites informed the demand by General Buba Marwan, head of Nigeria's drug law enforcement that political office aspirants should submit themselves to drug test.

In all, the book has a total number of six hundred and eighty-six pages and twelve parts with each part dealing with very topical concerns in the socio-economic and political milieu in Nigeria for the reading pleasure of the Nigerian public especially scholars, activists, youths, and researchers. There are a total of forty-two chapters in the book and the chapters are arranged under the twelve thematic parts.

Part 1 | The Student Movement and Radicalism

Chapter 1 | From "Partners in Progress" to "Aluta Continua, Victoria Acerta!": Understanding the Travails of Critical Student Unionism in Nigeria

> The history of student unionism in Nigeria is the history of "tears, sweat and blood." It is the history of tear-gas, batons, and bullets for Nigerian students. It is the history of trigger-happy sadism and exuberant vandalism [by] the Nigerian law enforcement agencies. Indeed, it is [a] history that compares fundamentally with the systematic dehumanisation for which Soweto and Sharpeville are universally notorious.[1]
>
> **- Segun Okeowo**

> Just as the first tremors of an earthquake warn of the shock and tremors to come, societies on the edge of the abyss are alerted by [outbreaks] of "student unrest."[2]
>
> **- Patrick Francis Wilmot.**

Introduction

The history of the national liberation struggle against colonialism in Nigeria will be incomplete if it does not highlight the role of Nigerian students, within and outside the country, in that struggle. Indeed, as Walter Rodney argued,

> ... Students who were taken to universities in the metropoles were the most favoured and most pampered of the Africans selected by the white colonial overlords to become Europeanised; and yet they were among the first to argue vocally and logically that the liberty, equality, and fraternity about which they were taught should apply

1 Okeowo, S., "Students' Unionism on Nigerian University Campuses: A Curse or Blessing" in A. U. Kadiri (ed.), 25 Years of Centralized Education in Nigeria, National University Commission (NUC), 1988, P. 91. Also in Yusuf, A. A., "Academic Freedom, Institutional Autonomy, and Social Responsibility" in *Great Nigerian Students: Movement Politics and Radical Nationalism,* Centre for Research and Document & Politics of Development Group, Kano & Stockholm, 2005, Pp. 49-50.

2 Wilmot, Patrick F., *The Right to Rebel: The Phenomenology of Students' Revolutionary Consciousness,*Zim Pan-African Publishers, Oguta, Nigeria, 1986, p. 3.

> to Africa… After all, most of them were sent there to study British Constitution and constitutional law.[3]

Scholars have documented the contributions ofdiasporan African students to the struggle for independence in their countries. The West African Students Union (WASU), founded in Great Britain and led in significant part by Nigerian students, initiated and energised immense popular struggles to liberate African countries.[4] Students in Nigeria contributed significantly also to the struggle for national independence from British colonial rule,[5] attained on 1 October 1960. The students subsequently entered into conflict with Nigeria's ruling civilian and military classes.

The second section of this paper gives an overview of student unionism between 1960 and 1978. The third section briefly highlights the 1978 "Ali must go" student uprising led by the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS). The fourth section addresses the formation of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), which occurred following the uprising. The fifth and sixth describe some major struggles by Nigerian students under this new umbrella body.

Student Unionism in Nigeria, 1960-1977

The student struggle between 1st October 1960 and 1970 was principally against neo-colonialism and the emergent autocracy of the ruling classes. A

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3 Rodney, W., *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Ikenga Publishers, Enugu, Nigeria, 1982, p. 303.

4 See, for instance, Garigue, P., "The West African Students' Union: A Study of Cultural Contact," *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. xiii, 1953; PEP, *Colonial Students in Britain: A Report by Political Economic Planning Group*, PEP, London: June 1955; Carey, A. T.,*Colonial Students*, London: Sacker and Warburg, 1956; Emmerson, D. K., "African Students Organisations: The Politics of Discontent," *African Reporter*, Vol. 10, No. 5, May 1963; Ullrich, I., "The Development of Anti-colonial Students Movement in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Asia, Africa, Latin America*, Special Issue, No. 2, 1977; Ullrich, I., "Youth and Student Organisation as School for Petty Bourgeois Leaders in the Anti-Colonial Struggle," *Asia, Africa, Latin America*, Special Issue, No. 2, 1980; Olusanya, G. O. *The West African Students' Union and the Politics of Decolonisation*, Ibadan, Daystar Press, 1982; Ayu, I. D., *Essays in Popular Struggle: Fela, Students' Patriotism, Nicaraguan Revolution,*Zim Pan-African Publishers, Oguta, Nigeria, 1986; Ezeazu, N. E., Students and Politics in Nigeria, Unpublished M.A. (History) Dissertation, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, June 1989; Yusuf, A. A., "The West African Students Union and Its Contribution to the Anti-Colonial Struggle," *Africa* Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1998.

5 See, Yusuf, A. A., "Radical Students' Movement and Bourgeois Nationalists in the Struggle for Nigeria's Independence", *Africa* Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1998.

case in point was their continuous demonstration between November 1960 and January 1962 against the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact, which empowered the Prime Minister to arrest and detain any person or group of persons they considered a "security risk" to the nation.[6] They also participated in the struggle for human and civil rights in the country. The apex student union, the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS), led students to protest against the 1962 Preventive Detention Act; the 1964 Press Bill, which stipulated a fine in combination with or alternative to imprisonment for publishing a national secret, deliberate falsehood, or rumour against a public figure "deserving protection"; and the rigged 1964 general elections, among others.[7] The students,however, split into two groups during the Nigerian Civil War, with one wing supporting the federal government and the other fighting with the Biafran forces. Both sides, however, opposed the duplicity and hypocrisy of Britain and other Western European powers in the conflict rather than the war itself.[8]

The end of the war in 1970 coincided with the commencement of the Oil Boom period, which saw improved relations between the students and the military governments.State-provided scholarships and other benefits significantly enhanced the lives of students in tertiary institutions.[9] These improved conditions induced NUNS to consider the government "partners in progress," and "Commendation, Condemnation and Recommendation" became the organisation's philosophy of politics and unionism. Therefore, the subsequent student conflicts with the military governments arose from the students' need to protect these improved conditions, which they saw

6 This Pact sought to establish British military bases in Nigeria and grant British soldiers "unrestricted power to carry guns wherever they go in Nigeria" and complete immunity—legal, fiscal and diplomatic. See, Babatope, *A Decade of Students Power in Nigeria: 1960–1970*, pp. 11-17 and Ezeazu, *Students and Politics in Nigeria*, M.A. (History) Dissertation, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, June 1989.

7 *Ibid.*

8 Darah, G. G. and F. Taiwo, "Students Unionism" in O. Omosini and Biodun Adediran (eds.), *Great Ife: A History of Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife (1962-1987)*, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, 1989, pp. 22-226.

9 See, Yusuf, A. A., The State, the Students' Movement and Democratic Struggles in Nigeria, 1925-1990, Unpublished M.Sc. (Political Science) Dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, 1st January 1991, pp. 186-191.

10 See, NUNS, "We Reject Increase in Education Finances", (Handbill) April 1978; and NUNS, "Reforms and Democratisation of Education in Nigeria", Presidential Address at Education, held at the University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria, 23rd – 26th March 1978.

as organically connected to the struggle for national development.[10]The government and university authorities responded harshly to this "bread and butter" unionism, resulting in what Afro-Beat musician, FelaAnikulapoKuti,in one of his records, titled "sorrow, tears, and blood."

The January 1970 protest by University of Ibadan students was an example. Provoked by insufficient hostel accommodation and the racial prejudices of the European lecturers and administrators who dominated the university's hierarchy, it resulted in twostudent deaths at the hand of soldiers. The authorities also expelled Adams Aliyu, the Secretary General of the student union. A second example was a similar 1st February 1971 protest at the same university against inadequate food, poor catering, inadequate hostel accommodation, and strained relations between the students and university authorities.[11] This protest, known as the "Apampa-Must-Go" protest, led to the martyring of a student, Mr. KunleAdepoju, by armed police. A nation-wide students' protest erupted in solidarity. This strained the relationship between the student movement and the military government, led by General Yakubu Gowon, leading to the launching of "Operation Gowon Must Go" by the Students' Union of the University of Ife, Ile-Ife.[12] Thus, when the General Gowon administration was terminated in a military coup that led to the installation of General Murtala Ramat Mohammed, university students took to the street in celebration.[13]

Operations Consultation and Consolidation to Operation Confrontation: The NUNS' Legacy

In 1978, NUNS organised a nation-wide students uprising against school fees increases and the commercialisation of primary to university education, amongst others. The federal government had cut its funding of education drastically, causing the re-introduction and raising of school fees. For instance, it ended financial assistance to the state governments for the Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme, resulting in increases in existing fees and levies and

11 Legum, C., *Africa: The Year of the Students – A Survey of Students Politics in Universities and Schools,* Rex Collings, London 1972, pp. 20-22;

12 Yusuf, A. A., "From the Citadels of Learning to Battle-Grounds: An Exploration of 'Students' Unrest' in Nigeria", *Indian Journal of Politics,* Vol. XXVI, Nos. 3-4, 1992, p. 67.

13 Okeowo, S., *Anniversary of Students' Massacre! Obituary and In Memoriam: NUNS Testament of the Free Education Jihad* (Publisher not stated), 1979, p. 7.

the introduction of new ones. Fees at federal government secondary schools rose from ₦90 to between ₦150 and ₦280. The government cancelled the university-level Students Loan Scheme, increased school fees payable by Nigerian undergraduates from ₦150 to between ₦468 and ₦534 and by their foreign counterparts from ₦ 500 to ₦1,250. The increases were retroactive also for students on any form of scholarship. The government justified these increases on the account of, amongst others, the need to re-direct resources to national infrastructure development and the government's inability alone to fund education. Parents needed, therefore, to contribute to education financing, it argued. NUNS rejected government argument and proceeded to organise, coordinate, and lead the struggle against these increases in a three-stage process: Operation Consultation, Operation Consolidation, and Operation Confrontation.[14]

Operation Consultation was a peaceful means to reversing the increases by appeals to the government and involved consulting those NUNS described as "the consultables." These included the vice-chancellors and Council members of universities and the Constituent Assembly members that the government had appointed to adopt a new constitution for the country. Others included state military governors, federal ministers and state commissioners of education, and traditional rulers. NUNS sought, under Operation Consultation, to persuade these leaders to appeal to the federal government to reverse the increases in education charges.NUNS and student union officials indeed consulted these "consultables" between 1977 and 1978. During these consultations, they posited that the education policy was "confusing, contradictory, un-progressive, and oppressive" and blamed the Federal Military Government for failing to "harness our vast human and material resources for progressive national development."[15] They equally asserted that the general increase in fees was an attempt by a small but powerful group of bureaucrats to deprive the "rural and urban majority of our people their inalienable right to education."[16]Appealing to government to rescind its decision, they warned of a likely "class confrontation" should the government fail to heed to reason, appeal and public opinion.[17] The NUNS

14 See, Yusuf,The State, the Students' Movement and Democratic Struggles in Nigeria, pp. 259-319 for a detailed study of the "Ali Must Go" Nationwide Students' Uprising.

15 NUNS, "Text of the Presentation of NUNS to the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Shehu Musa Yar'adua on Tuesday 8th March 1978.

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

President asserted, in a speech to the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, that,

> ... This is not the time to mouth empty ideological rhetoric or go on a safari of descriptive literature. We are making it unequivocally clear and in no uncertain terms that … to avoid a class confrontation (which the nation could ill-afford), which could lead to social anarchy… the Federal Military Government should review these horrible policies…. Nigerian students are prepared to go [to any lengths] to ensure that we put the interest of the nation first.[18]

Operation Consolidation sought to cascade the results of NUNS consultations to the rank-and-file studentsand, in so doing, to prepare them for the struggle against the commercialisation of education. Operation consolidation, in other words, sought to consolidate operation consultation.

Operation Confrontation, the students' last resort, involved the boycott of academic activities, hunger strikes, demonstrations, and the distribution of posters and pamphlets within and outside the campuses against the increases. It also involved mobilising primary and secondary school students, workers, market women, and all "who wished us well" to join the protest in whatever way they could. The NUNS Executive adoptedOperation Confrontation because,

> … All the protocols and finesse of consultation have been exhausted. The demands and rigours of consolidation have been satisfied. We [have] left no administrative stone unturned as far as [the] legitimate pursuit of our demands are [concerned]. We, therefore, stand absolved in case we embark on the third and final ladder of the operation. Our goat is being deliberately pushed to the wall. There is an elastic limit to [the] suffering and patience of every human being. Let nobody hold Nigerian students responsible for any concomitant consequences of the current action of the government.[19]

The "Ali must go" began on 18th April 1978 spread like bushfire in the harmattan. By 24thApril the uprising has been brought down by

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18 *Ibid.*

19 Okeowo, S., "The Moment of Decision", Being the Opening Address at the Special Executive Meeting [of NUNS] Holding in the University of Calabar, 9-11 April 1978, p. 1.

20 Okeowo, S., *Anniversary of Students' Massacre! Obituary and In Memoriam: NUNS Testament of the Free Education Jihad,* p. 11.

unparalleled primitive police barbarism and unprecedented barbaric military anarchism.[20]Students and other innocent citizens were killed, injured, brutalised and dehumanised. Students' leaders and activists were harassed, intimidated, blackmailed, arrested, detained and imprisoned without trial, and some of them were expelled. Non-students, including lecturers, vice chancellors, medical personnel, journalists, etc., were punished for supporting the students' struggles. Public reactions to the uprising was favourable, eventhough, some section supported the students, not for what the students were fighting, but because of the crude and barbaric manner the uprising was brought down. Of course, state official expressed "regrets" over the injury, maiming and death of students and other citizens, they, nevertheless, justified the primitive actions of the police and armed forces by criminalising the students cause and struggle. Nonetheless, the uprising brought the students' movement politically closer to the popular masses, tarnished the popularity of the "radical" military administration of General Obasanjo, and drew the battle-line between the students' movement and the state. The uprising, in fact, initiated and unprecedented historical consciousness on Nigerian students and marked a turning point in militant, radical, pro-people and anti-state students' unionism and politics.[21]

The Making of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS)

NANS emerged from the ashes of the April 1978 "Ali must go" uprising. The promulgation of a new Nigerian constitution and inauguration of the Second Republic on 1st October 1979 facilitated the emergence of a new apex student organisation, the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS). Before NANS' formation in December 1979, the NUNS leadership had formed the National Organisation of Nigerian Students (NONS) to replace NUNS and continue its struggles to de-commercialise, liberalise and democratise education.[22] The organisation made no impact on the campuses or national politics, however, and expired less than a year after its formation. The major reasons for this were its leadership's inability to withstand state repression, weak connections to the campus unions and the student mass, and poor articulation of its goals and methods. Thus, it simply ceased to exist

21 For the details of the crude suppression of the uprising, its significance and its limitations, see, Yusuf, The State, the Students' Movement and Democratic Struggles in Nigeria, pp. 289-319.

22 Yusuf, The State, the Students' Movement and Democratic Struggles in Nigeria, p. 201.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 201.

when the government expelled some of its leaders from the universities and others graduated.[23]

But the state repression of the "Ali must go" uprising, the punitive measures it took against students' leaders and activists, and its hostilities towards attempts at forming another apex student union, amongst others, contributed in radicalising the students' movement. One of the manifestations of the radicalising effects of "Ali must go" was the formation of a national Marxist, Pan-Africanist and nationalist student organisation known as the Patriotic Youth Movement of Nigeria (PYMN). Most importantly, however, the PYMN came into the forefront of the student movement. Operated clandestinely, the organisation's leaders and activists raised consciousness among students across the country on the need for an apex student union. With the commencement of the Second Republic, AlhajiShehu Shagari, Nigeria's President 1st October 1979-31st December 1983, "lifted the ban on NUNS" on three conditions; namely:

(a) a constitution-drafting committee comprising representatives of
students and the federal ministry of education would produce the constitution of the new student organisation;
(b) the constitution would provide for "democracy" by including a "vote-before-strike" clause; and
(c) the organisation's financing would include a federal government subvention, contrary to the tradition of financing by the campus unions.[24]

Students welcomed the "lifting" on the ban of NUNS, as it provided a free space for students to operate without police harassment. Nevertheless, most campus unions rejected these conditions on two grounds. First, they would create room for government interference in students' unions affairs and, second, they contradicted Article 37 of the 1979 Constitution, which guaranteed Nigerians freedom of association *without* state interference.

Student union representatives from all over the country created the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) at a meeting on 12

24 Movement for the Defence of Students' Rights, *Nigerian Students At A Crossroad,* February 1982, p. 1.

December 1979 at the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria. However, its formation was a difficult process, rather than an easy and once-and-for-all deed. First, it involved intense intellectual debates within the student movement. The string of questions posed and answered in these debates included: Why could the Administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo successfully proscribe NUNS? If its proscription was because of the "Ali must go" uprising, why did the revolt "fail"? Should they resuscitate NUNS or form a new organisation? If the latter, what type of organisation should it be?The dominant view on the "Ali must go" uprising was that, notwithstanding its historic significance, it failed because the public saw it as an affair principally of university students. Proponents of this view substantiated it by pointing out that the students of most polytechnics, colleges of education, advanced teachers' colleges, and schools of basic and preliminary studies did not participate in it. They argued that NUNS' limitation of its constituency to university students accounted for a variety of factors that undermined the struggle. These included the organisation's failure to bring students of non-university tertiary institutions into its fold and to recognise and fight for their particular interests.[25] These students, therefore, showed greater interest in their national unions—the National Association of Technological Students (NATS) and the Advanced Teachers and Colleges of Education Students Association (ATCESAN).[26]

The view was popular among student leaders that NUNS failed because it isolated itself from the student mass before the uprising and showed little interest in the struggles of working and oppressed groups. They blamed these failings on the annual financial subvention that the organisation received from the federal government through the federal ministry of education, which converted NUNS into a virtual extension of the ministry. This reliable flow of funds enabled the leadership to ignore with little consequence the concerns and struggles of students and popular groups and attracted venal opportunists into its fold. Furthermore, the student leaders criticised NUNS for lacking a position document that clearly stated the views of students on educational, national, and international issues and that provided a framework for their struggles. Its absence made it easier for student leaders to derail in these struggles.At

25 See, Black, A., "Reminiscences from Ahmadu Bello University" in in Beckman, B. and Y.Z. Ya'u (eds) *Great Nigerian Students: Movement Politics and Radical Nationalism,* Centre for Research and Document & Politics of Development Group, Kano & Stockholm, 2005, pp. 44-48.

26 Abayomi, O., *National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS): Ten Years of Democratic Struggle, 1980–1990,* p. 25.

the meeting of 12th December 1979, Abdul-Rahman Black, President of the Main Campus Student Union at the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria, summarised the popular opinion of students on the limitations of NUNS:

> … the structure of NUNS as it existed was incapable of meeting the challenges that eventually saw its demise. It was a structure that cut off the leadership from the grass-roots. Highly retrograde and parochial elements in the set-up of NUNS were easily susceptible to manipulation by our external and internal detractors. And in the circumstances where those retrograde and parochial elements acquire leadership, our survival as an organisation becomes threatened.[27]

Three positions emerged in the debate on the resuscitation of NUNS. The first argued that the students should urge the federal government to lift the proscription on NUNS. The meeting rejected this position on the ground that it could only serve the intent of making the organisation an appendage of the government. The second, that they should resuscitate NONS, met with the counter-argument that NONS was like a stillbirth as university students essentially formed it. The third position, the one adopted, was for the formation of a new grass roots, students-based, students-financed, and students-driven organisation. The meeting agreed that the organisation should comprise all universities, polytechnics, colleges of education, and schools of basic and preliminary studies. Such organisation, they argued, would be capable of withstanding state repression.[28] The students premised their decision on Article 37 of the 1979 Constitution, which stipulated that:

> …every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and, in particular, he may form or belong to any political party, trade union, or any other association for the protection of his interests.

They adopted the name National *Association* of Nigerian Students because associations, unlike unions, did not require registration with any government agency. Thus, the founders of NANS knew what they wanted: a united organisation inspired, based on, and driven by students, with organic connections to the working and oppressed people of Nigeria.The 12th December meeting resolved further that NANS' aims and objectives should be similar to those of NUNS. The gathering also established a committee to

27 "Opening Address" delivered by Abdul-Rahman Black at the Opening of All Nigerian Students Meeting, held at ABU Main Campus, Zaria, 12 December 1979, p. 1.

28 See, *Ibid.*, p. 25.

draft its constitution, which the students subsequently approved and ratified at the University of Jos, Jos. This latter meeting elected a caretaker committee to run the organisation and prepare for the election of its inaugural executive council. Student representatives elected the council in a transparent and democratic process at a meeting in ABU, Zaria in December 1980.

The primary aims of the PYMN leaders and activists who spearheaded the formation of NANS to replace NUNS were to democratise education, promote academic freedom, and protect the autonomy of educational institutions. Importantly, they sought also to assert the authority and power of students in national and international politics. This purpose manifested in their efforts to press upon the Nigerian government a militant policy on the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, including nationalising all multi-nationals operating in those countries.[29]

The PYMN played a vanguard role in the drafting and adoption of the *NANS Constitution* and *Charter of Demands*. In the latter, the student movement spelt out its goals and strategies. The leaders and activists of the body saw the building of NANS and the campus unions as an integral part of the "democratic struggle." Among their slogans were: "Without a revolutionary movement, there can be no revolutionary struggle!" and "Without a Revolutionary Theory, there can be no Revolutionary Movement!"

The struggle of NANS to remain an independent student organisation began right from its birth. Conflict between two factions of its leaders almost incapacitated it from 1979 to May 1981: the one wanted close relations with the state; the other insisted on independent student unionism. The former received financial assistance from the state, publicity on state media, and sponsorship to "represent" Nigerian students at international student conferences in Benin Republic and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). The latter, in contrast, devoted its energies to educating students on the need for independent student unionism and mobilising against its pro-state opponent. The state supportsthe first received and the ferocious attacks on its opponents by the state, which includedexpulsion, rustication, or suspension from school and the dissolution of their campus unions, enabled the pro-state group to stubbornly hold on to power in NANS. In May 1981, nonetheless, forty-two student union representatives held a "Conciliation Conference" at the Kongo

29 See, NANS, *Nigerian Students Charter of Demands and Constitution,* Unife Students Union, Ile-Ife, 1982/83,

Campus of ABU, Zaria that re-affirmed the legitimacy of the executive council elected in December 1980. The meeting declared the pro-state caretaker committee illegitimate and directed it to hand over all NANS documents in its possession. The federal government convened a poorly attended counter-meeting of NANS in June 1981, which set up a "Steering Committee," led by one Chief Onajiromu Onojade, to manage the body's affairs. However, many student unions refused to identify with this committee or participate in their activities. This rejection and the mounting pressure from the general student body ultimately compelled its leadership to write a letter of apology to NANS in November 1981 and formally dissolve itself.[30]

NANS and the Struggle for National Development during the Second Republic, 1979-1983

The Second Republic (1st October 1979-31st December 1983) was eventful in the history of the students struggle for national development. The NANS understood the goal of this fight to be to solve the problems colonialism and imperialism brought on Nigerians and to implement Chapter Two of the 1979 *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*. In other words, NANS saw its struggle,in the Cabralian sense, in which ideas matter and counts a lot, but the improvement in the material well being of people as being primary and decisive:

> The people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone's head. They are fighting for material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.[31]

The leaders and activists of NANS, therefore, saw national development in its political dimension as a process by which students would democratise governance and society. They understood democracy as the opposite of authoritarianism, autocracy, despotism and absolutism. They in fact saw the people as the primary source of power and that, therefore, democracy was about the people making decisions on issues and imposing these issues on the state for implementation. The ends of the struggle for democracy were, thus, to negate all monopoly of power and enthrone the people at the helm of state, economy and society. Such a conception of democracy necessarily

30 Movement for the Defence of Students' Rights, *Nigerian Students At A Crossroad,* February 1982.
31 Cabral, A., *Revolution in Guinea: An African Peoples' Struggle*, Stage 1, London, 1974, p. 70.

rendered the Second Republic undemocratic in the view of most students' leaders and activists. Indeed, Chris Abashi, NANS President in the 1983 session, maintained that:

> To us, democracy starts with living. Living itself involves having the basics of life, whereas in Nigeria, these basics are denied and the people wallow in disease, unemployment, squalor, ignorance and hunger. There can be no democracy.[32]

The leaders of NANS saw national development in its economic aspect, therefore, as the provision of the necessities of life: food, clothing, shelter, etc. They understood the struggle for economic development as, on the one hand, striving for policies and measures that facilitated the provision of these necessities and, on the other, opposing those that hampered it.This conception of national development held by NANS was bond to lead and did led to conflict and confrontation between the organisation and the state. Between 1982 and 1983, the Association and its units constantly criticised the federal and state governments and the political parties over, among other things:

(a) delay, half-payment, or non-payment of workers' salaries for periods ranging from three months to one year;
(b) closure of industries, leading to the massive retrenchment of workers in both the public and private sectors;
(c) dispossession of peasants of their land by the state and multi-national companies without or with inadequate compensation;
(d) oil spillage in Rivers, Cross River, Bendel, and Imo states, causing the destruction (without compensation) of peasant farms and fishing rivers;
(e) hoarding of essential commodities like food, salt, sugar, soap, etc.;
(f) hyperinflation, with prices of most items rising between 500% and 1000%;
(g) withdrawal of subsidies on fertilisers for peasant farmers, resulting in poor yields;
(h) increase in school fees for primary and secondary education and the increase or introduction of fees for tuition, feeding,

32 Quoted from Movement for a Progressive Nigeria, "NANS: Forward Ever, Backward Never (1)", ABU, Zarai, 2nd December 1983, p. 3; and Yusuf, A. A., "Notes on the Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic", presented at the Central Committee (CC) Meeting of the Movement for a Progressive Nigeria, ABU, Zaria, on 5th January 1984, pp. 17-18.

> accommodation and examination at tertiary institutions of learning owned by state governments; and
>
> (i) withdrawal or reduction of student scholarships or bursaries.[33]

NANS equally criticised the practices of the ruling classes: corruption, the politicisation of ethnicity, religion and religion, executive lawlessness, official arrogance, political intolerance and repression, violations of the constitution, etc.[34]The students' movement vehemently criticised the 1983 general elections. The Students' Union of Ahmadu Bello University, Main Campus, Zaria, criticised the 1983 elections, noting that,

> ... When the present historical epoch of Nigeria is documented, the year 1983 will stand out as the culmination of the most consistent and well organised political and economic betrayal of the honest yearning of our people. And the so-called Presidential election as well as the Gubernatorial election just concluded will remain at the nadir of an era dominated by a traitorous and dastardly actions of a ruling class which knows nothing but looting the nation's treasury and lacerating the political sentiments of our people for "democracy".[35]

The NANS, on its part, described the 1983 general elections as a "rigging match", refereed by the Police and the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) in favour of the ruling party, NPN. It strongly denounced the monetisation of the elections, in which the political parties spent over ₦1 billion (more than a billionUS Dollar), FEDECO ₦600 million, and the police ₦415 million. The organisation also condemned the killings, property destruction, detention of political opponents, and police brutality during the

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33 NANS, "December 10 [1983] Demonstration: The Specifics of Our Action," NANS Secretariat, University of Jos, December 1983, p. 1. Also see, Chris Abashi, ""We Will Not Succumb to Any Intimidation" – Being text of an address by Chris Abashi Ex-president of NANS at the opening of the 4th Annual Congress of the National Association of Nigerian Students at Bauchi Road Campus of the University of Jos on Saturday, December 17, 1983" in *The Nigerian Standard,* 7th & 9th January 1984.

34 Abashi, C. (President) and N. P. Ojidoh, (Pubic Relations Officer), "An Open Letter to His Excellency, President Shehu Aliyu Shagari, on the Police and its Inspector-General" in *NANS News Letter*, February/March, 1983, pp. 12-18.

35 Quoted from Yusuf, "Notes of the Fall of the Second Republic", p. 16-17

36 Abashi, C. (President) and N. P. Ojidoh, (Pubic Relations Officer), "An Open Letter to His Excellency, President Shehu Aliyu Shagari, on the Police and its Inspector-General" in *NANS News Letter*, February/March, 1983, pp. 12-18.

elections, maintaining that these exposed the "façade of liberal democracy."[36] Its Senate found the elections so repugnant. It described the mishandling of the elections and sporadic violence that accompanied thepresidential election as "a façade of liberal democracy"[37] It suspended the Students' Union presidents of the universities of Benin and Lagos from all NANS organs for congratulating President Shagari, on "behalf of NANS", for his "landslide" electoral "victory"[38] Besides, their action "amounted to impersonation and a misrepresentation of the collective stand of Nigerian students."[39]

The Association organised nation-wide protests - including lecture boycotts and public demonstrations - on 10th December 1982, 27th April 1983, and 10th December 1983 on the state of the economy and nation. The students demanded improvements in the living and working conditions of Nigerians, a halt to the retrenchment of workers, prompt payment of workers' salaries and allowances, and respect for human rights. They also demanded the removal of the inspector-general of police, a stop to police brutality, full government funding of education, and the prompt payment of students' bursaries, scholarship allowances and grants. Finally, they wanted the end of authoritarianism in the campuses, respect for press freedom, and the termination of talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.[40]

The activities of NANS drew hostile criticism from the state and the ruling party – the National Party of Nigeria(NPN). At a convocation ceremony in Bayero University, Kano, in May 1981, for instance, President Shagari lamented the widespread students' protest demonstrations on the campuses. Describing them as "incidents of lawless behaviour and misdirected aggression" that were "destructive, violent and hostile to constituted authority,"he added:

Our campus revolutionaries are familiar with test-book clichés of what a revolution is all about and demonstrate by utterances and actions that they are strangers to the real conditions and needs of the Nigerian masses.[41]

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37 Quoted from Yusuf, "Notes of the Fall of the Second Republic", p. 17.

38 Also in Abayomi, O., National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS): Ten Years of Democratic Struggle, 1980–1990, Unpublished B.A. (History) Dissertation, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, 1991, p. 37.

39 Quoted from *The Guardian* (Lagos), 22nd September 1983, p. 3.

40 See, *NANS News Letter,* February/March, 1983,

41 Quoted from *STRUGGLE: Theoretical & Organisational Journal of the Marxist-Leninist Movement of Nigeria,* Vol. 1, No. 1, 1981, p. 2.

NANS and the Struggle against European Imperialism

The National Association of Nigerian Students and its constituent units paid attention to international affairs throughout the Second Republic. It pursued a primarily anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-racist foreign policy and advocated for a similar line by global and continental bodies. It maintained that,

> ... Seeing that America and other Western countries represent reaction and imperialism and are enemies of all oppressed people all over the world, we demand a more progressive and anti-imperialist stand in the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and Organisation of African Unity (OAU).[42]

Domestically, it also campaigned that the Nigerian government should adopt a clear-cut, radical and anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-racist foreign policy that would lead to the liberation of Namibia, South Africa, and the Western Sahara and the defeat of neo-colonialism and imperialism in Africa.[43]In line with NANS' anti-imperialist policy, campus and national student leaders and activists campaigned against U.S. foreign policies and practices, opposing whatever that country supported and supporting whatever it opposed. The organisation campaigned against attempts to reverse the 1979 revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, for instance, and partook in the international youth movement against the latter's invasion by U.S.-backed Contras. It condemned and organised protests against:

(a) United States collaboration with Apartheid South Africa in the latter's denial of Namibian independence and belligerence against the frontline states (Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe);
(b) the United States and Apartheid South Africa's violation of U.N. Resolution 435 on Namibia in their insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a condition for Namibian independence;
(c) the United States invasion of the tiny island of Grenada on 24 October 1983, supposedly at the invitation of the leaders of some

42 NANS, *Nigerian Students Charter of Demands and Constitution,* p. 14.
43 See, *ibid*., pp. 13-14; and "NANS picks new officers, condemns govt. foreign policies" in *The Guardian,* (Lagos), 2nd January 1984, p. 8.

Caribbean countries, which NANS described as a "complete violation of international law and the right of the Grenadian people to self-determination and sovereignty";

(d) United States deployment of 572 Pershing missiles in Europe, which NANS considered as a threat to world peace should there be a nuclear exchange; and

(e) the collapse of U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva for the reduction of international nuclear missiles.[44]

NANS and its constituent units did not only engage in opposing and demonstrating against American and European imperialism but equally believed that the best way to fight imperialism was to oppose its agents, policies, and practices in Nigeria and considered the Nigerian state and ruling classes to be such agents. Therefore, they staunchly opposed the country's foreign policies, exemplified in their standoff with the Shagari Administration on its policy and actions towards Flight Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings overthrown the civilian Administration of Liman in Ghana on 31 December 1981. The Western countries reacted by organising a multi-national force to invade Ghana, using Nigeria as the staging post. Getting wind of this international conspiracy, the NANS leadership, under Chris Mammah, courageously exposed it in the press and demanded that Nigeria refuse to participate in it. Nigeria subsequently did, and the invasion fell through.

Student leaders and activists similarly condemned the abortion of the OAU Heads of State Summit scheduled for 5 August 1982 in Tripoli. The Summit failed primarily for two reasons. The first was to stop the admission of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) into OAU membership and, the second, prevent Libyan President, Muammar Gaddafi, from assuming OAU Chairmanship. Nigeria's President Shagari and some other African leaders refused to set out for the Summit unless a quorum was formedin their absence. In the event, only thirty countries showed up in Tripoli - short of the two-thirds of members required for a quorum. NANS denounced the consequent abortion of the Summit as being "in line with the design of America and world imperialism."[45]

Most importantly, however, the students showed great interest in the

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44 *Ibid*., p. 8; and NANS, "December 10 [1983] Demonstration: The Specifics of Our Action," NANS Secretariat, University of Jos, December 1983, p. 1.

45 NANS, *Nigerian Students Charter of Demands and Constitution,* p. 13.

national liberation struggles against racism, white settler colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa, and Zionism in the Middle East. The NANS demanded that Nigeria refuse diplomatic relations with Israel, grant the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) official recognition, and support it on all international fora. The organisation should also receive permission to open an office in Nigeria as the African National Congress (ANC) had.[46]

The Nigerian student movement was probably most successful in its contributions to the liberation struggles. It persistently protested against military attacks on the Frontline States by colonial Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. The NANS supported the anti-apartheid campaignby the Youth Solidarity on Southern Africa (YUSSA)[47] and they held joint lectures, symposia, and exhibitions to mobilise support against colonialism and apartheid in South Africa. They pressed the Nigerian government to render economic, political, diplomatic, and military support to the national liberation movements. In addition, they pushed government to recognise the South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC) as the sole representatives of the oppressed and fighting peoples of Namibia and South Africa respectively. They campaigned too for the nationalisation without compensation of companies (American, Western European, and all others) that operate in South Africa and have subsidiaries in Nigeria.[48]

The student movement, especially NANS, YUSSA, and Marxist student groups, considered imperialism in general and settler colonialism and apartheid in particular not only as issues of race (White vs Black) but also of class. Like the government, they recognised settler colonialism and apartheid as a White-Black conflict. However, unlike the former, they also saw the liberation struggles in Southern Africa as organically connected with the struggle for national development in Nigeria. Hence, their assertion that "the struggle against apartheid is our struggle" for three major reasons; namely:

> … We have a common enemy, which is *imperialism*… which

46 *Ibid.*, 14.

47 For a description of the "anti-apartheid student movement" and their activities, see, Yusuf, "The State, the Students' Movement and Democratic Struggles in Nigeria, 1925-1990," pp. 229–233. Some YUSSA officials were members of their campus student unions and NANS.

48 See, *The Guardian,* 2nd January 1984, p. 8; and Chris Abashi, ""We Will Not Succumb to Any Intimidation" in *The Nigerian Standard,* 9th January 1984, p. 8.

exploits, oppresses, and dehumanises the people of Southern Africa by masquerading as apartheid… while in Nigeria, imperialism exploits, oppresses and degrades the majority of us by masquerading as neo-colonialism;
…is an act of solidarity… of mutual aid between forces fighting for the same objective, the same goal; and
…we want to advance the liberation, progress, and unity of the peoples of Africa and Africa itself.[49]

49 Yusuf, A. A., "Struggle Against Apartheid: Role for Nigerian Youths" in *The Nigerian Standard,* 3rd and 5th January 1984.

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Chapter 2 | Student Radicalism and the Nigeria Project: A Critical Analysis of the Students Union Movement in Nigeria

Chibuike Mgbeahuruike

Introduction

Globally, student associations are a vocal group with a tendency to engage in organised protests and demonstrations when necessary. Such student activities are familiar globally. University students, in particular, often protest to demonstrate their dissatisfaction (Smith, 1968; Brickman and Lehrer, 1970; Ericson, 1975; Lipset, 1993) regarding campus and broader social issues.

Student radicalism is as old as the learning institutions. For example, students staged protests as early as the 13th century in France. In 1519 students in Korea staged an unprecedented demonstration against a (sitting) king in the city.

The world has at one time or another witnessed extreme forms of student radicalism. For instance, Czech student Jan Palach committed suicide by self-immolation to protest the 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the attendant restrictions on the media, free speech, and travel. The invasion, which occurred in a period of political liberation and mass protest, was to crush the liberalising reforms of the communist post-World War II Czech government, known as the Prague Spring.

Another Czech student, Jan Zajíc (born 3 July 1950), also committed suicide as political protest on 25 February 1969 when he ignited his chemical-soaked clothes. He had written several public letters urging the people to fight against the Warsaw Pact's military occupation of their country. The police prohibited his interment in any major city of Czechoslovakia because they feared it might ignite a demonstration like the one that followed the burial of Jan Palach. A bronze cross to honour the two students was later erected in front of the National Museum in Wenceslas Square in Czechoslovakia.

Similarly, geology student Kostas Georgakis (23 August 1948–19

September 1970) committed suicide on 19 September 1970 to protest the dictatorial military regime that ruled in Greece from 1967-1974. The Junta came to power in April 1967 through a coup d'etat led by a group of colonels. After several demonstrations to denouncing the Junta, Georgakis set himself ablaze shouting, "Long live Greece," "Down with the tyrants," "Down with the fascist colonels," "I did it for my Greece." Georgakis refused help and ran away from people who tried to extinguish the fire. He died.

In 1968, violent protests by students in France almost ousted the government of President Charles de Gaulle, who eventually stepped down from office the following year. Similarly, two months of student protest forced the prime minister of Burma to leave office in July 1988 after twenty-six years in power (Lintner, 1988). Also, in South Korea in 1987, student protests forced the government to conduct elections, which resulted in a significant political change.

Student movements in Africa have been a significant political force as evidenced in their roles in struggles for social and political transformation. We may safely attribute much of the success thus far in the new wave of democratisation in Africa to them and the civil society. The African continent witnessed a tremendous clamour for political, social, and economic change by students and civil society groups in the 1980s and early 1990s in the face of intensified repression. University student associations rose to the occasion and were at the forefront of the fight against authoritarianism.

All through the struggle against apartheid rule in South Africa, Nigeria students played a decisive role by organising protest rallies and demonstrations against the oppressive regime in South Africa. For instance, during this period they organised a massive "Freedom for Nelson Mandela" concert at the University of Lagos, Nigeria.

Nigerian students—like their counterparts in Europe and America—valiantly defended popular sovereignty in Nigeria's long struggle for political independence from the British and for democratic governance. They have contributed (immensely) to the political development of the country (Eesuola, 2012), for example, by their unrelenting clamour for a National (Political) Conference during the struggle against military rule! Such radicalism and commitment to a "national project" have no doubt placed students meritoriously in the forefront of the fight for democratic reforms.

A proper appreciation of this paper requires understanding the keywords and phrases in its subject. The word *radical* means "getting to the root of the

matter." When people talk about "radicals," they mean those who are unafraid to lay bare what is hidden or uncomfortable to discuss. Radicals do not mind upsetting the status quo, received wisdom, or "common sense" conceptions of any kind. To talk about radicalism, therefore, is to talk about the belief systems of radicals. Radicalism is also context-dependent. In other words, whether a set of ideas is radical depends on its context. Many ideas that people once considered radical have become mainstream over time. Yet what is it that characterises radicalism, and how does this impact our understanding of knowledge generally?

Student radicalism is a political doctrine embraced by socio-political movements that favour individual and collective freedom and emancipation from authoritarianism and social hierarchy (Koselleck and Sartori, 2005). In essence, student radicalism is student action for political, economic, or social change.

The Nigeria project, a term that is widely used, overused, or misused, can mean anything to the user. Someone described it as "the basic upgrades required to make Nigeria a viable nation." It remains work in progress! A nation-state founded on justice, honesty, and a sense of purpose, one that guarantees the security of life and property. A corruption-free society, where citizens are law-abiding and exhibit a high sense of commitment, patriotism, and discipline in every area. A nation that works towards sufficiency in every area of her national life: food security, technology, power and energy, industrialisation, human development, etc.

Analysis of Student Radicalism in Nigeria

African students occupied, in many respects, a privileged position in national politics in the 20th century. Their elite status and credentials as "spokespersons of the masses," made Nigerian students a legitimate part of the political order during this era (Altbach 1984; Munene 2003; Byaruhanga 2006). The wind of student unionism began to blow in West Africa in 1925 when Ladipo Sholanke formed the West African Students Union (WASU) (Zuokemefa and Sese, 2015). Its formation united all student associations at that time and promoted friendship and brotherliness among West African students. Most African countries were under colonial rule at this time. The WASU ran public enlightenment campaigns against colonial exploitation, political repression, racism, and social inequalities in West African colonies, including by publishing books and journals. These activities contributed

greatly to the attainment of political independence by most West African states (Babatope 1976 and Ezera 1990).

The University of Ibadan, established in 1948, began student unionism in Nigeria and Kunle Adepoju was its pioneer student union president. This development gave rise to student unions in other institutions in Nigeria and the formation in 1956 of a unified union called the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS). Governments and the authorities of the country's tertiary institutions feared and respected these organisations in the early days. The unions acted as ideology-based pressure groups with a high sense of purpose and that engaged in intellectual debates. They resisted the oppressive tendencies and anti-people policies of the government and administrators of higher educational institutions. They very boldly expressed their views to the authorities on such matters and generally enjoyed the support of the society.

Historically, Nigerian students have staged major interventions in the struggles that shaped the destiny of the country. For example, as members and co-leaders of the West African Students Union (WASU), they sided with the nationalist movement in its demand for independence for Nigeria and other countries in the sub-region. They also forced the post-independence Nigerian government to cancel the Anglo-Nigerian Defense pact in 1962 (Akintola 2010), which had entitled Britain to test its planes in Nigeria's airspace.

No history of student unionism in Nigeria is complete without mention of Segun Okeowo and the famous protest that demonstrated the movement's power. It was a nation-wide agitation in which the National Union of Nigeria Students (NUNS) came into open confrontation with the military government of General Olusegun Obasanjo. The bloody conflict started in April 1978 when the government asked the students to pay fifty kobo more per day for their meals, raising the price from ₦1.50 to ₦2.00. The then-Minister of Education, Col. Ahmadu Ali, ultimately bore the brunt of its outcomes. The announcement did not go down well with NUNS and Segun Okeowo, its president, set the organisation in motion to resist the increase. The students held demonstrations upon realising that the government was unwilling to reverse itself. That was the moment things began to fall apart. The first day of the protest brought the students and the Police face to face at the University of Lagos (UNILAG). A student bled to death from a gunshot wound in the leg because the Lagos University Teaching Hospital (LUTH) and Orthopaedic Hospital, Igbobi, refused to treat him. The killing infuriated the NUNS president, who immediately sent a message to his counterparts in other universities.

The protests escalated, with students engaging in open confrontation with the police and the army for over a week. Angered by the police-killing of a student in UNILAG, students across the country went on a rampage and soldiers reportedly gunned down about eight at the Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. The murder of the students caused more problems for the government. The protest slogan "Ali must go" rent the air since the students believed the Minister of Education to be the cause of the crisis that led to their death. The federal government shut down all the universities after one week of the nation-wide protest and ordered the students to leave the campuses. It subsequently banned the Segun Okeowo-led NUNS, but the organisation and the "Ali must go" protest remain a notable episode of student radicalism in Nigeria.

In 1989 the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), the successor to NUNS, led nation-wide protests against the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This programme supported the lavish lifestyles of corrupt government officials while the masses were suffering. The protest movement erupted from mass anger at real and perceived corruption in high places. Student activists circulated handbills alleging the large-scale theft and stashing in foreign accounts of public funds by government officials. A NANS Senate meeting, held a few weeks earlier at the University of Ibadan, had mandated this action as part of a mass mobilisation programme against the Structural Adjustment Programme. The NANS alleged that corruption had become institutionalised and the income of the top 1% had soared while public-sector wages remained frozen and private-sector workers faced retrenchment. The first major fuel price hike also took place in 1988 as part of structural adjustment. The authorities closed for almost a year six universities considered to be at the heart of the movement. The government soft-pedalled in the end and promised to lessen the hardship by providing employment, transportation and other facilities.

It is important to note that the SAP riot inspired the formation of the Alao Aka-Bashorun-led National Consultative Forum (NCF) that attempted to organise a National Conference in September 1990. The failure of the attempt eventually led a year later to the establishment of the Campaign for Democracy (CD), which united leftist groups and some trade unions. The CD was the principal vehicle of resistance in the first phase of the 12 June revolution.

Another landmark in student activism in Nigeria was the "Occupy Nigeria" project. It was a socio-political protest movement that began on Monday,

2 January 2012 in response to the removal of fuel subsidy by the Federal Government on 1 January 2012. Petrol prices went from ¦ 65 to ¦ 140. The student movements in universities quickly mobilised members and liaised with other bodies such as the Nigeria Labour Congress. Protests took place across the country and even at the Nigeria High Commission in London.

A Review of other Students' Protests in Nigeria

Hardly any Nigerian university completes an academic session without an incident of violent conflict due to student radicalism (Etadon, 2013). However, this opposition to the state usually comes at a price. The first day of February 1971 was a watershed being the first time a student died in a protest in Nigeria. Alimba (2008) notes that in 1971, the first violent student protest took place at the University of Ibadan and the violent protest led to the death of a student named Kunle Adepoju. Several other cases have occurred since then.

A review of some early students-administration conflicts is also relevant. In 1957, students at the University College Ibadan, now University of Ibadan, protested the curtailment of their liberty when the university authorities decided to construct wire burglar proofing round some male halls. The students destroyed chairs and tables in their rooms in protest. They also protested against the ban on using electrical appliances in their rooms without the warden's approval.

University of Lagos students clashed in 1960 over the removal of the Vice-Chancellor and NUNS demonstrated in 1978 over a feeding fee increases from 50k to N1.50k. The drafting of police to stop the protest worsened it, in the course of which some students died. It later became a nation-wide protest. There was a protest at Ahmadu Bello University in 1981 against the Vice-Chancellor over an alleged rice deal. A proposed introduction of tuition fees and scrapping of catering services in 1984 ignited a protest.

Many universities across the country rose in protest in 1986 against the alleged high-handedness of the Ahmadu Bello University authorities, resulting in months-long university closures and the expulsion of some students. The removal of petroleum product subsidies in 1988 sparked demonstrations, and nation-wide protests erupted in 1992 against currency devaluation and the hardships of citizens. Students protested at the Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, in 1998 against cult activities, and the fuel price increases in 2003 sparked violent protests in most tertiary institutions across the country.

The Place of Students Radicalism in Our Society

There is a strong bond between education, development and society. We may consider students the raw materials produced by educational institutions through a systematic training process to impart essential competencies to produce goods and services for national development. They have participated actively in the Nigeria project since independence. It is on record that students played an active role in the struggle for Nigeria's independence. Some student protests focus on the internal affairs of a specific institution;[1] others focus on broader issues such as dictatorship or economic policies.[2]

The radicalism of the student movement in Nigeria is well-known. Radicals, in the popular portrayal, are perpetrators of violence, extremism, fanaticism, and militancy. But this is not always correct, as radicalism tends to be associated historically more with progressive reformism than with extremism or fanaticism. Students have played an active role in workers' struggles, aside from organising national actions against government attacks on education. This activism is a product of the viability of ideological trends on campuses. The Nigerian student movement fought not only for its members but also for workers and the oppressed.

Likewise, some student protests focus on institutional inefficiencies in Nigerian universities, such as their inability to provide basic amenities—e.g., electricity and water. They may also be responses to arbitrary increases in school fees. Other student protests may focus on a regional or national policy, such as education policy or inadequate education financing. Student movements have also focused on international issues. For example, Nigerian students created awareness and organised protests during the apartheid era in South Africa.

The Nigerian student movement has contributed immensely to the socio-economic and political development of the country. For example, under the auspices of NANS, students have supported the democratic struggle, in which they have participated since the 1960s. Student unions also fought colonialism, imperialism, and internal socio-economic policies that they considered antithetical to their future and Nigeria's (Jonas, 2000).

Student unions promote political development in the country. They oppose the violation of constitutional rights and advocate the restoration of

1. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/"Student_protests" \o "Student protests."
2. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/"Dictatorship" \o "Dictatorship."

popular democracy (Idika, 1997). The radical Nigerian student movement contributed significantly to the democratic process (Eesuola 2012). They played a crucial role in forcing the military out of power and returning the country to democracy. Student unions organised conferences, seminars, rallies, demonstration and protest walks against military rule and for democracy. They opposed the anti-people and adverse economic policies of the military. In conjunction with civil society organisations such as the Campaign for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR), student unions staged protests and rallies against the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

Furthermore, students have been in conflict with state security agencies concerning the national well-being and obnoxious government policies. These have included the structural adjustment programme (Eboh, 1990), annulment of 12 June 1993 presidential election (Mahmud, 2013), inadequate facilities on campus (Omonijo et al., 2014). School fees and fuel price increases (Omisade, 2014; Busari, 2012), insufficient education financing, low staff remuneration, and inadequate work conditions have also been causes of conflict. Others have included subsidy removal from petroleum and allied products (Aluede, 2001), etc.

Adelabu and Akinsolu (2009) aver that student unions operate like typical governments. They serve, therefore, as a fertile ground for students to develop political skills and leadership. They have assisted in political education through mobilisation, rallies, and civil society activities, thus aiding socio-political development, directly or otherwise.

Conclusion

The student union is necessary, being a significant part of university administration and tool for national socio-political development. The university is a unique educational institution for the overall development of students. The radical student movement in Nigeria has demonstrated its anti-imperialist, antimilitary-rule, and pro-democracy orientation. The documented benefits of student radicalism in Nigeria render it imperative and permissible for students to continue to organise themselves into unions and associations.

The orientation and training that student unions provide prepare their members to take over the mantle of political leadership in Nigeria. The country can only progress if its students remain active players in its political system. They must continue to serve as a pressure group: appealing constantly to the nation's conscience and challenging the government's outrages and anti-people

policies to protect the fatherland.

Nigerian students should also continue to work with other pro-people and pro-workers organisations such as the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) in evolving a just and egalitarian society. They must not be intimidated or contented with the catchphrase of being "leaders of tomorrow." Students should strive to be active partners in the building and reconstruction of the nation; identifying themselves with the masses and nation-building. They should play the role history has assigned to them, moulding the clay of the Nigerian struggle. Student union leaders should join other groups in the patriotic mission of Nigeria's total liberation from economic inequality, injustice, underdevelopment.

I will conclude with something I stumbled upon while researching this paper:

> When conscious, caring people learn about injustices in the world, one of the most commonly asked questions is, "What can I do?" I know the feeling well: the despair and helplessness that come with the yearning to fix an inequity, along with the awareness of a lack of means. The "if only's" chip away at my heart. If only I were a real activist. If only I had a platform. If only I had a million, a billion, a gazillion dollars to invest in this issue. If only, if only, if only.

But we do not need endless resources to be compassionate human beings. We already have the resources to participate and invest in everyday radical activism. Radicalism is both a process and an outcome. Remember the etymology of "radical," meaning the root. The source of radical activism is below the foundation. The real problems lie at the root; we must start there to solve them. Clipping the leaves is not enough. So, even if you feel that you do not have the power to make a real difference in social justice movements, *remember to go back to the root. To truly change the system, we must draw upon core resources: our voices, our relationships, and our resolve.*

I wish to leave you with the following scenarios which I think anyone anywhere can create to radically respond to issues that assail us here in Nigeria or on a global scale:

Listen and learn: No matter how knowledgeable or passionate you are, there is always more to discover and nuances to understand.

Know when to speak up and when to stay silent: Let others know about your experiences, but also keep in mind what your privileges are. Do not be a "voice for the voiceless," because having a marginalised voice does not

mean someone is voiceless.

When you do stay silent, signal-boost the voices of others: Silence does not always mean tuning out. It can mean listening carefully, too. If you care about an issue, bolster the voices of oppressed people speaking on that issue. Publish, re-blog, or share other peoples' words.

Always know when to review your language: Whatever your language and means of communication, you can think more carefully about the words you use. Be careful with binary language that could be offensive.

Call out people in your community: Keep your friends and family liable for harmful things they say.

Learn context and (do not twist) history: Do not be ahistorical and do not twist history to fit a narrative that is not yours. At the apex of the Ferguson protests, many people expressed thoughts such as, "I agree with the message, but not the method. Martin Luther King Jr. would be disappointed with these violent protests." This is a blatant disregard for the history of the Civil Rights Movement. Non-violence does not mean peaceful. Disruption and commotion are not acts of violence—they are expressions of the right to protest our system.

Understand the difference between anecdotal and systemic: One of the most derailing things people can do is to throw an "exception" into social justice conversations. Oprah's billions and Obama's presidency do not erase anti-black racism in the United States. Facebook CEO Sheryl Sandberg's success does not erase the glass ceiling for women in the workplace.

Recognise that your favourite people can be problematic, and when you mess up, own up (acknowledge it), apologise, and stop doing it. Hold people, groups, and structures accountable.

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Chapter 3 | Student Radicalism and the Nigerian Project: A Critical Analysis of the Nigerian Student Movement

Emman Usman Shehu

I

Higher education, although optional, has become a critical part of national development. A school of thought believes that it is the nexus between science, economy, and development. Hinrich Seidel is a major advocate of this position and explains this connection in his paper "The Social Significance of Higher Education."

He drew his illustration of political development from the situation in Europe marked by at least three events of overriding importance. First, the dynamic expansion of the European Community with its population of over 320 million. Second, the unification of Eastern and Western Europe—the division of which had separated East Europeans from the European Community and the European Free Trade Association. Third, the universal recognition that the most vital issues for any future society and political action concern the environment. The Gulf War has brought this home terrifyingly to people everywhere.

In turning to economic development, he cites the main features in the following manner. First is the international division of labour—i.e., decentralisation. It is the only guarantee of rational economic development and has become the basic principle as much of economic as of political and scientific development. The second feature is the technological progress of recent years, particularly the now near-universal use of micro-electronics that has left no branch of the economy untouched.

For the third, Seidel states that environmental questions are a cost element in all economic processes. The cost of restoring the Gulf regions has demonstrated this dramatically. So has the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe or, in South America, for example, by the situation in Peru. Here again, we see the ties between economic questions, on the one hand, and politics and science, on the other. In other words, non-economic questions

increasingly involve economics, and the solution of environmental problems depends on scientific progress and political decisions.

As for the sciences, the two main features of development are, on the one hand, increasingly intensive and specific basic research and, on the other, greater concentration on highly complex general problems. I will mention only three fields. The first is systematic health research—an important factor in the work of the World Health Organisation (WHO). The other two are research into conflict management, which we have to pursue energetically, and research into the many environmental problems. Research increasingly has to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to deal scientifically with highly complex questions. Regarding method, the use of information technologies has become central, indispensable, and international.[1]

Higher Education is important for the development of society, and that applies to Africa. However, its impact must be assessed by how it emerged here and has grown. Emnet Tadesse Woldegiorgis and Martin Doevenspeck put it in proper perspective:

> The role (it has) carried out through time has always been shaped by the continual socio-political and economic dynamics among states, societies and the academic oligarchy (Clark, 1983). Higher education policies and reforms have also been a product of historical processes which have been shaped by socio-political and economic contexts of nations. African higher education policy setting and reform measures are also reflections of historical contexts at various times. Thus, the changing role of higher education in Africa could be best understood through analysing the historical context of the system at large from pre-colonial, through colonial and post-colonial higher education landscape and policy trends of Africa.[2]

Thus, the practice of education existed at various levels in the African pre-colonial era and contributed to the emergence of "complex civilisations." Learning in pre-colonial Africa had its foundations in the cultural setting of the time, albeit without formal institutions for knowledge production and dissemination. Its fruits included the building of various African civilisations,

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1. Hinrich Seidel, "The Social Significance of Higher Education," http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/24_133.pdf.
2. Emnet Tadesse Woldegiorgis and Martin Doevenspeck, "The Changing Role of Higher Education in Africa: A Historical Reflection," https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1079222.pdf.

generational transfer of cultural identity, and reproduction of a coherent way of social life. Moreover, these indigenous forms of learning were means of local autonomy, elite-formation, and cultural propagation. Local institutions, including those for higher education, were products of societal dynamics continually shaped by the interaction of society's needs. African societies determined their roles, which included mainly religious, philosophical, moral, medical, and other studies (Abjayi et al., 1996).[3]

Foreign powers splintered the continent after the Berlin Conference of 1885 according to their whims and changed everything from administration to education. The British and French played the principal role in shaping Africa's modern institutions (including higher education), although other European colonisers—including Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—participated. Establishments for primary and secondary education existed in colonial Africa before the First World War (WWI) but few higher education institutions existed before the Second World War (WWII). Among the few established before WWI were the Fourah Bay College in Freetown, Sierra Leone, established in 1827 by the Church Missionary Society (CMS) of London to train African clergymen and schoolmasters. The College was the first on the Western model (Ridder-Symoens, 1992) but others soon followed. In South Africa, the University of Cape Town came into being in 1829 and the Stellenbosch University in 1866. In North Africa, the University of Khartoum opened in 1902, Cairo University in 1908, and the University of Algeria in 1909.[4]

The colonial administrations established additional institutions of higher education in Africa following WWI, including Makerere University (1922) in Uganda, Egerton University (1939) in Kenya, and the University of Ghana (1948). The University of Ibadan in Nigeria came into existed in 1948, Addis Ababa University in 1950 in Ethiopia, and the University of Zimbabwe in 1952 (Damtew, 2003). This establishment of higher education institutions in Africa was mainly in Northern African countries and South Africa. At the end of the 1960s, for example, sub-Saharan Africa had only six universities for a population of 230 million. Some countries—including Cape Verde, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles, and São Tomé and Príncipe—had none

3. Woldegiorgis and Doevenspeck, "The Changing Role of Higher Education in Africa: A Historical Reflection," https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1079222.pdf.
4. Woldegiorgis and Doevenspeck, "The Changing Role of Higher Education in Africa: A Historical Reflection," https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1079222.pdf.

(Teferra and Altbach, 2004).

The number of public and private higher education institutions has increased greatly since independence. There were more than two hundred and fifty public higher education institutions and four hundred and twenty private ones in Africa as of 2009 (World Bank. 2009). Higher education access, however, was limited compared to other regions. Sub-Saharan Africa had only one hundred and sixty-two higher education students per 100,000 persons in 1989 whereas Asia had six hundred and forty-five and in Latin America 1,659 (Ibid). Governments and societies have always determined the roles of higher education institutions. These have changed over time under the influence of governments, societies, international donors and financial institutions, ideological change, market forces, and globalisation.[5]

The purpose of higher education in Nigeria was the same essentially as in the other colonies: to produce an elite that would sustain the colonial order. Thus, there were few higher institutions which ensured a limited number of people got admitted. This approach framed the fortunate ones as elites in the mould of the colonialists. Various groups have called repeatedly since then for the overhaul of the education system to meet the post-colonial needs of the country.

II

Activism is a doctrine that emphasises direct and vigorous action in support of or opposition to one side of a controversial issue. Students of tertiary institutions often take action to demonstrate their position on an issue. Student activism came to the fore in the 1960s in the global protest wave of that decade.

According to Colin Barker, the protest wave of the 1960s and 1970s was, notably, an international phenomenon. It had a novel feature, compared with earlier waves—such as those during the 1848 revolutions in Europe or the mass protests that attended and followed the First World War. The novel element was the role of student struggles. Students were usually on the side of reaction in earlier periods. June 1848 in Paris saw students on the 'bourgeois' side of the barricades; likewise, in the revolutions of 1917-1919 in Europe. University students were remembered chiefly as strike-breakers during the British general strike of 1926. Students were not notable contributors to anti-

5. Woldegiorgis and Doevenspeck, "The Changing Role of Higher Education in Africa: A Historical Reflection," https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1079222.pdf.

fascism in inter-war Europe. By the 1960s, however, matters were different. Right-wing student mobilisations were not the predominant pattern, although some occurred. On the contrary, a strong link existed between student activism and radicalism or even revolutionism.[6]

The protest wave was the product of factors that originated in the post-Second World War period and became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. Coming out of the war, people felt the situation was one of peace and security. But the younger generation felt the period was one of complacency, stagnation and authoritarianism. They felt the leaders were neither doing much to prevent future wars nor addressing social injustice (such as the plight of African-Americans). They thought it was necessary to disrupt the prevailing conformist culture. These became the catalyst for the protest.

Another factor was the rise of the New Left, especially in America, under the leadership of disillusioned college students. In the notes accompanying a video titled "The Student Movement of the 1960s," the authors note:

> … its members separated themselves from the Old Left, which rejected change in favour of the status quo, while rejecting the extremist conservative right. The most recognizable political organisation that developed within the New Left movement was Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). It is important to note that the antithesis to the New Left and organisations like SDS was the Young Americans for Freedom; while not as large as the SDS, it projected a conservative approach.

Furthermore, the authors observed that members of the New Left rejected a government led by a few elected officials and favoured participatory democracy, which involved decision-making by all Americans. They believed this type of grass-roots effort was the only way to address the growing societal ills of the United States. Tom Hayden and Al Haber, the SDS leaders, developed the notion of participatory democracy in the 1962 Port Huron Statement, which became the platform of the 1960s student movement.

These protests were social conflicts, predominantly involving popular rebellions against military and bureaucratic elites, who responded by escalating political repression.

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6. Colin Barker, "Some Reflections on Student Movements of the 1960s and early 1970s," https://journals.openedition.org/rccs/646.

These protests marked a turning point for the civil rights movement in the United States, which produced revolutionary organisation like the Black Panther Party. Also, the Tet Offensive engendered broad opposition to the Vietnam War in the United States and London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome. Mass socialist movements emerged in the United States and most European countries. The May 1968 protests in France was the most spectacular of these. French students joined wildcat strikes involving up to ten million workers and, for a few days, the movement seemed capable of overthrowing the government. Struggles against dictatorship, state repression, and colonisation in many other capitalist countries also involved protests in 1968. These included the beginning of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Tlatelolco massacre in Mexico City, and the escalation of guerilla war against the military dictatorship in Brazil.

Protests occurred also in the revisionist countries against the repression of free speech and violation of other civil rights by the revisionist bureaucratic and military elites. Central and Eastern Europe experienced widespread protests that escalated, particularly in the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia and Warsaw, Poland, and Yugoslavia.[7]

III

The similarities in the movements described above do not mean that student activism and radicalism are homogeneous phenomena. As Christopher Rootes argues:

Like all social movements, student movements are creatures of the societies in which they occur and as such evince, in variable measure, all the excellencies and deformities of their circumstances. Similarly, the political significance of student movements varies according to their social and political circumstances. Indeed, different sets of political, economic and social conditions will, to varying degrees, create the conditions for or foreclose the possibilities of the development of a student movement. We should therefore not expect the same model to fit equally well in all instances of radical student politics."[8]

The student union, which exists fundamentally to promote and defend students welfare in a higher institution, is the basis for the student movement in Nigeria. The movement's development has been in two broad phases: the

7. Wikipedia, "Protests of 1968," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_of_1968.
8. Christopher A. Rootes, "Student Radicalism: Politics of Moral Protest and Legitimation of the Modern Capitalist State," https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 656878?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

colonial and post-colonial.

The colonial phase begins with Nigerians who went overseas for higher education and the formation in 1952 of the West Africa Students Union (WASU). The Union, started by two anti-colonial activists—the Jamaican Amy Ashwood Garvey and the Nigerian law student Lapido Solanke—was a welfare organisation for African students and immigrants in London.[9] It aimed to improve their living conditions in the city by, for example, supporting newly-arrived West Africans in finding accommodation. However, the organisation quickly changed into a platform to vividly discuss alternatives to the imperial world order. Solanke, himself a Pan-African thinker, saw the WASU as a training ground for practical unity and effective cooperation between all West African students.[10]

The Union contributed to the emergence of nationalism in some African countries. It was a training ground for its members, some of whom joined the political struggle against colonial domination on returning to their home countries. These included Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) as well as Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria).

The WASU established branches in major West African towns under British rule, and through its publications, preached against the demerits of colonisation. It also advocated directly to the Secretary of State for Colonies for internal self-government for the colonies.

We may call this as the beginning of the "national project" in some of those countries. It confirms an apt observation by Bjorn Beckman:

> Such radicalism and commitment to a 'national project' have ensured that student movements have been at the front stage of reform, spearheading, for instance, 'Democracy Movements' or the demand for a 'National Conference' at times when civilian and military politicians have been as particularly inept in handling the nation's affairs.
>
> This has been the case, despite their narrow basis in the institutions of higher learning—accessible only to a tiny minority of the population—and despite their privileged class aspirations and perhaps class origins as well. Moreover, the political class which they so vehemently

9. Garvey was the wife of the Pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey.
10 Simeon Marty, "The West African Students Union (WASU) and the London Moment," https://exilegov.hypotheses.org/962.

> attack for its failure to fulfil national aspirations is to a considerable extent made up of people with university training, some may even have had their first political training as radical activists in the student movement."[11]

Some tertiary institutions already existed by 1956, notably the Yaba College of Technology (established 1948) and the University College of Ibadan. These formed the basis of a home-based National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS), which came into being that year. Student unionism in this phase also featured an anti-imperialist stance, showing that political education was taking place.

Fittingly, there was a protest in 1961—when the second phase started—against the government's decision to enter into a defense pact with Britain. Students went from Ibadan to Lagos to disrupt parliamentary proceedings to formalise it, and the government eventually withdrew from it.

Student protests have occurred fairly regularly since then in Nigeria for reasons such as the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election. Many concern the problems facing Nigeria. Top of the list is the inadequate funding of education, which has affected the universities particularly and been the cause of persistent crisis in those institutions. The universities are grossly under-funded, under-staffed, over-crowded and lacking infrastructure and facilities. Also, they have experienced violations of due process, academic freedom, and university autonomy.[12]

Conclusion

The activism of the Nigerian student movement reflects the country's challenges, including the impacts of unpopular government policies. Some student protests have succeeded in reversing such policies; others have not. The ruling class has succeeded in undermining the unity of the student movement compared to its early days. However, this will not stop student activism. Students will continue to rise in protest as long as the salient problems of the Nigeria project persist and affect them directly.

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11. Bjorn Beckman, "Student Radicalism and the National Project: The Nigerian Student Movement."
12. A. Yusuf, A. M. Akanmu, A. D. Hussain, M. A. Usman, E. Olorunsuwa, Surajudeen, A. A. Lawal, A. Y. Ishowo and I. I. Alao, "The 21st Century Unilorin Student Unionism," http://unilorinsu.com/union-history.

Chapter 4 | Getting Back to the Basics: What Should be Done to Rebuild the Critical Student Movement?

Amina Salihu

In writing this piece, I have relied on a reflection piece that I shared at a 2018 conference on Marxism in Nigeria. The article, "Weaving the Cord of Solidarity: A Narrative on Mentoring Young Marxists in the 1980s Student Movement," examined memory from a historical–analytical perspective. It explored the nature of that movement and what we might learn from that period to build a new student movement. The task of this paper does not differ significantly from that purpose. The challenge is that no direct comparability exists between that decade and the present, although without a doubt there are lessons to learn from the 1980s. They are what they are: eras, each with a distinct socio-economic and political arrangement. The task, therefore, is to identify the core principles that have remained true across the eras in the raising of a critical mass of youth who sustainably demonstrate leadership.

> The keywords in this chapter are basics, rebuilding, critical, student, and movement**.**

What is the critical student movement? What are the basics?

A critical student movement is a body of students consciously engaging with their ecosystem to publicise and protect fundamental human rights. Creating it requires the right values, knowledge, opportunity, and solidarity; it also requires safe spaces, critical thought, and infrastructure. The freedoms to think and challenge are essential, too. These are the basic factors required. The project to *rebuild* such a movement implies the assumptions that, first, it once existed but not any more, and second, it had intrinsic value. This paper agrees with this standpoint. However, it also cautions that we may have to rebuild the movement differently from how we built it in the 1960s and 1980s.

The ideals of the 1980s

I was a student in 1986 at the College of Advanced Studies, Zaria, from

where I went to the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in 1988 as a direct-entry student of political science. It was a period of self-discovery and amasing conversations; highly politically conscious students organised and demanded accountability. We arrived at the university in the tail of the furious 1978 "Ali must go" protests, in which students confronted authority over a 50 kobo increase in the cost of their meals.[1] About eight students lost their lives in ABU alone. The protests successfully removed the minister of education, and the students basked in the full glory of their organising power. There was a conscious effort to recruit new students to fuel the movement and create the core of a critical successor generation. I was active in the social environment although the authorities suspended the student union government (SUG) for a substantial part of our days at ABU. I met my husband Salihu Lukman when for fear of victimisation some of us had to go into hiding following a demonstration against sexual harassment. The comrades had sent him to find me and ensure I was safe. He was president of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) and had graduated the year before I got into ABU but had stayed close to the movement.

That was the way of things. There were no set times for relationships; they were fluid. There was no end or start of new relationships according to changing status. People did not transit out of the movement when they graduated; we only metamorphosed from student to non-student to worker, always remaining an ally of the struggle. The relationship was one of equity and respect. We engaged our teachers in debates and arguments, some called them by their first names, but that did not diminish the respect we had for them. Those were just a measure of the camaraderie and trust that they fostered. To fight the state, we needed to unite and see each other as a family. Hassana Garba and I were members of the same cell. "Oga"[2] Steve Daniel—himself very bohemian and boyish, ever-smiling, teasing, and so kind—introduced us to each other. I would see him again in 2018, eighteen years after I left the department:[3] he remained his old easy-going self.

Our lecturers—S. Y. Dodo, Balarabe Abbas, and A. S. Mohammed—went to extra lengths to share literature with us. We had cells on campuses, in

1. https://www.pulse.ng/communities/student/how-50-kobo-increase-in-food-caused-students-protest-id7803807.html
2. A Yoruba term for boss or master.
3. I was on a leave of absence before later withdrawing my services as a lecturer.

departments, and across years of study. These were spaces of nurture where we learned skills they did not teach in classes and had access to tutorials that enabled us to excel in class and combine activism with academics. We felt safe with those of the other gender.

I want to stress the nature of the learning space. It was strict in the classroom but very egalitarian outside it. We had fiery lecturers in the political science department who motivated us. They introduced political economy literature to us in digestible chunks of knowledge that made reading works like Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* and Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* approachable.

No doubt, the small student population contributed to the excellent ambience. Tutorial classes averaged twenty-five students, which facilitated interaction. There were no mobile phones (smart or not) or internet, not to mention social media: we only had hard-to-use pay-phones, and email was still a novelty. Yet we found each other and connected, sometimes climbing three or more flights of stairs more than once a day to check whether one or another lecturer was in the office.

Let us circle back to the political science department at ABU. We had the honour of meeting an incredibly resourceful teacher, Okello Oculi, a political science professor and one of East Africa's foremost and pioneering writers. Born in Uganda and educated at the universities of Makerere, Stanford, Essex, and Wisconsin in Madison, he has authored many novels and poems. His poetry follows the road opened by Okot p'Bitek of *Song of Lawino* fame, theirs a literary school that asserts the resilience of the African cultural heritage and creative future. Oculi was a foremost lecturer of Marxism at the department in the university. An original mentor, he founded the OAU Mock Summit club,[4] a student-nurturing platform where students across faculties researched and simulated the African policy site of the same name. Students joined the club from non-social science departments, even those as far removed as engineering and medicine. Many of his students cut their political and diplomatic teeth in the club. I played PANA—the Pan-African News Agency—whose role was to report on the OAU conference. The "mock summit" required research, preparation, public speaking, and wit. Those tasks shaped me for my life today, income-earning activities, and social commitments. Decades after

4. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) later became the African Union (AU).

leaving ABU, Oculi continues this unique pedagogy today under the Vision 525 Initiative.

After leaving university, activists of the student movement maintained relations with each other through inter-generational conversations that were not limited to the academia. We had an active community that supported each other, whether as students or workers, a truly comradely relationship where we shared good and bad times. A comrade did not need an invitation to visit another; the visitor could have any meal that the host could afford. Adagbo Onoja, Y. Z. Yau, Anselm Akele, Joseph Mamman, Ene Obi, Yakubu Aliyu, Chom Bagu, John Odah, Otive Igbuzor, Hauwa Mustapha, Hassana Garba. We had mentors: Jibo Ibrahim, Kole Shettima, Charmaine Pereira, Bilkisu Yusuf, and more. They were always welcome in our home, as Salihu Lukman and I considered them family. Y.Z. Yau, the founder of the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD), was at our wedding twenty-four years ago. This social network no longer obtains on-campus or off-campus. For the many who did not experience this, where did we go wrong?

I have painted this picture of the campus life we knew to introduce the questions that I want to pose:

1. In what ways is the campus different now?
2. How do we recreate the energy and safe space of the learning context where mentoring took place?
3. How do we build lifelong traditions within and outside the campuses?
4. Is there hope to revive this?
5. How do we work across disciplines?
6. Is there anything to learn from feminism?

Approaching the Student Movement of the 2000s

I am speaking now as a former student. Perforce, my methodology for this section rests not on participant observation mainly but on secondary data. First, we must not assume that the student movement no longer exists: it does, only not as we knew it. Second, we must look for it as a product of the present ecosystem. Third, we must not come to it from a judgemental perspective. This latter point is a health warning that we must heed, one I came away with from a student website.

Many progressives look longingly to the 1960s in hopes that today's student activists will glean inspiration and vision from a period many consider a heyday for youth revolt. What's forgotten is that students of today face

vastly different issues and challenges than their generational counterparts of the sixties.[5]

This quote shows that a cohort of students/graduates already feels the pressure of expectation from an older generation and expresses their push-back. Its continuation below gives it context.

The quality of life that higher education promised U.S. students via the American Dream has already withered away; at the same time, we are being overburdened with mounting student loan debt and the stress of finding increasingly scarce jobs after graduation.[6]

That is about the United States, where the median household income was $62,000 in 2018.[7] Juxtapose that country to Nigeria, where the average income per person was $2,461[8] in 2018. The list of woes would be longer in the setting of our present-day public tertiary institution. It would read something like this: struggle to pay fees, no potable water or regular electricity, over-crowded classes and hostels, cultism, sexual harassment, conflict, teacher strikes,[9] the dearth of relevant recent literature, etc. As the BBC reported, using National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data, poverty has risen in Nigeria despite economic growth, with almost 100 million people living on less than $1 (£0.63) daily. The National Bureau of Statistics reported that 60.9% of Nigerians in 2010 lived in "absolute poverty," up from 54.7% in 2004.[10]

That speaks to economic poverty. However, it is not only economic poverty that confronts us; there are also the political and the social. We resisted in the 1980s the religious and ethnic divisions that usually threaten to emerge during

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5. https://www.thenation.com/article/building-student-movement-us/
6. https://www.thenation.com/article/building-student-movement-us/.
7. The 2017 nominal median income per capita was $31,786. The mean income per capita was $48,150. The Census Bureau reports those in the Current Population Survey. June 2018 Median Household Income. According to Sentier Research, the median household income in the United States rose from $61,858 in May 2018 to $62,175 in June 2018, an increase of 0.5% over the previous month. https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-average-income-in-usa-family-household-history
8. https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/gdp-per-capita
9. Between 1999 and 2018, Nigerian public universities have gone on strike for a cumulative period of three years. https://www.pulse.ng/communities/student/all-the-times-asuu-has-gone-on-strike-since-1999/5jtb8cs
10. According to the report, the measure of absolute poverty is the number of people who can afford only the bare essentials of shelter, food, and clothing. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873

student union elections. Students saw them as evidence of the wider society attempting to assert its influence on the campuses. Fast-forward to the 1990s and 2000s. It is common today to demand that a student standing for election should reveal their ethnic identity and that the student union executive body should be religiously and geopolitically diverse. Diversity might have its advantages; however, the emphasis on diversity becomes problematic when it precludes merit or is to the detriment of capacity, passion, and interest in the union. Add the following to this equation: conflict and its devastating consequences on organisation, the vitality and health of the individual, and their ability to focus on learning. Insurgency and frequent strikes by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) undermine teaching and make it hard to be physically present to organise and pursue unionism. There was never a greater need for a cohesive and knowledgeable student movement than today when the moral and political fibre of society is fraying.

My point here is that there are challenges that require that we rebuild the student movement differently. This prospect should not daunt us, however, because there are opportunities for success. Even challenges can be opportunities, and we must rise to meet them. The new student movement must be purpose-built for a 21st-century environment. Hear this:

> We are the youth without a future building a U.S. movement to address the challenges facing us as millennials. We are on campuses, in tenant associations, a part of state-wide climate justice coalitions; we are building students unions; but most importantly, we are all over the country and, for the first time, we are actively working to meet one another.[11]

What is the defining character of the student movement today? Can we say there is a movement or only fiefdoms that collaborate with the state for pecuniary reasons? Are Nigerian youths in transformative coalitions? Do internal democracy and learning opportunities exist in our student unions? Are we organising to confront corruption? It appears on the surface that what exists is a student movement that shares in the malaise of society. The president of Nigeria has a convoy; so the SUG president has one too. The former has a special presidential vehicle, so the NANS president also has one with plate number 001. The country's president has an entourage; so the

11. https://www.thenation.com/article/building-student-movement-us/

NANS president grows one. Student leaders and followers are equally guilty in promoting these practices.

However, a closer look at the student unions reveals that there is more to them. You see a body of young people constructively engaging the state, working with the labour movement for the rights of workers and to influence policy through political lobbying. They have been instrumental to the electoral victory of an opposition political party through the unprecedented use of social media for mobilisation**.** In contrast with their counterparts of the 1980s, who dealt with a militarised state, the youth of the 2000s are coming of age under a civilian dispensation.[12]

Opportunities for building a critical student movement in the 21st century

Specific openings enable viral and sustainable organising among students. We examine some of them here.

Private universities: Private universities were unheard of in Nigeria in the 1980s, hard to believe as it may be given the proliferation of private higher institutions today, of which seventy-nine exist as of 2019.[13] They are better run, their teaching calendars know little disruption, and their students are mostly free of the social and economic burdens that students in public universities bear. Their guardians are better able to provide for them, as evidenced by their ability to pay the high fees demanded. However, their being in a physically more comfortable space does not insulate them from poverty. They will leave that cocoon eventually to seek jobs and will need public services. Conscientising them is essential, then; building partnerships between the students of public and private tertiary institutions is a wide field to explore.

Technology: We relied in the 1980s upon the post office, public pay-phones, or faxes for communication; otherwise, we travelled to connect physically. Today, in contrast, tools exist to create virtual communities, online spaces for sharing ideas and holding meetings, modes of communication that are cheaper than physical travel. They may not replace the long-term practical interaction needed for bonding and testing comradeship; they are, nonetheless, considerably important means for rebuilding a student movement.

Democratisation of information: Laws and policies exist today that give students voice and that we could exploit in rebuilding the movement. These

12. Barring Daniel Kanu's one-million-'man' march in support of Gen, Sanni Abacha's efforts to transmute into a civilian president in 1998
13. https://www.myschoolgist.com/ng/private-universities-in-nigeria/

include the Freedom of Information Act 2011, Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act 2015, whistle-blower policy, etc.

What we can learn from feminism

Feminism is the belief in the social, political, and economic equality of the sexes; feminist activism is the struggle for that equality.[14] Like many philosophies, feminism has various strands: the liberal, African, Marxist, radical, etc. We focus here on radical feminism. This variant of feminism holds that patriarchy is the driver of women's oppression and that the former exists in the private and public spheres. Indeed, it argues that the private-public divide is false, for the one reinforces the other.[15]

New issues confront women and men on campus and outside today. Sexual harassment and examination malpractices were not rife in the 1980s; neither infrastructure nor poverty was as much a problem as it is today. Now, however, these aberrations have become the norm.

Mentoring, not teaching. Feminism is a heuristic tool. We can only pass it down successfully if we enable young minds to think, reflect, and see the world anew.

Changing the pedagogy of the classroom: A positive pedagogy could impact the future. Feminist pedagogy gives insight into how to begin changing the classroom as a precursor to the changes needed within the university and the entire social system.[16] The classroom must become more interactive, research-based, and collaborative among students, with the teacher as guide and facilitator, not teacher. Everybody can be a "knower;" nobody is self-made. Everyone had help along the way. The sooner we realised that the better; because we would become less arrogant about our learning and more able to build networks of support; because the giver may be the needy tomorrow. Teachers can learn from students and vice versa. Also, we must have respect for different personal experiences among students and challenge traditional

14. https://cathyreisenwitz.com/the-definition-of-feminism-what-do…
15. Amina Salihu. Marxism and Feminism: The Disconnects, Intersections and Import for Transformative Pedagogy. Being Text of a Paper for the Nigerian Committee for the Advancement of Working Class Solidarity Conference, Nasarawa State University, Keffi 1-4 November 2018.
16. Amina Salihu Transformative Power of Feminist Pedagogy to Revolutionise Learning Reflections of a Feminist Teacher Ahmadu Bello University 1993-2000, unpublished 2016

learning ideals.[17]

Creating non-academic egalitarian spaces: We need spaces where young students can interrogate adults and express themselves without fear of judgement. It is essential to bring successful people from various sectors to interact with students in seminars. As Grace Osakue, a veteran member of Women in Nigeria (WIN) and Marxist, said at the 2018 Marxism conference held at the Nasarawa State University:

> We need to hold conferences in communities where we have youths because the absence of such spaces for inter-generational discourse with [them] is a big part of the problem in [Nigeria].

Collaborative and outreach events that bring students out of their campus are vital. Exchanges between students and community leaders who speak the local language could help the former understand that English need not be the means of communication. Rules of etiquette and protocol should be established and understood before the implementation of such projects.

Creating safe spaces: The environment shapes you. Young mind blossom where they get love, nurture, and attention, just like little flowers would. Where the ground is harsh, acrid, and depressing, you get hard, crude, sad people susceptible to influences to abuse drugs, cheat at exams or join cults. A youth with self-confidence is more likely than not in a positive environment to apply themselves to their education and the pursuit of excellence. The personal is political; everything is political. We need to find the balance between our needs as persons and ambition as students or academics. We cannot hope to progress and excel when our basic needs are yet unmet. Also, we should be concerned about oppression and exclusion, and should not accept the subjection of any gender to them. They diminish not just the sufferer but all those who stand aside and watch.

Mentoring cells: A mentor is a trusted counsellor or guide, and a mentee a willing learner.[18] An age difference usually exists between them, hence the expressions "across generations" or "inter-generational." The mentor's role derives by their wealth of experience and knowledge that informs

17. http://www.teach-nology.com/teachers/methods/feminist_pedagogy/ retrieved 31 May.
18. The original Mentor is a character in Homer's epic poem *The Odyssey* to whom Odysseus, King of Ithaca, entrusted his kingdom when he went to fight in the Trojan War. Mentor served as the teacher and overseer of Odysseus' son, Telemachus. http://management.about.com/cs/people/a/mentoring.htm

the conversation between mentor and mentee in which the one transfers learning and skills to the other. This process is the inter-generational dialogue. Biologically, the term "generation" comes from the Greek word *ãåíåÜ (*pronounced |*yenea*|), which means to procreate or produce offspring. Socially, it means to interact and create ideas. Inter-generational dialogue is where social meets biology (Sarikhan, 2009).

Activating a student movement

These ideas for activating the movement are building blocks in the conscientisation that is required. We present them as elements in a four-phase process: inception, testing, activation, and learning.

Inception: This is the phase in which a mentor identifies a nucleus of students keen to change their environment. The former supports them in analysing their environment and thinking about change as an incremental process involving themselves and making personal sacrifices. They set *S*pecific, *M*easurable, *A*chievable *R*ealistic, *T*ime-bound and *I*nclusive (SMARTI) goals.

Testing: In this phase, the mentor supports their mentees to research issues that affect the community. They guide them in their study of the major texts to help them understand the big issues: social conflict, climate change, corruption (including sexual harassment and rape), etc. They work with the mentees to build internal trust and test internal and external solidarity.

Activation: The mentees test the waters in this phase. They challenge the *status quo* and put into practice the knowledge gained from their reading and the mentoring received on pushing back and engaging the *status quo* sustainably. They practise in real life all they have learned and tried in the test stage. The group has greater visibility now and engages the community to buy into a social justice project. Such a project could be a protest, debates, community outreach, media engagement, etc.

Learning: This phase involves reflection on and learning the lessons from the previous. All—sweet or sour—are useful. This phase provides a space to decompress and support each other, to find the energy for more research and community engagement.

Conclusion: Why a critical successor generation is important

It takes one who has suffered voicelessness to speak effectively for the voiceless. Some voices are forgotten in the policy-making process, not

because they are too small a minority to have a say. They may, indeed, be the majority but are "minoritised" all the same. Nonetheless, social policies affect them significantly, positively or negatively—the latter oftener than not. They bear the brunt of the system's failure, therefore, subsidising the state without recognition or reward.

Two such groups readily come to mind: women and children. I organised in 2006 the first inter-generational dialogue between school pupils and public officials in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The public and private primary school pupils toured the FCT and were hosted at the Nigeria Television Authority (NTA). Below is an excerpt from my notes and reflections on the session.

> The Inter-generational Dialogues were highly commended by many. Speaking with the children later, one got the impression that governance could be demystified for the young as well when they are brought into contact with policy-makers whom they can look in the eye and ask hard questions.
>
> At the Inter-generational Dialogue, a young girl put the policy-makers (Ministers Nasir El Rufai and Oby Ezekwesili) on the spot when she very wisely retorted "Why is it that adults never have time for us? This is the first time we are having a meeting like this and the right kind of leaders attend. They only used to send others to represent them." The two ministers present had to concede to the accuracy of that shot. If only the young girl… knew that even adults are not spared this embarrassment. A lot of the time policy-makers are too busy attending other events which to most people do not appear half as important as those they should be attending. The personal political and intellectual weight of a public officer can usually be determined by the kind of gatherings [at which] they prefer to be seen. It is like being able to judge a person by the books they read.[19]

Repression exists in different forms: a Burundian president, for instance, had some teenagers arrested for doodling on his photograph. We must stop repression, whether in the benign form of ridiculing others or of impunity and genocide.

It is not new that university systems in some parts of Africa lack quality

19. Amina Salihu, *Reflections from the Abuja at 30 Inter-generational Dialogue*, FCT, 2006.

control, whether in their academic or administrative operations. Scholars and activists alike should preoccupy their minds with the question of what we can do about it. The irony is glaringly visible. The Ivory Tower, which should provide solutions to society's problems through teaching and research, is besieged by poor learning, unsafe and untoward environment, inadequate financing, and academic and administrative corruption. Lives are on hold and may go to waste while we await better funding, more research space, and greater government respect. Students stop learning effectively, and teachers are demotivated and apply themselves less and less.

This situation can change. One way in which we could do this is by changing the way we teach and interact with students. The French writer Francois Rabelais warns that *a child is a fire to be lit, not a vase to be filled*.[20] A child in this context is not so much a numerical thing as a quantum of experience. The mentor's duty, therefore, is not to fill the mentee's head with all their knowledge. Mentoring is to guide and share lessons where the mentor believes they can inspire the "child." They should aim not to clone themselves but to share knowledge in a form that allows its adaptation**.**

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Part 2 | The Farmer-Herder Conflict

Chapter 5 | Nomadic Pastoralism, Rural Banditry and Violence in Nigeria: History, Context and Prospects for Reforms

Hussaini Abdu

Introduction

Nomadic pastoralism is today a key source of violent conflict in Nigeria. Although not a new phenomenon in the country, it has escalated in the last few years into a major security issue, joining its tangle of political and social fissures. The context and dynamics of the conflict have changed significantly, therefore. The intensity of the violence and the number of casualties are arguably only second to those of the Boko Haram insurgency in the country's north-east.

Certainly different from Boko Haram, the herders and farmers conflict has attracted more political interpretation, thereby masking the reality of context and dynamics. Something that everyone understood traditionally as being a seasonal conflict has since 2015 become a major political issue, sometimes taking a simultaneously political, religious, and ethnic dimension. Some speak, indeed, as though there was never conflict of this type before 2015. It has therefore transformed from a seasonal phenomenon into one of the most contentious political issues of the past four years.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to understand that all violent conflicts are political, they may not necessarily be partisan, but they are often associated with power and resource distribution. It is impossible to insulate the herders and farmers conflict from politics, being a resource-based conflict. The challenge is to understand its nature, context and character. It is certainly not political, although political actors have tried to cash in on it for their political advantage. It is also not ethnic, although the actors are of different ethnic backgrounds; neither is it religious, although the conflicting groups are of different religious identities.

Farmers and pastoralists are historically two components of rural society in northern Nigeria and have enjoyed accommodating relationships in many

parts of the country. Such co-existence is now under strain or has broken down in many communities. The character and intensity of farmer-pastoralist conflicts vary across the country. The two groups still accommodate each other in some places but have intensified their clashes in many states, with killing and destruction reaching unprecedented levels in major flashpoints, especially in central Nigeria. Tensions have now extended to other parts of the country. How we comprehend the conflict—particularly our identification of its sources and culprits—determines how we design and implement responses to it (Higazi and Yousuf 2016).

This presentation aims to understand the context and dynamics of the conflict by tracing its history and analysing the driving forces. This is to aid the well-grounded evaluation of the prospects for reform.

Pastoralism and Pastoral Communities in Nigeria

Three forms of pastoralism exist in Nigeria, according to the degree of movement: nomadic, transhumance, and agro-pastoralist. This paper examines transhumance pastoralism, which involves *the regular movement of herds between fixed points to exploit seasonal availability of pastures*. Part or all of the herd moves to access crop residue in adjacent farms or graze in open ranges. They move even further south in some cases as the dry season becomes more severe and return north with the advent of the rains (Junaidu 2014).

The Fulani (an ethnic group spread across West and Central Africa) are the largest pastoral group in Nigeria, constituting over 90%, but they are not the only ones. Pastoralists own approximately 90% of the national herd, estimated at 19.5 million cattle, about 975,000 donkeys, 28,000 camels, 72.5 million goats and 41.3 million sheep. Livestock represents between 20 and 30% of total agricultural production and about 6 to 8% of overall Gross Domestic Production (International Crisis Group, 2017). Not all Fulani are transhumant: some are partly or completely settled, even in communities to which they migrated. The character of pastoral nomadism has changed tremendously in the last three to four decades. Most pastoral communities in Nigeria are of Nigerian, other West African, or Central African origin. Movement is mostly north to south during the dry season and back during the rainy season. There is a higher level of pastoral activity in the north than in any other part of the country. The movement of cattle is mainly along two corridors—north-west and north-east—both of which pass through central Nigeria. There was also

movement until recently from the north-west to the South-west.

Nomadic pastoralism has a long history in West Africa and the Sahel region, probably since the 16th century. It is a rational response to seasonal variations in pasture and water sources. A single area of grazing land usually cannot support a herd year-round, and water resources are often insufficient during the dry season in the northern savannah and Sahel (Higazi and Yousuf 2016). Pastoral movement is an adaptative response to climatic uncertainty, fluctuations in rainfall and the often-long Sahelian dry season. This adaptation mechanism involves the seasonal migration of families and livestock over distances of up to hundreds of kilometres, and even across international borders (Higazi and Yousuf, 2016).

The maintenance of transhumance routes is a requirement of national governments in the 1998 Transhumance Protocol of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). Rising demographic and ecological pressures in recent years have intensified competition for land and water in the rural areas of Nigeria. The surge in its population has caused an expansion of cultivated farmland and a reduction in the available grazing land. Climatic uncertainty and lower rainfall in the far north have made sustain increasing populations more difficult, pushing many farmers, pastoralists, and livestock southwards. This has happened gradually over the decades—apparently intensifying in the last—and increased the pressure on land and water resources in central and southern Nigeria.

Ecological pressures have aggravated competition for land and water in the rural areas of the country in recent years. The National Meteorological Agency reported in 2008 that over the preceding thirty years the annual rainy season dropped from an average of one hundred and fifty to one hundred and twenty days. Over 350,000 sq. km of the already arid region turned to desert or desert-like conditions in the last six decades, a desertification process that is progressing southward at 0.6 km yearly. In Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara states, estimates suggest that 50-75% of the land area is becoming desert (International Crisis Group).

State and Pastoralism in Nigeria

State responses to pastoralism are as old as the activity itself. The pre-colonial Sokoto caliphate state fully incorporated pastoralism into its political economy. Some pastoral families participated in the jihad and, therefore, significantly in the state-building process. Their economic activities, including

tax and tribute payment, contributed significantly to sustaining the state. Some of these practices continued in colonial and post-colonial northern Nigeria.

Grazing reserves are areas of land set aside for exclusive or semi-exclusive use by pastoralists. Nigeria currently has a total of four hundred and seventeen across the country, of which the government has only gazetted about one hundred and thirteen. The reservation of land for grazing is a long-standing element of communal land-use practices and forms in much of northern Nigeria. These reserves (*hurum*i in Hausa; plural = *hurumai*) emerged as part of post-Jihad Caliphate state-formation, and were communal grazing areas located near major towns and settlements and away from farmlands. Their administration was under the jurisdiction of the traditional rulers (the ruling aristocracy, under the emirs and chiefs). A network of stock routes or *burtali*, customarily recognised as rights of way, linked the settlements and *hurumai*. The giving of customary gifts and payment of cattle tax (*jangali*) to the authorities by the Fulani pastoralists secured the practice of reserving *hurumai* for use by herdsmen.

The British colonial authorities first established the African Ranches Limited (1914 – 1931) to try the idea of intensive *sedentarisation* in Northern Nigeria. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) introduced in the 1950s a pastoralist programme known as the Fulani Amenities Programme. The programme offered services in animal health, promotion of hay and silage, and production and provision of supplementary feed for dry season feedings using groundnut and cotton by-products. The Nigerian government reviewed the Fulani Amenities Programme after the country attained independence in 1960 and consolidated it into a Comprehensive Pastoralist Resource Development Programme. The new programme provided for the establishment of grazing reserves, watering points, and veterinary outposts in major pastoral areas in Northern Nigeria, as well as pasture development and marketing channels.

Most of the four hundred and fifteen reserves came into existence in the 1960s and 1970s. With the discovery of oil, most state governments abandoned the establishment and development of grazing reserves.

The Nigerian government instituted a policy in 1988 to set apart 10% of Nigeria's total land area as grazing reserves. However, only about 2% of Nigeria's land area is so far designated as such, most of these being reserves established before the policy as we stated earlier.

Other state interventions include:

1. Second Livestock Development Programme, 1987-1995;
2. National Commission for Nomadic Education Programme;
3. Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund Pastoral Development Programme 1996-1999;
4. Presidential Committee on Livestock, 2003;
5. Inter-Ministerial Committee on Pastoralist/Crop Farmers Conflict Resolution, 2007;
6. Millennium Development Goals (MDG) programme.

Changing Dynamics of Pastoralism and Rising Violence

Rising climate pressure, urbanisation, and violent conflict in most of northern Nigeria have produced the increasing *sedentarisation* of pastoralist households, transforming formerly nomadic pastoralists to sedentary agro-pastoralists. While their households live in permanent or semi-permanent settlements, however, there is a rise in livestock migration: women, children, and the elderly remain in settlements but the young migrate with the cattle. This has unsettled the traditional relationship between farmers and herders totally since younger herders have no understanding of context and networks of authorities in farming communities.

Livestock productivity has declined due to inadequate pasture. This inadequacy, in turn, results from the degradation of grazing lands due to climate change, over-grazing, and encroachment on traditional grazing reserves. These adverse developments have reduced the number of livestock holding per household, thereby affecting the livelihood of pastoral families. The outcome has been the resort by young pastoralists to crime, including cattle rustling in connivance with some non-pastoral communities or serving as mercenaries for attacks on farming communities. Thus, two new factors have arisen in the long history of farmer-herder conflicts: cattle rustling and rural banditry.

To be sure, cattle rustling is an old and deeply-entrenched feature of pastoralism, which fostered competition between groups that found themselves in harsh, delicate environments. Cattle rustling also served as a means of primitive accumulation in the context of subsistence and commercial pastoralism. However, these activities have been relatively minimal in Nigeria. Its violent expression is a recent phenomenon. In the last few years, cattle rustling has become a major organised crime in most parts of northern Nigeria and beyond. Fulani cattle, particularly those semi-settled in the north-west and north-central regions, have been major targets. Cattle rustlers have killed

hundreds of Fulani in the past years few years and stolen thousands of cattle.[1]

Increased pressure on land and water in rural areas, combined with inappropriate, weak or non-existent state interventions to mediate and resolve growing tensions are parts of the key drivers of the conflict. Farmers in many parts of rural northern Nigeria and, to some extent, the south have suffered significant crop damage due to encroachment by herders and their cattle into their farms. On the other hand, pastoralists are experiencing the widespread obstruction and occupation of designated cattle routes and loss of grazing land as farmers cultivate these areas. This pushes pastoralists in some cases to move their cattle across farms or rear them on crops instead of grass (Higazi and Yousuf, 2016).

Other significant drivers are the changing demographic, ecological and climate conditions and their impacts on agricultural and pastoral production systems. As noted earlier, the northern parts of the country have been experiencing serious climate change issues, including rising aridity due to desertification. The massive damming of rivers in the region has reduced the flow of water and the number of flooded plains that were grazing land historically. All-season farming through the *fadama* and the appropriation of *fadama* wetlands by farmers have contributed significantly also to the herders' southward movement and the consequent conflict. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) and the almost total failure of the state in rural governance have aggravated these conflicts. The years of failure and the growing number of ungoverned territories across the country have weakened the capacity of the state. The traditional conflict management system also has collapsed under the weight of the corrupt and exclusively formal policing and security architecture.

Pastoralists are one of the most excluded communities in the country, without a national presence or identity. They enjoy no recognition as belonging in most communities, irrespective of years of habitation there. Governance is weak in rural areas, and the heavy dependence on the oil economy has caused the neglect and decline of the agricultural sector, especially the pastoral economy. Generally, the public has lost a sense of the economic value of livestock and its contribution to the economy. Nigeria abolished the cattle tax nationally in the mid-1980s. The disregard for the economic value of

1. Cattle rustlers are armed robbers literally who steal cattle, a common phenomenon in East Africa (Higazi and Yousuf, 2016).

pastoralism, notwithstanding, its politics has risen in prominence. The farmer-herder conflict fits perfectively into the narrative of "Hausa-Fulani" domination in the north-central region, and some present the conflict politically as involving Islamic "expansionism." Sometimes, others incorrectly link it to the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east. This has intensified the insecurity and political and ethnic profiling of Fulani pastoralists.

Prospect for Reforms

State response to the escalating violent conflict between herders and farmers has been problematic historically. Some in the northern parts of the country consider this conflict to be normal. The state sends in the police or military to deal with the situation when it escalates, often resulting in the killing of innocent people on both sides, mass arrests, and extortion. We have seen in the last few years an increasing politicisation of the issue, as narratives of federal government support for herders began to gain prominence. These narratives stand on the simplistic basis that President Buhari shares the same ethnic identity with the herders and, therefore, necessarily supports their activities. They interpret the historical failure of the Nigerian state as a regime issue. Some state governments, apparently frustrated or in need of political gains, resorted to self-help. This included passing discriminatory legislation and constituting and arming of vigilante groups, ostensibly to defend farming communities against the "marauding" herders. Others have resorted to mobilising communities to unleash violence against sometimes innocent herders.

Media sensationalism also has encouraged hate against pastoral communities—comprising principally the Fulani, whom the media have presented as generally violent and should not enjoy the right of free movement. Pictures of herders carrying AK47 assault rifles gained prominence in national newspapers, although most of them were in fact of South Sudanese and Kenyans. Media reporting of this conflict have been deeply prejudicial to the pastoralists. Media reports almost inevitably present the farmers' accounts *verbatim* and play on the readers' stereotypes of the Fulani as violent, unpredictable nomads. However, they pay no attention to the structural factors underlying the conflict and, consequently, make no effort to rethink the agro-pastoral policies involved (Blench 2003).

There is little political will at present to resolve farmer-pastoralist disputes, and political discourse has contributed in fact, to the increased *scapegoating* of Fulani pastoralists. The conflation at state and national political levels of

farmer-pastoralist conflicts with inter-communal tensions, and the activities and spread of Boko Haram, risks undermining potential conflict resolution mechanisms.

Our key recommendations include:

1. *Provide incentives to support the settlement of pastoralists*. The government should provide incentives to herders to settle as agro-pastoralists and establish cattle farms. For example, the Bank of Agriculture to operate special loan schemes for them. Pastoralism should be treated as an economic venture, not just a cultural practice. The government should encourage investment in the sector and provide the necessary resource for its development. Funding research on breed improvement and feeding regimes, and introducing academic programmes to produce trained personnel in range management will improve the system and encourage other types of investment;
2. *Invest in local land use and conflict management initiatives*. The federal and state governments should initiate policies and mechanisms to facilitate and support land management and allocation to farmers and pastoralists in rural areas. This could include a comprehensive assessment and mapping of the existing network of transhumance routes, including those that have been blocked.[2] This could facilitate the reopening of blocked routes. The policies should also involve establishing and strengthening conflict mediation, resolution, reconciliation and peace-building mechanisms, working principally with local community institutions;
3. *Strengthen State capacity to respond to rural security challenges and enhance the security of herders and farming communities*. The growing insecurity is not only undermining productivity, it is also causing the loss of lives and property and the displacement of thousands of people. Improved security will require that governments and security agencies sustain campaigns against cattle rustling and rural banditry, improve early-warning systems, and maintain the operational readiness of rural police and other security units. They will also have to encourage communication and collaboration with local authorities and tighten control of the production, circulation and possession of illicit firearms and ammunition, especially automatic rifles. This has to include strengthening

2. The 1998 ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol places the national governments of signatory-states under obligation to maintain these routes.

cross-border co-operation with neighbouring countries' security forces (International Crisis Group 2017). It is also necessary to introduce cattle identifications for registration, traceability and movements monitoring to allow for proper tracking of rustled cattle;

4. *Reclaim grazing reserves/routes and establish new ones in consenting states*. This will help minimise contact and, consequently, conflict between herders and farmers. The process will entail gazetting already existing reserves and developing new ones in states where the government and communities are open to it. It requires also formulating and implementing the ten-year National Ranch Development Plan proposed by a stakeholder forum facilitated by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in April 2017. Finally, it calls for encouraging livestock producers' buy-in through easier access to credit from financial institutions (International Crisis Group, 2017). Reviving the grazing reserves and transhumance routes requires the federal government to update existing legislation and the state governments to implement them;
5. *Invest in Rural development*. The farmer-herder conflict is part of the rural crisis arising from the long neglect of the rural areas. It is necessary, therefore, that the government take the rural areas more seriously. About half of the population of the country still reside in rural areas. Actions could include investing in education and employment generation, which will help diversify livelihoods away from pastoralism is a viable option. This has important security implications as well, given the rise in young men turning to organised banditry and crime within pastoralist communities. Rebuilding the system of nomadic education, and education generally in rural areas, is key (Higazi and Yousuf, 2016);
6. *Develop climate change mitigation and adaptation measures*. The authorities will need to take issues of climate change very seriously. They will need to invest in diverse mitigation efforts, including building green walls and discouraging the construction of dams—especially in northern Nigeria. They will also need to educate farmers and herders on sustainable and agriculture include how to cope with the inevitable impacts of climate change**.**

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Chapter 6 | Herdsman-Farmer Clashes in North-Central Nigeria: Implications for Peace and Nation-building

Eugene T. Aliegba

Introduction

This presentation looks at the herdsman-farmer clashes in central Nigeria, with a focus on Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba, Niger, and Kogi states as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and southern Kaduna. It analyses the nature and sources of the crisis and its implications for national unity and nation-building. It then makes recommendations.

Nature and Dimensions of the Clashes

Clashes between herdsmen and farmers in North-Central Nigeria are common in Nigeria's history (Blench, 2002; Gambo, 2017). However, its present, more dangerous stage started in 2011. Its particulars differ in Benue, Niger, Nasarawa, Kogi, Plateau, Kwara states and the FCT; however, common to them is the great loss of life from violent attacks by herdsmen (Asishaua, 2017:7).

Human Rights Watch reported in 2013 that violence between Fulani and farmers in local communities had killed more than 3,000 people since 2010. The violence claimed another 1,000 lives across five states between December 2013 and April 2014 and over two hundred in 2015.

Nigerian Fulani pastoralists, the masterminds of this carnage, operate extensively in West Africa and the Central Africa Republic. They are the fourth deadliest terror group globally after the Islamic State (ISIS), Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, according to the Global Terrorism Index. By 2014, the group reportedly had killed 1,229 people, operating mostly in the Nigerian Middle Belt where each of their attacks claims on the average eleven lives. Benue, Nasarawa, and Taraba states and the southern part of Kaduna State are particularly hard-hit. From 2013 to the first half of 2016, these states had witnessed close to a hundred major attacks on communities. Over 5000

persons perished in these attacks. One attack early in the year in Agatu Local Government Area claimed over three hundred lives, including children and women (Ihuah, 2017: iii).

These clashes arise from the movement of livestock by herdsmen first from the northern to the central parts of Nigeria. Second, there is movement also into the country through its northern borders with neighbouring countries—especially Mali, Niger, Chad and Cameroon—into the north-central region. This migration occurs for reasons that include (Takaya, 2017):

1. *Desertification*: Statistics indicate that fifteen northern states, representing a whopping 63% of Nigeria's landmass, are experiencing desertification. Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Kano, Jigawa, Yobe, Borno, Gombe, Plateau, Taraba, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Niger, and Kebbi states lose up to 350,000 hectares of land to desertification annually (Oluwamuyiwa, 2017:16);
2. Availability of rivers and rich wetlands outside the north with the capacity to feed animals;
3. Better animal health services nation-wide in contrast to previously when the forest zones were tsetse fly-infested and deadly to animals;
4. Increase in the animal population today, hence the need to expand grasing areas;
5. The cultural attraction of northern Nigeria to foreign herdsmen of Mali, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, especially those of Hausa-Fulani extraction and who are Muslims;
6. Porous borders and entry points;
7. Absence of taxation, which makes livestock farming cheaper;
8. Potential tolerance of migrants for electoral benefits.

This grasing issue frequently results in the destruction of crops by cattle, which sometimes graze also on harvested crops, thus initiating a cycle of violent reprisals by farmers and herdsmen (Tonah, 2006; MUT, 2016; Olayoku, 2014).

Conflict between these the Tiv and Fulani over farm-lands was usually mild before these coordinated and sustained attacks began in the early 2000s. Pastoralist Fulani would arrive and formally request for permission to camp and grase, which was granted usually. Any infringement on the farmers' crop was amicably settled through traditional conflict settlement mechanisms. However, the conflict resolution mechanisms appear to have collapsed due to the pattern of newly arriving pastoralist Fulani beginning in 2000. At that time, Fulani pastoralists started arriving without their families, only male adult

with their herds and sophisticated weapons—including AK-47 rifles—in hand. Armed conflict between these groups began to assume dramatic dimensions, particularly since 2011, with instances in Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa, and Benue states.

Cattle routes and grasing reserves have been with us for a long time. They were the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and later the Veterinary Division, and they allowed no farming or development on these routes. These helped the cattle Fulani to move southward and back when weather conditions were too wet. There are four hundred and fifteen grasing reserves in the country, of which only one hundred and twenty have been gazetted. However, some of the gazetted have experienced a high level of encroachment. Kachia is the most developed grasing reserve in Nigeria, yet it faces many challenges (Dafwang, 2016).

Since 1954, we have not been able to develop any of the four hundred and fifteen reserves to any appreciable level nor demarcate up to 100 km of stock route. These routes have disappeared over time and cannot be traced (Daily Trust, 20 March 2017:9).

North-Central Nigeria and the Clashes between Herdsmen and Farmers

The clashes between herdsmen and farmers arise from the heavy presence of herdsmen and their grasing animals in predominantly farming areas. North-central Nigeria is attractive to herdsmen because its climate is good for all types of agriculture such as:

1. Grains (rice, maize, sorghum, millet and even wheat and barley) and legumes (beans, ground-nuts, peas, bambara, etc.);
2. Fruits and tree crops (citrus, mango, apple, pineapple, coffee, cocoa, tea, etc.);
3. Root crops (yam, cassava, coco-yam, and their temperate varieties such as beet-roots, radish, parsnips, etc.);
4. Vegetables (tomatoes, water-melons, cabbages, and even exotic temperate vegetables like broccoli, cauliflower, fennel, sage, basil, mint, etc.);
5. Livestock grasing and other forms of animal husbandry—whether commercial or pastime—(cattle, goats, sheep, piggery, pack animals, poultry, or rabbits, snails and grass-cutters);
6. Year-round crop cultivation by rain-fed and fadama-irrigated farming (Takaya, 2017:5).

The region is also hospitable to outsiders and peaceful. It has inexhaustible commercial and industrial potential—with hardly any rivals—as well as much food and a comparatively low cost of living (Takaya, 2017:5).

Effects of the Clashes on Peace and Nation-building

The clashes between herdsmen and farmers have generated effects and consequences which disrupt peace and makes nation-building difficult.

It has triggered ethno-religious tensions, raising fears of Hausa-Fulani dominance and plots to Islamise Nigeria, especially in the predominantly Christian areas of Benue, Plateau, and Nasarawa states. Such politicisation has worsened and complicated the situation (Adogi, 2013). This has been the work of bodies like the Myetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MCBAN) and the Al-Haya,[1] on the one hand, and Christian groups, on the other. For example, the local branch chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Rev. Ahmad Dan Aliyu, said after the seventeenth attack on Kkrum and surrounding villages in Bauchi State (Ishaku, 2017:157):

> This is not the first time they (Fulani herdsmen) would attack Christian communities in this area. They started attacking and killing before, during, and after the (2011) election. They killed and maimed people, especially women and children… Their intention was to prevent us from voting. And things become worse for us when a Christian was voted as President of the country. So, up till now, the post-election violence is still affecting us.

There are too many internal wars in the country. A nation at war with itself can neither be united nor enjoy peace. This has engendered persistent calls for restructuring, etc. All this is due to the perceived dominance by a group that is using its political power to marginalise others and, in the clashes between farmers and herders, favour the latter.

There is so much preaching of hatred. Indeed, messages of fear and hatred have become the norm in the country, especially central Nigeria communities, creating enmity even between migrant groups and indigenous communities that previously cohabited peacefully. As one scholar observed:

This toxic brew of religious and ethnic friction is being compounded by a carefully orchestrated message of fear… stained hatred has been polished

1. The Fulani dominate the former and the Shuwa and Kanuri the latter.

and presented to the impoverished peasant. Nigerians scattered in our rural areas as well as depressed citizens on the streets of cities struggling under the tough economy (Okonkwo, 2017:48).

This has awakened a dangerous minority nationalism much inclined towards armed violence to eliminate perceived enemies (Fulani). Tribes in Taraba, Benue, Nasarawa have formed alliances to fight Fulani herdsmen.

The conflict has resulted in the destruction of farms and cessation of farming activities in agricultural zones and, thus, in hunger and high food prices. This is coming at a time when agriculture is at the heart of Nigeria's economic diversification strategy. One evidence of its impact is the disclosure by the Minister of State for Agriculture and Rural Development, Heineken Lokpobiri, that Nigeria spends about $22 billion a year on food importation. The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Audu Ogbe, made a similar statement in early 2016: according to him, Nigeria spends a whopping $20 billion on food importation annually (Ishaku, 2017). Farmers and their families displaced by the conflict have become refugees and, with their children out of school, the school system has collapsed in these areas.

Electoral fraud: politicians take advantage of the absence of people in the communities to rig elections by bringing in "results" from deserted communities.

There are too many sophisticated arms available in the society, such as long-range and heavy artillery, nocturnal helicopters dropping supplies, and intensive arms production locally. Worse is that some groups have begun to use chemical weapons (Ishaku, 2017:190). In February 2014, newspapers reported an attack on the Sengev community in Gwer West Local Government Area of Benue State during which invading Fulani herdsmen using chemical weapons killed fifteen people. The corpses of the fifteen were reportedly without visible wounds, whether from gunshots or other weapons, but were foaming at the mouth. There were also similar reports from other locations in the state. The National Agency for Food, Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) subsequently investigated and confirmed the allegation. Its Director-General, Dr Paul Orhii, said: "Chemical weapons have been used on our people… for the first time; I saw it yesterday. It was concealed in canister shells"[2] (Ishaku,

2. Dr Orhii, the Agency's Director-General at the time, was speaking to journalists after a fact-finding visit to the area.

2017:198).

The poor handling by the security gives the impression of divisions within Nigeria's security organs on religious and ethnic conflicts that disrupt peace and threaten nation-building. For instance, the law enforcement agencies have not arrested any major tribal leaders—especially on the side of the Fulani—when they perpetrate violence or make inflammatory statements. The following is a case point: Suspected herdsmen killed Senator Gyang Dantong and Hon. Gyang Fulani on 8 July 2012 in Barkin Ladi. Following a mass evacuation notice for the area by the STF to allow a special military operation to find the culprits, Dr Tilde, a Daily Trust columnist, wrote on 18 August 2012:

> …when the Fulani in Riyom and Barkin Ladi were given [a] quit notice by the STF last month, I immediately got in touch with the Sultan the supreme commander of the Fulani in Nigeria to register my disapproval to the order… meanwhile he (Sultan) agreed with me that the Fulani should disregard the order. I conveyed his stand to them (Fulani) (Bagudu, 2017:46).

In defending the Fulani, Saleh Bayeri leader of Myetti Allah in an interview in the Nation Newspaper of 7 May 2016, gave a glimpse into the mind of the Fulani-herdsmen. He states:

> The Fulani herdsmen have this instinct of wanting to take revenge. It is in their nature. It is inherent, and in his blood even from his traditional activities. So if you strike a Fulani man today, wait for him another time. So when you hear that herdsmen attacked a community, just ask if there was no… clash say, ten, fifteen years ago (Wegh, 2017:110).

We must acknowledge that the Sultan of Sokoto, the leader of Muslims and Fulani in Nigeria, has consistently condemned the acts of terrorist Fulani and insisted they should be arrested.

Politics and governance in the country are drifting towards ethno-religious polarisation. Religion and ethnicity are effective tools of mobilisation, and politicians and elites are using them to acquire power and influence.

Religious/Jihadist tendency to Islamise Nigeria. This has caused the Church and Christian leaders to be outspoken in the crisis.

Intensification of criminal activities in the country leading to heighten cattle rustling first within the herdsmen themselves and the herdsmen and host communities.

Nigeria's national security is under threat from foreign herdsmen and

mercenaries recruited to foment armed conflict in the country. According to sources, some Chadians and Nigeriens were among those arrested in Jos. The foreign fighters, the report said, "were not brought in by Muslim extremist groups nor were they affiliates of foreign extremists." The evidence of the presence of foreign fighters among the attackers was also compelling at the height of the siege by herdsmen on Plateau State communities in 2013. There were similar narratives of strange elements in the conflict from Benue State. Governor Muazu Babangida of Niger State sent away two hundred "Fulani" who had settled in a part of Niger State, believing that they were foreigners who may start an armed conflict there. He said that these migrants had no relations in the state nor could they speak Hausa the *lingua franca* of the North (Ishaku, 2017:193).

Recommendations

The following recommendations can help address this problem and strengthen national unity and peace:

1. Establish livestock agriculture as a business. Nigeria seems interested more in moving animals more than their meat; however, animals bred in ranches and fed with good grass would likely be healthier and produce better meat for the citizens. We should devise better models of livestock management like other countries have done, e.g., Brazil (Duran, 2014);
2. Run programmes for managing desert encroachment and expanding afforestation;
3. Form herdsman-farmer peace committees within communities. This will make it easier to isolate terrorist herdsmen as well as reduce cattle rustling and create peace between herdsmen and farmers;
4. Isolate killer herdsmen from indigenous ones clearly and handle their issues separately;
5. Enforce impartiality by security personnel in handling these conflicts to avoid engendering citizen distrust of the state and boost citizen confidence that it can protect and promote their interest;
6. Apprehend and prosecute herdsmen openly bearing arms;
7. Promulgate a law to manage and regulate these movements. The Gombe legislation could be a model;
8. Improve basic infrastructures such as electricity generation and transmission. This will improve irrigation facilities in the country. The government also must revive rail transportation in the country to facilitate

the movement of animals;

9. Conduct studies towards the modernisation of grasing reserves. This must go along with the introduction and promotion of grasing grasses all-year-round in areas that can sustain them (wetlands). Countries with fewer wetlands, such as Chad and Niger, raise good and healthy cattle;
10. The federal government should vigorously pursue its programme to create a 3,000-person agro-rangers force to protect farmers and secure farm investment in Nigeria. This group is reportedly to constitute a unit in the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) (*Daily Sun*, 4 July 2017:15).

Conclusion

A major problem in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is the need to respect and recognise the component groups. Conflict erupts when some of them believe they are not receiving fair treatment, and such conflict might become violent if the situation persists. Nigeria's development indices are not impressive: the country ranking in 2016 as the one hundred and fifty-ninth of one hundred and seventy-seven in human development. Indeed, poverty is high in the country (Orabuchi, 2017:17) and governance is not effectively addressing issues that affect the greater part of the population.

We need to stop playing politics with the conflict between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria because politicising it condones lawlessness and disorder, which lead to the breakdown of law and order. The government's failure to police the issue well in north-central Nigeria engenders feelings of neglect and betrayal in the indigenous groups and encourages resort to self-protection, producing a drift into anarchy. Peace, progress and development will continue to elude Nigeria insofar as our leaders ignore the interests of the country and the majority of its citizens. The issues of justice, fairness and equity will continue to plague the new countries that will emerge if Nigeria "breaks up," because their leaders will not be 'born again.' For they will be the same leaders who have pauperised and underdeveloped the country and its citizens.

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Chapter 7 | Herdsman-Farmer Clashes in North-Central Nigeria: Implications for Peace and Nation-building

Y. Z. Ya'u

Introduction

In the last two years or so, the herdsman-farmer conflict has assumed a prominent place in the violence landscape of the country. Both the frequency and intensity of these clashes have increased. Next to the Boko Haram insurgency, it produces probably the most loss of lives and destruction of property in the country. Kaduna and Plateau states seemed for a long time the epicentre of the conflict because of the killings there. In more recent times, however, Benue and Taraba states seem to shoulder most of the death burden. That is excepting Zamfara State, which has experienced the longest run of the conflict and recorded more destruction and deaths than any other state. That the Zamfara tragedy features little in the mass media says much about their preferences, which seem to be for narratives of the conflict in terms of north-south or Christian-Muslim.

The herder-farmer conflict is perhaps also the most extensive territorially, today covering much of the north-west, north-central, and even parts of the south-east and south-west. Additionally, it has provided cover for other forms of criminal activities including kidnapping, cattle rustling, rural banditry, and outright armed robbery.

It has assumed a quasi-ethnoreligious character, with an uncritical and sensationalist media proclaiming it the new front of the jihad against Christians. Politicians from both sides, long unable to justify their electoral mandate, are taking positions on the issue that undermine confidence in the possibility of resolving it. Yet this is a conflict whose resolution requires an open mind and recognition of it as a consequence of the failure to modernise Nigeria's economy.

A Short Recent History of the Herdsman-Farmer Conflict

Current media coverage of the herdsman-farmer conflict creates the impression that it is a recent development or occurs only in north-central Nigeria. This conflict, typical of competitions between farmers and herdsmen over land and its resource, has gone on for a long time. Indeed, the Emir of Katsina did draw attention to this around 1930, urging all stakeholders to do something to prevent it (Joda, 2017). It was partly in response to this and to control herd migration that the colonial authorities and the immediate post-independence governments embarked on demarcating grasing reserves and tracks. Neither the devastation nor the killings associated with it are new. What is new are the wider expanse of the conflict area and the higher number of killings with the introduction of guns in place of sticks, bows, and arrows.

The conflict's trajectory is clear from even an abridged history of its career in recent times. A major herdsman-farmer clash engulfed the northern part of Bauchi State in the early 1990s, covering Katagum, Itas, Zaki, Jamaare, and Gamawa local government areas. Hundreds of people died, many villages rased, and properties destroyed. It took long before peace returned. The population in these areas is a mix of Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, and Badawa. These Fulani, including those who keep cattle, are farmers. A survey put at one hundred and forty the number of farmer-herdsman conflicts in Bauchi and Gombe State from 1996 to 2002 (Abbass, 2012).

The conflict moved to parts of Yobe and Jigawa States in 1997/1998. These parts are contiguous with the northern part of Bauchi State. This may mean that the fighting in these states represented a northward movement of the violence that had occurred in the northern local governments of Bauchi State in the early 1990s. The ethno-religious mix of these three states is similar, and many Fulani are farmers in each. The conflict moved years later to Zamfara State, which bears its main burden today. It subsequently turned to Kaduna, Plateau, and Benue and is now extending to Enugu. A second strand from Kaduna (and Zamfara) states stretches to Niger and Kwara states and down to the South West. It met and blended with an existing ethno-religious conflict in Kaduna State.

The farmer-herdsmen conflict was, therefore, entirely predictable. Its movement is traceable and its outcome foreseeable. Also, it is a resource-utilisation conflict—contrary to its media portrayal as religious, with some screaming that the herdsmen aim to Islamise the country. The predictability of its movement should enable a competent government to arrest new outbreaks

before they occur. However, Nigeria's governments have repeatedly responded only after the clashes.

Herdsmen without Herds

The literature claims that herdsmen supply about 90% of the beef consumed in the country. This seems so on the surface; however, the actual situation—the outcome of recent developments—is that the herdsmen do not own much of the cattle they keep. Ownership and dispossession are principal questions in the changes taking place: who owns the herds and who only keeps them? They are vital to understanding the herdsmen and farmer conflict. The disregard for statistics is, unfortunately, a key characteristic of our national life; without reliable statistics, however, socio-economic planning or even the comprehension of social issues is difficult, if not impossible. Over the last fifteen years, there is a gradual but hardly studied trend about what I call the *de-herdsmenisation* of the Fulani. They are losing their herds through a variety of ways, including:

1. *Massive cattle loss to rustling*: Interestingly, Nigeria has not experienced a beef shortage though the Boko Haram crisis cut the northern supply chain that provides about 40% of its beef needs. That is because cattle rustling made up the shortfall. We may discern the magnitude of cattle rustling in the area from the report by the Sarkin Fulani of Gundi that his family lost over five hundred cattle to the gangs.[1] Similarly, Mohammadu Chibi of Bishini in Kaduna State reported that he lost three hundred and twenty cattle to rustlers (Ujorha, 2017);
2. *Depletion of the cattle stock by disease*: The herdsmen leave the well-being of their animals to nature and its elements. Some nomadic Fulani vote in elections but most do not because they are usually on the move. They consequently have little bargaining power with politicians for the delivery of social amenities: even the nomadic schools established years ago are hardly functioning. They do not feel the presence of the state positively;
3. *Increasing desertification*, which makes pasture hard to come by and depletes the cattle stock by hunger. The movement to greener areas in the south has caused many conflicts, in which people and cattle have

1. The Sarkin was speaking at a seminar by the Zaria-based Centre for Democratic Development and Training (CEDDERT).

died. Those unable to move have not fared better. They see their herds dying from lack of food;

4. *Dispossession of herdsmen*: With many Fulani struggling to maintain their herds, the rich have started buying up their cattle cheaply and entrusting them to the dispossessed Fulani for keeping. Some of these wealthy owners have established private ranches, but some still have their cattle herded in the traditional free grasing mode in and around major settlements. Some engage in the cattle business probably as a means of money laundering and are the ones mostly who entrust their herds to the Fulani.

De-herdsmenisation is also transferring ownership of cattle to the urban rich, mostly generals, politicians, and top civil servants. Many Fulani are consequently now keepers of cattle they do not own. Since the herd owners understandably wish to keep a close eye on their property, the herders have to live permanently close to the major settlements where the former reside. However, this means herding cattle in environments where land is scarcer and put to a variety of uses, thus creating a potential conflict situation. The numerous Fulani *de-herded* of cattle, possessing no other skills or means of livelihood, have found places in the criminal economy of cattle rustling and kidnapping, and profit from the conflict.

But What is the Cause?

Theoretically, the conflict is over land: the farmers want land for crops, the herders want land for fodder. Access to land and water is at the root of the conflict. It is simplistic to leave the matter there, however. Farmers and herdsmen have had a long history of peaceful co-existence across the vast area of northern Nigerian. Indeed, a symbiotic relationship existed between farmers and herdsmen. The farmers would invite the herdsmen after harvest to camp on their farms, ensuring the fertilisation of their land with the dung and other excreta of the cattle. The current seemingly intractable conflict is thus the result of a combination of factors that have modified how both farmers and herdsmen see and use the land and the resources on it.

It is also occurring at a time when land for fodder is diminishing and the demand for farmland is rising. Nigeria has seen massive growth in population. But in the years from 1986 to early 2000, it also saw the extensive decimation of the middle class. This spurred families to seek coping strategies and, in the

absence of industrial jobs and the shrinking of commercial activities, farming became the only available alternative. But land has become both scarcer and less productive due to a combination of factors, further increasing the need to bring more land into cultivation.

The compromise between herdsmen and farmers in the past involved restricting the former to designated grasing routes and fields and the latter to tending their farms. The herders would usually negotiate agreements with the farmers on grasing their cattle on farmland. These might require the herdsmen to assist the farmers in moving their produce to safe temporary storage before the former moved their cattle into the farms. The parties settled transgressions of their agreements by the herders paying compensation to the farmers. The colonial authorities and the early post-independence military regimes enforced this system because they had an incentive to do so. This was that the state collected the cattle tax by ensuring that herdsmen followed only designated routes and grased their cattle only in approved grasing fields.

These community pacts have collapsed and things have changed. The present crisis is due to the inability to manage this change. It is in a sense about the failure of the state to modernise its agricultural policies and practices.

Factors Driving the Movement of Herdsmen Further South

The movement to the south by herdsmen may appear natural: it is not. It is a response to the failure to plan for the cattle in a system in which open grasing is dominant. Comprehension of the factors that have induced the movement southward by Fulani herders is vital to understanding the conflict in the north-central region. A relationship exists between these factors and the decreases in, on the one hand, the amount of land available for fodder and, on the other, its capacity to grow fodder.

When the Kano State government (under the People's Redemption Party, PRP) and later other state governments abolished the cattle tax, they lost interest in enforcing the orderly movement of herdsmen. This had two results. First, farmers converted grasing lands into farmland since no authority was keeping watch and, second, herdsmen moved without documentation since they were no longer a revenue source for the governments.

Two other processes have compounded this situation:

1. *Desertification* has overtaken much of the grassland of the upper north, forcing herdsmen to move southwards;
2. *The rising population* has resulted in land hunger and, coupled with

falling soil productivity and desertification, driven farmers to encroach on grasing lands in the north. A study by the Zamfara State government, for example, shows that over 50% of the officially-designated grasing fields and routes have become farmland. The table below shows this.[2] Muhammad-Baba and Tukur, (2015) also report similar encroachment on grasing reserves in Kaduna, Bauchi, Katsina, Plateau, Niger and Kogi states.

Impacts of other Conflicts

However, the southward movement by herdsmen is not due to climate change and land hunger alone. Conflicts in Nigeria and the wider West African region also propel it. Many Fulani had to flee conflict areas in some West African states, including Mali and Niger, where perennial conflict made it difficult for herdsmen to graze their cattle. Similarly, many Fulani—particularly in the north-east—left the region because they were vulnerable to attacks and cattle seizure by Boko Haram insurgents. The vast Sambissa Forest in Borno State was home to many Fulani herdsmen before Boko Haram took control of it; many have left it since. Also, cattle seizure and harassment by Boko Haram insurgents have forced many Fulani formerly inhabiting the Balmo Forest in Bauchi State to move elsewhere. Cattle rustling gangs have forced others out by occupying their habitats. This is the case along the Rugu Forest up north and runs through both Katsina and Zamfara States only to join the Kamuku Forest which itself traverses Kebbi, Zamfara, Kaduna and Niger States.

Moving into the Middle Belt

The combination of these factors is responsible for the southward movement of the herdsmen in search of fodder. This movement is taking place without state regulation of its path or where the herdsmen could graze their herds. Compounding this absence of organisation is the fact that many herdsmen are fleeing other conflicts.

The herdsmen not only had no incentive up until the early 1970s to move south but also faced a barrier to such movement: the tsetse flies that made grasing south of Kaduna impossible. This is not to say that there were no Fulani in north-central Nigeria: Awogbade (1983) documented the presence of quite sizeable populations of them on the plateau even before the colonial period. Cattle could not graze deep into the north-central region in the colonial period,

however, and only did so during a short window in the year. The tsetse fly belt was a natural barrier to their movement. Tsetse flies not only infected the herdsmen but also killed the cattle. In an attempt to eradicate sleeping sickness in the country, the government ran a successful campaign, spraying the forests and killing tsetse flies in their habitats. This was one of the most successful health campaigns in the country. Cattle could now graze in those lands south of Kaduna once the campaign eradicated the tsetse flies. There was no effort, however, to create and maintain well-demarcated grasing lands and routes.

This is not to say that there are no grasing reserves outside the north-east and north-west. Some of the over four hundred and fifteen grasing reserves owned by the federal government are in the middle belt and even further south. Consequently, there were no defined grasing routes or reserves in much of the middle belt and the south. However, there were hardly clashes in those early days when cattle started moving in because there was sufficient land for both farmers and herdsmen. The need to bring more land into cultivation is obvious as land hunger intensifies in the middle belt. The states in north-central Nigeria have witnessed a population explosion like in other parts of the country.

On the other hand, the herdsmen's movement to the middle belt is no longer for brief periods as more of the north becomes permanently dry and unable to support fodder production. It has become a migration to settle permanently in the region. In the past, the herdsmen moved down south during the dry season and back up north when the raining season set in. Now with little grass in many of the previous pasture areas in the upper north, they remain in parts of the middle belt during both dry and raining seasons. These environmental pressures, combined with the now permanent presence of herdsmen in the middle belt, and the absence of clearly demarcated grasing fields, set the context for the herder-farmer conflicts.

The Conflict in the Middle Belt

There are three key features of the herdsman-farmer conflicts in the middle belt that are different from those of the north-east and north-west. First, the Fulani in the north-east and north-west are both farmers and herdsmen, giving the conflict both an intra-ethnic (within Fulani) and inter-ethnic (Fulani-Hausa) character. In the north-central, in contrast, the Fulani are almost exclusively herders and the indigenous people predominately farmers, the conflict thus manifesting as entirely inter-ethnic.

Second, the conflict assumes an inter-religious character in the north-

central because the assumption there is that the herdsmen are exclusively Muslim and the farmers Christian. This contrasts with the situation in the north-east and north-west where both farmers and herdsmen are predominantly Muslim, thus denying the conflict a religious colouration. It appears in the north-east as a conflict between non-Muslim herdsmen and Muslim farmers, since the average rural peasant there does not see the nomadic Fulani as Muslims, which is true sometimes.

Third, the herdsman-farmer conflicts in the north-east and north-west occurred during military rule, excepting those in Zamfara and Katsina states. In the north-central, in contrast, they only became a feature of the social landscape during the civilian dispensation. The ethno-religious co-manifestation of the conflict beclouds its agrarian nature, allowing its sensationalisation as a religious war in a political context of fear, suspicion, and mistrust.

Why Solutions Seem Elusive

Some factors make the problem seem intractable, particularly given the frequent recurrence of clashes in some communities. A key one is the poor understanding of the crisis. It is impossible to find a solution to it without understanding it, and Nigerians—within and outside government—have shown a remarkable lack of understanding of this phenomenon. Our focus on the identities of the parties results in our misunderstanding an agrarian crisis and failing to take action where the solution lies.

Our poor understanding of the conflict also makes us comfortable with stereotypes: for instance, that all Fulani are herders and Muslim and all farmers are Christian or non-Fulani. This is untrue. Some hold the wrong perception that herdsmen are all Fulani whereas some herd keepers belong to other ethnic groups, especially in the north-east (Muhammad-Baba and Tukur, 2015).

Our predisposition to conspiracy theories encourages the narrative that Fulani foreigners are responsible for the conflict, a common notion among the Fulani in the region and the people of the middle belt. How do we know this is true, and why do we allow them to foment conflict? Do we know who these Fulani foreigners are? There are three categories of Fulani in most, if not all the areas, where this conflict has occurred. The first are settled in the land and engaged in cattle husbandry and subsistence farming; the second, come south seasonally to graze their animals; and the third, are herders who fled other places.

There is a tension between these three groups. As the conflicts in Gawari

and Riyom show, the settled Fulani are targets of attacks by both sides—the herders, on the one side, and the farmers, on the other. The Gawari community had to shelter their "their own" Fulani who were attacked by others. No study has demonstrated which set of these herdsmen are prone to conflict and why. The new wave of grazers may be foreign to the new place they have entered but may not necessarily be foreigners. On the other hand, given the trans-border nature of pastoralism, there is no guarantee that among the new waves are also herdsmen from other countries. This demonstrates the need for a more diligent study of the movement of herds rather than an uncritical embrace of the simplistic assumptions we make daily.

The point above also shows a certain naivety in our understanding of pastoralism. The reality is that pastoralism in West Africa is trans-national; we must address it as such. The historical sources indicate that the Fulani dispersed from the Futa Jalon and Futa Toro in present-day Guinea and Gambia. They spread across most of West Africa, particularly in the countries of the savannah, and to countries in Central Africa—including Chad, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic. Some of them are sedentary but numerous are nomadic, moving with the dictates of the seasons. Many of the sedentary remain herders, only permanently bound to settlements; but the rest have lost their cattle and either become farmers or taken up other occupations in urban areas.

We also fail to address the corruption that is feeding on the conflict. Typical herdsmen have no time for long court cases as they are most of the time on the move. So they prefer to sell his cattle to settle corrupt state officials, who benefit more from conflicts than peace. It is noteworthy also that sellers offer rustled cattle—driven over long distances—for sale in Nigerian markets, and the security agencies are unable to apprehend the rustlers!

Our media pander to the sensational rather than seek solutions, allowing the deployment of hate speech and, thus, compounding the problem. Most media reports on the conflict are neither informed nor educative. They celebrate it rather than seek its resolution. As observed by Ibrahim and Dabugat (2015) there exists "the tendency to view rural banditry as an expression of social conflict induced by ethno-religious sentiments."

We look to the state for a solution to the conflict, ignoring the fact that state failure is a principal contributor to it. Who polices the borders? Who has the census of the movement of the herders? State failure is a factor in several aspects of the problem. The security agencies, particularly the police, do little as rustlers forage our forests, stalking herders and taking their herds. The

immigration service keeps the borders open for the inflow of undocumented people and cattle. Our courts are no longer where ordinary people go to seek for justice. The government itself has not shown the capacity to apprehend and address this moving conflict.

Implications for National Unity

The crisis has many implications for national unity and the corporate existence of the country. These include:

1. The economic effects of the crisis include the increasing food insecurity, general insecurity, loss of lives, etc. There can be no harvest when farmers are unable to farm or lose their crops. That will induce or exacerbate food shortages in the country, which—given that Nigeria is already a net importer of food—will have grave economic consequences. The food shortage can engender general disaffection, with the potential to exacerbate the centrifugal force in the country;

3. In the present context, communities are ready to dispense with human rights and pursue extra-judicial solutions. Communities on both sides prefer to dispense "justice" by themselves, the way they deem fit. Innocent people routinely lose their lives in the resulting spiral of mass killings, as has happened in southern Kaduna. This, of course, demonstrates a lack of confidence in the capacity of the state to dispense justice;
4. The conflict also involves the unresolved question of indigenes versus settlers (or, more correctly, indigeneship versus citizenship). There is also the nationality question: from where do the Fulani come? What is the nationality of trans-national herdsmen? Who determines this nationality? Which Fulani are Nigerian and which are not?
5. The question of the right to freedom of movement of individuals is also entering into the conversation. Some state governments have banned the movement of cattle and, therefore, herdsmen in their states;
6. Inevitably, it will also lead to an interrogation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) treaty of the free movement of people. The treaty allows citizens from all countries of the community to move freely in search of economic opportunities, jobs, means of livelihood, leisure, and tourism;
7. If unaddressed, it will transform gradually from an agrarian to an ethno-

religious conflict and further into a political crisis that will undermine national unity and cohesion.

Averting a Major National Crisis

It is urgent to address this conflict earnestly, given that others are piggy-backing on it. We must think outside the current tool-box—which has produced solutions that have been both *ad hoc* and ineffective, often addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of the problem. A productive approach must treat it as a problem of the modernisation of an agrarian society that is simultaneously experiencing the effects of climate change.

Consequently, our point of departure is to ask, where is Nigeria's national response to climate change? What are its goals? What are the strategies to achieve these goals? Without addressing this, the squeesing of Nigeria's population into the centre will continue unabated. The pressure on the land will become even more intense as more people move to the middle belt.

We must address climate change: What are governments and communities doing to address the challenge of climate change? *Nowhere to Run*, a film by the Yar'Adua Centre, shows how desertification in the north and deforestation, ocean surges, and other environmental degradation in the south are squeesing Nigerians to the centre. What are our agricultural research institutes doing to re-grassed grass-depleted regions?

We must undertake land ownership reform: Our land tenure system, especially at the community level, requires attention. Parents divide their landed property between several heirs, the inherited plots thus getting smaller in each generation. This is the source of land hunger in an economy that has failed to modernise its agriculture. There are two opposed responses to the land-use problem. On the one hand are those who want land to be freely available to those who can afford it and on the other are those who want it kept for the community. In between, the state governors remain the owners of our common endowment and corruptly allocate it however they wish.

Addressing state failure: Conflicts such as these are unsolvable without an accountable and willing state. The Nigerian state drives citizens to "do it yourself" solutions, which is feeding the spiral of revenge and reprisal. Take the dynamics of the most recent conflict in Kajuru in Kaduna State. A group considered indigenous in the area reportedly captured a "known notorious thief." They killed him instead of handing him over to the police. The Fulani, believing that his killing was not because he was a "known notorious thief" but

because he was a Fulani, decided to avenge his death and killed six people. In retaliation, the other party ransacked Fulani settlements in the area and killed more people (Andrew Agbese and Christiana T. Alabi, 2017). This illustrates that none of the parties has confidence in the state's ability to deliver justice.

The use of sophisticated weapons is a prominent issue involved in the current stage of the conflict. This is an example of state failure. How did the combatants in these conflicts get these arms? What are their sources? The circulation of small and large weapons means that our security agencies are not vigilant or have shut their eyes to the sale of arms in underground markets known to them. The use of sophisticated weapons in these conflicts makes it urgent that the governments improve arms control in the country. It also raises the question of the capacity of relevant state institutions to discharge their responsibility in this respect.

Bringing back the table: The table in the middle goes missing in hate-filled conversations. It is the classic case of what Daniel Kemmis (1990) refers to as the "vanishing table," a situation characterised by a stalemate rather than negotiation. No one is working to bring the warring farmers and herdsmen to the table for dialogue to enable them to understand their differences and develop a solution to their problem. What is happening is like the dialogue of the deaf: each party states its side of the dispute and casts itself as the victim. There is no effort to engage with each other to find a collective solution to the conflict. An us-or-them approach leaves the problem unaddressed while stoking the fire for new rounds of retaliation and revenge.

Addressing the mindset: We must also open up our minds in finding a solution to the conflict. We must abandon our stereotypes and engage in a more informed conversation that is grounded in realities rather than conspiracy theories. These stereotypes take us away from the crisis and into seeking solutions to the wrong problem. For example, the Taraba State governor described a bill he was signing into law that prohibited open grasing in the state as a response to the "rampaging killer herdsmen" (Ishaku, 2017). He was engaged in labelling here, for his implication was that all herdsmen were killers. The media is most unhelpful in this.

Would developing grasing ranges solve the problem? Many countries have adopted the development of ranches as a solution to the crisis between farmers and pastoralists. This is the debate now. Some states such as Benue and Taraba have already passed laws that cattle can only graze in ranches. Unfortunately, no one is taking the initiative to develop ranches. There are

three models of ranch development globally: the government-developed, owner-developed, the commercial ranches in which pastoralists can graze their cattle for a fee. The owner-developed model would be infeasible in our context because communities are unlikely to give their lands to herders for ranches. This is especially given the land hunger and growing distrust between farmers and herdsmen.

Finally, Nigeria cannot solve the problem of pastoralism in isolation of other West African countries since pastoralists move across national borders in the region. It must involve those countries in articulating a regional response to the problem.

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Chapter 8 | Herdsman-Farmer Conflicts and the Call for State Police in Nigeria

Solomon Ogbu

Introduction

The protracted violent clashes between herdsman-farmer in Nigeria in recent years have attracted national and international attention and condemnation because of the danger they pose to national survival and cohesion. There have always been episodes of herdsman-farmer conflicts even during the pre-colonial period. However, their dimension and scope have become alarming in recent years, particularly from 2011 is, in terms of their catastrophic consequences for human lives, properties, and the economy.

The orgy of violence has continued unabated despite efforts by security agencies and well-meaning Nigerians to end the catastrophe. It is still killing thousands of farmers and pastoralists, mostly in the middle belt states of Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, and Plateau as well as in Kaduna and Zamfara states (Archived, 2015). Three factors allegedly account for this conflict, which has appeared in Nigeria and most parts of the Sahel—including Ghana, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. The first is the phenomenal population increase that has intensified the pressure on land and water resources used by both farmers and pastoralists, especially in drought-prone areas. The blocking of transhumance routes and encroachment on farm-land are together the second factor. The third is the mass movement southward by pastoralists. This last factor has often led to violent clashes between herdsmen and farmers because the cattle destroy farm products (Foreign Affairs, 2015). The herdsmen, who are mostly Hausa-Fulani and reportedly responsible for most of the killings, claim that they have to bear arms for self-defense against possible attacks by farmers (Star, 2016).

Unfortunately, the response of the government to the imbroglio is *ad hoc*, half-hearted, and ineffective, allowing the violent attacks to continue unabated. This has prompted widespread agitations for the creation of state police to contain the situation.

The Problem

As highlighted earlier in the paper, the genesis, persistence, and consequences of the herdsman-farmer conflicts in Nigeria are multidimensional and far-reaching. These include uncontrolled population growth, which has put enormous pressure on grasing lands and farm-lands in a country of about 192 million people. Low rainfall in the far north, desertification, and the energy crisis—which is causing deforestation via tree-felling for firewood—are driving pastoralists southward in search of water and grass for their herds. The resistance by farmers to the encroachment on their farm-lands by these herdsmen and the destruction of crops by their cattle often trigger violence between the two. This has caused the loss of many lives (Thandiubani, 2016) and fuelled animosity and insecurity in the affected areas.

Grasing reserves—land designated for the exclusive or semi-exclusive use of pastoralists—allows a limited form of pastoralism and animal husbandry. Their absence is partly responsible for open grasing and the unrestricted movement of herders, resulting in persistent conflict between them and farmers. Grasing in reserves is the practice in countries such as India, Pakistan, Canada, and the U.S., which have modernised pastoral nomadism and thus forestalled or minimised herdsman-farmer violence. Nigeria has four hundred and seventeen grasing reserves, per the 1965 Grasing Reserve law, of which the government has gazetted only one hundred and thirteen. However, the enforcement of the grasing reserve law by both successive federal and state governments has been lackadaisical. This has created room for open grasing with all its catastrophic consequences.

The National Assembly attempted anew in 2016 to pass legislation establishing a grasing reserve in each state of the federation. This was to improve livestock yields and curb the incessant conflict between herders and farmers. The effort failed following opposition on the ground that the proposed law would favour herdsmen mainly at the expense of non-herdsmen. It would have been in any case violation of Section 41(1) of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, which states that:

Every citizen of Nigeria is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof, and no citizen of Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refused entry thereby or exit therefrom.

The present situation is that Nigeria lacks a comprehensive policy framework for livestock production. Extant laws that regulate pastoralism and livestock production have been dormant for decades. For example, the Northern

Grasing Reserve law is outdated and unenforced, the Land Use Act of 1978 seems to be non-functional, and pastoralists and other migrants blatantly abuse the ECOWAS Transhumance protocol. The sectorial and piecemeal approach to the problem of pastoralism cannot enduringly resolve the herdsman-farmer conflict. The Benue State anti-open grasing law and those under consideration in Ekiti, Taraba, Edo, and other states will not suffice because the herdsmen are likely to flout them.

Also, the media stereotyping of the herders as perpetrators and the farmers as victims only fuels the fires of religious and ethnic sentiments. More so as most of the herdsmen are Muslims of Hausa/Fulani stock and the farmers mostly Christians. This breeds suspicion and distrust as well as ethnic and religious bigotry, which often spark violent clashes between the two sides (http, Saharareporters, 2018).

The Call for State Police and Community Policing

The Nigerian Police Force and the other security forces as presently constituted cannot effectively meet the expectations of the citizenry with their current strength, equipment holdings and absence of modern crime-fighting capabilities (Gbajabiamila, 2018).

This statement by Hon. Femi Gbajabiamila, leader of the 8th House of Representatives, underscores the urgent need for state police forces in the country. Gbajabiamila demonstrated his conviction of the necessity for these agencies by sponsoring a bill in 2018 for their creation. This bill has passed second reading in the House and is under consideration in the Senate.

Arguments for Creation of State Police

Calls for the creation of state police have been loud, clear, and persistent from all sections of the society—politicians, the intelligentsia, community leaders, and the business community. The clamour arises from, among other things, the need to decentralise the police force in line with the devolution principle that is characteristic of the federal system globally. State police are standard in federal states, be it Canada, Switzerland, or the USA (Travils, 2008), where several police jurisdictions and forces co-exist. The present constitution of the police in Nigeria derives from Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The section provides that the Inspector-General of Police, an appointee of the President, is the chief security officer of the federation. The state governors are the chief security officers of their respective states under

the constitution. However, their state Commissioners of Police can only implement their directives with the express permission of the inspector-general (Peel, 2018).

Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo has lent his voice to the call for state police, arguing the need to complement the effort of the Nigeria Police Force to police all parts of the country effectively. The National Economic Council (NEC) also supports this call, arguing that the police force—as the first line of defense—should be expanded and restructured to cover all of Nigeria (Robert, 2017). Its proponents believe that state police will employ thousands of youths, easing the pressure on the government, the youths, their parents, and the entire society. The foregoing attests to the groundswell of support for state police in the country.

The Deputy-President of the 8th Assembly, Ike Ekweremadu, is among those calling for state police. He contends that only the institutionalisation of state police can guarantee the protection of life and property and the promotion of the citizen's welfare, which are the primary responsibilities of government. It will bring policing to the doorsteps of the helpless in the local communities.

Even the top echelons of the police force have admitted that its present architecture is over-centralised (George and Wyloff). They recommend even the establishment of community policing alongside state police forces. This would enable the law enforcement system to meet the security needs of communities that are far from the seat of government, the main concentration of police resources. The rationale for encouraging community policing is that its organs will mostly comprise young men who are conversant with the local culture, language, and security needs (Robert, 1994). The critical role of vigilante groups in checking local criminality and banditry testifies to the potentials of community policing in protecting life and property in rural communities (Bonnie, 1999). Community policing would actualise the slogan that, in the words of the Nigerian government, "security is everybody's business."

The support for state police and community policing is overwhelming and unequivocal. State police will make the police force an all-inclusive body that is adequately responsive to the security needs of the people. There can be no gainsaying the fact that state police will enhance the operational efficiency of the central Police Force. It will also mitigate the much talked about police brutality allegedly being perpetrated by the men of the central Police Force. State police can respond swiftly on the order of state governors to local disturbances, violent communal clashes, and aggressive actions by

militant groups such as the herdsmen. Such responses would not have to wait for usually-delayed directives from the Inspector-General of Police in Abuja.

Similarly, cooperation between state police and other police agencies could substantially curb kidnappings and armed robberies, which have become rampant across the country. It would also enhance the effectiveness of military operations against Boko Haram and law enforcement action against the Shi'ite movement, a looming threat to peace and security in the north.

Arguments against the Creation of State Police

Even as many are canvassing for the creation of state police forces, dissenting voices are warning against it. This is on the ground that Nigeria's dwindling resources make it difficult to finance an enlarged police force. Yahaya (2018) is one of them and has described the call for state police as counter-productive, ludicrous, and a ploy by state governors to drive the country into a *cul-de-sac*.

Generally, the critics hold that what is needed is to equip the existing police force better. The government should provide it with the fighting and surveillance facilities it needs to combat crime with professionalism and efficiency: helicopters, tracking devices, sophisticated weapons, etc. They argue further that the state governors are likely to hijack state police and use them to terrorise their real and imagined political enemies. State governors of the All Progressive Congress and the People's Democratic Party could, for example, use their state police to perpetrate electoral malpractices to favour themselves or their allies and parties. These practices might include ballot box snatching and ballot box stuffing, thereby manipulating and falsifying the results in their domains. These antagonists of state police allege that intimidation, as well as unlawful arrest and detention based on malicious accusations by state governors and their allies, will be rife under the state police regime.

Concluding Remarks

The first conclusion from our analysis of the herdsman-farmer conflict and the arguments for and against state police is that the government's response to that conflict has been half-hearted and ineffectual. This explains the continuance of the killings in the middle belt and other parts of the country. Besides, the killings and reprisal attacks have acquired an ethno-religious colouration, itself a serious threat to national security and unity.

The arguments of state police proponents are unassailable and compelling.

However, the journey to state police will be long and difficult, since it will require an amendment of Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The constitution's rigidity and the difficulty of altering it mean that citizens must bring immense pressure on the National Assembly to amend it to allow the creation of state police. There is hope that its advocates will achieve this since the bill for an Act for this purpose has passed second reading in the House of Representatives. Nonetheless, relentless efforts must continue to sensitise the public—especially the critics of state police, on its necessity and to build a consensus on it. It is necessary to allay the fear of state police critics by establishing an institutional mechanism to check abuse of the agencies by state governors and other top government functionaries.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are pertinent in light of the issues discussed in this paper:

1. *Grasing Reserve Law*: An all-inclusive legal instrument is necessary to resolve the herdsman-farmer conflict, rather than the usual regional and piecemeal legislative approach. Such a law, which must benefit both sides, is the panacea for the incessant clashes. Thus, the government should promulgate a grasing law urgently to regulate pastoralism across the country.
2. *Enhancing pastoral-farmer relations*: the government should promote cooperative relations between herdsmen and farmers. For example, it could bridge communication gaps between them to promote cordial relations, as in countries with a similar challenge such as Chad, Ethiopia, and Niger. This will create an atmosphere of intimacy, mutual understanding, trust, and a sense of oneness and harmonious relations between the herdsmen and farmers.
3. *Policing the Borders*: government agencies should place north-eastern Nigeria, the abode of Boko Haram insurgents, under constant surveillance. This is to end arms trafficking from Libya and neighbouring countries to the insurgents and the arms-bearing herdsmen who are warring with farmers in the middle belt.
4. *Creation of Ranches*: Ranching should be encouraged, especially in areas with low population density, to limit pastoral nomadism and its associated problems. The Sambissa Game Reserve in Borno State and the Gidan Jaja Grasing Reserve in Zamfara State each accommodates a wide variety of

livestock. This suggests that ranching a significant population of cattle can reduce the mass movement of pastoralists southward during the dry season. This will decrease violent clashes between herdsmen and farmers to the minimum.

5. *Digital Tracking of Cattle*: Digital tracking of cattle involves inserting microchips in the animal skin and then tracking them with mobile phones to know their movements and locations. This will greatly reduce the incidence of cattle rustling and herdsman-farmer clashes. The Kaduna State government has already launched such a tracking system with significant success.
6. *Sensitisation of People*: Elite advocates of state police should undertake intensive sensitisation to win the support of the National Assembly and the Presidency for their goal. The government should create a conducive environment for community policing as a complement to the federal police force in the provision of security in all of Nigeria.
7. *State Police as a gateway to true federalism*: The advocates should link the campaign for state police to the persistent clamour for the restructuring of the federation. Pursuing this its logical conclusion will help achieve the goal of true federalism.

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Chapter 9 | Beyond the Herder-Farmer Conflict: The Role of State Police

Peter Adejobi

Introduction

The farmer-herder conflict has been on the front-burner of political discourse in Nigeria. Initially limited to north-central Nigeria, it has spread to other regions. Narratives creating meaning, context, and misunderstanding about it have emerged in tandem with this expansion. The commonest ones adduce it to intense competition over increasingly-scarce land and water resources. They depict the nomadic, predominantly-Muslim Fulani herders as the perpetrators of violence against the mostly non-Muslim farming communities of diverse ethnicities, which they represent as the victims. These narratives often generate or strengthen ethnic and religious bigotry, which leads to cycles of attack and counter-attack between these groups with the attendant destruction of property, human displacement, and loss of lives.

Conflict is as old as man, from the primitive to the modern. Humans accept it as part of their nature. Man is a gregarious animal, naturally predisposed to live in groups, communities, and societies. His communal effort to eke out a living sometimes generates conflict (Okolie, 2009). Ifesinachi (2009) defines conflict as the pursuit of opposed interests and goals by violence. It is a necessary consequence of the insatiable and often conflicting wants of humans. It arises from the pursuit of divergent interests, goals, and aspirations by individuals and groups (Otite, 1999). Indeed, it is the constant characteristic of history, and humans believe that it drives growth and development.

Herder-farmer conflicts are fundamentally resource-based and a consequence of the economic adversity in Nigeria. Under capitalism, economics appears separate from politics. The ruling class sometimes uses state violence against workers when they resist exploitation (Choonara 2009:33). The administration of President Muhammadu Buhari is not different from all those since that of President Shehu Shagari, which introduced a neo-liberal regime of economic austerity. The military seizure of power compounded the economic

adversity of Nigerians that arose from this economic regime and the crisis that gripped the country's economy.

The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which the administration of President Ibrahim Babangida introduced despite widespread protest, brought untold hardship on Nigerians. The people's well-being was no longer the goal of economic development under this programme; instead, the degree of achievement of policy targets was the measure of progress. Thus, the gross domestic product (GDP) increased without a commensurate impact in the lives of Nigerians, the gap between rich and poor grew, and the inequality gap widened. Neither Vision 20:2020 of General Sani Abacha's administration nor the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) of President Olusegun Obasanjo's helped matters. Similarly, the Transformation Agenda of former President Goodluck Jonathan did not improve the situation, as the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) of the present administration also has not.

The neo-liberal economic regime has instead reconfigured the state to serve the narrow class interests of Nigeria's small elite. On the other hand, the government has failed to meet its obligations to provide the people with water, sanitation, healthcare, education, and the means of self-actualisation by the youths. Economic policy under the Buhari administration continues to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie at the expense of the majority of Nigerians. This reconfiguration of the state has resulted in the neglect of the youths, whose well-being the state considers to be of little importance.

Nigeria experienced an unprecedented rise in conflicts from 1999, including:

1. Sharia riots of 2000, resulting in many deaths;
2. Ethno-religious conflicts in Jos, 2001;
3. Sagamu crisis of 1999 and the reprisal attacks in Lagos and Kano in October 2000;
4. Hausa-Yoruba conflict of 2001;
5. Ethnic violence between Tiv and Junkun
6. Boko Haram insurgency that has ravaged northern Nigeria since 1999, especially the north-east.[1]

1. The insurgency aims to impose a sharia-based Islamic regime on the country.

An ideal polity is one that can manage conflicting interests and needs constructively (Auwal, 2010). Nigerians usually explain even political conflicts in terms of religious or ethnic differences. Many multi-religious societies grapple with conflicts: Nigeria is not an exception. Its religious pluralism generates distrust between its units, and fear of group domination is rife (Salawu, 2010).

The Role of State Police

The police is an institution of the state under capitalism; its essence cannot be different from that of the latter. The state is a compulsory political organisation with a centralised government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a geographical territory. Some view it, questionably, as corresponding to civilisation. The state is characteristic of class societies, those that feature clear stratification. The power of the ruling class derives from the latter's exclusive access to strategic resources and rests on coercion (in the form of armies, police, and prisons). Lenin posits that the state is an organ for the oppression of one class by another (Lenin's Collected Works (LCW), 25:387). It comprises the whole body of repressive institutions employed to prevent the inhabitants of a nation from challenging the existing property relations and forms of exploitation. It consists of special bodies of armed men with means of coercion (prisons, etc.) at their command (LCW, 25:389). These institutions are not neutral. The law does not treat rich and poor alike: it defends the rich and powerful. Karl Mark says in the *Communist Manifesto* that the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie or exclusively for the rich.

State police is an instrument of repression and coercion, being an institution of the state. It is to protect the interest of the ruling class and the rich in the society at the expense of the poor. We cannot understand the role of the Nigerian police without comprehending the country's security architecture. Nigeria's 1999 constitution defines the government's primary purpose as guaranteeing people's security and welfare. The provision of security consists of protecting their life and property, regulating their behaviour, and correcting those who disobey the laws and customs of society. This is the justification for the Nigeria Police Force. The colonial government established it in 1930 as a federal agency to replace the regional police forces of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Its primary function was the coercion and oppression of the citizens and the repression the nationalist movement. This purpose did not change after independence

in 1960. Nigeria's constitutions since 1960 have continued to provide for the police. Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that "there shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force."

Section 4 of the Police Act defines the duties of the body to include the prevention and detection of crime, preservation of law and order, and protection of life and property. They also include enforcing a wide range of laws and regulations and performing military duties within and outside Nigeria as required. The legislation grants the Force significant powers to enable it to perform these duties effectively, including to take preventive measures against crime. However, the military has taken over the conflict management role of the police: it is the army that government drafts in whenever there is violence in any part of Nigeria.

The ruling elite stirs ethno-religious sentiments to manipulate poor and working-class people. However, the primary dividing lines are between the wealthy bosses of diverse ethnicities, on the one hand, and the poor and working-class people of all ethnicities. There are rich Fulani, Igbo, Kataf, Kanuri, Ijaw, etc. The working people must unite to fight the bosses. At the heart of the problem is the capitalist system. We must channel our energies to fighting for system change, i.e., establishing a socialist society rooted in solidarity and mutual co-operation.

Nigeria's ruling class fails to see the relationship between poverty, unemployment, hunger, and injustice, on the one hand, and insecurity, on the other. They do not see development and security as intertwined. The unemployment rate was 33.1% in the third quarter of 2017 and over 70% of the population lived on less than $1 daily. There can be no real security in such a country, where the government allocates funds to purchase arms for defense and security but not to provide jobs, a living wage, pension, or micro-credit. Managing the expanding and intensifying conflicts in the country in these circumstances is, therefore, a Herculean task for the police and other security agencies. This is although the national security architecture includes about eighteen agencies:

1. Armed Forces of Nigeria (comprising the army, navy, and air-force);
2. Nigeria Police Force;
3. Defense Intelligence Agency;
4. National Intelligence Agency;
5. Department of State Service.
6. Nigeria Immigration Service;

7. Nigeria Correctional Service;
8. National Emergency Management Agency;
9. Nigeria Custom Service;
10. National Agency for Drug Administration and Control;
11. Federal Road Safety Corps;
12. National Drug Law Enforcement Agency;
13. Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps;
14. Standards Organisation of Nigeria;
15. National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons;
16. Economic and Financial Crime Commission;
17. Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences;
18. Office of the National Security Adviser.

The Nigeria Police Force is responsible only for crime prevention and detection, the protection of life and property, etc. Yet it is the agency at the forefront of conflict and crisis management in Nigeria, from the "maintain" crises of 1980 to the present herder-farmer conflicts. The country's security agencies operate independently of each other, no synergy or inter-agency co-operation exists between them. This makes it difficult to control insurgencies and conflicts such as that between farmers and herders.

System Change

It is impossible to over-emphasise the need for system change in light of the mounting crises of capitalism globally. Most people live in atrocious conditions, including violence, terrorism, natural disasters due to climate change, famine, and unemployment. The combination of these crises places humankind and the earth in great peril today.

The Scandinavian Countries

Why do Scandinavian countries have such a low crime rate? These countries—Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, Iceland—have demonstrated a direct relationship between social welfare and the crime rate. They are welfare states in contrast to the capitalist states, in which crime and criminality are rife. These latter states emphasise reinforcing their security machinery by producing and importing sophisticated weapons. The Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, have progressively reduced the numbers of their police stations and police personnel as their crime rates have

fallen yearly.

Why is this? The low level of crimes in these countries is attributable to the following factors:

1. The gap between poor and rich is relatively small; that is, they have low levels of inequality;
2. These countries have high employment rates.

The poor are few in these countries and are well taken care of through a robust social security system. This reduces crimes of desperation because the poor are less desperate since welfare payments and other support systems are quite generous. Finally, the Scandinavian societies are transparent and do not condone or allow corruption, unlike the capitalist states—which thrive on corruption, violence, and terrorism.

Socialism as the Way Forward

A socialist economic system operates on the premise that what is good for one is also for all. Everyone works for their good and that of everyone else and the government determines wealth distribution. There is no free market in the socialist economy. The government provides for everyone, taxes are usually higher than in capitalist countries, and social security programmes include medical aid.

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Part 3 | Fundamentalism and De-radicalisation

Chapter 10 | Causes and Implications of Fundamentalism in Nigeria

Maikano Madaki

Abstract

Fundamentalism is the extreme adherence to conservative beliefs or practices that the follower is unwilling to change or give up. It exists in ideology and other belief systems but more commonly in religion. That is why some define it as a strict attachment to traditional religious tenets. Religious fundamentalism is "the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, and essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity." However, strong self-identification with a religion inevitably leads to ethnocentrism, i.e., exaggerated in-group centrality and discrimination against out-groups. This attitude, in turn, breeds group stereotypes, a set of beliefs that a religious group believes are valid. *Fundamentalism* means total compliance with the original position of things, devoid of adulteration, alteration, or combination. Its sources include secularisation, modernisation, socialisation, ideological cohesion, radicalisation, violence, intolerance, economic and cultural factors, racism, marginalisation, misconceptions/misinterpretation of religious doctrines, desire for self-esteem, etc. It breeds hatred, increases mutual condemnation, violence, fear, and apathy; it exploits collective outrage and increases polarisation and the probability of radicalisation. The renewal of the family and provision of children and youths with quality training, socialisation, education, and improved economic conditions may neutralise violent fundamentalism. The authorities could reduce fundamentalism also by censoring and moderating hard-line preachers to retain and maintain the core teachings of ideologies and religions.

Introduction

Human beings belong to different groups and, therefore, associate with

diverse beliefs and ideologies during their lives. Depending on a person's choices and interests as influenced by their experiences and socialisation, some of these connections arise spontaneously and others consciously. Such influences cause individuals and groups to develop personality and moral standards that shape their behaviour. They also acquire belief systems about society that may fall into the categories of "liberal," "fanatic," "extremist," and so on, the last two of which terms are tantamount to "fundamentalism." Use of the word *fundamentalism* is usually in connection with religion. Yilmaz (2002) averred that the phenomenon manifests mainly in two types of intolerance: the non-violent and the violent.

Non-violent intolerance refers to extreme self-identification with a particular religion. The subscriber to this form believes the world revolves around religious norms and considers religion the final authority on issues. These standards of conduct are subjective interpretations, in the final analysis. Nonetheless, the subscriber typically submits unquestioningly to their received rendition and considers further inquiry unnecessary. There is usually no direct association between non-violent intolerance and physical violence.

Most religious people in this category live in a private world and are generally pacific. However, strong self-identification with a religion inevitably leads to ethnocentrism, i.e., exaggerated in-group centrality and discrimination against out-groups. This attitude, in turn, breeds group stereotypes, a set of beliefs that a religious group holds to be valid. Group members attribute desired qualities to themselves and unwanted ones to out-groups. They view themselves as good, successful, honest, virtuous, and peace-loving and members of out-group in the opposite terms: evil, lazy, deceptive, bellicose, and so on (Yilmaz, 2006). This tendency inescapably harms inter-communal relations and gives rise to a societal tension, thus reducing the quality of civic life, even without overt conflict.

A more extreme form of religiously-driven non-violent intolerance manifests in the phenomenon of dehumanisation. It may involve a decline in empathy for out-group members and the denial of their human qualities. It systematically destroys the individual's capacity to identify with other human beings.

Violent intolerance is the most dangerous manifestation of religious fundamentalism, apart from discriminating against out-groups and dehumanising them. It involves the use of physical violence—including killing people and destroying property—to achieve religious goals. Examples

of this include the 11 September 2011 attacks on the U.S., the July 2005 bombing of the London subway, and the March 2019 massacre of Muslims in two mosques in New Zealand. Religion-driven violent intolerance involves terrorism in many cases.

Violent intolerance, thus, emerges as the most frightening appearance of religious fundamentalism and begs for careful analyses. We will address several reasons for religion-driven violence but must note here that violent intolerance characteristically involves a notion of sacred necessity. A given group or "people" believe themselves to be the chosen representatives of the divine order or existentially threatened by a sinister enemy. The "right to survival" warrants extreme action against the enemy, whose very existence constitutes a continuing danger. Therefore, violent intolerance mostly occurs as a broadly-defined "anticipatory self-defense", even if no objective condition justifies it.

Conceptualising Fundamentalism

Curtis Lee coined the term *fundamentalism* in the 1920s to differentiate the phenomenon from *conservatism*. However, fundamentalism has since become an extreme form of conservatism. Many scholars have offered various definitions of the term since Lee.

Fundamentalism is total compliance with the original position of things, i.e., free from the minutest adulteration or alteration. It is also definable as strict adherence to the basic principles of any subject or discipline. Fundamentalism usually has the connotation of unwavering religious attachment, although the term is also applicable to politics, culture, economics, etc. That is why some see it as an attachment to traditional religious forms or strict adherence to some belief or ideology. Harle (2014) posits that fundamentalism expressed the organised determination of conservative churchmen to perpetuate the cultural imperialism of Protestantism within an inhospitable civilisation dominated by secularism and progressive Christian idealism.

In the context of monotheism, fundamentalism is the type of religious behaviour that embraces a central religious text and places it in such a holy, sacred place that it becomes considered infallible. People often see fundamentalism as violent, intolerant, stubbornly backward, sometimes inhuman, godly, and sectarian. It acquires these traits because subscribers to a religion believe its "fundamentals" are those morals, practices, and beliefs of the earliest followers. Hence, fundamentalist ideas tend to clash with "modern

society" and "modern morality." In the 1970s, only politically militant groups received the appellation "fundamentalist."

Chapman et al. (2015) list five features of fundamentalist movements:

1. A literal interpretation of religious texts: They take their "moral codes" straight from their sacred texts. A good fundamentalist lives their life by the original sacred text of the religion, with little or no room for flexibility;
2. Every area of social life is sacred: Fundamentalists tend to impose their views on others and police people's daily behaviour;
3. Intolerance of other religions: fundamentalists believe they have a monopoly on the truth and tend to purge the symbols of other faiths when in power;
4. They have conservative beliefs;
5. They tend to look at past religious eras with nostalgia, and sometimes want to change society back to how it used to be.

Religion is the body of attitudes, values, beliefs, behaviours, etc. that are associated with the search for the sacred. Religious affiliation is the identifiable group that an individual identifies with, comprising particular characteristics (i.e., religion) that provide a framework for exploring the sacred. Therefore, religious dissimilarity is an individual's perception that there is some notable difference between some aspect of their religious affiliation and another's. Harrison et al. (1998) define deep-level diversity as comprising individual differences in attitudes, values, or beliefs. These characteristics are "communicated through verbal and non-verbal behaviour patterns and… only learned through extended, individualised interaction and information gathering" (Harrison et al., 1998, p. 98). Given this definition of deep-level diversity and that of religion as attitudes, values, beliefs, feelings, thoughts, experiences, and or behaviours (Hill et al., 1998; 2000), religion is a characteristic of deep-level diversity.

Cunningham and Sagas (2004, p. 320) posit that "predictions for deep-level diversity are based on the similarity-attraction paradigm." The paradigm's key point is that similarity breeds attraction, and dissimilarity breeds division (Byrne, 1971; Sunnafrank, 1983; Amodio and Showers, 2005). This tenet implies that similarity in attitudes, values, and beliefs increases interpersonal attraction and dissimilarity in them decreases it (Cunningham and Sagas, 2004). Consequently, it is reasonable that perceived religious difference

(i.e., a characteristic of deep-level diversity) would correlate with divisions between co-workers. Therefore, a negative relationship between the degree of mutual religious difference and mutual attraction between individuals should produce progressively weaker attraction between them the more religiously dissimilar they are. Research has shown that persons exhibiting high religious fundamentalism are highly sensitive to religious dissimilarities between them and others (Altemeyer, 2003). Such persons are present in most major religions, including Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, Mormonism, and Catholicism (Hood et al., 2005).

Religious fundamentalism is:

> The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity: that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by force which must be vigorously fought: that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004, p. 118).

As a result, fundamentalism is a highly ethnocentric attitude to one's religion (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004), ethnocentrism that prominently features certitude in one's religious beliefs (MacFarland, 1989). Kirkpatrick et al. (1991) assert that religious fundamentalism correlates with a rigid, closed-minded, and dogmatic way of approaching the world. Since fundamentalism is an attitude, value, and or belief, it qualifies as a characteristic of deep-level diversity based on the definition of deep-level diversity asserted by Harrison et al. (1998). According to Simmel (1950), most religions require the unconditional acceptance of the like-minded and, conversely, a similar exclusion of those who are not. For example, believers of the Islamic faith dichotomise all of humanity into two basic categories. The "house of Islam" is where "Muslim law and faith prevail" (Kurtz, 1995, p. 144) and includes all believers of the Islamic confession. In contrast, the "house of unbelief" consists of all unbelievers (Kurtz, 1995, p. 144).

Likewise, the Christian faith distinguishes between believers and non-believers. In 2 Corinthians 6:14, the Apostle Paul admonishes Christians: "do not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers." John 3:16 is one of the most-widely cited Bible scriptures. It states: "For God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him should not

perish but have everlasting life." Therefore, Christians hold that believers in Jesus do not perish but have eternal life and should not relate with unbelievers.

High religious fundamentalists, however, take this dichotomy a step further. High religious fundamentalists view others with differing religious beliefs (Kirkpatrick, 1993; Altemeyer, 2003) as very threatening (Hunsberger et al., 1994). For example, fundamentalists see little complexity in their orthodoxies (Pancer et al., 1995). A complex orthodoxy is "characterised by a recognition that more than one point of view on an issue can be valid, and that different perspectives can be integrated or related to one another in some manner" (Pancer et al., 1995, p. 214). Pancer et al., (1995) conducted a study on whether fundamentalist attitudes and beliefs were orthodoxy-specific. High religious fundamentalists in the research showed the same level of complexity about other orthodoxies as low religious fundamentalists, except for religion. Simply put, high religious fundamentalists display fundamentalist attitudes and beliefs regarding religion but not necessarily other matters (Pancer et al., 1995).

Thus, high religious fundamentalists may categorise others with dissimilar religious beliefs as part of the out-group for two reasons. First, religious fundamentalists may affiliate with a religion or an orthodoxy that teaches an unconditional acceptance of the like-minded and a similar exclusion of those who are not (Simmel, 1950). Second, previous research has identified a link between attitudes and behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1973; Katz, 1983). Thus, high religious fundamentalists exhibit highly ethnocentric attitudes about their beliefs (i.e., deep-level diversity characteristics) and, consequently, behave more negatively towards those with different beliefs (Pancer et al.,1995; Altemeyer, 2003). So, how do they determine the deep-level diversity (i.e., religion) of co-workers to enable to them make in-group/out-group distinctions? Harrison et al. (1998, p. 98) argued that "over time, as people acquire more information, their perceptions are based more on observed behaviour and less on stereotypes prompted by overt characteristics." Also, "people have placed greater emphasis on similarity in attitudes (beliefs) than on ethnic similarity, particularly when information about attitudinal differences was available or salient" (Harrison et al., 1998, p. 99).

Some researchers contend that the communication of religious beliefs does not occur in the workplace. However, Tsui et al., (1992, p. 551) stated that "a variety of physical, social, and status traits can be used as the basis for inferring similarity in attitudes, beliefs, or personality." Therefore, the exact religious beliefs of co-workers need not be overtly communicated for others

to identify dissimilarities with theirs. This would, seemingly, hold especially true for high fundamentalists who, by their very nature, seem hyper-sensitive to others with different deep-level characteristics (i.e., religion).

Harrison et al. (1998) also found evidence that deep-level diversity characteristics became more influential to group functioning, overtime. They used a longitudinal design involving two sets of surveys that spanned 9-weeks. They found statistically significant results concerning the effects of deep-level diversity in this brief period. Also, respondents' tenure ranged from one year to approximately four and a half years and showed no significant correlation with any surface or deep-level measure (Harrison et al., 1998). As a result, it appears that deep-level diversity characteristics (i.e., an individual's religion) are communicable in many ways over a short time. Therefore, one subject of this study was the tendency of high religious fundamentalists to seek out co-workers' deep-level diversity characteristics that are associated with religion. It also examines the propensity of high religious fundamentalists to obtain this information and draw conclusions whether others are "like" or "unlike" them.

According to Pancer et al. (1995), high religious fundamentalists hold their religious beliefs as central to their identity. Hunsberger et al. (1994, p. 343), discuss how high religious fundamentalists consider their religious beliefs as so central to their identities that they are "especially sensitive to existential challenges." High religious fundamentalists are highly sensitive to dissimilarities between them and others. This is so much that they consider as part of the out-group even those who seem "like" them and affiliate with the same religion but hold slightly different beliefs (Altemeyer, 2003). According to Altemeyer (2003), because their religious beliefs are central to their identity, high religious fundamentalists are prone to evaluate the world in terms of "us" and "them." As a result, high religious fundamentalists "tend to have a very small 'us' and quite a large 'them'" (Altemeyer, 2003, p. 27). Therefore, an additional concern of this study will be the effects of religious fundamentalism on an individual's tendency to cohere to others.

Bollen and Hoyle (1990, p. 482) defined perceived cohesion as "an individual's sense of belonging to a particular group and his or her feelings of morale associated with membership in the group." This particular measure has two main components: attachment and morale (Bollen and Hoyle, 1990). Sense-of-community is another measure of individual belonging, particularly in the religious sphere (Milliman et al., 2003). Sense-of-community is "the mental, emotional, and spiritual connections among employees in teams or

groups in organisations." It derives from their belief that they are "connected… and that there is some type of relationship between one's inner self and the inner self of other people" (Milliman et al., 2003, p. 429; Maynard, 1992). This paper will use perceived cohesion and sense-of-community to examine the influence of religious fundamentalism since both evaluate an individual's feeling of belonging to a group, although by different means.

Religious commitment is "the degree to which a person adheres to his or her religious values, beliefs, and practices and uses them in daily living" (Worthington et al., 2003, p. 85). Individuals who report intense commitment to their religions may have imbibed some of its exclusionary tenets and view those with other religious affiliations and beliefs as different or worse. According to Worthington et al. (2003, p. 85), such individuals "evaluate their world on religious dimensions based on their religious values." Therefore, highly religiously committed individuals may evaluate others by their religious attitudes, values, and beliefs. Thus, scholars have argued that religion is a characteristic of deep-level diversity that can influence negatively an individual's interact with others who they perceive as having dissimilar religious affiliations. In other words, dissimilarity breeds division. Consequently, we examine commitment to one's religion as an intensifier of the negative relationship between religious fundamentalism and individual belonging (i.e., perceived cohesion and sense-of-community).

Altemeyer (2003) posits that, because high religious fundamentalists hold their religious beliefs as central to their identity, they are prone to evaluate the world in terms of "us" and "them." This evaluation rests upon their perception of the dissimilarities between their religious orthodoxies and those of others. Therefore, a particular religious orthodoxy can become central to the consciousness of individuals and attitudes can lead to behaviours. High fundamentalists learn from an early age to categorise people per the similarity-attraction paradigm (Altemeyer, 2003) and consider their religious beliefs as central to their identity (Pancer et al., 1995).

Religious commitment is distinct from religious fundamentalism, however. The latter is an individual's ethnocentric attitude towards their religious beliefs, regardless of their content, whereas the former is the extent to which they have integrated those beliefs into their behaviour. Religious fundamentalists can hold their religious beliefs central to their identity, but this does not necessarily translate to religious commitment. This is because they may or may not adhere to the tenets of their religion in their behaviour. Their behaviour

may only reflect their ethnocentric attitude towards their beliefs. A religious fundamentalist may, however, also be highly committed to their religion. In this case, a religious fundamentalist may perceive greater dissimilarity between their religious beliefs and those of their co-workers. This may derive from their ethnocentric or fundamentalist attitudes towards their religious beliefs, their religious evaluation of the world, and their values that stem from religiously commitment. As a result, we examine religious commitment as a moderator of the relationship between religious fundamentalism and perceived cohesion and sense-of-community.

Causes of Fundamentalism

It is necessary to note here that religious fundamentalism is a complex phenomenon involving a wide variety of personal, cultural, and situational variables that always require further research. Nonetheless, fundamentalist movements feature several common factors. First, one aspect of religious fundamentalism relates closely to socialisation. Individuals from religious families are generally more religious than those from secular backgrounds. Such people, like their parents and ancestors, tend to interpret religious text(s) literally per their traditions. Their behaviours fall mostly into the category of "non-violent intolerance." They are usually ethnocentric and employ the language of militancy but are normally not directly associated with physical violence. A few others may choose to be radically religious, their motives varying mostly with personal variables. It may be due to, for example, inner insecurity arising from an environment that is frightening or confusing or that they perceive to be so.

Social psychologists identify a basic need to reduce uncertainty or anxiety (Hogg and Abrams, 1993), construct meaning, and avoid confusion (Reykowski, 1982). Religious fundamentalism, as literal thinking, serves to these ends in many ways. First, by sticking to a religious belief and accepting it as the ultimate source of knowledge, the individual finds "satisfactory" explanations of puzzling or mysterious phenomena. Religion satisfies the desire to understand and becomes the resort when mundane means of explanation fail. In that sense, religious fundamentalism offers intellectual security largely by satisfying the cognitive needs of the person. Inexplicable problems, which cannot be resolved by any other means, are unravelled by recourse to theological and religious sources of knowledge. Second, religion also provides the imaginary satisfaction of substantive needs of the individual.

The religious believe that their material needs that cannot be satisfied otherwise will be eventually, if not in this life, certainly in the next. This belief, in turn, reduces anxiety by providing the individual with a sense of confidence.

Finally, religious fundamentalism serves to reduce anxiety by promising justice. Indeed, structural conditions, over which the individual has little or no control, create many frustrations that are hard to bear. The powerful use the underprivileged, some exercise power over others. In most parts of the world, some enjoy prosperity and well-being whereas others can hardly survive. Thus, in the face of earthy injustices, religion functions as a palliative by promising that justice will be done and all sins punished eventually. In the next life, everyone will get what they deserve. This belief helps the individual face life's difficulties with relative comfort and confidence.

Strong identification with religion sometimes arises from a desire for positive self-esteem. Such identification is to satisfy the need to belong and is a means of increasing self-esteem; it is necessary, therefore, that the group have a positive public image. That is, individuals would like to be identified with a grouping that appears worthy and prestigious. In this respect, many may become attached to a religion of the powerful and prestigious. Many people convert to the dominant religion in their community or residential area to more easily integrate into it and gain acceptance. But again, individuals in this category usually do not advocate violence.

Religiously-driven violence, on the other hand, appears to be an even more complicated phenomenon. It often occurs as a complex interplay between a subjective interpretation of religious norms and the pursuit of certain interests or goals. In this respect, violent intolerance sometimes results from individual or group understanding of religious injunctions or precepts. For some religious believers, the direct use of violence is obligatory against any enemies. For instance, according to Kahane Chai parties in Israel, "They (the Israelis) [are] in a state of war, and in a war there is no innocent people. The Palestinians are, thus, all guilty by association" (cited in Kelsay 1994: 1). Likewise, some segments of Serbian Orthodoxy reinforced a violent Serbian nationalism against the Muslims during the Balkan conflict of the 1990s. Some Muslims, too, believe that they are in a constant state of war against non-Muslims. Although such literal interpretations of religious doctrine motivate some individuals and groups, most religious fundamentalism and related violence tend to correlate with real or perceived external threats to in-group identity.

Algeria's first identifiable Islamic movement, the Ben Badis-led

Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama that emerged in 1931, was a reaction to French influences that were diluting indigenous culture and identity. The movement participated in the initial nationalist struggles for equal rights and the preservation of the Muslim identity, rejecting the notion that Algerian Muslims could ever become Frenchmen (Yilmaz 2002: 212-231). In the Egyptian case, likewise, the conflict between Islamic values and Western ideas runs deep in the political history of the country. Masferrer (2013) noted that the attacks on 11 September 2011 and in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) opened a debate about maintaining a balance between security and human rights in the counter-terrorism fight.

Bruce (1996) identified modernisation and secularisation as the main causes of fundamentalism. They cause some believers to cling to traditional practices to avoid destruction or minimise contamination. The followers seem to play a kind of collective outrage against any new change or alteration in the original structure and design of the system. Modernisation undermined religion in at least three ways:

1. Social life has become separated from religious life;
2. Rationalism encourages people to seek scientific explanations for things.
3. Religious traditionalists feel threatened, so they defend tradition.

Other causes Bruce identified include ideological cohesion around a single sacred thing or God or a common enemy against whom to unite. Synthesising from the foregoing, the following are among the most common causes of fundamentalism:

1. Intolerance
2. Discrimination/Prejudice
3. Radicalisation
4. Violence
5. Economic and cultural Factors
6. Religion and Politics
7. Racism
8. Lack of centralised control
9. Marginalisation
10. Misconception/misinterpretation of religious doctrines

Implications of Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is the belief of an individual or group in the absolute

authority of a sacred text or body of teachings. These fundamentalists believe that their religion is beyond any form of criticisms or innovation. Logical explanations and science, to some extent, have no place in fundamentalists' belief system. Religious fundamentalists believe strictly that religion dictates every sphere of life. Therefore, they resist any innovation within the faith to minimise or avoid "contamination," which is why modernisation sometimes generates "collective outrage" even within the same religion. For example, some terrorist organisations or groups like *Boko Haram* in north-east Nigeria and *Al-Qaeda* regard western civilisation/education as the symbol of the secular modernisation that threatens traditional Islamic values.

Violent fundamentalism in today's world is responsible for much misery, claiming many lives of innocent people. A society with fundamental beliefs breeds a closed attitude towards life to the degree of paranoia, and in some cases nurtures aggressive behaviour. It shuts doors for the acceptance of modern ideas and scientific principles and exchange of thoughts among societies around the world. Fundamentalism breeds support for violence against others and often leads to conflict. Believers practise it often to protect their belief systems and traditions from being swept away by the waves of modern change, and they develop aggression and violence in the process. The key implications of fundamentalism include:

1. Breeds hatred;
2. Increases condemnation and violence;
3. Aggravates fear and apathy;
4. Intensifies state and non-state criticisms;
5. Plays on collective outrage even within the same; religious community;
6. Enhances the probability of radicalisation.

Conclusion

Religions come into existence to foster peace and tranquillity in the world, but fundamentalism—mainly of the religious variety—most often has negative connotations. Religious fundamentalism intertwines with diverse motives and can be a serious source of intolerance and conflict. However, a well-interpreted religion can foster inner peace, tolerance, and love, thus, outer peace and social harmony in their broader sense. We have discussed some causes of fundamentalism, including secularism, modernisation, economic adversity, the collapse of family and education, hard-line proselytising, and so on. It has been addressed, in this respect, that the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism

could involve both value and interest-driven motives. It might be a reflection of subjective beliefs, a vehicle for expressing accumulated frustrations, or a utilitarian activity to achieve personal or social improvements.

Religious fundamentalism has implications for society. It breeds hatred, increases condemnation and violence, plays on collective outrage even within the same religious community, increases fear and apathy, increases state and non-state criticisms, and increases the chances of radicalisation. Reviving the family values, provision of quality training, socialisation and education to children and youth would go a long way in addressing the problem of fundamentalism. Other measures include improved economic conditions, censorship and moderating hard-line preachers to refrain from "use of trigger language" and maintain core teaching of ideologies and beliefs. Finally, it is vital to understand religious fundamentalism more thoroughly so that the country is better able to cope with it in the twenty-first century and beyond.

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Chapter 11 | Strategies for De-Radicalisation of the Youth in Nigeria: A Multi-Sectoral Approach

Umar Jibrilu Gwandu

Introduction

It is the joy of individuals to live in a serene and peaceful environment where the views of all get respect. Nigeria's founding fathers dreamt to bequeath us a luminous nation where peace and justice reign. Yet, numerous daunting challenges bedevil contemporary Nigeria. Insurgency, kidnapping, electoral fraud, banditry and, violence are among the issues that receive the most global attention.

The public sphere resounds with calls for restructuring, true federalism, resource control, and the actualisation of Biafra; it churns with multifarious uprisings in the name of religious or ethnic communities. A recurrent issue is the radicalisation of Nigerian youths and their direct involvement in violence. Most of them, who should be the trustees of posterity and agents of positive change, allow themselves to be pawns in the hands of manipulators and agents of destruction.

Who is a youth? What is radicalisation? Why are youths susceptible to it? What are its manifestations? By what multifaceted strategies could we de-radicalise radicalised youths? How should we design and present communication packages for behavioural change among their different categories: the imprisoned, released, and yet unapprehended? This paper addresses these and related questions.

Who is a Youth in Nigeria?

One of the most contentious issues in Nigeria is giving a clear delineation of what constitutes the youth. The concept of "youth" has been used and abused in Nigeria to score certain primordial ulterior motives and political prejudices. Jega (2017) noted this when he said:

> A notable Nigerian political party not long ago appointed a sixty-year-old person…its national youth leader! Now, that is by any definition a

> mature adult; indeed, [one] virtually in the departure lounge waiting for the trip to the [great] beyond! Also, a seventy-plus-year-old president not long ago defined himself as a youth, because, he said, youthfulness is in the heart!

However, the United Nations Organisation's Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNESA) classified youth as young people passing from childhood to adulthood. These are people who fall within the age category of fifteen to twenty-four years.

In the same vein, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), broaden the definition to encapsulate people within the age category of fifteen to thirty-four years. In addition to this, the African Youth Charter defines youth as young persons between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five years.

Lamido (2012) noted "that many definitions given to the term *youth* are tied to given age brackets. Umar, for instance, defined a youth as 'an individual who is within the age group eighteen to thirty years of age.'" However, he observed, studies sometimes count as youths even those between the ages of fifteen and eighteen "depending on their economic roles." Some expand the category, he reports further, to accommodate those between thirty and thirty-five years, depending upon the "responsibility and occupational resources" at their disposal. Youth, according to Kawu, refers to a life phase that is "neither childhood nor adulthood, but rather in-between."

The National Youth Policy (2000, 8) classifies youths into ten sub-groups, "age ranges depending on [place of] residence, ethnic, religious, community, gender, socio-cultural and educational backgrounds." These are those of school age who are in school, unemployed youth, and unprivileged youth. Others are the inadequately-trained graduates and professionals without gainful employment and their adequately-trained counterparts without employment. Others still are youths with talents, skills and aspirations but without support, the specially-talented ones, the handicapped, the social misfits, fraudsters and other criminals, and vulnerable youths.

The National Bureau of Statistics says that 54% of Nigeria's population comprises youths below the age of thirty-four. According to *The Punch* (2018), 52.65% of them are unemployed. Many with a job are at risk of losing it. Hence, they are at the mercy of the winds and tides of radicalisation. As it is commonly said, "An idle mind is the devil's workshop."

Indeed, youth unemployment rose to 52.65% in Q4 2017 from 49.7% in

the preceding quarter. This translated to 22.64 million persons aged between fifteen and thirty-five years old who were either jobless or underemployed, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Its data showed that Nigeria lost 7.9 million jobs from January 2016 to September 2017, leaving some four out of ten Nigerians jobless or underemployed. The country's 18.8% official jobless rate was the world's third-highest after South Africa (27.7%) and Greece (20.9%) in Q3 2018.

Speaking at the Commonwealth Business Forum in Westminster on 18 April 2018, President Muhammadu Buhari said many Nigerian youths had no schooling.

About the economy, we have a very young population, our population is estimated conservatively to be 180 million. This is a very conservative one.… More than 60% of the population is below thirty, a lot of them haven't been to school, and they are claiming that Nigeria is an oil-producing country, therefore, they should sit and do nothing, and get housing, healthcare, education free.

Most of the counters to that speech focused on challenging the claim that Nigerian youths want to get things for free. However, the fact was unchallenged that most Nigerian youths are without education. Indicative of the grave unemployment situation in the country is the army of applicants whenever the government advertises vacancies in lucrative positions at the Nigeria National Petroleum Commission, Custom Services, etc. The private sector, including the *Dangote* conglomerate, also receive large numbers of applicants with qualifications higher than required for the jobs available.

The Processes of Youth Radicalisation

Scholars define radicalisation in a variety of ways. Some see it as a "process of developing extremist ideology and beliefs" (Özerdem and Podder, 2011). Others view it as a "movement in the direction of supporting or enacting radical behaviour"(Kruglanski et al., 2014, p. 70). Bartlett and Miller (2012) posit that radicalisation is either non-violent or violent. Ahmad (2017) defines it as "the process of forming an extremist view that has a high propensity to result in violent attitudes or violent action." Similarly, Onuoha (2013) says:

Radicalisation [is] the process by which an individual or group transitions from passive reception of revolutionary, militant, or extremist views, ideas, and beliefs to [the] active pursuit of these ideals, especially through supporting,

promoting, or adopting violence to realise such intentions."

Beutel (2017) outlines its stages:

> The process of radicalisation begins with changes in self-identification due to grievances, frequently driven by personal or group concerns regarding local issues, as well as international events. A grievance is understood to create the sense of alienation or disenchantment that provides a cognitive opening for radicalisation. A radical ideology—an extreme set of ideas—then provides the individual with a new outlook and explanation for the world in which he finds himself. An individual becomes mobilised as he slowly integrates into a community of other like-minded people. Finally, a tipping point—usually a specific event—can push an individual or group from rhetoric to action.

De-Radicalisation: The Imperative of a Multi-Sectoral Approach

The adverse consequences of radicalisation have caused the world to pay great attention to de-radicalisation. Dechesne (2011) defined the aim of de-radicalisation as "to prevent further escalation of violence" and "[create] the conditions conducive to dialogue." El-Said (2015) says de-radicalisation is:

A package of policies and measures designed and implemented by authorities…to normalise and convince groups and individuals who have already become radicalised or violent extremists to repent and disengage from violence (p. 10).

Porges (2011) stated that "no single model of de-radicalisation is universally applicable" (p. 2). Porta and Lafree (2012) have cautioned that de-radicalisation had two components that scholars often overlooked or conflated. The one is the "de-radicalisation of attitudes and beliefs." The other is "the disengagement from violent behaviour and the process of leaving violent groups and reintegrating into other social groups" (Porta and LaFree, 2012, p. 7).

According to Ahmad (2017), de-radicalisation can be effective without a formal programme and "may not require any coordinated action to get it underway" (Dechesne, 2011, p. 288). Hence, Ahmad (2017) defined de-radicalisation as "a formal or informal approach aimed at reducing commitment to an extremist viewpoint that has led or could lead to violent action."

Effective de-radicalisation requires the analytical exploration of the reasons and means of youth radicalisation. According to El-Badawy, Comerford, and

Welby in *Inside the Jihadi Mind: Understanding Ideology and Propaganda* (2015) published by the Centre on Religion and Geography of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change:

1. There is a distinct difference between the ideology of Salafi-jihadism and the Islam practised by the majority of the world's Muslims. The Salafi-jihadi ideology is built upon Islamic religious principles, which it distorts to produce a single-minded focus on violent jihad;
2. Ideological values, which form the moral basis of the groups' actions, are present in 80% of all the propaganda sources; these include Islamic creedal values in 62%, the values of honour and solidarity with the Muslim community in 68%, and explicit references to the end of days in 42%;
3. The importance of *tawhid* (monotheism) is revealed in [several] themes throughout the propaganda, in different strands of the ideology: one God, one state, and one *ummah* (the global Islamic community). These themes appear in over 74% of the propaganda;
4. An emphasis on the nobility of jihad runs throughout the propaganda, often presenting it in chivalric terms, with pictures of fighters on horseback, or references to Saladin. Altogether, such references appear in 71% of the propaganda;
5. The importance of honour and the solidarity of the *ummah* [are] also central, appearing in 68% of the propaganda. The virtue of martyrdom—common to many religions, but here applied deliberately to death in battle—forms a significant part of the value of honour, appearing explicitly in 32% of the propaganda, and implicitly in 68%;
6. Altogether, justifications from the Quran, Hadith, or […] scholarship appear in 87% of the propaganda. One ISIS statement contained twenty-four references to the Quran, making up 26% of the entire statement. Of these twenty-four references, thirteen different *surahs* (chapters) were referenced;
7. While Quranic justifications are usually presented without context, reinforcing the accusation that the groups "cherry-pick" passages that support their case, the ideology makes extensive use of scripture: half of the propaganda references the Quran, with sixty-three out of the one hundred and fourteen *surahs* referenced;
8. Hadith justifications are used much less than Quranic justifications, appearing in only 22% of the sample. The accusation that Salafi-jihadi

groups pick Hadith that suit their vision may be bolstered by [how] they use them: authoritative Hadiths are cited with the full details of their origins; the referencing of those of more doubtful provenance is much more vague;

9. When the groups are criticised for their actions by rival Salafi-jihadi groups or others, the Quran and the Hadith are the first reference points that are used for the rebuttal. Hadiths, in particular, are used in bulk when groups are attacked by other followers of the ideology;
10. Nevertheless, the vaunted Salafi rejection of much Islamic scholarship as 'innovation' is belied by references throughout the propaganda to forty-five different scholars from all the major schools of jurisprudence apart from the Hanafi school.

Reasons for the Radicalisation of Nigerian Youths

Onuoha (2014) reported in "Why Youths Join Boko Haram" that "poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make, or contribute to making, young men vulnerable to radicalisation." He reported further that "Itinerant preachers capitalise on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt."

The author identified the following as causal factors in youth radicalisation in Nigeria and recruitment into Boko Haram:

1. Ignorance of religious teaching opposed to violence makes youths more vulnerable and susceptible to recruitment;
2. Unemployment and poverty make them vulnerable to radicalisation;
3. Children with difficult upbringing are more vulnerable to extremist views;
4. High levels of illiteracy aid youth radicalisation and extremism;
5. Excesses of the security forces achieve mixed results;
6. Widespread corruption is conducive to recruitment and radicalisation.

It is a commonplace notion that inadequate access to mainstream education, and poverty and weak legal and political institutions contribute significantly to the growing radicalisation of youths. Disaffected youth, unemployed high school and university graduates, and destitute children are more susceptible to radicalisation by deviant groups.

Combating Radicalisation: Approaches across the Globe

Zhou (2017) described China's strategy for de-radicalisation as including "five keys," "four prongs," "three contingents," "two hands," and "one rule." The five keys are:

1. Solve ideological problems using ideology;
2. Resolve cultural problems utilising culture;
3. Treat folk customs respectfully;
4. Solve religious problems per religious rules;
5. Combat violent terrorism in line with the rule of law and through iron-fisted actions.

Zhang Chunxian at the Xinjiang Stability Work Conference on 8 January 2016 reportedly offered four prongs:

1. *Squeesing by correct faith* means using correct faith to clarify the people's understanding of Islam, awaken their minds, and squeeze out extremism;
2. *Counteracting by culture* means seeking effective and practical [means] to [counteract] extremism and [guide] people to secularisation and modernisation;
3. *Controlling by law* means making the best of the role of law not only in regulating social behaviour and countering religious extremism but also in guiding social expectations and building social consensus;
4. *Popularising science* means spreading the knowledge about and promoting the use of science and technology…to guide the people to uphold science, remove ignorance, and deny extremism.

The three contingents refer to professionals, school teachers, and religious leaders. They should receive training in de-radicalisation so that they, in turn, can influence the youths with whom they come into contact in their work. According to Zhou (2017), "two hands" refer to the one "firm hand" that cracks down on terrorists and the other "firm hand" that educates and guides the public. "One rule" refers to the inculcation of the rule of law in the citizens.

El-Badawy et al. (2015) enumerated additional strategies for youth de-radicalisation:

1. Understanding and targeting the foundation of radical ideologies;
2. Creating a simple alternative framework for applying values and principles;

3. Reforming the role of education systems, role models, and funders in inoculating youths against radicalisation.

Koser and Thorp's *How to Prevent Extremism and Policy Options* (2015) addressed the challenge of understanding radical ideologies, education, building community resilience, social engagement, and mobilising religious leaders. Simon Itodo offered the following solution to mitigate against radicalism in Nigeria:

1. Focusing on the root cause of extremism;
2. Creating a counter-radicalisation programme;
3. Opening renunciation and amnesty to radicalised youths who are willing to change;
4. Creating jobs for idle youths as they are susceptible to radicalisation;
5. Imposing stiff sanctions on clergy, religious bodies, elders who preach extremism and encourage radicalisation;
6. Investigating, prosecuting, and imprisoning politicians who fund youths to purchase arms and ammunition;
7. Making civil education compulsory for Nigerian students at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels;
8. Establishing a national rehabilitation centre for youths.

Turning the Table: The Need for De-Radicalisation of Media Content

The mass media latently provide the oxygen of publicity for the terrorist, helping to terrorise the public who consume their content. Numerous studies demonstrate that the mass media can influence how people view and think about a phenomenon (Gadarian, 2010; James and Waldman, 2003; Okoro and Chukwuma, 2012; Ekwueme and Obayi, 2012). Obaje (2017) posits that:

> Emotional content, not simply the factual information in media reports, has a significant influence on attitudes. Subjects exposed to media reports with emotional content were more likely to support the use of military force, support spending on sizeable and statistically foreign policy, and approve of specific counter-terrorist and foreign policies.

Karber (1971) notes that "the terrorist's message of violence necessitates a victim, whether personal or institutional, but the target or intended recipient of the communication may not be the victims" Dowling (1986). Picard (1991) cited British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher saying that "democracies

must find ways to starve the terrorists and hijackers of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend." Similarly, Laquer (1976) noted that "the media are the terrorists' best friends… the terrorists' act itself is nothing, publicity is all." Jenkins (1983) said that "terrorism is a product of freedom, particularly freedom of the press." Nacos (1994) averred that "getting the attention of the mass media, the public, and decision-makers is the *raison d'etre* behind modern terrorism's increasingly shocking violence."

Kratcoski (2001) "if one of the elements of terrorism is the wish to obtain publicity for the cause and create propaganda, the media has obviously over-reacted in responding to this desire." Jenkins (1975) notes:

Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press. Taking and holding hostages increases the drama. The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is a theatre.

Search for Common Ground (Search), an organisation in Kyrgyzstan, implemented a pilot project title *Social Media for De-radicalisation in Kyrgyzstan: A Model for Central Asia*. It submits in its report that:

1. It is necessary to promote open discussion and education about religion. This is especially on issues such as jihad so that they do not become 'taboo subjects' that radical/extremist groups can exploit. People refrain currently from discussing religion for fear of being considered radicals. An opportunity exists now to facilitate the open discussion of religious matters and promote education about religion, especially at the community level;
2. The project demonstrated again the need to work with the youths, especially school children before they leave school, by engaging them in useful activities (education, sport, entertainment, etc.). It is necessary to give them positive role models, fill the ideological vacuum in them, and provide them with socio-economic opportunities. The emphasis should be on the most vulnerable;
3. Women remain poorly researched and are not much involved in projects of this kind. An opportunity exists for such a project on women and religion to explore the intersection of these two elements;
4. The internet and social media outlets are gaining popularity in Kyrgyzstan, especially among youths. However, use rates are still too modest to substantiate the claim that the media, especially social

networks, are the key factor in religious radicalisation. Offline activities remain pertinent and important. Therefore, there is an opportunity to combine these two modes (online and offline);

5. Social media campaigns are necessary and their importance will grow with the increase in the number of internet users. However, for conducting social media campaigns, one needs to understand the audience and be sensitive to the differences between social media outlets to create tailored actions.

Based on its findings and key messages, the evaluation furnished [the] following recommendations for future programming:

1. Combine the online and offline activities to promote de-radicalisation;
2. Design social media campaigns by considering the specifics of each social media outlet and its purpose and audience;
3. Ensure that the content of a media campaign (videos, pictures) is relevant and sensitive to the needs, interests, culture, and language of the audience;
4. Making the content of a media campaign short and clear;
5. Increase the number, size, coverage, and diversity of small grants to work with youths and engage them in more positive and constructive forms of behaviour and improve their critical thinking skills;
6. Involve a larger number of women in the project activities and include a clear gender element into the research;
7. Build the capacity of local media on producing the content on de-radicalisation;
8. Expand project activities, particularly the small grants, to other areas;
9. Revise the project implementation strategy as follows:
    1. Identify different categories of youth and adjust the message of the content and/or work approach to each category;
    2. Involve religious leaders (e.g., imams) in the project team and community level;
    3. Involving popular social media networks users into the team of social media marketers in the project;
    4. Collaborate with popular websites and groups/account holders on social media outlets to promote project content;
    5. Carry out further research to understand the link between labour migration and radicalisation for future programming activities;

6. Facilitate life skills training among young women in Madrassas;
7. Improve social media campaigns based on the pilot project;
8. Expand a spectrum of activities of grants, given out to young people.

Religious Scholars to Preach (Da'wah) Tolerance and Diversity in Islam

Scholars have identified ignorance of religious teachings as a cause of radicalisation. A factor propelling radicalisation is the belief that there is only one way of looking at a thing. However, the Glorious Quran made it clear that God Almighty is the creator of everything and made diversity an integral part of life. Diversity has been embedded and entrenched in humankind from the creation.

> "If thy Lord had willed, He could have made mankind one people: but they will not cease to differ, except those on whom thy Lord hath bestowed His Mercy" (Q11:118-119). The Quran has said, "And if thy Lord had pleased, all those who are in the earth would have believed, all of them. Wilt thou then force men till they are believers?" (Q10:99).

Other verses on this issue include Q49:13 and Q30:22. Allah has also classified human being as believers or non-believers. While some believers deviate from the track, non-believers are those who have lost the compass guiding their sojourn on earth. Allah (S.W.T.) ordered believers by their deeds to enlighten and call the non-believers to His path and re-direct the deviating believers. Deeds, when done in the approved manner, is the best form of speech and, by extension, worship.

In Islam, *da'wah* is not a hard and fast rule of making "disciples of the whole world." It is rather committed obedience to the divine injunction to spread the message. This is perchance people may understand the reason for their creation, know the deity worthy of worship, acknowledge all the messengers sent by God, and follow the right path. Allah (S.W.T.) said:

> Clear proofs have indeed come to you from your Lord; so whoever sees, it is for his own good; and whoever is blind, it is to his own harm. And I am not a keeper over you. . .and if Allah had pleased, they would not set up others (with him). And we have not appointed thee a keeper over them, and thou art not placed in charge of them(Q6:104 and 107).

The Quran laid a solid foundation for peaceful *da'wah*. This involves avoidance of mocking the non-believer, thus forestalling the instigation of

abuse to Allah. It also includes amplifying the understanding of diversity and leaving the matter of the called-people in the hands of Allah to judge:

> And abuse not those whom they call upon besides Allah, lest exceeding the limits, they abuse Allah through ignorance. Thus, to every people have We made their deeds fair-seeming; then to their Lord is their return so He will inform them of what they did" (Q6:108).
>
> But if they dispute with thee say: I submit myself entirely to Allah and (so does) he who follows me. And say to those who have been given the Book and the Unlearned: Do you submit yourselves? If they submit, then indeed they follow the right way; and if they turn back, thy duty is only to deliver the message. And Allah is Seer of the servants (Q3:20).

After all, the premise of calling is to the way of Allah:

> Call to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and argue with them in the best manner. Surely thy Lord knows best him who strays from His path and He knows best those who go aright (Q16:125).
>
> So remind. Thou art only to remind. Thou art not a warder over them. But whoever turns back and disbelieves, Allah will chastise him with the greatest chastisement (Q88:21-24).

Da'wah can be done in various aspects of social life, can be through verbal and non-verbal interactions, and requires expertise and skills at some stages. "And from among you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin the right and forbid the wrong. And these are they who are successful" (Q3:103 see also Q9:122 and Q29:46). This prevents unnecessary argument, unskilled confrontation, and malignant contentions.

Students of the Quran and Islamic history point out that Prophet Moses (A.S.), like other prophets, received prior training on *da'wah*. They note also that he went to Pharaoh under order to speak to him "gentle words, haply he may mind or fear"(Q20:44).

An essential requisite is to know that guidance is in the hands of Allah:

> Certainly, thou canst not make the dead to hear the call. Nor canst thou make the deaf to hear, when they go back retreating. Nor canst thou lead the blind out of their error. Thou canst make none to hear except those who believe in Our messages, so they submit (Q27:80-81).

It is paramount for the Daa'i to know that:

> There is no compulsion in the religion—the right way is indeed clearly distinct from error. So whoever disbelieves in the devil and believes in Allah, he indeed lays hold on the firmest handle which shall never break. And Allah is Hearing, Knowing (Q2:256)

Expositions on Moderation: The Cornerstone of Countering Radicalisation

Radicals take extreme religious positions, yet Islam preaches moderation in all facets of life. The Glorious Quran made it clear that:

> And thus we have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you. And We did not make the qiblah which you used to face except that We might make evident who would follow the Messenger from who would turn back on his heels. And indeed, it is difficult except for those whom Allah has guided. And never would Allah have caused you to lose your faith. Indeed Allah is, to the people, Kind and Merciful (Quran, 2:143).

Islam recommends that the pursuit of the hereafter should not make one unmindful of the present world.

> But seek, through that which Allah has given you, the home of the Hereafter; and [yet], do not forget your share of the world. And do good as Allah has done good to you. And desire not corruption in the land. Indeed, Allah does not like corrupters. (Quran, 28: 77).

It is on this note that the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) taught the Muslims this important prayer:

> O Allah, put right for me my din in which lies the protection of my affair and put right for me this world in which lies my livelihood and put right for me the Next World in which is my future. Make life increase in every good thing for me and make death a rest for me from every evil thing.

Islam demonstrates its easiness by always offering alternatives to believers when they are in difficulty:

> O you, who have believed, when you rise to [perform] prayer, wash your faces and your forearms to the elbows and wipe over your heads and wash your feet to the ankles. And if you are in a state of *janabah*, then purify yourselves. But if you are ill or on a journey or one of

> you comes from the place of relieving himself or you have contacted women and do not find water, then seek clean earth and wipe over your faces and hands with it. Allah does not intend to make difficulty for you, but He intends to purify you and complete His favour upon you that you may be grateful. [Quran, 5:6]

In one of the famous expressions of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.), he reportedly said, "Ruined are those who insist on hardship in matters of the Faith." He repeated this thrice. (Muslim)

Allah (S.W.T.) ordered the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) to be merciful and lenient:

> So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them. And if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded from about you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who rely [upon Him]. [Quran, 3:159]

The Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) says, "Gentleness does not enter anything except that it beautifies it and harshness does not enter anything except that it disfigures it." (Muslim)

Jabir ibn Abdullah reported:

> The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, passed by a man who was praying on a rock. The Prophet went to Makkah and remained there for a while, then he returned and found the man still praying this way. The Prophet stood and clasped his hands and said, **"**O people, you must be moderate, you must be moderate, you must be moderate! Verily, Allah will not give up until you give up.

Abdullah ibn Amr reported:

> The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, said to me, "O Abdullah, I am told you fast all day and pray all night." I said, "Of course, O Messenger of Allah." The Prophet said: "Do not do so. Fast and break your fast, pray in the night and sleep. Verily, your body has a right over you, your eyes have a right over you, and your wife has a right over you." (Sahih Bukhari 4903)

Hanzalah Al-Usayyidi reported:

> I said, "O Messenger of Allah, when we are in your presence and

> are reminded of Hell-fire and Paradise, we feel as if we are seeing them with our very eyes, but when we leave you and attend to our wives, our children, and our business, most of these things slip from our minds." The Prophet said: "By Him in whose hand is my soul, if your state of mind remains the same as it is in my presence and you are always occupied with the remembrance of Allah, the angels will shake your hands in your beds and roads. O Hanzalah, rather time should be devoted to this and time should be devoted to that."(Sahih Muslim 2750).

Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) demonstrated his tolerance and love for peace. For instance, he deleted the clause that said he was a messenger of Allah in the preamble to the treaty. He changed his description to "Muhammad, son of Abdullah" as demanded by the non-Muslims.

The Quran upholds Islam over all other faiths (Quran 9:33, 48:28 and 61:9), but Prophet Muhammad's commission was not to compel people to his faith. "It is He Who has created you, and of you are some that are Unbelievers and some that are Believers: and Allah sees well all that ye do" (Quran 64:2).

Thus, Allah told the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.), "Therefore do thou give admonition, for thou art one to admonish. Thou art not at all a warder over them" (Quran 88:21-22). After all, "There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error" (Quran 2:256).

> Say: O People of the Scripture! Come to an agreement between us and you: that we shall worship none but Allah, and that we shall ascribe no partner unto Him, and that none of us shall take others for lords beside Allah. And if they turn away, then say: "Bear witness that we are they who have surrendered [unto Him]" (Quran 3:64).

The message of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) condemns in unequivocal terms the killing of lives. Jihad does not mean killing and wanton destruction of lives and property. The Glorious Quran warns that "whoever kills a person, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he had killed all men. And whoever saves a life, it is as though he had saved the lives of all men" (Quran 5:32).

> "Whoever kills a believer intentionally, his punishment is hell, abiding therein, and Allah is wroth with him and He has cursed him and prepared for him a grievous chastisement" (Quran 4:93). "And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah, and make not your own hands

> contribute to (your) destruction, but do good; for Allah loves those who do good" (Quran 2:195). "Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you Most Merciful!" (Quran 4:29).

Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) made it categorically clear: "Whoever kills himself with something will be tormented by it in the Hell-fire" (Bukhari).

To prevent the instigation of conflict, the Prophet's message (S.A.W.) forbids insulting the non-Muslims. The Quran makes it emphatically clear that:

> Revile not ye those whom they call upon besides Allah, lest they out of spite revile Allah in their ignorance. Thus have We made alluring to each people its own doings. In the end will they return to their Lord, and We shall then tell them the truth of all that they did. (Quran 6:108).

It also forbids reprisals by his followers even for insults by non-Muslims. He recommended patience instead.

> Certainly you will Hear much that will grieve you, from those who received the Book before you and from those who worship many gods. But if ye persevere patiently, and guard against evil—then that will be a determining factor in all affairs (Quran 3:186).

In a Hadith narrated by Abu Hurayrah (R.A.), Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) ordered the fasting faithful, "if somebody fights with him or abuses him, he should tell him twice, 'I am fasting.'" [al-Bukhari]. The principle is applicable even during non-fasting periods. Ibn Mas'ud reported that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Insulting a Muslim is going off the path (*fusuq*) and killing him is disbelief." [Agreed upon] "Allah loveth not the utterance of harsh speech" (Quran 4:148).

Clearing up Misconceptions about Jihad and Some Religious Texts

The Arabic equivalent for holy war is *harb Al-Muqaddass*, which is not in the Islamic literature. The word *jihad* simply means to struggle for a cause. The Glorious Quran: "if any does jihad—strive [with might and main], they do so for their own souls: for Allah is free of all needs from all creation" (Quran 29:2). Neither this nor any other verse of the Quran urges anyone to kill in connection with jihad.

The word *jihad* is traceable to the Meccan Suwar—revelations before the Muslim migration to Medina and before any physical combat with the non-Muslims. The early Muslims never used the presence of the word in the Quran or their terrible torture by non-Muslims as justification to kill. They

remained calm instead until they received orders to defend themselves. The followers of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) were tortured and killed. Allah (S.W.T.) had been pacifying them to keep patient and not fight back.

> And do thou be patient, for thy patience is but from Allah; nor grieve over them: and distress not thyself because of their plots. For Allah is with those who restrain themselves and those who do good." (Quran 16:127-128).

When the level of persecution reached its crescendo, the Muslims received permission to defend themselves. Islam emphasises the concept of just war. Many international peace-keeping missions re-echo this principle. Regarding the "just war" theory, a publication of the New Delhi Institute of UN Studies Ensembles on United Nations states:

> Just war theorists and international lawyers generally argued that war is sometimes necessary, that states are the only viable unit of governance, and that the hope for peace lies in finding conventional limits to war within the system of sovereign states that currently exists.

Allah asked the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) to fight back only as a last resort and when the non-believers violated the treaties they signed.

> Those of them with whom thou madest a treaty, and then at every opportunity they break their treaty, and they keep not duty [to Allah]" (Quran 8:56). "To those against whom war is made, permission is given [to fight], because they are wronged;- and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid;- [They are] those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right,- [for no cause] except that they say, "our Lord is Allah." (Quran 22:39).

However, the Quran states limit, "fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors" (Quran 2:190).

> … turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult or oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith (Quran 2:191).

It is clear that the order to "fight" was within a context of events in a continuum, especially the Hudaibiya treaty which happened six years after the migration of Muslims from Makkah to Madinah. Yusuf Ali's commentary

on this verse is clear:

> War is permissible in self-defense, and under well-defined limits. When undertaken, it must be pushed with vigour, but not relentlessly; but only to restore peace and freedom for the worship of Allah. In any case, strict limi
> ts must not be transgressed: women, children, the old and infirm men should not be molested, nor trees and crops cut down, nor peace withheld when the enemy comes to terms.

Some religious texts contain similar little-noticed expressions. For instance, Jesus Christ reportedly said:

> Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and a man's foes will be those of his own household. (Matthew 10:34).

The biblical text quoted Jesus Christ as saying:

> I came to cast fire upon the earth; and would that it were already kindled! … Do you think that I have come to give peace on earth? No, I tell you, but rather division; for henceforth in one house there will be five divided, three against two and two against three; they will be divided, father against son and son against father, mother against daughter and daughter against her mother, mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law and daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. (Luke 12:49-53).

He therefore ordered, "but all those enemies of mine, who did not want me to reign over them, bring them here and slay them before me" (Luke 19:27). The Bible gave a generic command: "Go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all they have, do not spare them, but kill both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass" (I Samuel 15:3).

Islamic scholars classify jihad into four kinds: *jihad al-nafs* (jihad against one's self), *jihad al-Shaytaan* (jihad against the Shaytaan, i.e., Satan), jihad against the kafirs, and jihad against the hypocrites. In his *Zaad Al-Maad*, Sheikh Ibnul Qayyim says that *jihad al-nafs* consists in struggling to acquire Islamic knowledge, implementing what is learned, and calling others to the religion and persevere in the struggle. The jihad against Satan includes warding off the doubts that Satan stirs up to undermine faith and striving against him to

ward off the corrupt desires that he provokes. Concerning jihad against kafirs, considered as *Fard Kifayyah* in most cases, it is important to note that there are three categories of kafirs. These are those in a truce or peace treaty with the Muslims, those at war with them, and those under the rule and protection of the Islamic state. Islamic scholars state four conditions that make jihad against the kafir compulsory. These are viz: when the Muslim is in battle, when the enemy attacks a Muslim land, when the ruler mobilises the people, and when a person is indispensable for a task. An important condition is the presence of a legitimate leader per the requirements of Islam and qualified to command in that respect.

The jihad on hypocrites is by words and ideas (preaching), and that against oppressors, in four stages—heart, tongue, wealth, and hand, depending on the individual's capacity. Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) put greater emphasis on the struggle against one's self, which he (S.A.W.) described as the greatest jihad. The Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) not only considered obedience to parents a form of jihad but preferred it to a man engaging in physical combat rather than caring for their parents. Abdullah Ibn 'Umar (R.A.) says that a person once asked the Prophet's (S.A.W.) permission to participate in jihad. The Prophet (S.A.W.) inquired: "Are your parents alive?" The person replied in the affirmative. The Prophet (S.A.W.) then remarked: "Keep serving them. This is jihad." (Bukhari).

The Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) also described exertion by women to perform the hajj as the best form of jihad for them. Aisha (the Mother of the Faithful Believers), said, "O Allah's Apostle! We consider jihad as the best deed." The Prophet said, "The best jihad (for women) is Hajj Mabrur."

In another context, Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) stated that the best form of jihad is to speak truth before a tyrant ruler. Sheikh Ibn Baaz says in his *Fatawa*:

> Jihad is of various kinds: with one's self, one's wealth, by making *du'as*, by teaching and guiding, by helping to do good in any way. The greatest form of jihad is jihad with one's self, followed by jihad with one's wealth, jihad by speaking out and guiding others. *Da'wah* is also part of jihad.

Conclusion

The current stage of radicalisation in Nigeria has caused much damage to the country. There is a need for multi-sector approaches to de-radicalisation.

The government has to develop multi-sectoral counter-radicalisation programmes that include encouraging religious discourse among the working class and enhancing ethnic solidarity. Others elements should include promoting religious harmony, improving peoples' livelihood, maintaining social stability, and strengthening community leadership.

It may be necessary to monitor and regulate religious preaching, create job opportunities for Nigerian youths, design and deliver a robust programme for destitute children. Other measures also might be helpful: enhancing the provision of education and literacy programmes, promoting peace education, and improving the anti-corruption campaign. There is the need to focus on the root cause of extremism, and open renunciation and amnesty to radicalised youths who are willing to change. Vital in the de-radicalisation process is the investigation, prosecution, and jailing of politicians and all who fund youth to purchase arms and ammunition. Civil education should be compulsory and a national rehabilitation centre for radicalised youths established.

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Part 4 | Migration and Social Inequality

Chapter 12 | Migration and Social Inequality in Africa

Ladi Sule Matinja

Introduction

Migration is one of the most significant aspects of human civilisation and has a close relationship with human survival. Africa's history has deep roots in a complex network of migration, today a mainstay of the continent's economy and a critical source of income for tens of thousands of Africans. A growing number of people seek their livelihoods outside their countries, either voluntarily or due to circumstances such as famine, drought, civil unrest, or war. Others emigrate to escape political persecution or are victims of enslavement for forced labour in foreign lands. Therefore, the history of migration in Africa has been a product of influences exerted by various factors, including commerce, inter-ethnic wars, and the political and diplomatic engagements of ethnic leaders. We may consider it an internal flight-alternative for displaced individuals and an official engagement opportunity for ruling authorities (Akanle, 2013).

Migration and changes in the socio economic status of individuals and households have close links (Guest, 2006; White, 2009). Some authorities consider it a livelihood strategy (Quisumbing and McNiven, 2007). Occurring usually wherever wealth and poverty coexist, its principal drivers are the uneven distribution of population and resources, unbalanced use of resources, and unequal economic and cultural development. Uneven population and resource distribution, unbalanced use of resources, and variation in economic and cultural development are the main factors that influence human mobility. Deteriorating socio-economic conditions and deepening poverty propel a wide variety of migration. Today, as the global economy drives global inequality, movement across and within borders has reached unprecedented levels.

The debate in the literature has centred on, firstly, whether migration increases or decreases inequality and, secondly, its socio-economic impacts on the host country. Regarding the first question, the effects of migration may differ for the countries involved: inequality might increase in the receiver-country but decrease in the sender-country, or vice versa. This paper examines

these interactions and impacts in Africa.

Clarification of Concepts

A conceptual understanding of migration and inequality is necessary for an examination of the phenomena in Africa.

Migration

Social scientists in the various disciplines define migration differently because of their differing approaches. Geographers emphasise the time, space, and significance of mobility in their definitions, but sociologists accentuate its social sources and consequences. Economists focus on the effects of the distribution of goods and services on livelihoods, whereas political scientists stress the impacts of government policies on migrants. *Migration* means the permanent or temporary shifting of people or individuals from one cultural area to another. Teevan (1992) defines it as "…the movement of people across significant boundaries for…permanent settlement" (p. 531).

The keywords in these definitions of migration are movement, boundaries, and settlement. The world's natural, economic, and technological resources are unequally distributed. Therefore, living organisms (including humans) sometimes have to leave environments running short of the resources they need to prosper and propagate themselves for others where they can thrive. Such programmed movements of species in large numbers to new locations of survival are what we describe as migration. In the words of Clugston (1998), migration is: "the seasonal movement of, usually, whole population of organisms in response to environmental stimuli such as temperature and daylight hours" (p. 501).

Migration is a fluid and dynamic phenomenon, therefore. In addition to its aspect as territorial mobility, it might also be a form of social mobility because it could modify an individual's social status, wealth and income.

Migratory Factors

Social scientists differ on the factors responsible for migration. Since the beginning of human civilisation, however, migration has had distinct impacts on its places of origin and destination. The process involves *push factors* at the former driving migrants out, *pull factors* at the latter attracting them in, and *neutral factors* at both places. Considered alternatively, these are the positive (encouraging), negative (discouraging) and neutral (indifferent) characteristics of these locations that influence the process of migration. The positive features of an area—the pull factors—attract migrants from where push factors exist. The negative ones—the push factors—repel migrants to

move to where there are pull factors. The neutral factors that impede the movement of a person exist between the places of origin and destination. These do not contribute to the migration decision but strike a balance between the positive and negative factors. The positive (+), negative (-), and neutral (±) factors operate simultaneously at the places of origin and destination and might be of a physical, demographic, social, political, religious character. Also, they function differently for different migrants at different stages of life in the process of migration.

There is no theory of the causal factors of migration beyond that it results from not any single factor but a confluence of them that differs in time and space. The pull factors include better employment, education, recreational facilities, housing, and opportunities. The movement by Africans to the West in search of greener pasture is a classic example of this. Conversely, the push factors include poverty, inequality, indebtedness, social exclusion, unemployment, natural calamities, war, and conflict. The movement of the Rohingya due to civil unrest and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar exemplifies the driving force of these factors. Other examples are the population movements in South Sudan due to civil war and in Somali, Nigeria, and Cameroon because of civil unrest. The neutral factors are the distance between the places of origin and destination, attachment to the native land, travel costs, social condemnation, migration laws, religion, culture, etc.

Most studies find that economic factors are significant in motivating migration, as in the classical movement to seek economic fortunes in the West. Other causal factors in migration that scholars have studied include the physical, demographic, social, political, and religious.

Social Inequality

Every society is a hierarchy of groups with unequal access to material and symbolic rewards, a social pyramid of which each stratum wields more power than the one below it. The most privileged group forms the top layer, the least privileged the bottom. This network of relationships involves persistent inequalities in the distribution of socio-economic resources such as wealth, income, status, and power.

Inequality is the state of being unequal in the distribution of social valuables between individuals, groups, and populations. Therefore, social inequality refers to differences between groups that occupy different positions in a hierarchy, to the hierarchical distribution of social, political, economic

and cultural resources. *Stratification, a* closely-related concept, is a more specific and technical term for social inequality in variables such as wealth and social standing. It is a systematic pattern of inequality that endures across generations and is in-built into institutions and everyday practices. Social scientists principally study inequalities in such variables of standards of living as income/wealth, education, health, and nutrition.

Social inequality is evident in virtually every aspect and institution of society; it is also inseparable from ideas of social division, distance, and separation between social groups. It creates relations of domination and subordination that imply judgements about the value of the groups in those relationships, some being considered inferior to others. It thereby creates disadvantage, poverty, and socio-economic deficits that hamper the victim's self-realisation. That limits their social prospects and possible contribution to the development of their community. These disadvantages and limitations then initiate the processes of territorial and social mobility.

Incidence and Pattern of Migration in Africa

Migration has always been central to the livelihood and advancement strategies of Africa's rural and urban populations. Contrary to media portrayals that focus on African migration to Europe and North America, most African population movements are within the continent. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of reliable data, analyses using recent data confirm that most African migrants move within the continent.[1] Intra-regional migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is larger (67%) than migration to other regions, with South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia as the leading destinations. Intra-regional movements in West Africa make up 84% of migration, making it the region with the highest intra-regional mobility (SWAC and OECD, 2012). Many of the participants are labour migrants moving within the sub-region to take advantage of opportunities in its other parts. However, they increasingly include young people moving to take advantage of educational facilities outside their countries.

1. The data is from the Global Bilateral Migration database, the migration and visa databases from the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) project (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016). Another source is the census data from fifteen ECOWAS countries (Awumbila, Benneh, Teye, and Atiim, 2014).

Social Inequalities and Migration in Africa

Migration and inequality have become critical development issues globally. The former has been integral to labour markets and livelihoods across Africa since at least the last century, cuts across class and skill boundaries, and exists in different geographic and demographic contexts. It is closely associated with inequality, whether regarding wages, labour market opportunities, or lifestyles. Millions of workers and their families move each year across national and continental borders, seeking to reduce perceived gaps in wealth, social status, and position between them and others in their communities.

There is a growing consensus in the development field that migration represents a crucial strategy of livelihood diversification for many in the world's poorest nations. That refers to not only international migration. It includes permanent, temporary, and seasonal migration within poor countries, a phenomenon of considerable importance in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Internal and international migration in Africa can have significant development and inequality implications for individuals and their families, places of origin and destination, and national economies. Empirical evidence demonstrates the linkages between migration and inequality at the global and national levels. The United Nations argues that migration can reduce poverty and inequality and stimulate economic and social development. That is if conducive policies are operational at the global, regional, and national levels that reflect the interests of both the places of origin and destination (Global Migration Group 2010).

Regional papers commissioned for this survey indicate that most migrants, be they internal, cross-border, regional, or contract workers, benefit economically from their movement in two ways. Firstly, migration increases livelihood and employment opportunities and, secondly, it often increases their financial income (Kwankye and Anarfi 2011; Ratha and Mohapatra, 2011). That implies that poor people migrate internally and internationally; and, relative to their situation before migration, the income of migrants often increases significantly. It is not the case for all migrants, though: some find themselves in serious debt, which they cannot repay and causes them to fall into further difficulties.

The consensus among scholars on the economic impact of migration on migrant households and extended families in Africa is that migrant remittances constitute a valuable input to family income. Migration impact studies in Africa have focused on households, income levels, human capital formation,

women's empowerment, investment, and the emotional strain on families. Migration by family members helps most left-behind households to increase their incomes; and, in some countries, evidence shows that migration reduces poverty and inequality at the family level.

The above paragraphs indicate a positive association between social inequality and migration in Africa. Migration—permanent, temporary, or seasonal—reflects perceived and actual inequality of opportunity between places of origin and destination. It is not only inequality between them that promotes migration; inequality in the area of origin also can generate it, since villages with greater inequality tend to produce more migrants than those with less.

Conclusion

Migration is a complex phenomenon that involves much contradictory movement with impacts at different levels, and inequality is undoubtedly one of its key drivers. It is a means by which many African individuals and households seek income and livelihood security. However, migration is not a panacea for socio-economic underdevelopment and is closely related to social inequality in many African countries. Social inequality shape migration, and migration, in turn, shapes social inequality: it is neither a cure nor a curse for social inequality.

Government policies are critical to the management of international migration. Creating a conducive environment for broad-based prosperity can shape the socio-economic landscape in migration places of origin and migration's contributions to development. These can influence, in turn, the non-migration options available to those who stay behind. The critical challenge for African governments is to design policies that enhance these contributions to socio-economic development in their countries—that is, to use migration as a development tool.

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Chapter 13 | Inequality and Migration in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa

Okello Oculi

Introduction

Migration is very much in the air in the teenage period of the 21st Century. As of 25 April 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu reversed a plan to deport 36,000 African migrants to Uganda or Rwanda. Nigerian media reported the immolation of a Nigerian migrant in South Africa, and the frenzied media coverage of Rohingya communities evicted from Myanmar had abated. Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, in a pre-recorded audio message on the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), condemned attacks by South African youths on fellow Africans while ignoring Italian, Greek, Pakistani, and other non-African immigrants. British Premier Theresa May apologised while hosting Commonwealth Heads of State for Britain's racist withdrawal of citizenship from Caribbean islanders whom its government had imported during the 1938-45 War. Their importation had been to meet a labour shortage due to high death rates among British soldiers and civilians at the time.

In the United States of America, President Donald Trump denied entry to travellers from Muslim countries by Executive Order because, as he told a campaign rally, "Muslims hate us, they hate America." This policy was a follow-up to President Barack Obama's of lighting fires of regime-change along the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea with mass protests dubbed the "Arab Spring." Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, later murdered on the street, was a primary target of this campaign, the results of which included the explosion of Libya, Egypt, and Syria into horrendous civil wars. Over six million Syrians became forced immigrants to Jordan and Lebanon. Their migration combined with others, including those of persons "human trafficked" from Syria and Afghanistan, to push the European Union into erecting "protective fences" to block entrance across their borders.

This season of migration towards Europe exposed the fragility and economic hollowness of the sovereignty of African states. Global television networks provided sustained coverage of youths crowded in boats—mainly

from Eritrea, Sudan, Senegal, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria—and hundreds of thousands of whom drowned. They were escaping poverty and unemployment.

This paper will combine a historical perspective, which identifies the peculiar features of migration in eastern, central, and Southern Africa, with factors highlighted in migration studies elsewhere, notably Mexico. Those studies focus on the role of remittances (that result from migration), tourism, and the brain drain. Two particular elements in these regions are the prevalence of conflict as a push and pull factor in refugee flows and the impact of migration on development and inequality.

Roots of Migration

The above section focused on conflict and unemployment as factors pushing victims to choose migration to better their life chances. The East, Central and Southern African regions became stages for replays of post-1492 European deportations of poor people in crowded prisons across oceans. European migrants included victims of religious persecution after 1648, and labourers contracted to work in Brazil's coffee plantations and mines, wheat farms in Argentina's prairies, and North America's farms. These wretched of the European earth often became perpetrators of *genocide* against indigenous populations in Australia, New Zealand, and across the landmass between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Migration ended inequality for some of these migrants but brought death and destruction to millions in these victim populations.

In Kenya, Rwanda-Urundi, Bechuanaland, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia and Angola, European immigrants benefited from colonial-government labour recruitment for mining or agricultural enterprises and individual white farmers. The principal beneficiaries were mining companies in South Africa, Southern and Northern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe and Zambia, respectively), Kenya, Tanganyika, and the Belgian Congo. The robbing of the indigenous communities of their land and compelling them to supply labour involved the infliction on them of enormous violence. European migration to these places brought structural violence and deepened poverty for Africans, engendering "the development of underdevelopment" for them but capitalist development for the European immigrants.

In 1931, chiefs rounded up six thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine men in Rwanda to work in copper mines and tea and cotton farms in Uganda.

Between 1914 and 1928, white farmers in the fertile highlands of Kivu benefited from "forced labour" from thickly-populated Rwanda-Urundi.(Mamdani: 2002: 20-241). The Tutsi descendants of these victims of "transplantation" would in 1994 leave Kivu to enlist in the invading army of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) to defeat Rwanda's "interim government." That government's fall cost a genocide that preceded RPF-AFDI attacks on 350,000 refugees walking "toward Lobutu while a smaller group of around 150,000 went down toward Shabundu"(Prunier: 2009: 143).

The transfer of farming labour from households to white farmers in Rwanda-Urundi caused a massive famine. That also occurred in Kenya and other countries that deported healthy males to work in mines in the Belgian Congo/Southern Rhodesia Copperbelt. The prohibition on wives accompanying these labourers led to "pro-creational genocide," as it denied men and women at the peak of fertility sexual contact during long periods of forced labour. The resultant population decline across the region was a bizarre form of "silent migration" into "After-Africa."

Pressure on African governments from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank *to terminate national capitalism* intensified the transfer of household agricultural labour to production for external economic interests. They sought this by insisting that these governments sell state-owned assets to foreign capitalists and chase peasant farmers from community-owned land by violence, making them landless. They also sought to block the growth and consolidation of a middle class that could have constituted a national market for local companies. That class could also have produced inventors of local technologies that would enable African countries to participate in a global economy of "increasingly sophisticated goods and services" (Oswaldo: 2001:2).

The loss of home-grown capitalism blocks the use of labour-intensive technology to reduce unemployment (which, in Uganda, for example, was at 80% in 2016). It often leaves only three ways to participate in the global economy: consumption of imports, sale of raw materials at declining international prices, and payment of external debts (Jazairy: 2017:3). The export of profits by multinationals and payment of compound-interest debts by African governments denies the continent the funds for running high-quality education and building good infrastructures. It is these assets that Singapore and India have exploited to attract investments by subsidiaries of multinational firms.

A peculiarity of Italian colonialism was the reliance on the importation of workers from Italy's most poor areas to provide labour for white-owned farms,

carpentry firms, and technical services in garages. This practice ensured that when Colonel Gaddafi executed his 1969 military coup, there were no local skilled workers in Libya. He deported the Italian workers and signed a contract with Egypt to provide workers to fill the gap. Unlike colonial contract workers across East, Central, and Southern Africa, the Egyptian immigrant workers were highly skilled, well-educated, and not engaged in slave labour**.**

Brain Drain

It is not clear that anyone regarded Egyptian migrant workers in Libya as a "drain" of intellectual productivity from Egypt's economy. They were, instead, a contribution to the "Arab Revolution" as preached by Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose military coup against the Egyptian monarchy was god-father to Libya's by a younger admirer. The labour supply contract also opened a window for the export of Egyptian consumer goods to Libya.

Table 1: Number of immigrant professionals in United States enterprises

YEAR	NUMBERS
1990	60,000
1993	140,000
2001	180,000
2002	179,000
2003	80,000

Table 1 shows the upward growth in the number of immigrant professionals working in American establishments before adverse public opinion turned politicians against foreign workers. Moore underlined their value as follows:

Anyone who believes that immigrants are a drain on the U.S. economy has never visited the Silicon Valley in California. Here and in other corridors of high-tech entrepreneurship, immigrants are…the lifeblood of many of the nation's most prosperous industries. In virtually every field in which the United States asserted global leadership in the 1980s: industries such as computer design and software, pharmaceuticals, bio-engineering, electronics (Moore: 2006: 309).

Here is an example of professionals from poorer economies adding intellectual power, inventiveness, and productive capacity to a developed

economy, thereby widening the gap between scientifically sophisticated economies and so-called developing ones. Not even reparations equal to the value created by the "drained" brains could compensate for this gap.

In 1980, this immigrant "labour aristocracy" in Britain constituted 12%, 15%, and 11% among Jamaican, Indian, and Pakistani immigrants, respectively. Migrant workers who performed "the most physically demanding, dangerous, and undesirable tasks in an increasingly technological society" comprised 94% of Jamaican, 61% of Indian, and 87% of Pakistani migrants. Their skills could only make limited contributions to the "development" of their countries of origin. Their biggest concern was to afford their children an opportunity than they had for a better life through either education or professional sports in the host environment(Freeman: 2006: 151).

The flight of highly-trained human resources from Southern Africa between the mid-1960s and 1994 consisted of whites of two categories. The one detested the prospect of being governed by African leaders of successful liberation struggles; the other decided to wait things out from safer sites like Canada, Britain, Australia, and the Americas. The Ugandan diaspora sprouted during General Idi Amin's dictatorship (1971-78), and critics of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) grew after the failed military coup of 1982. His leading critics, Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Micere Mugo, escaped death by re-locating to teach in American universities. Such migration deepens underdevelopment in the region (Ngugi: 2002).

Remittances

Those who downplay the quantity and financial and political productivity of South-to-North "brain drains" tend to emphasise the numbers and limited multiplier effect of funds and projects that immigrants remit. McKenzie claims that in Mexico, "remittances are predicted to improve child health outcomes by allowing the purchase of additional medical and nutritional inputs." Better fed babies are less likely to suffer from "cognitive and neurological impairment"(McKenzie: 2008:128).

Highly-educated persons who were openly critical of terror-governance and corruption fled into exile from Amin's Uganda, arap Moi's Kenya, and the apartheid regimes in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (1948-94). That saved them from death by what Kenyans called "accidenting," i.e., regime-arranged fatal motor accidents. In Mobutu's Zaire (now the Democratic

Republic of the Congo), the regime invited victims to dinner with the president and had them thrown off presidential planes that were transporting them to the rendevous (Nzongola: 2000). In such circumstances, migration to the North from countries that were deficient in democracy and personal safety was a valuable means of conserving human resources. That brain drain was well compensated.

The economics of brain export from poorer countries to the European Union and North America, like non-human natural resources, is yet to be exhaustively examined or the value of this export calculated. It is inappropriate and lazy to evaluate it by comparing the dollars remitted by the African Diaspora, on the one hand, against the magnitude of Africa's problem of inequality, on the other. Measurements by the Africa Migration Project have focused on the impacts of "international remittances" and "intra-African remittances" on recipient-households, the beneficial ones being similar to those noted in Mexico. Studies have found other benefits in East and Southern Africa:

> During droughts in Botswana, families at risk of losing cattle and those relying on crops for their sustenance tended to receive more remittances than other families…. Ethiopian households that receive international remittances were less likely than other households to sell their productive assets, such as livestock to cope with food shortages (Mohapatra and Ratha: 16).

Also, recipients of international remittances to Uganda and Kenya invest the money in buying land, building houses, and paying school fees, often enabling female youths to obtain more education—including getting university degrees. In another sector:

The steady stream of remittance receipts can also be…a factor in evaluating the credit-worthiness of recipients for micro-loans, consumer loans, and small business loans (sought, for example, to purchase agricultural equipment) (ibid: 17).

Remittances answer calls by inequality at both the receiving and sending ends.

Tourism

> The sad thing about tourism in East Africa is that most of the revenue comes from visitors from outside the East African region and… Africa. Domestic tourism has greatly been neglected as more and more emphasis is placed on foreign tourism. It is very hard to get citizens from the East African region [to visit] other tourist destinations

> [outside]… their own countries, say, Kenyans visiting Tanzania and Tanzanians visiting Kenya or Uganda as tourists.

That picture is changing. Rwanda abolished in 2011 visa requirements for members of the East African Community. That increased tourism earnings from $283,000 in 2010 to $478,000 in 2013 (: 2016:2). Kenya's tourism earnings have suffered from attacks by Al-Shabaab terrorists. These attacks include the kidnapping of European tourists for ransom, the killing of shoppers inside a Nairobi supermarket, and the slaughtering of 147 university students at Garissa University in north-east Kenya. Other adverse factors include the travel advisories that the American and British governments issue consequent on such attacks and the drought-related decimation of the primary tourist attraction—wildlife.

Fifty-eight million tourists visited Africa in 2016, bringing in $165.8 billion—of which foreign spending accounted for only 36.7%. South Africa received 6,001,000 tourists in 2000 and 15,052,000 in 2015. The top five non-African contributors in 2015 were the United Kingdom (407,486; 19%), United States (297,226; 14%), Germany (256,646; 12%), France (128,438; 6%), and the Netherlands (121,883; 5.7%). The next five were Australia (99,205; 4.6%), China (84,691; 3.9%), India (78,385; 3.7%), and Canada (56,224; 2.6%). The top five were historically the countries of origin of the largest numbers of settlers in apartheid South Africa and participated in exploiting its raw materials and labour.

South Africa also has significant imaginative structures for wildlife-related holiday visits by its large European immigrant population to enjoy its tropical wonders. Those structures also served to attract European visitors from colder climes. This manipulation of its tropical ecology had the strategic value of winning vital Western support for continued white domination of the region against pressures by armed African nationalism. According a ride on a coal-fired train, night picnics in the bush featuring meats of diverse wildlife and local wines: these were seductive offerings. The following tourist advertisement is typical:

> South Africa [ranks] sixth…of the world's seventeen mega-diverse countries and is home to a large variety of animal life. Among the large mammals found in the northern bushveld include lions, leopards, cheetahs, white rhinoceroses, blue wildebeest, kudus, impalas, hyenas, hippopotamuses and giraffes…. The Kruger National Park, established in 1926, is one of the most visited national parks in the country, with

> a total of 1,659,793 visitors in the 2014/15 period. The country is also particularly rich in plant diversity, with a wide variety of biomes… which—on Table Mountain—was the most-visited national park in South Africa in 2014/15, with…2,667,787 visitors.

Unlike East Africa, tourists also visited the country from SADC member-states, as shown in the table below:

Table 2: Tourists from SADC countries to South Africa

Country	Tourists	% of total	Rank	2015
Zimbabwe	1,900,791	28.9	1	
Lesotho	1,394,913	21.2	2	
Mozambique	1,200,315	18.3	3	
Swaziland	838,006	12.7	4	
Botswana	593,514	9.0	5	
Namibia	212,514	3.2	6	
Zambia	161,259	2.5	7	
Malawi	135,260	2.1	8	
Angola	48,416	0.7	9	
Tanzania	35,817	0.5	10	
Source:				

Noteworthily, these countries share a history of sending contract workers to South Africa, with Mozambique supplying workers for white farmers.[1] They also host European immigrants who engage in local farming, mining or commerce and cherish holidays in the much-richer South African.

The Kenya Tourism Board (KTB) had a 168 billion KShillings budget, against the 15 billion Shillings budget of the Uganda Tourism Board (UTB).[2] It ran a marketing campaign in 2015 to attract Ugandan tourists, using "modern branding techniques and effective positioning strategies." It included offers of

1. A 1991 law required workers to return home, having come to work without their wives.
2. Osaze Lanre Nosase, 03/04/2021 12:45: The author should provide the year of reference.

weddings on Kenya's long and wide beach on the Indian Ocean and "medical tourism:"

> Globally, Uganda is [the] fourth source market for Kenya. The latest figures by KTB indicate that the top five performing markets based on air arrivals as of close of 2016 are [the] USA with 97,883 tourists, followed by [the] U.K. [with] 96,404, India…64,116, Uganda…51,023, and China…47,860… (Batte: 2018: 1-3).

Terrorism reduced the flow of Ugandan tourists between 2013 and 2015. However, the numbers rose by 75.7% in air arrivals from 29,038 in 2015 to 51,023 in 2016.(*ibid*: 1). Ethiopia benefits from the annual African Union summit of Heads of State and Government and the many meetings of the body's agencies with officials of the fifty-four member-states in attendance. Ancient rock architectures hosting religious temples also attract visitors. Thirty years of war against Eritrea's liberation movement, followed by a civil war against Mengistu Haile Mariam's dictatorship, created a climate of insecurity that hurt tourism.

Some scholars have cast doubt on the economic benefits of tourism for African countries other than South Africa. Bookman claims that "tourism seems to be more effective than other industries in generating employment and income in the less-developed of the peripheral regions of a country." This position emphasises tourism's benefits, such as the locals serving as guides on bush tracts, drivers of vehicles, cooks and chefs in resorts, and tourists purchasing handicrafts. However, expenditure on these services and goods do not compare with that on airfares, hotel accommodation, and car-hire—which tourists pre-pay before arrival on African soil (Bookman: 2006: 90). Works of art made from legitimately-obtained elephant tusks are yet to reach the artistic quality of objects for interior decoration achieved historically in China and Asia. The tusks are still items of export as raw materials, if not of smuggling.

Northern countries for decades have built zoos to host and breed tropical animals and other creatures for the education and recreational edification of their predominantly urban populations. That has reduced their citizens' demand on their governments to fund their tourism to Africa for its wildlife. The escalating slaughter of rhinos and elephants for their horns and tusks is a particularly criminal form of tourism.

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe argued that Zimbabwe's beautiful hills and mountain ranges, red skylines at sunset, and beautiful flowers and rough bushes that trekkers found attractive were its property. Tourists should

pay for their appropriation like they do for consuming food items and diamond stones. The international firms that reap huge profits from marketing these components of scenery do not and cannot produce them. Charges for these tourist attractions would raise income that could fund social services and small-scale rural industrial processing. Tourist migration would, thereby, effectively combat poverty and inequality.

Refugees

Through taxation and encouraging the production of stipulated export crops, colonial rule trapped some peasant societies that rested on the communal ownership of land. Producers received forced-labour prices, but the export profits did not go into the local industrial production of improved tools. Nor did it finance food importation to compensate for the decline in food production due to the diversion of labour to export crops. Rural life became a prison of poverty.

The colonial powers seized fertile land in Kenya, Algeria, and most of Southern Africa (except Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana, to a limited extent) and sold it cheaply to immigrant Europeans. The resulting landlessness seriously depressed food production levels, and colonial administrations forced the dispossessed to work for the new owners by means that included the prohibition of migration to urban areas. That made the agricultural sector also a prison of deepening poverty.

These two measures were socio-economic pressure-cookers, and their contents erupted into the urban areas when colonial rule ended. There were no post-independence housing plans to accommodate the massive internal displacements they produced. Accordingly, slums proliferated in towns like Kinshasa, Nairobi, Harare, and Cape Town (examples of white-settler post-colonial economies); and the Kibera slum in Nairobi became a favourite project site for United Nations officials. These movements that came out of this prolonged, silent structural violence did not gain the label of "internal displacement."

Terrorism by the Lord's Resistance Movement (LRM) in Uganda and government military counter-operations caused massive populations movements from the country's northern districts into Buganda. As a woman passenger in a bus from Lira town to Kampala told me, "since peace was only in the south, we too decided to come and enjoy it." Museveni's government moved scattered household communities into Vietnam-type concentration camps, presumably to prevent LRM recruitments. One principal effect of this

was that the inhabitants became dependent on occasional food distribution by "humanitarian agencies."

A United Nations Committee identified 85 multinational corporations that supply guns and cocaine to militia groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That was for them to drive out rural communities from sites that satellite pictures had revealed to have large deposits of valuable minerals. They then dug up these deposits and flew them out in helicopters to diverse destinations, including Rwanda (Nzongola-Ntalaja: 2003:.)[3] This pandemic of violence and forced migration followed the larger war that terminated Mobutu's regime in 1997. The displacements disrupted farming, with harvests either looted or burnt. Children hiding with their mothers in the bush at night and in the rain become exposed to pneumonia, malaria, and snake bites. The resultant poverty deepened inequality.

This type of resource-related external intervention also occurred later in Darfur in western Sudan. There the "Sudan Liberation Movement" and the "Justice and Equality Movement" led a liberation struggle against the government in Khartoum for "oppressing Darfur's non-Arab population." That struggle instigated a military offensive led by cattle-rearing *Janjaweed* militias, which prompted the forced relocation of local farming populations into "concentration camps." Non-governmental organisations based mainly in New York City condemned the measure loudly and persistently and accused the government of Sudan of "systematic genocide" in Darfur(Frederick Musisi: 2018:3). A protest against the dismissal of Darfur indigenes from the officer ranks of the military was, in the final analysis, the source of this conflict and the migration it generated. The *Janjaweed*, *who* traditionally migrated from Kordofan and northern Darfur in search of pasture for their animals, were ready allies of the government—lured by permanent access to grasing land.

Uganda hosts refugees from 13 countries, including Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Chad, Central African Republic and South Sudan. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) put their numbers at 1.277 million as of June 2017, the Bidi Bidi Camp in Yumbe District alone hosting three hundred thousand. "One thousand refugees [arrived daily] in the West Nile districts of Arua, Moyo, Yumbe, Adjumani, and Lamwo," fleeing massacres and hunger due to the collapse of farming. This influx was likely

3. Osaze Lanre Nosase, 03/04/2021 21:06: This citation needs a page reference.

to drive the refugee population above 1.5 million by 2018 (Musisi *op cit*: 2).

Fears of a repeat of events in Burundi, Ethiopia, and Rwanda drive the war in southern Sudan. Ruling ethnic minorities in those countries have prevented ethnic-majority elites from winning democratic elections by exploiting their population advantage. Before the ascendancy of Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu, as president, successive Tutsi minority governments in Burundi repeatedly slaughtered tens of thousands of the majority Hutu to crush their political uprisings. The ethnic-majority Hutu and Dinka elites (currently dominant in Burundi and South Sudan, respectively) employ defensive terror against their ethnic-minority Tutsi and Nuer counterparts, who reject the permanent dictatorship of the majority.

Civilian populations caught in this conflict vote with their feet by fleeing as refugees to neighbouring countries. They often go to cross-border kith and kin who are as poor as themselves but wealthier in the absence of violence and hunger. Uganda has pioneered the novel policy of giving refugees 100-by-100-metre farmland to enhance their food self-sufficiency and justifies it by the obligations of African brotherhood.

Climate Change

Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, northern Kenya, and north-east Uganda suffer from dry north-east winds that drop their moisture on the Ethiopian highlands or Arabian desert. Their combination of high vulnerability to drought and predominance of pastoralism produce migratory volatility:

These regions have traditionally experienced cross-border migration by pastoralists. However, intensified climate change and environmental degradation have contributed to increased…migration, variation from traditional migration routes and increased distance to move.

Conflict within and between pastoral communities has increased. In north-east Congo, Belgian troops quelled a conflict between the cattle-rearing minority Hema and the farming majority Lunda at the latter's expense. It had arisen from the Belgian colonial administration making the Hema chiefs over the Lunda. Following Uganda's invasion of eastern Congo, her troops struck an alliance with and armed Hema youths. On the other hand, the ruling party appears—in recent electoral jostling—to have roused Lunda nationalism and rejection of Belgian colonial structural violence imposed over them. Their "liberation" has assumed the form of "ethnic-cleansing" attacks on the Hema, causing the latter since 2017 to flee in waves into Uganda as refugees. Here

is a case of the remedial political manipulation of historical injustice resulting in forced migration: it has driven the Hema into poverty and dependence on humanitarian support.

Conclusion

The region under review has known many mass migrations, primarily involving poor rural populations undergoing conflict-driven internal transplantation. Their movements have been across the border of a neighbouring country or several borders into farther ones within the region.

Colonial administrations conducted contract migration, which wrecked food self-sufficiency and population increase in affected countries. Whole communities in Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Darfur, and Somalia fled from insecurity and hunger or became trapped in government concentration camps. Migration into racist South Africa aided capitalist development in South Africa principally but only to a lesser extent the smaller economies of Kenya and Zimbabwe.

South Africa and Kenya have taken the lead in promoting tourism and attracting tourists from neighbouring countries and farther afield. Rwanda has benefited from pioneering a no-visa policy within the East African community.

The region experienced a brain-drain due to repression and wars for liberation. South Africa and Uganda have benefited most from international remittances.

The region has produced large flows of refugees, Uganda leading at over 1.277 million and rising. Intra-regional conflicts have engendered numerous demonstrations of the brutality of Africans to fellow Africans. There are rays of hope: Kenya stepped back from a threat to close the Dadaab camp that holds 600,000 Somali refugees, and Uganda offered land for families to grow their food.

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Part 5 | Nigeria, China and Debt

Chapter 14 | The Chinese are Here: Any Prospect for Growth and Development?

"Our African partners really have to watch out that they will not be facing a new process of colonisation."

Chijioke Uwasomba

—German development ministry, appraisal of China's[1] activities in Africa

Introduction

Let us not quibble: interdependence is the axle upon which the wheel of progress turns. That holds at all levels of human relationship and among nations. However, unfair and unbalanced relationships—including those of trade and investments—undermine and endanger nations at the disadvantaged end. The prefatory quotes, both from representatives of countries that have taken unfair advantage of Africa for decades, show that China's ubiquitous presence in Africa and its affairs is causing some concern.

Africa has been at the receiving end since its contact with the West. As Labi and Robinson noted in their blistering essay "Looting Africa" (2001):

> Africa—its people already plundered by slavers, its animals by poachers and its mineral wealth by miners—is now yielding up its cultural heritage. The historical legacy of Africa is that of a continent of trade by force dating back centuries; slavery that uprooted and dispossessed about twelve million Africans; land grabs; vicious taxation schemes; precious metals spirited away, stealing of antiquities; imposition of racist ideologies to justify colonialism; carving up of Africa in Berlin in 1884-85, Cold-War battlegrounds in which Africa was used as proxies for the U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflicts during the Cold War and other wars signposted by mineral searches with the accompanying violence that left Africa wounded and devastated.

1. These quotations are from Sautman and Hairong, 2007:6.

Africa gets poorer still, with per capita incomes in many countries "below those of the 1950s-60s era of independence" (Bond, 2006:2).

Colonialism imposed and encouraged cash crop production and mineral extraction in the colonies for export to the metropole and discouraged heavy manufacturing.

It is unsurprising that many decades after independence, African countries have not developed the manufacturing capacity to make their exports competitive in the global market. How can people who cannot provide for themselves compete favourably with the advanced economies? Rodney (1972) articulated this condition thus in his ground-breaking work, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*:

> Under colonialism, the ownership was complete and backed by military domination. Today, in many African countries the foreign ownership is still present, although the armies and flags of foreign powers have been removed. So long as foreigners own land, mines, factories, banks, insurance companies, means of transportation, newspapers, power stations, etc., then for so long will the wealth of Africa flow outwards into the hands of those elements. In other words, in the absence of direct political control, foreign investment ensures that the natural resources and labour of Africa produce economic value which is lost to the continent (208).

African Elites and Their Idea of Development

The African elite's tendency—because of its character—to accept prescriptions by outside institutions uncritically regarding how to run their economies is a serious problem. That has posed a challenge to Africa's development: infant industries and manufacturing jobs suffer when African governments lift protective tariffs with ease and careless abandon. As Christian Aid noted, "trade liberalisation has cost sub-Saharan Africa $272 billion over the past 20 years… overall, local producers are selling less than they were before trade was liberalised" (2005: 3). The result is the immiseration of more people (as evident in the higher poverty index), social conflicts, and crises.

African elites are interested in obtaining foreign direct investments (FDI), as their embrace of the 2001 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) demonstrated. Thandika Nkandika Mkandawire (2005: 6), among others, has argued that:

> …little FDI has gone into [the] manufacturing industry. As for

investment in mining, it is not drawn to African countries by macro-economic policy changes, as is often suggested, but by the prospect of better world prices, changes in attitude towards national ownership and sector-specific incentives.

Many African countries depend upon a single commodity for exports.[2] These include crude oil (Angola 92%, Congo 57%, Gabon 70%, Nigeria 96% and Equatorial Guinea 91%); copper (Zambia 52%), and diamonds (Botswana 91%). Others are Coffee (Burundi 75%, Ethiopia 62%; Uganda 83%); tobacco (Malawi 59%,) and uranium (Niger 59%). Overall, primary products account for about 80% of Africa's exports. It is little wonder that Africa's exploitation by outside forces in collaboration with internal elements, which started with the slave trade, has continued and become even more rapacious. What is happening is another wave of colonialism in a new guise.

The Chinese are Here

The Chinese: What Are They Offering?

This question is vital, given that every nation—regardless of its philanthropy—operates first and foremost to satisfy its citizens' interests. The Chinese cannot be different: they are in Africa to pursue the interests of their citizens. Thus, Wolf (2006) avers that China is perpetuating or even reinforcing the inherent unevenness of capitalist development. It does this by blocking the path of African countries to export-led industrialisation and locking them into "unfavourable trade structures [that] make it harder to diversify toward higher value-added products" (254).

Africa is experiencing another scramble for its resources. Bond (2006) holds that, from the early 2000s, China became a chief participant in the exploitation of Africa and its resources. The country is "attracting growing geopolitical controversy (because from Sudan to Zimbabwe to Angola, Chinese loans and investments have propped up corrupt regimes) and having a marked de-industrialisation effect" (59). The Chinese threat to African industry is real. Chiahemen (2005) reports that "Lesotho's garment industry collapsed when the African Growth and Opportunity Act Benefits evaporated in 2005 once China joined the WTO" (29).

Critics also accuse China of illegal timber importation from Indonesia,

2. "Looting Africa," p. 58.

Cameroon, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea.[3] Further, Schiller asserts that:

> …in its rush to expand, development experts say, China is reinvigorating an older, crude style of development, re-establishing an era of white elephant and "prestige" projects with little benefit to local people. In Ethiopia, the Chinese state-owned Jiangxi International built $4 million worth of new housing after a flood left hundreds destitute. But instead of accommodating the homeless, the blocks ended up being used by military officials (74).

Opinions differ on China's effects on industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some scholars, including Kaplinsky(2008), argue that Chinese industrial and business policies and activities do not favour African manufacturing. Others, such as Lin (2012), Jumbo and Frasher (2014), Oshodi (2012), and Chakraparty (2016), believe Chinese investments in Africa can ignite local industrialisation and business development. Critics of those investments accuse China of sundry anti-development activities, including a preference for Chinese rather than local workers. Examples abound: importing thousands of Chinese labourers and engineers to build Ethiopia's $300-million Takazee Dam and construct and maintain Sudan's oil pipelines. Thousands of Chinese workers are also active in other African countries. Critics also accuse the Chinese of dumping sub-standard products in Africa, thus killing local initiatives and innovations. Finally, Adisu et al. posit that many Chinese investments in Africa will benefit the Chinese more than they benefit Africans:

> …few states…pursue a foreign policy that favours citizens of other countries than it would favour their own citizens. Where available, such nation-states would be in the minority. Apart from its support for decolonising Africa, China had carried out tasks that sometimes favoured Africans more than it [did the] Chinese. In the heat of poverty, hunger and famine in the years between 1956 and 1978, China still provided aids to Africa worth millions of dollars.[4]

Mkandawire (2013: 50), an otherwise trenchant critic of Africa's borrowed development paradigm, say this about China's role in driving investment in Africa:

> There can also be no doubt that [the] China factor is making a huge

3. See resources at www.globaltimber.org.uk.
4. Quoted in Oshodi (2012: 24).

difference not only because it has brought infrastructure back to the aid agenda but because it has led to the decoupling of African economies from slow-growing Europe and coupling to the more dynamic Asian economies.

There is no doubt that China has become a force to reckon with in Africa and the world. It has established the Forum for Chinese African Co-operation (FOCAC, a quasi-political and quasi-ideological body) and built airports, roads, railways (for example, Nigeria's ongoing rail project), and other large infrastructure projects. These investments, one dare say, confront Africa with the prospect of a new scramble for her resources. The West is not ignoring China's new influence in Africa. Both they and China are in a rivalry to establish their presence and hold on Africa. The contest is not merely ideological. It also has practical impacts: deepening the underdevelopment, dependency, and immiseration of African peoples. Although Africa needs Western and Chinese investments, the strategic interests of Africa and its people are sacrosanct. The rivalry between China and the West serves the strategic interests of the rivals and their African lackeys. It does not benefit the people of Africa.

The West and China view Africa as a vast reserve of natural resources and, increasingly, a "camp" for cheap labour. The material interests of these "powers" propel them into Africa, causing plunder, conflicts, and humiliating exploitation. As I write this paper, social media is awash with reports of a Nigerian's expulsion from a Chinese restaurant for daring to patronise the place. Similar issues of race and class discrimination have become problematic in Chinese/African relations in workplaces.

Another "war" is on as the Chinese are on the rampage in Africa, and the Western world, which has pillaged Africa many years, is devising new tactics and strategies. The scramble is on, and Africans are likely to tell more tales of woe in the next fifty to a hundred years.

Chapter 15 | Dining with the Tiger: Towards a Critique of the Nigeria-China Partnership

Osaze Lanre Nosaze

Introduction

China represents its relationship with Africa as benevolent and rejects charges that it is neo-imperialist or, at least, proto-imperialist. It contrasts its African partnerships instead with the West's imperialism on the continent. Thus, Liu Guijin—formerly the Chinese ambassador to South Africa—cites Zheng He's African odyssey during the Ming Dynasty to demonstrate the non-predatory character of Afro-Chinese relations.[1] He notes that "China did not occupy an inch of any newly discovered land or set up any military fortresses" consequent on that voyage. Liu contrasts that with the outcomes of Christopher Columbus' visits to South America between 1492 and 1502. He insists that China's primary purpose in its relationship with Africa is to help the continent's countries "improve their…development ability."[2]

Yet Africa's historical experience advises scepticism of China's altruism. The country is unquestionably the alpha of the Asian Tigers, although the literature usually does not list it among them. And, as Chinweizu has observed, "it is suicidal for lambs to…think and act out of assumptions…that…further the interests of the lions and jackals [that prey] upon them."[3] That caution need not produce a knee-jerk rejection of all possibility of China's sincerity with Africa. Instead, it calls for a calm and clear-headed debate on the Afro-Chinese relationship—in all its implications and ramifications. Those committed to the self-liberation of Africa's working people from the barbarian existence thrust

1. Zheng was a 15th-century Chinese admiral and mariner.
2. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', pp. 39-40. For Zheng He, see Cartwright, 'The Seven Voyages of Zheng He'; and Brown, 'Zheng He'. For Christopher Columbus, see 'Christopher Columbus', 28 August 2018; and 'Christopher Columbus'.
3. Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, p. xiii.

upon us by the global capital system[4] must take their watchword from Aimé Césaire. Concerning colonialism, he said:

> "In dealing with this subject, the commonest curse is to be the dupe in good faith of a collective hypocrisy that cleverly misrepresents problems, the better to legitimise the hateful solutions provided for them. *In other words, the essential thing here is to see clearly, to think clearly—that is, dangerously…"*[5]

Therefore, this contribution on the China question does not offer an impartial analysis.[6] It is, instead, an exploratory attempt to think radically about contemporary Nigeria-China relations regarding their implications for the self-emancipation of Nigeria's working classes. If mental lucidity on this matter is dangerous, that could only be to those who would hide or misrepresent the truth about that relationship.

The invitation to present a paper on the subject was an opportunity to investigate a disturbing question for many activists since the 1990s. In doing so, however, we took the liberty of re-conceptualising the primary question to clarify its essence better. For the given title—*Chinese Investments in Nigeria: An Imperial Project?*—immediately evokes "imperialism." Hartwich contends that opponents of neo-liberalism have reduced the term to a swearword that has

4. We follow István Mészáros and Samir Amin in distinguishing between the "global *capital* system" or "capital system," on the one hand, and "capitalism" or *"capitalist* system," on the other. The former refers to the international network of social formations (more simply, societies) whose interconnections and inter-operations only make possible capital accumulation and capital's systemic reproduction at the world level. We reserve the latter for references to the mode of production in which the profit motive is the governing principle. The formations that constitute the capital system are at different stages of socio-economic development and may feature more or less severe systemic controls on capital accumulation or even reject it *in principle*. Their affinity as members of the system is that, nonetheless, each plays a role in capital accumulation and capital's reproduction on the global scale.
5. Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, p. 2.
6. "Objectivity, like the claim that one is non-partisan or reasonable, is usually a defensive posture used by those who fear involvement in the passions, partisanships, conflicts, and changes that make up life; they fear life. An 'objective' decision is generally lifeless." Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, p. ix.

usurped the place or blunted the acuity of analysis.[7] "Imperialism" preceded it in that office by at least a century and a half. Rather than engaging in a barren "labelism" that could only produce clichéd reasoning, we thought to grapple with the substantive questions involved in the China problem. Those questions reduce into one: Are Chinese investments bringing Nigeria into a structural dependency that enables China to dominate and exploit it?

This question is of the utmost relevance in light of Africa's historical experience of enslavement, occupation, and colonisation. It is more so that the international systemic relations into which global capital brought Nigeria in the 19th century still reproduce the existential barbarisation that we have suffered since. Therefore, the question is legitimate whether the developing Nigeria-China relationship is a new phase in Nigeria's tighter integration into a self-perpetuating system of exploitation and domination. Is what we see taking shape not a new version of the imperialist robbery in the 18th and 19th centuries of the peoples occupying the area that is modern Nigeria? In those exchanges, the rulers of these peoples sold off the young and strong for such fripperies as mirrors and glass beads.[8] The evidence from our preliminary investigation indicates that Chinese investments in Nigeria are part of a broad strategy that is bringing the latter into relations of dependency on the former. The effects of those relations include:

1. Facilitating global accumulation by Chinese capital through the exploitation of Nigeria's labour force, the extraction of its natural resources, and the sale of China's surplus commodities in its market;
2. Reproducing Nigeria's neo-colonial role and place in the current configuration of the capital system and the new one that China and its allies are seeking to create;
3. Hampering and limiting the compass of Nigeria's independent agency

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7. Hartwich, 'Neo-Liberalism: The Genesis of a Political Swearword'. Hartwich's intention and perspective in this work are decidedly anti-progressive. Nonetheless, his observation is correct. The term "neo-liberalism" has become an excuse for many on the Left not to investigate the ideological, policy, and practical issues it describes. It is enough among too many of us to label a policy "neo-liberal" to put it beyond the pale of critical inquiry. It becomes simply a bludgeon to beat the bourgeoisie over the head with, an insult to hurl at ideological opponents! There is no need for effort to understand the policy's meanings, impacts, or implications for the struggles of the labouring classes. Without such comprehension, however, it is impossible to devise effective counter-strategies to it.
8. See Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa; Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us; and Uzoigwe, Britain and the Conquest of Africa: The Age of Salisbury.

towards its self-liberation from that function and position and the underdevelopment and other adverse structural effects they produce.

These theses raise involved questions that demand careful and close investigation. This paper is only a preliminary exploration of the primary question that we have posed. Therefore, it cannot and does not attempt to answer the questions raised in any significant detail. We only aim to identify the main issues here and sketch out some ideas and lines of inquiry that might serve as inputs in the investigation.

In keeping with Césaire's admonition, we must think clearly in these matters. However, a distinct strand of Sino-philia among Nigerian socialists endangers this on the China question. It flows in part from pride in and admiration of China's unquestionable achievements in less than half a century. Also, it springs in part from the historical significance of the 1949 Chinese Revolution for many Third World radicals. The October 1917 Russian Revolution was the first successful socialist revolution. However, Russia—though not then a country of the system centre—was a global power and in the inner periphery of the capital system. Contrastingly, China was in the outer fringe and its socialist revolution the first in that systemic zone whose peoples were the West's unshod hewers of wood and fetchers of water.

That revolution is to this day the most effective implementation of the theory of the revolutionary worker-peasant alliance. In a country with only a relatively small working class, an unambiguously communist party led a predominantly peasant population into revolution on a distinctly proletarian ideology and programme. Finally, that event made a critical contribution to the theory of permanent revolution. That was in the Maoist insistence—which underlay the much-maligned Cultural Revolution—that the class struggle does not cease with the political success of the socialist revolution. On the contrary, it persists—and the working people must wage it vigorously—throughout the long transition to socialism.[9] If only for these reasons, Ernest Mandel was correct that the Chinese revolution matched the Russian "as the most important and progressive event" of the 20th century.[10]

Nonetheless, the deserved appreciation of the importance and value of that revolution hardly justifies an uncritical Sino-philia or Sino-nostalgia that

9. Wamba-dia-Wamba, 'Crisis of Marxism', pp. 129-30.
10. Mandel, 'China', p. 197.

blinds thought to the reality of Chinese practice today. Marx said somewhere that we must judge people by their actions instead of their self-descriptions. He believed we must evaluate societies likewise: not by their self-representations[11] but the material premises of their operation and the laws and results of their systemic reproduction.[12] That, however, is precisely what those socialists do who presume the sincerity of the Chinese ruling class in its assurances that they only have Nigeria's best interests at heart. Often, that presumption is because the Chinese ruling party has "communist" in its name and its leadership peppers its speeches with references to Marx, Lenin, and Mao. If China is a tiger, this viewpoint amounts to the prey adopting the reasoning and representations of the predator.

In contrast, this contribution takes Marx's advice in addressing the China question. The implications of Chinese investment in Nigeria turn on the nature of China's political economy, its socio-historical character and governing imperatives. That is, is China socialist, capitalist, or something else? For it is the governing imperatives of a social formation that generate its necessities and, therefore, determine its goals in its external relations. In turn, the character of those relations conditions their impacts on those involved. For instance, as Samir Amin argued in *Class and Nation*, the nature and results of centre-periphery relations were radically different in the tributarist period from the capitalist. He notes that Roman imperialist domination of Egypt in tributarist times differed in character and effects from Europe's similarly imperialist dominion over Latin America, Asia, and Africa under capitalism.[13] Thus, the character and impacts of China's relations with Africa and Nigeria would be radically different if China were a socialist formation from if it were a capitalist one. For the socio-historical laws and systemic imperatives of the one are essentially different from those of the other.

China's Political Economy: Socialist? Capitalist?

Representative positions in the "What is China?" debate

A decade and a half ago, Amin defined the central question about China thus: "is China evolving toward a [stable] form of capitalism? Or is China's

11. That is, the legitimating ideologies in which it presents itself.
12. This epistemological principle underlies all of Marx and Engel's mature works, from *The German Ideology* and the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* to *Capital*.
13. Amin, Class and Nation, pp. 16-18.

perspective still one of a possible transition to socialism?"[14] His statement of the question historicises it properly by placing it within the historical transition to socialism. The extended development of capitalism—starting with its precocious European shoots in the 14th and 15th centuries—was not a linear, inevitable process; it involved stagnancies, declines, and collapses.[15] So the lengthy transition to socialism involves diversions, reversals, and implosions. The world saw this in the progressive deformation and ultimate collapse of the Stalinist socialist states.

The question then is whether the Chinese transition to socialism that commenced with the 1949 revolution remains on course, has taken a detour back to capitalism, or entered a cul-de-sac? If China is engaging in capitalist practices, is that a tactical manoeuvre, a strategic retreat, or a complete abandoning of its erstwhile socialist aspirations and goals? Is it still socialist, transitioning to capitalism, or already a capitalist social formation? Socialists have wrestled with these questions since 1978 when China commenced far-going economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping. The two principal schools in the debate are, on the one hand, those who insist that it is still socialist and, on the other, those who hold that it has gone capitalist.[16]

The China-is-still-socialist school

Zhiming and his co-authors represent the first school. They reject claims that China is capitalist on the ground that capitalism's defining characteristics are absent or weak and strictly limited in China's political economy. These features are the divorce of labourer from means of production and the maximisation of capitalist profit. The numerous small enterprises, they claim, do not feature the first of these traits and are therefore more like simple rather than capitalist production units. Also, state-owned enterprises feature little separation of labourer from means of production and do not engage in profit maximisation. Zhiming et al. insist that the former is even less in the collective enterprises (i.e., the cooperatives and communes), although the workers do

14. Amin, 'On China', p. 4.
15. Ponomarev et al., The International Working-Class Movement: Problems of History and Theory, Vol. 1: The origins of the proletariat and its evolution as a revolutionary class: pp. 42-46.
16. A critical overview of the theoretical and practical issues involved in market socialism, which China says it is practising, is available in Ollman, 'Market Socialism: The Debate Among Socialists'.

not participate in their management.

Rather than being capitalist, they argue, the Chinese system is "socialism with a market" because it presents ten features "foreign to capitalism." These are planning, a democratic framework of collective decision-making in the planning process, an extensive and non-commercial (or only weakly commercial) system of public service delivery. Others are the public ownership of land and natural resources (thus ensuring farmers' access to land) and diverse forms of property suitable to the "socialisation of productive forces." These forms include state-owned enterprises, small private property, collective property, and capitalist property. Other systemic traits include favouring the increase of labour income vis-à-vis other income types, promoting egalitarian social justice, and preserving nature. Yet another is the advocacy of non-exploitative and fair exchange in international economic relations (what they term the "win-win principle") and peaceful and egalitarian principles in international political relations.

Zhiming et al. acknowledge that China has undertaken state-sector and, since 2005, specifically financial sector reform. The former involved granting state-owned enterprises greater autonomy, transforming them into joint-stock companies, and encouraging them to adopt market principles and forge partnerships with foreign investors. They insist we must not confuse such "modernisation" with the adoption of capitalist finance principles. That is because state monetary authorities still intervene massively in the financial system, and the central bank tightly controls interest rates.[17]

Mandel held similar views in 1982 on China's political economy, arguing that it was "[incorrect] to say that China is undergoing a capitalist restoration." His primary argument for this conclusion turned on profit's function in China's political economy. "Far from becoming the autonomous motor of economic development," he insisted, it only functioned as one of the criteria by which the central authorities evaluated the performance of production units.[18] The state strictly regulated their operations, contracts, and expenditure. Profit was only a material incentive to intensify labour, and its so-called primacy was only formal. "Although profit is 'in command'," Mandel held, "the firms… are [unable] to influence the essential determinants of profit." Those were "the price of raw materials and machines, the wage fund, and the sale price of

17. Zhiming, Herrera, and Andréani, 'On the Nature of the Chinese Economic System'.
18. Others were the gross product, total transactions, and value-added.

finished products." The decommodification of labour-power and socialised ownership of the means of production were not only the principal causes of China's economic progress. Also, their very existence disproved the claim of capitalist restoration in the country.[19]

The China-is-now-capitalist school

However, most Marxists are in no doubt that China today is a capitalist country.[20] For instance, Greenfield and Leong posit that economic neo-liberalisation and the party-state bureaucracy's monopoly of power and privilege are the two constitutive elements of the country's market socialism.[21] Samir Amin was among the best representatives of this school. Although deeply enamoured of China's revolutionary history, contributions, and potentials, he thought that the Chinese ruling class had "chosen to take a capitalist approach, if not since Deng, at least after him."[22] In line with his historicisation of the question (see above), he argued that China's market socialism was potentially an initial phase in the transition to socialism. Realising that potential required three conditions. First, diverse forms of *de facto* collective property (state enterprises, regional collectives, and citizens or workers collectives) must be dominant without necessarily excluding forms of private property. Second, the system must regulate property rights to manage the conflicting imperatives of capital accumulation and socialist consolidation. Third, it must perpetually self-democratise to "reinforce the impact of socialist values on the process of decision-making on all levels and in all domains." With these conditions holding, market socialism (or socialism with a market) could be a transitional phase to enable a revolutionary society to build its capacity for viable socialist development.

That precisely, Zhiming et al. argue, is how China's ruling class describes their market socialism. They claim it is a mixed economy in which the private capitalist sector plays a significant role and the public sector and state power progressively gain strength. The system constitutes a *"primary phase of socialism" necessary to develop the productive forces required for full-*

19. Mandel, 'China', pp. 195 and 196.
20. Zhiming, Herrera, and Andréani, 'On the Nature of the Chinese Economic System'.
21. Greenfield and Leong, 'China's Communist Capitalism', p. 97.
22. Amin, 'On China', p. 4.

fledged socialism.[23] Amin contradicted this. "Modern-day China has already positioned itself beyond 'market socialism' as proposed here," he wrote. "[It] is progressing along a capitalist path, *having agreed in principle to the replacement of the dominance of collective and public property with [that of] private property."*[24]

He thought that market socialism has a dual political and ideological function in the capitalist transformation of China. Politically, "it [enables China' ruling class] to gradually put in place the basic structures and institutions of capitalism while minimising friction and difficulties during the…transition to capitalism." This ruling class chose this gradualism because, although conscious and desirous of its capitalist outcome, they recognise two facts. First, the Chinese people hold dear the socialist values of their revolution (primarily equality) and its benefits (principally the right of equal access to land for all peasants). Second, the consequent necessity of graduality in the capitalist transformation in China. Ideologically, market socialism lends legitimacy to this transformation and the power of China's ruling class. For this class, Amin argued, cannot acknowledge the path of capitalist development it has taken because its legitimacy derives from the socialist revolution. It would be suicidal to renounce that event, in which the Chinese people "made their massive and conscious arrival on the scene of their history."[25]

If it quacks and walks like a duck…

Still, these are only the views of others—albeit all deservedly highly-respected authorities. We must try to settle for ourselves the question of China's political economy, particularly as it remains near-completely unexamined among Nigerian socialists. This state of affairs allows some to harbour illusions about China's character and dismiss critical attitudes towards it as products of "imperialist propaganda." There is perhaps no better way to commence with tackling the question of China's systemic character than to do like Césaire regarding colonialism, i.e., ask: "what, fundamentally, is capitalism?"[26] For once we can answer that question, we have a good ground on which to pursue that of whether China today is a capitalist formation. If it quacks like a duck

23. Zhiming, Herrera, and Andréani, 'On the Nature of the Chinese Economic System'.
24. Amin, 'On China', pp. 9-10.
25. Amin, pp. 4-5.
26. "…what, fundamentally, is colonialism?" Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, p. 2.

and walks like a duck…

Sweezy provided as good a definition of capitalism as any in his authoritative work, *The Theory of Capitalist Development*. Following Marx, he set out the pre-conditions for the emergence of capitalism:

1. The dominance of private property in the means of production;
2. A high development of commodity production and exchange (the latter through money);
3. The divorce of labourer from means of production
4. The commodification of labour-power.[27]

Perry Anderson argues that we must distinguish "the genesis of a mode of production…from its structure."[28] If that is true, it is no less valid that the pre-conditions or circumstances of its emergence do not define or even indicate a mode of production's essence. With the pre-conditions for capitalism in place and that mode of production itself having emerged, its essential trait becomes operative. That is, capital's self-expansion as the governing purpose of social production—rather than the satisfaction of human need. The goal of production—indeed, its very reason—becomes the extraction of surplus value and accumulation of capital; meeting human needs becomes only a means to that end.[29]

With the proper provisos, we could press these traits into service as indicators of a society's level of capitalist development. The share of capitalist property in the total stock of means of production should indicate the extent of the society's capital formation. The portion of capitalist commodity production in the aggregate social product should tell the degree to which it meets its material needs by for-profit production.[30] The part of wage labourers in the

27. Marx considered the sale of labour-power the *differentia specifica* of capitalism, the element that is particular to it and distinguishes it from other modes of production.
28. Quoted in Amin, Class and Nation, p. 8.
29. Sweezy, Capitalist Development, pp. 56-59. An alternative conception of capitalism turns not on its systemic purpose but two other factors. These are the private ownership of the means of production and the primacy of market forces in economic transactions, value distribution, and resource allocation. For two representative works of this viewpoint, see Appel, 'Just How Capitalist Is China?' and Yasheng, 'Just How Capitalist Is China?'
30. The aggregate social product—more simply the social product—is the total mass of material wealth a society produced in a given period. Physically, it divides into means of production (machines, roads, power facilities, etc.) and means of sustenance (food, clothing, housing, etc.)

productive population should signal the level of the separation of worker from means of production; thus, it should suggest the extent of the commodification of labour-power, i.e., proletarianisation. Finally, trends in the share of capital in the total accumulation fund should indicate the degree to which the imperative of capital accumulation dominates a society's economic metabolism.

We attempt to apply this approach to China in the sections below, specifically regarding the first three indices: capitalist property, capitalist commodity production and exchange, and proletarianisation.

Capitalist property

Deng Xiaoping's 1978 launch of the *Four Modernisations* initiated policy discussions in the early 1980s to enhance political commitment to economic liberalisation, including strengthening private property rights.[31] China's leaders indicated their commitment by restoring expropriated capitalist property, meeting with private entrepreneurs, publicly apologising to those who suffered mistreatment, etc. Also, they implemented financial reforms beginning in the early 1980s to improve private-sector access to finance and allow its entrance into the financial services sector.[32] Thus Deng and his fellow reformists laid the foundation for the recrudescence of capitalism in China.

Today China has transformed from an agricultural to a rapidly industrialising economy, and the capitalist mode of production is more widespread and deeper-reaching than previously. It is difficult to determine this extent or depth, however. The Chinese economy is a complex system of productive modes and economic forms, with state-owned, private, collective, and town-and-village enterprises operating alongside each other. Also, world-class multinationals, big national enterprises, and small and micro-sised ventures jostle for market space. However, the real problem in determining the extent of China's capitalist transformation largely derives from the opacity of ownership structure in its economy. Yasheng cites Huawei Technologies Corporation in this connection, which requires its staff to buy its shares and sign share certificates. He notes, however, that it is difficult to determine the firm's ownership structure because it keeps in its possession all information and documentation concerning such transactions.[33] Thus, neither the public nor even the staff-shareholders

31. See Wu-Beyens, 'The Years of Reform in China'; and Yeung, 'China's Politics of Modernisation'.
32. Yasheng, 'Just How Capitalist Is China?', pp. 33-35.
33. Yasheng, p. 15.

have information about who owns what in the company. Also, legal-person shareholders in China are often not private incorporated persons but state-owned enterprises.[34] Legal-person firms, therefore, are frequently not private but state-sector enterprises.[35]

To define capitalism primarily as a system of private ownership in these circumstances would cause extreme difficulty in determining the extent of China's capitalist development. The interlock of private and state sectors would be one source of this difficulty. If, however, one defined capitalism by its essence—i.e., as the accumulation of capital by the extraction of surplus value—its legal-property form becomes irrelevant. It is possible to extract surplus and accumulate capital no less effectively under state-owned than under private capital.[36] The vital thing, then, is the character of the production and distribution relations in society and the individual production units:

1. Who owns the means of production?
2. How is the work distributed?
3. Who takes the decisions concerning production and the management and disposition of property and its products?
4. How are these decisions implemented?
5. Who owns the proceeds of production?
6. How are they distributed and utilised?

Private sector

Yasheng notes that, although China's economy self-evidently has a private capitalist sector, the economy's complex ownership structures make it difficult to determine the sector's actual size and boundaries. Approaching this task by simply distinguishing state from non-state enterprises is problematic, he argues, because the distinction is blurry. For instance, on the one hand, members of the public hold shares in most state enterprises. On the other, the non-state sector—which includes collective enterprise—is not simply reducible to the private sector. Further, the size of the non-state sector varies according to the criteria of definition. One definition attributed to it a 68.4% share in the

34.. Legal-person shareholding involves firms holding shares in each other.
35. Yasheng, p. 19.
36. Amin speculates that among the possible lines of development beyond capitalism is one in which a statist capitalist mode replaces private capitalism. In this configuration, the state holds the means of production for the capitalist class, extracts surplus value from the working class, and distributes it within the ruling class. See Amin, Class and Nation, p. 210.

1997 industrial output, whereas per another by China's National Bureau of Statistics, it only accounted for 21.2% of industrial value-added. Dougherty and Herd's 2005 study for the OECD—which defined the sector by shareholding structure—estimated its share in industrial output at 28.9% in 1998, 44.7% in 2001, and 71.2% in 2005.

Given the inadequacies of the predominant definitional approaches, Yasheng proposes the assignment of control rights as a basis to accurately determine the private firm and, thus, the size of China's private sector. Those are the rights to appoint an enterprise's management, dispose of its assets, and set its strategic direction. This criterion would mean that even state enterprises with shares held by the public would not be private sector firms insofar as the state has control rights. The problem, however, is the difficulty of determining in China whether the holders of those rights are the state or private persons.[37]

Irrespective of the definition employed, the tremendous growth of the private sector in China is undeniable. A domain that accounted for 71.2% of industrial output in 2005, per the OECD study referred to above, is unquestionably dominant in the economy. Further, the speed of its rise to that position is phenomenal given that it accounted only for 28.9% just seven years previously.

Public sector

China's public sector—comprising state-owned, town-and-village, and collective enterprises—is of particular importance in determining the character of the country's political economy. That is because they ordinarily embody the production relations of the socialist mode. Thus, their shares in the social product and total labour stock reliably indicate the size of this mode in the country's economy vis-à-vis the capitalist. Similarly, their operational and management practices are collectively a good indicator of socialism's condition in China. However, the available data suggests that these enterprises are only socialist in form or name, have little socialist content, and today constitute little more than husks of China's repented revolutionary aspirations.

1. State-owned enterprises. Many analysts consider China's state-owned enterprises a form of socialist property. Yasheng averred in 2008 that their reform in the 1990s did not involve their privatisation—i.e., the transfer of corporate control from state to private investors. Instead, it was only the

37. Yasheng, 'Just How Capitalist Is China?', pp. 14-18.

securitisation of state equity holdings in them.[38] Ten years later, Zhiming et al. maintained for three reasons that these enterprises were not capitalist entities:

1. Profit maximisation for shareholders is not their purpose but "productive investment" and service delivery;
2. They "pay relatively little—around 10%—in dividends to the state shareholder;"
3. Workers participation in management is "limited but real."[39]

However, it is necessary to treat these assertions with some reservation, bearing in mind that capital accumulation can and does proceed as effectively under state capital as under private capital. Yasheng informs us that the 1990s economic reforms "securitised" state equity holdings in state-owned enterprises. Would not that translate into giving state ownership a formal bourgeois character? It would seem that Zhiming et al. let the cat out of the bag when they admitted *"limited* but real" management participation by state-enterprise workers. In other words, the workers do not control those economic units; and insofar as they participate in decision-making, they and the representatives of China's ruling class are unequal adversaries. That could hardly be the case if the enterprises were socialist.

2. Town-and-village enterprises. China's town-and-village enterprises (TVEs) originated in the 1950s commune brigade enterprises. From 1.5 million firms in 1978, they rose to 25 million in 1993, with over 123 million workers in 1993. Their proliferation followed the 1984 market reforms that recognised them as profit-making entities and encouraged the unrestrained pursuit of profit and wealth accumulation. Greenfield and Leong inform us that many market socialist theorists consider them a form of state-owned socialist enterprise at the local level. These theorists argue from this that market socialism offers a viable alternative to capitalism through such local-state economic activism, combining "classic entrepreneurial skills" and "social ownership of the means of production." For example, Bowles and Dong declare the town-and-village enterprises to be socialist because they "behave differently from capitalist firms." Greenfield and Leong point out, though, that these two themselves admit "that TVEs are not worker-owned firms operating on democratic principles." They also acknowledge that local state officials "in practice [controlled the]

38. Yasheng, p. 20.
39. Zhiming, Herrera, and Andréani, 'On the Nature of the Chinese Economic System'.

property rights of TVEs" and there was "a discernible hierarchy of claims of the profits of enterprises."

Greenfield and Leong charge that Bowles, Dong, and other market socialists, can proclaim the TVEs "socialist" only because they fail to penetrate beneath their legal form. That is, they do not drill below the absence of *de jure* private ownership of the TVEs to their *de facto* private possession and control. They fetishise the letter of the law and take it for the truth. Greenfield and Leong argue that "…[most] TVEs are in fact privately owned, with only an estimated 7% under the collective ownership of townships and villages…" Township-village governments, rather than local citizens, control the TVEs, they maintain. For instance, TVE workers can only exercise their right to accept or reject their manager if and when the local authorities initiate the process. The latter usually do not do that unless disagreements develop between them and the TVE management. That is unsurprising, given the community of interests between TVE managements and local leaders in exploiting the workers. Further, their ability to determine who works in the TVEs and what wages they receive gives authorities immense power over the workers. The latter, therefore, rarely confront them over control of the enterprises.[40]

Greenfield and Leong find support in Yasheng. First, he points to an underlying misrepresentation of town-and-village enterprises that contributes to the misunderstanding of their true character. Western academic literature on China, he says, operates on an *ownership* conception of these enterprises, viewing them as public firms *owned* by towns and villages. In contrast, the Chinese define them *geographically* as *businesses operating in rural areas*. As to their ownership, China's Ministry of Agriculture data shows—he informs us—that as early as 1985, 10 million of 12 million of these enterprises were entirely private.[41]

Clearly, then, the TVEs are hardly a socialist form of production organisation. Greenfield and Leong are scathingly derisive in their final evaluation of the claim that they are:

> Here we have TVEs [that], we are told, are socialist. At the same time, we are told that workers exercise only nominal ownership over the means of production and even then only as local citizens. In effect,

40. Greenfield and Leong, 'China's Communist Capitalism', pp. 106-109.
41. Yasheng, 'Just How Capitalist Is China?', pp. 32-33.

> they exercise no control over the conditions under which they are exploited. In addition, there is hyper-exploitation of women workers and displaced migrant workers, as well as closures and mass lay-offs in response to the vagaries of the market. Thrown in with this, there is corruption and bare self-interest among those who do exercise ownership and control, and there is no democracy on the shop floor, in the local political setting or…the national context. There is even evidence of protest and resistance by workers and peasants. We are then expected to believe that this is socialism, this is the alternative to capitalism![42]

3. Collective enterprises. The situation in the collective enterprises mirrors those in the state-owned and town-and-village enterprises. Official ideology and market socialists represent them as autonomous entities owned and controlled by collectives of citizens or workers. However, an analyst of China's economy says about this: "In the decollectivisation of the rural economy in the early 1980s, collective enterprises were transformed into township-and-village enterprises that were later controlled or privatised by individuals."[43] Of those that the state did not privatise in this manner, another authority said: "In reality, collective enterprises are under close control of a government. Major investment and employment decisions could not be made without government direction or approval."[44]

There is nothing to add.

Capitalist commodity production and exchange

The significance of the extent of capitalist commodity production is that its share in the social product indicates the degree to which society meets its needs by capitalist commodity exchange. Regarding China, this signals, in turn, the controlling power of capitalism vis-à-vis socialism over the metabolism of the social formation. For whereas one distributes goods and services through market exchange, the other does so by allocation.

The data shows in this respect, as in that of capitalist property, the rapid

42. Greenfield and Leong, 'China's Communist Capitalism', pp. 114-115.
43. Hao, 'The Labour Share Question in China'.
44. Chong-En et al. (2003, 'Thriving on a tilted playing field.' In *How far across the river? Chinese policy reform at the millennium*, Edited by Nicholas C. Hope, Dennis Tao Yang and Mu Yang Li. Stanford: Stanford University Press), quoted in Yasheng, 'Just How Capitalist Is China?', pp. 32-33.

growth of capitalism in China. The capitalist sector contributed an insignificant portion to the manufacturing product until 1995. The state sector accounted for 78% of China's gross industrial output of 424 billion yuan in 1978; the collective, 22%; and the individual-private and "other" ownership sectors, 0% respectively.[45] The equivalent figures for the 2,392 billion yuan output of 1990 were: state sector 55%, collective 36%, individual private 5%, and "others" 4%. A creeping difference was already evident by 1995, however. For that year (in which the gross industrial output was 9,189 billion yuan), the figures were: state 34%, collective 37%, private 13%, and "other" 17%. Here, already, the combined share of the private and "other" sectors was 30% of the gross industrial output. By 2000, they accounted for 36% of the 8,567 billion yuan output (state 47%, collective 17%, private 6%, and other 30%). They were making the largest contribution by 2004: 60% of the 18,722 billion yuan output (state 35%, collective 6%, private 17%, and other 43%).[46] Thus, from 0% in 1978, capitalism by 2004 accounted for 60% of China's gross industrial output.

A similar picture emerges from data provided by Hart-Landsberg. His data shows that whereas the percentage contribution to industrial value-added by China's state-controlled enterprises stood at 54.8% in 1998, it had dropped by 2003 to 41.4%. In contrast, private enterprises accounted for 27.9% in 1998; but their share had leapt to 52.3% by 2003. This share was probably higher given that many state-controlled enterprises have private shareholders. Thus, although the state retains control over such firms, one might correctly think of them as public-private enterprises and divide their contribution to the industrial value-added between the state and private sectors. That surely would increase the share of the private capitalist sector. Regardless, the result is different if—to determining state sector contribution to the industrial value-added—we discount these public-private firms and consider only directly state-controlled enterprises. That contribution slips from the figures given above to 38.9% in 1998 and 22.9% in 2003.

It is clear then that the private capitalist sector accounted for probably higher than 52.3% of China's industrial value-added in 2003. That is, capitalist commodity production was already dominant in China's economic metabolism.

45. The "other" category comprises firms under "foreign and mixed ownership."
46. Lai, Reform and the Non-State Economy in China, p. 23.

The drop in the share of collective enterprises in industrial value-added from 17.3% in 1998 to 6.7% in 2003 drives home this point.

A similar trend is evident in the mode of distributing economic goods and services. We measure this by the percentage distribution of transactions in China from 1978 to 2003 by the governing factor in price determination: i.e., by market forces, state guidance, or state decree. That affords an idea of the relative predominance of capitalist commodity exchange in the distribution of use values. Again, the data shows a progressive rise to dominance by this mode of distribution.

In the producer goods sector of the market (the distribution mechanism for means of production), the share of transactions in which market forces determined prices was 0% in 1978. It had risen to 13% in 1985, however, again to 78% in 1995, and yet again to 87.3% in 2003. In contrast, the share in which the state fixed prices dropped from 100% in 1978 to 64% in 1085, 16% in 1995, and finally 10% in 2003. The consumer goods sector shows the same trend. The share of transactions with state-fixed prices fell from 97% in 1978 to 47% in 1985 to 9% in 1995 and finally to 2.6% in 2003. In contrast, that determined by market forces rose in those same years from 3% to 34% to 89% to 96.1% respectively. A similar trend is visible in farm commodities. Market forces determined only 6% of transactions in 1978, but their share jumped to 40% in 1985, 79% in 1995, and 96.5 in 2003. In contrast, transactions with state-determined prices, which stood at 93% in 1978, crashed to 37% in 1985, 17% in 1995, and 1.9% in 2003.[47]

Wage labour

The share of the wage-labour force (employed, under-employed, and unemployed) in the total labour stock indicates the progress of a two-pronged process. On the one side, the system dispossesses the labouring classes of the means of production—which it concentrates in the hands of the bourgeoisie. On the other, the labour-power of these dispossessed workers becomes a commodity, i.e., the dispossessed workers transform into wage labourers, into proletarians. It is thus one of the most important indicators of the progress of capitalist development. For this process is at once the defining characteristic

47. For the data on sectoral contributions industrial value-added and transaction shares, see Hart-Landsberg, 'The Chinese Reform Experience', p. 58, Table 1: Share of Transactions Conducted at Market Prices (per cent of transaction volume). See also Table 2: Breakdown of Industrial Value Added by Controlling Shareholder.

of capitalism and the first condition for its reproduction, i.e., for the production of surplus value and capital accumulation.

Labour market reforms

The dispossession and proletarianisation of the labour force are aspects of what Marx termed the primitive accumulation of capital.[48] Indeed, China's economic reform since 1978 is a compressed re-enactment in three decades of the primitive capital accumulation that unfolded over two centuries or more in Europe and North America. For it is precisely the process described above that has been at the heart of China's economic restructuring. On the one hand, the dispossession of the country's working classes by privatising and transferring to a new capitalist class the collective assets accumulated under the socialist regime. On the other, the economic compulsion of the dispossessed working classes to sell their labour-power, i.e., to become wage labourers producing surplus value for this new ruling class. These are the outcomes of China's economic reconfiguration since 1978: the state sector changes achieved the first and the labour system reforms, the second.

Ghose wrote concerning the Mao-era labour regime: "Prior to the onset of economic reforms in 1978, labour policy in China had the explicit objective of guaranteeing employment to all workers." China pursued this goal by the administrative control of job allocation, remuneration, and migration. The state assigned workers to jobs in agricultural and non-agricultural production units, with either party having little choice in the assignment or the labourer's remuneration. It also controlled labour migration strictly by tying access to social services and welfare to the recipient's registered residential location, which rendered migration without change of registration status impossible.

This labour regime prevented open unemployment but, according to Ghose, resulted in the amassing of superfluous labour, which impacted adversely on "work-effort, labour productivity, and economic growth." The economic reforms that commenced in 1978 gradually destroyed this labour regime. In respect of job allocation, the new labour regime instituted a progressively deregulated contract system in which, on the one hand, workers could seek jobs

48. Marx, Capital Vol. I, Part VIII: The so-called primitive accumulation. Other elements included the pillage and colonisation of foreign lands by the developing capitalist states of Europe and North America. They also enslaved and subjected their peoples to forced labour to produce wealth for the capitalist powers.

freely. On the other, employing production units could directly recruit workers on contract, determine their wages (including by using bonus and piece-rate systems),[49] and, in the case of state-owned enterprises from the mid-1990s onward, retrench those on lifetime tenure. In respect of labour migration, the new regime began from the mid-1990s to permit it and established an urban registration system for rural migrants. That became possible by eliminating food rations, free education, and healthcare services under the economic reforms, thus removing the constraints on migration.[50]

These neo-liberal labour market reforms in the 1980s ostensibly were to liberate state and collective sector workers from limitations on their income. Reform advocates attributed those limitations to the bureaucratic administration of employment and wages, "excessive" wage egalitarianism, and the policy of lifetime job security. The reforms, which imposed a new regime of labour discipline and competition, involved tying wages to individual performance, first through a bonus and then a piece-rate system. Concerning job security, the reforms involved a transition from lifetime employment to a labour contract system in which individual workers sold their labour-power annually to enterprise management. These reforms strengthened enterprise managements vis-à-vis the workers. By 1988, the former had the power to dismiss workers and in 1996—with the privatisation of enterprises and predominance of foreign capital—finally subdued workers' resistance to the labour contract system.[51]

Proletarianisation

The thrust of Ghose's account of China's labour regime reform since 1978 is to justify it. He did this by technicalising and abstracting it entirely from the conflict between the forces of permanent revolution and capitalist

49. That contrasted sharply with Maoist labour incentivisation. The method rested on demonstrating and actualising the material benefits of the compatibility between higher productivity and the workers' strategic interests. For, under the socialist system, the workers were the masters of economy and society. The Maoist leadership rejected the Soviet system of material incentives involving bonuses and piece-rate wages. That was on the ground that it predicated income on work done and did not factor in the 'contribution of individuals to socialism.' In contrast, the Maoist system involved encouraging workers' participation in management and regulating the income gap between workers and party cadres. China's neo-liberal reforms overthrew this system and replaced it with material incentives—which, however, also involved ending workers participation in management. See Hao, 'The Labour Share Question in China'.
50. Ghose, 'Employment in China', p. 3-5.
51. Greenfield and Leong, 'China's Communist Capitalism', pp. 98-99.

restoration in the country's socialist transition. His approach obscures any link between these reforms and the commencement of capitalist restoration following the victory of the latter forces led by Deng Xiaoping. Whether or not one acknowledges the proletarianisation purpose of those reforms, the facts demonstrate that this has been their outcome. Li Minqi has noted the rapid increase of non-agricultural employment's share in China's total employment from 31% in 1980 to 50% in 2000 and 60% in 2008. He concluded that this suggested the rapid formation of a proletarianised working mass since about 80% of those in that employment category were wage workers.[52] We obtain a more detailed picture of this process from World Bank data, according to which China's primary distribution of employment (i.e., between the primary economic sectors: agriculture, industry, and services) as percentages of total employment from 1995 to 2018 was:

1. Agriculture: 49.4 in 1995, 43.8 (2000), 35.8 (2005), 26.2 (2010), 19.5 (2015), and 16.4 (2018);
2. Industry: 29 in 1995, 28.1 (2000), 29.6 (2005), 30.2 (2010), 27.1 (2015), and 26.3 (2018);
3. Services: 21.6 in 1995, 28.1 (2000), 34.6 (2005), 43.6 (2010), 53.4 (2015), and 57.2 (2018).[53]

These data show that whereas agricultural employment alone accounted for 49.4% of total employment in China in 1995, its share had plummeted to only 16.4% in 2018. Conversely, non-agricultural employment (combining industry and services) increased its portion of the total employment from 50.6% in 1995 to 83.5% in 2018. Li considers that share a proxy for the extent of proletarianisation in the labour force. One should probably treat this with some circumspection. That is because the standard definition of employment includes self-employed persons, a subset of which comprises employers[54]—who, by definition, are not proletarians. The category of employees (or wage

52. Li, 'The Rise of the Working Class and the Future of the Chinese Revolution'. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reported similar findings in 2002.
53. 'World Development Indicators: DataBank'.
54. The International Labour Organisation defines employment as "…persons of working age who, during a short reference period, were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period (i.e., who worked in a job for at least one hour) or not at work due to temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangements." 'World Development Indicators: DataBank'.

and salaried workers)[55] is similarly problematic as it includes managerial staff. There is good reason not to count managers as proletarians: it is not simply that their labour is typically unproductive but primarily that they receive a share of the surplus that capital extracts from wage labourers. For they function as capital's agents in the extraction and management of that surplus.[56] In other words, they facilitate and benefit from the capitalist exploitation of labour. Nonetheless, trends in the share of wage and salaried workers rather than of non-agricultural labour probably afford a better notion of the progress of proletarianisation.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) provided estimates of China's wage and salaried workers as a percentage of total employment from 1995 to 2018. They accounted for 40.40 in 1995, 45.01 (2000), 52.35 (2005), 59.77 (2010), 63.21 (2015), and 63.72 (2018).[57]

These figures indicate a clear trend of progressive proletarianisation of China's labour force. Indeed, the extent of this process is probably more given that the self-employed category[58]includes two sub-sets—own-account workers and contributing family workers—that are disguised forms of proletarianisation. Contributing family workers[59] do not own the means of production by which they labour and are engaged in wage labour but for three differences. First,

55. "Wage and salaried workers (employees) are those workers who hold…jobs defined as 'paid employment jobs,' where the incumbents hold explicit (written or oral) or implicit employment contracts that give them a basic remuneration that is not directly dependent upon the revenue of the unit for which they work." 'World Development Indicators: DataBank.'
56. For a discussion of productive and unproductive labour, see Miller, 'A Comment on Productive and Unproductive Labour;' and Gough, 'Marx's Theory of Productive and Unproductive Labour.' For the function and place of managerial staff in the relationship between capital and labour, see Nichols, 'Management, Capital & Labour.'
57. The corresponding absolute figures for those years are (data unavailable for 2018): 365,601,654 (1995), 419,003,796 (2000), 480,057,189 (2005), 543,636,574 (2010), 576,596,953 (2015) 'World Development Indicators: DataBank'.
58. "Self-employed workers are those workers who, working on their own account or with one or a few partners or in cooperative, hold…jobs defined as a 'self-employment jobs,' i.e., jobs where the remuneration is directly dependent upon the profits derived from the goods and services produced. Self-employed workers include four sub-categories of employers, own-account workers, members of producers' cooperatives, and contributing family workers." 'World Development Indicators: DataBank'.
59. "Contributing family workers (also known as unpaid family workers) are those workers who hold 'self-employment jobs' as own-account workers in a market-oriented establishment operated by a related person living in the same household." 'World Development Indicators: DataBank'.

they do not receive money-wages but payment-in-kind (means of subsistence: food, shelter, etc.) Second, their labour contract is informal and operates by moral rather than legal norms. Third, consequently, their employment and material conditions are also precarious. In contrast, workers in own-account employment own the means of production by which they make a living.[60] However, these means and the income they can generate are meagre for probably most of these workers. Therefore, there is little substantive difference between their conditions of existence and those of the lowest strata of employed wage workers. Furthermore, probably many of them combine own-account with casual wage-employment to some degree and move between the former and formal wage-employment.

If own-account and contributing family employment are masked forms of wage labour, China's proletarianised workforce is significantly larger than the figures for wage and salaried workers suggest. For instance, ILO estimates of China's employment distribution by status as of November 2018 place own-account and contributing family workers at 32% and 11.8% of total employment, respectively, totalling 43.8%. Adding even half of that to the 53.1% wage and salaried workers represent would bring the proletarian workforce in the neighbourhood of 70% of total employment. That would hold even after subtracting the management staff stratum, which must constitute a tiny minority, from the employee category.[61]

In summary, the practical outcome of China's labour system reforms has been the creation and massive expansion of a proletarianised working class where none existed previously.

Labour conditions

Alongside the proletarianisation of China's labour force has proceeded that of its labour conditions. Having transformed a large portion of that force into wage labourers, capitalism in China has progressively moulded them and their conditions of existence to suit its accumulation imperatives. Here we look

60. These are "…self-employed workers without employees…" 'World Development Indicators: DataBank'.

61. For the ILO data on employment distribution by status, see 'Status in Employment: ILO Modelled Estimates, Nov. 2018'. The ILO reports China's unemployment rate at 4.4% of the total labour force. 'Unemployment Rate/ : ILO Modelled Estimates, Nov. 2018.' Since most unemployed are precisely unemployed wage workers, we can only get a notion of the true extent of proletarianisation in China by adding their portion of the labour force to that represented by the categories already discussed.

briefly at three aspects of these conditions: employment, labour share in the national income, and labour control and discipline.

1. Employment conditions. Although he favours China's pro-market economic reforms, Ghose admits that they have aggravated employment conditions in the country. He acknowledges that China's "unfavourable employment trends" during 1996-2002 resulted from the mid-1990s reform of state and collective enterprises and deregulation of migration controls.[62] These enterprises had amassed a high number of surplus workers before those reforms. Subsequently, however, they shed 59 million workers (42.5% of their workforce) in the period in question. The urban economy lost 43 million formal sector jobs and 23 million regular ones, although the emerging private sector generated 16 million new ones in the period, and the formal sector grew rapidly. The newly retrenched urban and migrant workers, many of whom moved to the urban centres following the relaxation of migration controls, sought irregular urban employment. The number of jobs in that category increased by 71 million in that period.[63]

Thus, where previously unemployment was non-existent (a goal of the Maoist labour regime), now (after pro-market reforms), tens of millions of Chinese workers were unemployed or in vulnerable, irregular employment.[64] The ILO estimated China's unemployed as a percentage of the total labour force from 1995 to 2018 at: 4.55 (1995), 4.53 (2000), 4.14 (2005), 4.20 (2010), 4.61 (2015), and 4.71 (2018). These rates are low relative to those of many developing countries and even some developed capitalist countries. Still, the corresponding absolute figures are huge: 31,311,980 (1995), 33,288.673

62. His "unfavourable employment trends" is a euphemism for the emergence of mass unemployment and irregular employment.
63. Ghose, 'Employment in China', pp. 7-8.
64. Ghose's definition of irregular employment makes it essentially equivalent to the ILO's definition of vulnerable employment. It concerns migrant and urban retrenched workers, he says, and includes casual wage-employment. Examples include work on construction projects, domestic work, or small-scale self-employment in street trading or repair services. The last amounts to own-account employment. Ghose, p. 5. According to the ILO, "Vulnerable employment is contributing family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of total employment," a sub-set of the self-employed as a category of the total employed. Of all "employed" categories, i.e., wage and salaried workers and the self-employed, own-account and contributing family workers are most at risk of falling into poverty. That is because "they are the least likely to have formal work arrangements, […] social protection and safety nets to guard against economic shocks, and often are incapable of generating sufficient savings to offset these shocks." 'World Development Indicators: DataBank'.

(2000), 31,727,339 (2005), 32,758,181 (2010), 36,244,721 (2015), and 36,966,342 (2018).[65] Whereas no Chinese was unemployed under the pre-1978 labour regime, the unemployed had reached 31 million by 1995 and almost 37 million by 2018 following the pro-market reforms.

However, the full gravity of the situation only becomes evident when we also consider the quality of the employment the reforms have produced. Ghose notes that although urban employment grew in China between 1990 and 2002, irregular employment accounted for all of it, suggesting a worsening in urban employment conditions in the period.[66] ILO estimates show that China's vulnerable employment—basically equivalent to Ghose's "irregular employment"—has been declining as a share of total employment. It was 53.3% in 2000, 38.6% (2009), 36.9% (2010), 35.4% (2011), 34.6% (2012), 34% (2013), 33.4% (2014), 33.4% (2015), 33% (2016), 33% (2017), and 32.9% (2018). It is note-worthy, however, that the corresponding absolute figures are in the hundreds of millions of workers. They were 495,993,471.55 in 2000, 351,484,590.24 (2009), 335,656,938.60 (2010), 322,131,507.54 (2011), and 314,987,476.78 (2012). For the other years, they were 309,672,673.20 (2013), 304,385,008.24 (2014), 304,561,674.20 (2015), 300,728,196.45 (2016), and 300,584,299.95 (2017).[67]

That then has been the outcome of China's labour system reform in this regard: the degradation of employment conditions for hundreds of millions of the country's workers.

2. Labour share, wages and precarity. This degradation of employment conditions was not a mere side effect of China's economic restructuring but a crucial factor that enabled capital's intensification of labour exploitation.[68] Li observes that the ruthless exploitation of hundreds of millions of workers has been the foundation of China's rapid capitalist development. For instance, the labour share in the country's national income dropped from 50% in 1990 to 37% in 2005.[69] Hao supports this observation, albeit citing slightly different

65. 'World Development Indicators: DataBank'.
66. Ghose, 'Employment in China', p. 6.
67. 'World Development Indicators: DataBank' Figure for 2018 not available.
68. That process was essentially the creation of a massive reserve army of labour. For Marx's analysis of the process and its function, see Marx, Capital Vol. I, Chapter 25, Section 3: Progressive Production of a Relative Surplus-population Or Industrial Reserve Army. For a discussion of the function and sise of the reserve army of labour in China, see Fusheng, Xiaolu, and Zhi, 'The Reserve Army of Labour in China's Economy, 1991–2015'.
69. Li, 'The Rise of the Working Class and the Future of the Chinese Revolution'.

figures. He notes that labour's share of China's national income trended downward between 1995 and 2007, falling from 51.4% of GDP in the former year to 42.4% in the latter. It only rose to 45.6% in 2012 with the intensified workers struggles following the 2008 global economic crisis, slowdown in China's economic growth, and their adverse impacts on workers' conditions.[70] Even *The Economist* observes that "Many countries have seen a fall in the share of labour income in recent years, but nowhere has the drop been as huge as in China."[71] Hao attributes this to China's measures to keep the profit rate sufficiently high to sustain investment growth, upon which the country's economic growth has depended increasingly since 1994.[72] *The Economist* agrees:

> The decline in the ratio of consumption to GDP [an expression of the labour share in the national income] is largely explained by a sharp drop in the share of national income going to households (in the form of wages, government transfers and investment income), while the shares of profits and government revenues have risen.[73]

That has found expression in low wages and payment practices that allow capital to rob workers of a portion of even these low wages. For example, TVE workers earned basic wages less than the minimum wage in the 1980s and had to earn additional income through overtime and piece-rate quota bonuses. Even these basic wages were uncertain since the power to set them belonged to the local township authorities. These authorities, we must note, had a vested interest in profit maximisation[74] and, thus, depressing wages below the value of labour-power. Li estimates that Chinese wages are about 5%, 6%, and 40% of United States, South Korean, and Mexican wages, respectively.[75] According to J. S. McClenahen, "Even after doubling between 2002-2005, the average manufacturing wage in China was only 60 U.S. cents an hour, compared with $2.46 an hour in Mexico…."[76] On top of this, Simons reports that "…systemic

70. Hao, 'The Labour Share Question in China'.
71. "A workers' manifesto for China." The Economist. 11 October 2007, quoted in Hart-Landsberg, 'The Chinese Reform Experience', p. 67.
72. Hao, 'The Labour Share Question in China'.
73. "A workers' manifesto for China." The Economist. 11 October 2007, quoted in Hart-Landsberg, 'The Chinese Refom Experience', p. 67.
74. Greenfield and Leong, 'China's Communist Capitalism', p. 112.
75. Li, 'The Rise of the Working Class and the Future of the Chinese Revolution'.
76. McClenahen (2006. "Outsourcing." IndustryWeek.com, 1 July), quoted in Hart-Landsberg, 'The Chinese Reform Experience', p. 66.

problems in payment practices in Chinese export factories consistently rob workers of at least 15% of their pay…"[77]

The combined outcome of the decline in the labour share in national income, low wages, and the degradation of employment conditions has been a rise in precarity among Chinese workers. China's market socialism has replaced workers' social security with insecurity. A Chinese saying expresses the change: "the old three irons—the iron rice bowl, iron armchair, and iron wage—have been replaced by the iron heart, iron face, and iron fist."[78]

3. Labour control. These iron heart, face, and fist are in ample display in the labour control practices engendered by China's capitalist development.[79] Greenfield and Leong report that foreign-invested and joint-venture enterprises in China feature repressive labour surveillance, control, and disciplinary practices involving fines and *corporal punishment* for various offences. These include speaking, drinking water, sitting, resting, or visiting the toilet too often during working hours; others are late-coming and wearing name tags incorrectly. The disciplinary regime also includes what they describe as "bird-cage management systems." These involve locking up workers in factories and dormitories and subjecting them to forms of "physical control and isolation…during and after working hours."[80]According to Li, about two-thirds of workers in the Pearl River Delta work more than eight hours a day (in some cases even up to sixteen hours) and did not have weekends off. Work conditions for about two hundred million workers are so hazardous that an estimated seven hundred thousand serious work-related injuries occur yearly, of which above one hundred thousand are fatal. In addition, managers routinely inflicted corporal punishment on their workers.[81]

It is at the point of explaining these phenomena rather than merely describing them that questions about the socio-political character of China's economic reform begin to demand answers. Analysts like Ghose offer

77. C. Simons (2007. New labour movement afoot in China. Statesmen, 4 February), quoted in Hart-Landsberg, p. 66.
78. The "old three irons" represent job and wage security and lifetime employment.
79. Harry Braverman argues in his seminal work that the modes of labour organisation and control in capitalist formations spring from the material imperatives of capitalist accumulation. Capitalism, he avers, demands and creates particular modes and no other. See Braverman, *Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*.
80. Greenfield and Leong, 'China's Communist Capitalism', pp. 100-112. These labour practices also exist in Chinese enterprises in Nigeria today.
81. Li, 'The Rise of the Working Class and the Future of the Chinese Revolution'.

explanations that present these phenomena in purely technical or pragmatic terms. According to that perspective, for instance, the state sectorial and labour regime reforms were merely technocratic responses to practical problems of surplus labour accumulated in the economy. In his rendition, the Maoist labour regime prevented open unemployment but resulted in the amassing of a surplus labour force, which adversely impacted "work-effort, labour productivity, and economic growth." The pro-market reforms only sought to correct this situation.[82] Nowhere, however, does Ghose define and demonstrate the existence of this "surplus labour" or the adverse trends he claims in labour productivity and economic growth. Also, he does not establish a causal relationship between these phenomena. He merely asserts it and wants us to accept his assertion without query.

What such ideological devices obscure is the conscious, political determination of the economic reforms. That is, that they aimed to solve not *technical problems of economic development* as such but specifically *structural obstacles to capitalist development*. Therefore, class conflict and class power are at the heart of the issue and should form the framework for its investigation. Thus, for instance, Hao rejects the technocratic explanation that mainstream economists offer for the progressive decline in the labour share. That approach attributes it to sectoral changes involving the fall of agriculture and the rise of services and industry as contributors to GDP. He contends, contrary-wise, that the drop has been possible only because the working class lost in the political class struggle that has marked China's capitalist transition. Having gained power following Mao's death, the capitalist reformers created the conditions necessary for capitalist restoration and development by dividing and weakening the working class. They achieved this by two principal means. The first was to create a reserve army of labour by laying off 30 million workers in the 1990s and engender an influx of migrant workers into the labour market. The second was the segmentation of the labour market.[83]

Only an approach like this goes to the heart of the question about China's political economy.

82. Ghose, 'Employment in China', p. 3-5.
83. Hao, 'The Labour Share Question in China'.

…it is a duck

The picture of China that emerges from the data suggests a rapidly developing, decidedly capitalist formation. It describes an erstwhile revolutionary society whose remaining socialist forms are weak and increasingly hollow husks. There can be little doubt that the imperatives of capital accumulation govern its metabolism and development. Although the social formation comprises the collective, simple commodity, and capitalist modes of production, it is evident that the last-named subjects all the others to its needs and laws.

This conclusion on the capitalist character of China's social formation has several implications for that country's relationship with Nigeria. First, the interests of capital—as the hegemon of its social metabolism—condition the very conceptualisation of its national interests. That is particularly as monopoly capital—rather than small or big capital—is the governing power in exercising and reproducing capital's dominance in China. Indeed, gigantic state-owned enterprises—for example, Sinopec and ZTE—and equally enormous private ones—like Huawei—dominate the country's economy. Thus, like in the countries of the system centre since the 19th century, the interests of Chinese monopoly capital and the Chinese state interlace closely. The second implication flows from the combination of the first and the fact that self-aggrandisement is capital's *raison d'etre*. Given these, the underlying economic purpose of China's relationship with Nigeria has to be to take advantage of opportunities to extract surplus value. That is, to exploit Nigeria's labour force and get its natural resources as cheaply as possible. For these are the necessaries of capital's self-expansion.

From this flows the third implication of the capitalist character of China's social formation: the necessity of domination. Relations of exploitation and dispossession are not sustainably self-reproductive. The contradictions between exploiter and exploited, dispossessor and dispossessed, engender conflict inevitably. Perpetuating exploitation and dispossession thus requires subjugating the exploited and the dispossessed and the continuous reproduction of that subjection. That gives the lie to presumptions of China's sincerity in its claims of only seeking cooperation with countries of the system periphery, such as Nigeria. Does this mean that such relations are impossible between countries, especially those of the underdeveloped world? Certainly not. However, insofar as monopolistic capital accumulation governs a social formation, extra-territorial expansionism and domination become powerful tendencies in its

relations with others. These tendencies only require opportunity and capability for them to assert themselves as constitutive features of these relations. The unequal balance of power between Nigeria and China is precisely that opportunity and ability wrapped together into one: the latter has the systemic necessity and tendency to dominate the former and the means to do so.

These questions of China's political economy and its implications are critical to any effort to comprehend the true character of China's activities in Nigeria. For only thus can we transcend the primarily transactional perspectives that dominate mainstream analyses of the Nigeria-China relationship. That is not to deny the importance of the equality of exchanges in this relationship. After all, unequal exchange has been a primary mechanism of the imperialist exploitation of the countries and peoples of the global system periphery.[84] It is, instead, to point beyond that transactional question to another that is of arguably greater importance in the long run. That is, the implications of the Nigeria-China partnership for Nigeria's structural location and function in the capital system, whether in its present configuration or some future one. Only having grasped the character of China's political economy is it possible even to begin to conceptualise and approach this vital question correctly. For it is the key to comprehending the interests behind China's global goals and its more particular goals in its cooperation with Nigeria. It is vital also for understanding their implications for the reproduction of the capital system and Nigeria's position and function within it.

China in Nigeria

The Nigeria-China partnership

China's global goals and strategies

China's global goals and strategies are vitally important to this exploration of Nigeria-China relations. That is in that they afford a view into the geopolitical rivalries between China and the dominant powers of the capital system in its current configuration. The United States is the principal one, but they include the other two entities of what Samir Amin termed the imperialist triad, i.e., the European Union and Japan. These rivalries comprise the framework of their global geopolitical contest—aggravated by the epochal structural crisis of the system—to monopolise the strategic natural resources and markets of

84. See Ake, A Political Economy of Africa; and Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa.

the world.[85] They provide the context that reveals the broader meanings and purposes of China's activities in Nigeria.

Nathan and Scobell contend that China's international stance since the Cold War is principally defensive, contrary to its widespread perception as "an aggressive, expansionist power." Its principal foreign policy tasks have remained to attenuate destabilising foreign influences, preserve its territorial integrity, sustain its economic growth, and minimise suspicions of its intentions among its neighbours. Having become deeply integrated into the global economic order, China also seeks to define a global role for itself "that serves Chinese interests but also wins acceptance from other powers." The chief of those powers is the United States.[86] The predominant view of China nonetheless is that it is "an aggressive, expansionist power." Schwartz is emphatic that "China's long-run objective is to become the most important power on this planet to correspond with the fact that [it] has the largest population of any nation."[87] Chau concurs that China's primary strategic goal is to become a global power. He contends that its other goals—including minimising Taiwan's diplomatic recognition and securing access to natural resources—are secondary to this one.[88]

It is unquestionably in the interest of triad imperialism to cast China in the role of an expansionist power. Yet China's leaders themselves have defined their strategic goal as the achievement of world power status. Amin already noted China's ambitious competitiveness. "The great nation of China," he said, "always compares itself to the most powerful." The Chinese have always striven to imitate and equal the most powerful nations, mindful of China's leading role in history and unable to tolerate its decline. Japan was China's first model, Amin argued, then revolutionary Russia, and now—with Japan in crisis, Russia weakened, and Europe imitating the United States—probably the U.S.[89]

That provides explanatory context to the global vision of China's leaders since Mao declared: "We will build up an entirely new, strong, and prosperous

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85. For the concepts of triad imperialism and the imperialist triad, see Amin, Ending the Crisis?; Amin, Beyond U.S. Hegemony? Assessing the Prospects for a Multipolar World; and Amin, The Law of Worldwide Value. For the theory of an epochal structural crisis of the capital system, see Mészáros, The Power of Ideology; and Mészáros, The Structural Crisis of Capital.
86. Nathan and Scobell, 'How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears'.
87. Quoted in Chau, Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 19.
88. Chau, p. 20.
89. Amin, 'On China', pp. 17-18.

People's Democratic Republic of China."[90] Consistent with that aspirational vision, Premier Deng Xiaoping in 1978 defined a three-stage strategic plan to make China a mid-level developed country by 2050. The first stage aimed to double China's GDP and GDP per capita by the late 1980s and the second to double them again by the end of the 20th century. The third sought, presumably, to make China a mid-level developed nation by the mid-21st century. The strategic plan of Xi Jinping, the current president, for contemporary China is to both realise and over-shoot this third goal. He said at the Chinese Communist Party 19th Congress that the country, having transformed its new wealth into strength, has entered a new era of becoming a "leading global power." China would consolidate and leverage its modern economy in the first phase of this transition (2020-2035) and, in the second (2035-2050), strive for "substantial global influence."[91]

Thus, far from aiming merely to be a mid-level developing country as Deng had envisioned, China speaks today of becoming a "leading global power" with "substantial global influence."

The country has indeed become a global power, despite being still a developing country. Nathan and Scobell acknowledge that one may correctly term it a "Great Power" given its territorial size and location, population, economic size and growth rate, share of world trade, and military prowess. Other factors include the global reach of its national interests, its ability to command attention, and, "*perhaps most importantly*," its perception as "a possible threat to U.S. predominance."[92] If success often arises from a conjuncture of opportunity and capacity, the secular structural crisis of the capital system plays the part of opportunity to the capability these features represent. For one element of this crisis, at least since its latest iteration as the 2008 global meltdown, has been the United States' increasing incapacity to provide system control, propulsion, and insurance. With Europe in a complex of difficulties, this crisis presents China with an opportunity to play a more active and prominent role in the global system's reproduction.

However, this must also mean a reconfiguration of the system. Breslin articulates the fundamental fear about China in the West—particularly "since the global financial crisis [of 2008-2009] undermined confidence in the

90. Mao, 15 June 1949, at the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, quoted in Chau, Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 19.
91. Zhong, 'China's Grand Strategy in a New Era'.
92. Nathan and Scobell, 'How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears'.

existing system." It is whether, when it finally replaces the United States as the leading global power, its leaders will exercise that power effectively and responsibly. That is, whether they will preserve the existing world order or "change [its] very basis…to suit their needs."[93]Hence the United States has demanded "strategic reassurance" from Beijing that it intends to leave the existing configuration of the capital system intact. They want China's promise to preserve the mechanisms by which the dominant powers exploit and hold down the system's working peoples and peripheral countries. In the words of James Steinberg, United States Deputy Secretary of State in the Barack Obama Administration:

> "Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China's 'arrival'…as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of [the] security and well-being of others."[94]

That then is the crux of the opposition between China and the triad powers of the capital system in its present constitution. Whether or not one considers this contradiction to be antagonistic,[95] it is indubitably the defining characteristic of relations between China and these system potentates. A principal element of this situation is that the United States remains the global hegemon—and will for a while yet, its declining powers of system control, propulsion, and insurance notwithstanding. It has not passively accepted the erosion of its dominance but is actively "trying to build new structures of global power to entrench [its] position of predominance."[96]Thus, it presents the gravest challenge to China's global goals. It is natural then that, as Nathan and Scobell posit, China and the United States have mutual suspicions, fears, and concerns about each other. China fears that the United States seeks to hamper its rise and undermine its interests; the United States perceives China as a threat to its global dominance. That dominance constitutes the fundamental and defining factor in China's global environment and is the primary determinant of its strategy to achieve its world goals.

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93. Breslin, 'China's Global Goals and Roles', p. 1.
94. Steinberg, September 2009; quoted in Nathan and Scobell, 'How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears'.
95. That is, regarding the reproduction or historical transcendence of the capital system.
96. Breslin, 'China's Global Goals and Roles', pp. 4-5.

According to Nathan and Scobell, China's strategists believe the United States has overwhelming strategic advantages over China. Militarily, it has deployed "technologically advanced" forces with "massive…fire-power… around the Chinese rim," forming "a strategic ring of encirclement"—per Qian Wenrong of the Research Centre for International Issue Studies. Economically, the United States is China's most significant foreign market and largest source of foreign direct investment and advanced technology. It has the capacity also to block China's supply of oil and metal ores and its access to strategic sea-lanes. Given the dollar's status in international trade and finance, the United States can also damage China's economic interests by adjusting U.S. fiscal policies and practices. The ideological power of the United States and its willingness to exercise it are evident in the enshrinement of its norms in international human rights instruments. They are evident also in its installation of Western-style democracy in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Its global promotion of democracy and human rights is another evidence of this power. In this campaign, the United States aims to "delegitimise and destabilise regimes that espouse alternative values, such as socialism and Asian-style developmental authoritarianism."

Also, the U.S. has deployed its diplomatic and political power to "reshape the global environment even further in its favour" by military, economic, and political means. The military means include expanding NATO, intervening in Panama, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia, and prosecuting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Among the economic are promoting free trade, *de facto* dollar devaluation while imposing its use as the global reserve currency, and displacing the cost of climate change mitigation to developing countries. Finally, the political measures include promoting anti-communist "colour revolutions" (in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan). China considers this "most disturbing," as it threatens regime security and stability in China by signalling support for opposition to the ruling communist party."[97]

These facts of China's global strategic environment have imposed upon it a strategy of cautious and piecemeal movement towards its strategic goals. A crucial element of this strategy is to avoid a direct, open challenge to U.S. hegemony and responsibilities that might hamper China's economic development.

Breslin aptly captures this element when he argues that China desires

97. Nathan and Scobell, 'How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears'.

preferential treatment as a developing-country Great Power. It considers itself a Great Power that is second only to the United States, with which it shares a peculiar position in the global order. Nonetheless, China wants other countries to temper their expectations regarding it by recognising its status as a developing country. That is in part to soothe U.S. concerns about its global ambitions and in part to limit and reduce the burdens others might wish it to assume as a Great Power. Hence, the policy: "[China] is Great, but not as Great as the U.S."[98] Zhong similarly summarises China's global strategy. Unlike in Mao's time, he says, contemporary China's foreign policy goal is not global revolution or dominance but to create the "stable and peaceful regional and international environment" necessary to realise its development goals. Therefore, he claims, its foreign policy eschews hegemonism and pursues multilateralism and partnership.[99]

Breslin argues that China, rather than directly challenging the United States, has chosen a non-confrontational approach to reconfigure the global system. For it recognises that confrontation would be too costly for it given the adversary's overwhelming advantages. Its leaders have little choice but to pursue their goal within the existing power structures over which the United States and the West generally are dominant. China's advocacy for the reform of global governance institutions has been one method of doing this. A second method, given U.S. resistance to such reform, is to erect alternative governance structures alongside the existing ones.[100]These include the BRICS group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Others are such trade groupings as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific.[101]

That is the context within which we can properly appreciate the import and purposes of China's efforts to build new economic and political relations with Africa and its strategic countries. These latter include Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Angola, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Insofar as the United States is constructing new alliances to shore up its global dominance, China also must establish counter-alliances to protect its immediate interests and support

98. Breslin, 'China's Global Goals and Roles', pp. 5-6.
99. Zhong, 'China's Grand Strategy in a New Era'.
100. In one example of the United States' stance, its Congress has refused to ratify the 2010 agreement to change the distribution of IMF voting rights.
101. Breslin, 'China's Global Goals and Roles', pp. 6-7.

its future hegemony.[102] The question, though, is how to do this. The U.S. is the global hegemon and, together with its triad partners, controls a web of economic, political, ideological, and security relations that ties all countries to their interests. China's answer is to rally to itself as many as possible of the disaffected countries of the existing world order and to do this by exploiting the system's structural vulnerabilities.

Principally, these consist of four features and outcomes of the capital system. First, it subjects most of the countries of the outer and inner rings of the system periphery to domination by monopoly capital from the countries of the system centre. Second, it has locked them into structural positions and functions that prevent them from "catching up" ever with the advanced countries. Third, it displaces the worst results of the system's contradictions from the centre to the periphery. Finally, it has condemned the peoples of the system periphery to perpetual poverty, underdevelopment, and a barbarian existence. China has stepped forward as the ostensible champion of these countries. Going beyond mere moral or ideological support of their cause, it has offered material aid to address the results of their position and function in the global system.[103] It aims by this means to wean them away from the triad powers sufficiently to give them a stake in its rise. Then it hopes to build new counter-alliances to the ruling ones of the existing world order by combining these countries with other system discontents such as Russia and India.

Thus, without a hegemonic confrontation with the United States, China nonetheless prepares the material premises of its future dominance while simultaneously meeting its present natural resource and global market needs. Hence, Chau argues that—even in its revolutionary period—China's goal in Africa was not simply to support revolutionary movements or win its ideological contest with the Soviet Union. Instead, it was always to advance its global strategic goal of achieving, as Howard L. Boorman phrased it, "recognised status as a major world power on its own terms."[104]

China's goals and strategies in the Nigeria-China partnership

102. Breslin, pp. 4-5.
103. "…in a world of competitive struggle among countries for both foreign direct investment and export markets, China's gains have been organically linked to development setbacks in other countries." Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 'China, Capitalist Accumulation, and Labour'.
104. Chau, Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 18-19.

The preceding contradicts the claim by Nathan and Scobell that China has ventured beyond:

> "[Its] immediate neighbourhood…so far for limited purposes: to secure sources of commodities, such as petroleum, […] gain access to markets and investments, […] get diplomatic support for isolating Taiwan and Tibet's Dalai Lama, and […] recruit allies for China's positions on international norms and legal regimes."[105]

On the contrary, as we have argued, a vital element in China's "going out" policy has been to construct a network of hegemonic counter-alliances to the dominant ones of the triad powers. Nonetheless, they are correct that securing access to natural resources, markets, and investment opportunities are crucial in China's global venture. Yang et al. project that China will strive in 2013-2023 to secure access to the "energy and mineral products that are of vital importance to the Chinese economy, national defense and basic life." However, it would do so in a manner that benefits all and protects the environment.[106]

Unarguably, this goal is indeed central in China's relationship with Nigeria in particular. Egbula and Qi offer a bland diplomatic statement of the principal aims of China's 2010 plan for its strategic partnership with Nigeria. These were to:

1. Extend cooperation in the telecommunications, energy, satellite, agriculture, infrastructure development, and electricity sectors;
2. Enhance cooperation in the international promotion of peace, security, human rights, and global dialogues;
3. Strengthen mutual trust to facilitate cooperation;
4. Enhance cultural exchanges and cooperation on public health issues.[107]

Such statements obscure the true purpose of China's activities in Nigeria. In contrast, Gold et al. put it directly, without diplomatic garb. Economic imperatives, they insist, drive China's engagement with Nigeria: to have a secure supply of natural resources and market for its manufactures.[108] However, that only partially states the matter: it names China's immediate economic goal but ignores the geopolitical one of building counter-hegemonic alliances. It has

105. Nathan and Scobell, 'How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears'.
106. Yang et al., 'China's Global Strategy (2013-2023)', p. 18.
107. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', p. 5.
108. Gold et al., 'China's Aid', p. 1225.

the virtue of honesty, nonetheless, which compensates for its one-sidedness somewhat. To pursue this line further, it is clear that attaining global dominance requires China to modernise its economy, state, armed forces, and society. Its global strategy, therefore, aims to:

1. Secure supplies of cheap raw materials and labour-power and lucrative investment opportunities for Chinese capital;
2. Open up a world market for its commodities;
3. Acquire strategic minerals to develop its military and information technologies.

Nigeria plays a significant role in meeting the necessities of this strategy. That comprises supplying cheap natural resources, serving as a reservoir of cheap labour-power, providing profitable investment for Chinese monopoly capital, and furnishing a market for China's products. Thus, as we demonstrate below, Chinese companies are active in Nigeria's extractive sector—alongside American and European ones—drilling and extracting crude oil and solid minerals. Some of these go on the international market, but some feed China's rapid development of its economic and military capacities. Taking advantage of cheap and abundant labour-power and the pro-capital labour regime in Nigeria, Chinese capital is active also in the super-exploitation of the country's labour force in every sector. These include construction, real estate, manufacturing, agriculture, natural resource extraction, foods, hospitality, and information and communication technologies. Finally, Nigeria offers the single largest and—given the absence of an effective regulatory regime—probably also the most profitable market in Africa for Chinese commodities. These range from phones, computers, plastics, and clothing to power generators, industrial machinery, and construction equipment to architectural design, software development, and project management.

How has China pursued its goal in Nigeria? By what means has it successfully harnessed Nigeria to its strategic needs? The availability of opportunity was the first necessary condition. The Nigerian bourgeoisie provided it through its by-now incontrovertible ineptitude in its historical tasks. Perhaps the four most important were to:

1. Develop for Nigeria a self-driven, industrial economy capable of producing enough wealth to meet the needs of the population;
2. Democratise governance on two principles: the free and faithful expression of the popular will and respect for human rights;

3. Fashion a true nation from the country's diverse ethnic peoples as a transitional step to the post-national unification of all Africans;
4. Raise the people's cultural level to free them from ignorance and the cultural imperialism of predator peoples and turn them into active producers of liberatory science, technology, and art.

Indubitably, the Nigerian bourgeoisie has failed in these tasks—the first is the pertinent one here—despite having immense human and material wealth at its disposal and unchallenged political sway for almost six decades. Therefore, the 1980s structural crisis of Nigeria's neo-colonial capitalist formation compelled it to undertake a neo-liberal opening-up of the economy to global capital. That provided the entry opportunity for China. In line with its broad global strategy, it has exploited Nigeria successfully by taking advantage of vulnerabilities deriving from the latter's disadvantaged place and role in the capital system. Among the most pertinent of these vulnerabilities is its *financial dependence* on the countries of the system centre for:

1. Credit and loans to import a significant part of its consumption and production needs;
2. Foreign direct investment for infrastructural and overall economic development;
3. Aid for critical governance and service delivery operations.

Another pertinent vulnerability is Nigeria's *technological dependence* on those same countries in oil production, light manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure development, transportation, information, communication, healthcare, etc. Yet another is its *unemployment problem* arising from its capitalist underdevelopment and the centre-to-periphery displacement of unemployment in the capital system.

These dependencies constitute vulnerabilities in that Nigeria cannot sustain economic reproduction or significant aspects of its governance and service delivery operations without funds, credit lines, and technological imports from the system centre. Also, mass unemployment is aggravating threats to its political stability and national security and hindering social and economic development. Finally, infrastructural underdevelopment is a principal factor in Nigeria's inability to attract foreign direct investment. The significance of this last point is that the ruling class depends upon such investment to boost manufacturing and agriculture and thus generate employment and increase

the production of non-oil wealth. The measures Nigeria has taken to attract foreign direct investment perhaps best indicate the gravity of the problem. They include:

1. Permission of 100% foreign ownership of enterprises except in the energy sector, where the 1995 Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act restricts foreign participation only to joint-ventures and production sharing agreements;
2. A 30% corporate tax rate, generous tax holidays and various deductibles. These include a 20% deduction for self-provision of electric power and others for capital expenditure that could amount to as much as two-thirds of annual taxes;
3. Permission of 100% repatriation of profits and dividends. To encourage their re-investment in Nigeria, there are allowances for production expansion and facility upgrade. There are other deductions up to 120% of research and development expenditure and for local content use and development;
4. Rationalisation of administrative processes to facilitate starting and running businesses in Nigeria. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission—set up to "encourage, promote, and coordinate investments in Nigeria"—is in charge of the process.[109]

It is by exploiting these vulnerabilities that China has succeeded in bringing Nigeria into a partnership with it.

The essence of this partnership consists in a transactional relationship in which China aids Nigeria to meet the challenges that these vulnerabilities represent in exchange for secure access to:

1. Supplies of Nigeria's natural resources and raw materials;
2. Its vast internal market;
3. Investment opportunities for Chinese capital in its extractive, manufacturing, agriculture, trade, and—increasingly in recent years—finance sectors.

That then is the reciprocal basis of the Nigeria-China cooperation, as Egbula and Qi put it. For China, it is Nigeria's enormous energy reserves and domestic

109. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', p. 10.

market of "150 million inhabitants with growing disposable incomes." For Nigeria, it is the inspiring example of China's economic transformation and its capacity to deliver and finance large infrastructure development projects. That was already transparently articulated in the 2006 Nigeria-China memorandum of understanding. Per this agreement, Nigeria required China to invest principally in its petroleum, power, telecommunications and manufacturing sectors. In turn, China required access to a secure supply of Nigeria's energy resources to fuel its rapidly growing economy. Nigeria's position flowed from recognition of its dire need for aid in infrastructure development, for which it was ready to trade oil. China's derived from its economic interests as articulated by its Ministry of Commerce in their four strategic goals in the Nigeria-China cooperation. These were to:

1. Increase the share of Chinese multinationals in the Nigerian market;
2. Expand the market for Chinese manufactures in Nigeria;
3. Increase China's footprint in Nigeria's energy sector;
4. Leverage China's investments in Nigeria to access the ECOWAS market.[110]

Thus, in exchange for Nigeria's natural resources, market, and investment opportunities, China provides it with:

1. Concessional loans as well as industrial and agricultural production technologies without the political, economic, and ethical constraints imposed by the traditional providers;
2. Infrastructure development partnerships on terms that are convenient for Nigerian governments;
3. Foreign direct investment in labour-intensive industries, agriculture, and commerce, thus generating significant employment.

This relationship has assumed the form of three lines of activity: trade, capital investment, and official development assistance. We outline each in the following sections.

Nigeria-China trade

Nigeria-China relations were tenuous in Nigeria's early post-independence

110. Egbula and Qi, pp. 3, 4-5.

period. Language and cultural barriers limited economic exchange severely. Also, because the Tafawa Balewa government was uninterested, China could not make allies of Nigeria and other African states in its fight against capitalism and Western imperialism. Diplomatic relations became stronger during the premiership of Deng Xiaoping. In that period, China rendered direct aid to Africa's national liberation movements, and Nigeria supported the cession of Hong Kong to China under the latter's "One China, Two Systems" policy. However, trade relations between them remained weak, as Taiwan remained Nigeria's favoured trading partner. During a 1997 visit to Nigeria by Li Ping, former premier of China's State Council, both countries signed several protocols on a diversity of subjects. These included investment protection and improved collaboration in the steel, oil, and electricity industries. However, they did not implement the agreements with vigour.

The situation changed in 1993 when China transformed from a net exporter of petroleum to the global second-largest importer due to its rapid economic growth. Nigeria was of particular interest to the Chinese since—like other Gulf of Guinea countries—it possessed both sweet light petroleum and a developing market that welcomed foreign investment. Driven principally by the oil sector and, to a lesser degree, cheap Chinese imports, the Nigeria-China trade volume more than quadrupled between 1990 and 1996. It leapt from ¦ 1.3 billion in the former year to ¦ 5.3 billion in the latter and then to ¦ 8.6 billion. The change in Nigeria's status as a Chinese visitation point indicated the extent of the transformation. The ten-country Africa visit by Chinese premier Zhou En-lai in 1963 excluded Nigeria. By 2006, however, it had become a principal port of call on the regular trips to Africa by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao.[111]

Trade between the two countries has grown even more since the 1990s. From less than $2 billion in 2000, it rose to almost $18 billion in 2010.[112] Table 1, which shows figures for the period between 2005 and 2014, demonstrates the unprecedented expansion of the Nigeria-China trade (see the Appendix).

Chinese capital in Nigeria

Utomi reports that the history of Chinese capital in Nigeria dates back to the 1960s. Taking up an invitation from Nigeria's Northern Region government,

111. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', pp. 40-41.
112. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', p. 3.

Hong Kong Chinese invested in its textile manufacturing sector, contributing to its early development. There was a lull in Chinese direct investments in Nigeria in the oil boom years, but there has since been a veritable influx of state and private Chinese capitals. Their activities have expanded beyond the limited ventures by Hong Kong Chinese in textile manufacturing and steel production in the 1960s. Today, Chinese financial institutions support Chinese investment in Nigeria heavily. They are now also directly acquiring stakes in Nigeria's financial sector. Two examples are the acquisitions by one of China's biggest banks in the Standard Chartered Bank and IBTC-Chartered Bank of Nigeria. Chinese investors now invest directly in Nigeria's manufacturing sector to produce for the foreign and domestic markets, and Chinese firms have won contracts for various development projects. An example is the 2000 contract the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) won to construct the 5,000-unit athletes' village for the eighth annual All-Africa Games.[113]

Determining the size and sectoral composition of Chinese capital in Nigeria is difficult, in large part because of the paucity of publicly available data. China's ambassador to Nigeria said in 2016 that "China has become a major source for foreign direct investment in Nigeria."[114] Egbula and Qi also inform us that Nigeria came second after South Africa as the leading African recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2003 and 2009. It received $1.03 billion of the $9.3 billion that went to the continent.[115] Such anecdotal data is helpful but cannot adequately perform the office of giving a complete and truthful picture of Chinese capital in Nigeria. The public agencies that should have and provide the relevant data, such as the National Bureau of Statistics and the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, offer little information. Further, what they do provide is mostly not highly disaggregated, preventing any drilling down for fine-grained details about the size and distribution of foreign capital in the country.

The China Global Investment Tracker—a project of the American Enterprise Institute—is therefore of immense value in this regard. According to the dataset available on the tracker website, Chinese state-owned enterprises made direct investments totalling $13.50 billion in Nigeria from January 2006

113. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', pp. 40-41, 44.
114. Zhou, 'Why China Remains Nigeria's Friend'.
115. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', p. 9.

to September 2018. The breakdown is as follows (figures are in rounded-off billions of USD):

1. **Year**: 2006 = $2.2; 2010 = $2.06; 2012 = $2.63; 2018 = $6.54;
2. **Investor** (single and consortia): CNOOC = $2.27; China Merchants and China Development Bank = $.15; China Railway Construction, Nanjing Government, China Development Bank, and Guangdong Xinguang = $1.91; China Power Investment = $.13; Sinopec = $2.50; China Energy Engineering, Power Construction Corp., Sinopec = $5.79; China Great Wall = $.55; Shandong Ruyi = $.20;
3. **Sector**: Energy = $10.69; real estate = $1.91; technology = $0.55; transport = $0.15; other = $0.20.

Also, China's state-owned and state-related enterprises invested $36.46 billion in construction projects in Nigeria from May 2006 to August 2018. The breakdown is as follows (figures are in rounded-off billions of USD):

1. **Year**: 2006 = $.11; 2007 = $.82; 2008 = $5.01; 2009 = $.85; 2010 = $.40; 2012 = $1.10; 2013 = $3.96; 2014 = $4.06; 2015 = $5.08; 2016 = $11.03; 2017 = $2.68; 2018 = $1.36;
2. **Investor** (single and consortia): China Communications Construction = $2.65; China Energy Engineering = $.59; China National Chemical Engineering = $.52; China Power Energy Consulting = $.11; China Railway Construction = $20.85; CNOOC = $.17; CNCP = $1.13; Huawei = $.75; Power Construction Corp. = $.70; Power Construction Corp., Sinomach = $1.29; Shenzhen Energy = $2.40; Sinoma = $2.99; Sinomach = $1.23; Tidfore Heavy = $.20; ZTE = $.88;
3. **Sector**: agriculture = $.32; energy = $7.86; real estate = $2.99; technology = $1.63; transport = $23.66.[116]

On the whole, these enterprises invested $49.96 billion from 2006 to 2018. It seems, however, that this data pertains only to Chinese state and state-related enterprises and does not include private Chinese capital. If that is so, it only offers a still partial picture of the size and diversity of Chinese capital in Nigeria. The actual size of Chinese capital operating in the country would be much larger than the total given in the dataset.

116. China Global Investment Dataset', Dataset 1 and Dataset 2.

Be that as it may, the tracker affords an idea of the operational scope of Chinese investments in Nigeria. We get an idea of this also from Egbula and Qi. According to them, the major Chinese companies in Nigeria include (showing their sector of activity, assets (in billions of U.S. dollars), number of employees, investments):

1. **Sinopec**: in oil and gas, with $152.80 billion in assets, 373,375 employees, and investments including Blocks OML 64,66, 29% stake and operating rights to block 2, Nigeria- São Tomé Joint Development Zone;
2. **CNCP**: in oil and gas, with $470.80 billion in assets, 1.67 million employees (of which 800,000 are foreigners), and investments including Licences for OPL 471, 721, 732, 298;
3. **SEPCO**: in electricity infrastructure construction, with $38.60 billion in assets, 19,756 employees, and investments including the Papalanto Power Plant;
4. **CCECC**: in infrastructure construction, with $2.17 billion in assets, 70,000 employees, and investments including Rehabilitation of Papalanto-Lagos expressway, Athletics village, Ikot Akpaden-Okoroette road, Lekki Free Trade Zone;
5. **CSCEC**: in infrastructure construction and real estate development, with $58.90 billion in assets, 121,500 employees, and investments including refineries;
6. **CNOON**: in offshore oil and gas, with $13.8 billion in assets, 21,000 employees, and investments including 45% interest in offshore exploitation licence, OML 130;
7. **Sinoma**: in cement, engineering, and infrastructure construction, with $2.9 billion in assets, 9,000 employees, and investments including collaboration with Nigeria's Dangote Group for cement production line EPC project in 2008;
8. **CGC**: in infrastructure construction, with $0.30 billion in assets, number of employees not available, and investments including Kebbi Airport, Water supply project in Gombe, Sakke Dam;
9. **Huawei**: in telecommunication, with $25.00 billion in assets, 51,000 employees, and investments including networks and mobile telephone handsets;
10. **ZTE**: in telecommunication, with $13.00 billion in assets, 85,232

employees, and investments in CDMA telephony and mobile telephone handsets.

The operations of the entire corpus of Chinese investments in Nigeria feature a division of labour: the public enterprises focus on natural resources and infrastructure development, and the private on manufacturing, agro-industry, and communications. For example, Chinese state and state-related firms are constructing airports, power plant, roads, and railways across the country. These companies include the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), which had invested more than $10 billion in Nigeria as of 2011. It is also implementing more than fifty projects—among which the largest is the $850 million Abuja-Kaduna railway line. The China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC) was building a dam in Sabke, a water supply network in Gombe State, an airport in Kebbi State, and a Kano-Maiduguri link road in Borno State. Also, the Sinohydro Corporation and Harbin Electricity Corporation won an $82 million contract to rehabilitate the Kainji hydro-power station to boost Nigeria's electricity generation capacity by 340 megawatts.

Among the private Chinese firms in manufacturing are Lee Enterprises and Wepco, the former manufacturing steel, leather hides, ceramic tiles and plastic products and the latter, furniture and roofing materials. Chinese state-owned ZTE produces telephone handsets, and numerous other Chinese firms in the hundreds are active in the pharmaceutical sub-sector, as well as in cement, food and beverages, plastics, and steel. Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company (ZTE) and Huawei are the leading Chinese enterprises in Nigeria's telecommunications sector. The former won a Nitel contract in 2005 to extend Nigeria's CDMA wireless telephony network across the north-east states and to supply Nitel with 13,000 CDMA terminals and handsets.[117] In 2010, it won a $400 million contract with the Nigerian government to construct a national security communications network. Huawei, ZTE's main rival in Nigeria, won an $80 million contract in 2004 to supply GSM equipment to V-Mobile in Nigeria. It also had a $40 million partnership project with MTN Nigeria in 2010 to deliver telephone services to hundreds of rural communities in Nigeria.

Another active Chinese firm is the state-owned China Great Wall Industry Corporation, which won the contract in 2005 to build and launch Nigeria's

117. The company has a handset factory in Abuja and offices in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Jos, Ibadan, Maiduguri, Bauchi, and Kaduna.

NIGCOMSAT-1, sub-Saharan Africa's first communications satellite. The project received $51 million from the Nigerian government and a $200 million loan from the China Exim Bank to expand telephony, internet, and GPS services and lower their costs. The satellite launched into space in May 2007 and was to remain in service for fifteen years. However, it failed one year later due to issues in its solar power system. China promised to build and launch NIGCOMSAT-1R in December 2011 to replace it.[118]

Chinese development aid to Nigeria

In place of a history of China's development assistance to Nigeria, that for Africa gives a good idea of China's aid activities here.[119]

Gold et al. identify two phases in the evolution of China's development aid activities in Africa. They distinguish them from each other by the primarily political goals of the first and economic ones of the second. The first ran from the 1955 Bandung Conference to the mid-1990s and received its driving force from China's contest with the Soviet Union for allies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The country's aid activities in that period included political, ideological, and limited military assistance to the African liberation movement. Also, as a member of the Security Council, it gave a voice to African countries in the United Nations. Among the infrastructure development projects that China financed in the period was the Tanzania-Zambia rail-line (TAZARA). A significant development in this period of China's aid activities in Africa was its switch in 1982 under Premier Zhao Ziyang from a one-directional to a cooperative aid paradigm. Whereas the former consisted, for instance, in China-to-recipient loans, the latter involved exchange between recipient and donor, both, thus, gaining something from the relationship.

The second, current phase of China's development assistance in Africa commenced in the mid-1990s and has sought to achieve principally economic goals. China pursues these through a diversity of instruments, including trade and investment, giving grants and concessional loans, and providing technical aid, capacity development and humanitarian assistance. The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 2000, has been the principal vehicle for achieving these goals and applying these instruments[120]

118. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', pp. 10-15.
119. 'Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the transfer of finance and resources, [including] loans, grants, and technical assistance, at concessional rate.' Gold et al., 'China's Aid', p. 1198.

as they pertain to Afro-Chinese cooperation. The current phase of China's aid activities in Africa has seen a proliferation of Chinese enterprises on the continent. Also, Africa's share in China's total foreign aid has increased from 45.7% in 2010 to 51.8% in 2012.[121]

As with Chinese capital in Nigeria, determining the size and areas of Chinese development aid to Nigeria is highly problematic. The Chinese ambassador to the country reported in 2016 that "The volume of China's concessional financial support to Nigeria's development [at that time was] close to $4bn."[122] Verifying such claims is difficult, however. That is due to both the scarcity of data and the ambiguity of much of what is available. Gold et al. note that China, unlike the West, previously did not publish its aid data. That was due partly to fear of criticism from its population, among whom there is still poverty and income inequality. It was due in part also to the notion that it was improper to take pride in aid-giving. That posture changed with the inauguration of Jiang Zemin's "Going Out" strategy in 1999 and the establishment of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000.

Gold et al. observe that, even with the change, determining the size or impact of China's aid to Nigeria remains difficult. That is first because project contract awards are often without competitive bidding and, second, China's foreign aid activities are opaque and often exaggerated—particularly regarding Nigeria. For instance, China made commitments to Nigeria worth $5 billion for the period 2000 to 2009 but had given only $589 million as of 2008. In light of this, they argue that Nigeria's government—which has figures on the actual value of Chinese aid—should make them available to fulfil its accountability obligations.[123]

The ambiguity of the aid data available derives from the absence of a clear distinction between aid and investment in China's practice. As Osakwe observes, "China's foreign direct investment in Nigeria is actively facilitated by governmental aid programmes…"[124] If Chinese development aid and investments are so intertwined, it becomes possible to present investment as aid and vice versa. That allows China to mask its capitalist extraction of

120. China systematised the ends and means of its development aid in the "Going Out" strategy that the leadership of Jiang Zemin defined in 1999.
121. Gold et al., 'China's Aid', pp. 1201-1205.
122. Zhou, 'Why China Remains Nigeria's Friend'.
123. Gold et al., 'China's Aid', pp. 1207, 1222-1223.

surplus value as assistance to the Nigerian people, thus defrauding them and fostering an illusion. Therefore, Egbula and Qi conclude that evaluating the value and sincerity of China's aid to Nigeria is problematic.[125] Regarding the former, they argue that it is hard to evaluate human resource development and in-kind gifts. Citing Deborah Brautigam—an analyst of Afro-Chinese relations—Egbula and Qi total China's official assistance to Nigeria from 2000 to 2008 at less than $220 million. Regarding Chinese sincerity, they hold that the line between aid and trade is often indistinct. Further, the requirement that recipients expend Chinese loans on Chinese products or services undermines China's claim that they are unconditional.

Nonetheless, Nigeria's share of Chinese infrastructure financing, which was little in 2004 and 2005, increased dramatically in 2006 when China gave financing commitments worth almost $5 billion. That amount accounted for 70% of China's pledges to sub-Saharan Africa in that year. Electricity projects received 33.4% of these pledges to Nigeria, transport projects 33.2%, ICT 17.4%, water 2.0%, and others 14.0%.[126]

Although there is little verifiable statistical data, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence concerning what public statements present as China's official development aid to Nigeria. To start with the quotidian, in October 2005, for instance, China donated military equipment worth $3 million to Nigeria. It also announced a development aid project to sink 598 boreholes in Abuja and eighteen states. Wang Yongqui, the then-ambassador to Nigeria, said this latter was to provide "clean drinkable water to ordinary Nigerians living in out-of-the-way areas." He also announced that his country would send in twenty-one experts to train Nigerian soldiers to use the military equipment donated. They included bullet-proof helmets and vests, computers and communication facilities, two special vehicles, uniforms and diving devices, and emergency runway systems.[127]

More substantively, China has concentrated the bulk of its development aid to Nigeria in infrastructure and agriculture development. The 2006 oil-for-infrastructure scheme during the administration of President

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124. Osakwe, 'Exploring the Complexities of the China-Nigeria Relationship: Is China Good for Africa?', p. 6.
125. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', p. 17.
126. Osakwe, 'Exploring the Complexities of the China-Nigeria Relationship: Is China Good for Africa?', p. 8.
127. Chau, Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp.1-2. This source provides information on numerous other aid interventions by China in Nigeria. See pp. 35-43.

Olusegun Obasanjo was the first structured and negotiated programme for the delivery of Chinese aid in infrastructure development. It involved the Nigerian government allocating oil blocks to China in exchange for Chinese development aid, including infrastructure development, debt forgiveness, grants, and loans. However, the successor Yar'Adua administration revoked most of the agreements under it for lack of transparency.[128]

The scheme's failure notwithstanding, the Nigeria-China infrastructure partnership has brought in Chinese private and public sector firms to rehabilitate and expand Nigeria's rail, telecommunications, road, and electricity infrastructures. These include ZTE, China Putian, and Alcatel-Shanghai-Bell. Nigeria-China cooperation in agriculture involves a tripartite agreement between Nigeria, China, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). It also includes an agreement for China to provide 500 Chinese experts in food production and water conservation to work in Nigeria, 400 of whom are already at work.[129] This cooperation also involves a 2011 agreement between the countries. Under it, China would provide Chinese technology and expertise to boost cocoa, palm oil, and soybean production, and that of other cash crops with high Chinese demand.[130]

Other Chinese aid to Nigeria include providing hundreds of scholarships to Nigerians for studies in China and building three hundred "friendship schools" in Nigeria's rural areas. Additionally, several Chinese enterprises run independent and informal aid programmes—such as the China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC), which sinks boreholes without cost for rural water projects.[131]

Gold et al.[132] afford us some notion of the extensive scope and monetary value of these Chinese aid interventions. Among the most significant from 2001 to 2012 are:

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128. Gold et al., 'China's Aid', pp. 1221-1222. According to these authorities, some scholars have attributed the scheme's cessation to the preference for cash by Nigeria's rentier elite. (That the old arrangement did not involve the transfer of funds between the partner governments possibly influenced its rejection. For that policy would provide little room for embezzlement or other forms of corruption by Nigerian officials.) However, others acknowledge the validity of the charge of opacity. They admit that the scheme's lack of transparency allowed the inflation of expected project costs and the hiding of details about the implicit terms of the agreements.
129. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', p. 45.
130. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', p. 16.
131. Egbula and Qi, p.16.
132. Gold et al., 'China's Aid', pp. 1215-1220.

1. **2002**: modernisation of small-scale farming in Nigeria, involving building 3,000 small dams and providing 500 Chinese agricultural experts and technicians to train 10,000 Nigerians in building and managing small dams;
2. **2003**: Cancellation of a ¦ 325 million debt;
3. **2004**: $100 million loan for Phase 3 of a national rural telephony project covering over 150 local government areas;
4. **2006**: $4.5 billion oil-for-infrastructure agreement for three projects—construction of the Lagos-Kano rail-line ($2.5 billion), rehabilitation of the Kaduna oil refinery ($2 billion), and building the Mambilla power station—in exchange for licences for four oil drilling blocks;
5. **2007**:

1. 75% financing of a $1.46 billion project on the Mambilla dam in Taraba State;
2. $50 million MOU to develop the Lekki Free Trade Zone in Lagos State;

6. **2009**: ¦ 308 million contribution to a ¦ 500 million project to construct four rural primary schools in Katsina, Ogun, and Kaduna states and the Federal Capital Territory;
7. **2012**:
    1. 75% funding of a $927 million project to construct a 700 MW hydro-power station on the northern section of the Zungeru River;
    2. $500 million loan to construct four terminals at airports in Abuja, Enugu, Kano, and Port Harcourt.

New Partnership or New Imperialism?

Pat Utomi prefaces his review of Nigerian assessments of the Nigeria-China relationship with a call for a national debate on the subject:

> China's increasing presence in Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa, has spurred much speculation about the nature of the emerging partnership model. A national debate across sectors on this partnership will be a healthy exercise and may drive more rigorous analysis of what best serves African countries' quest for human material advance; friendly, mutually beneficial relations in trade and politics; and stewardship of the shared heritage of the planet.[133]

133. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', p. 39.

Such a debate is necessary as there is much ideological obfuscation in the public discourse on the matter. We have noted, for instance, that the ambiguity of Chinese official development assistance to Nigeria allows room for the misrepresentation of investment as aid. That is, it permits the misrepresentation of the exploitation of Nigeria's labouring classes and pillage of its natural resources as material support for its people. Such mystifications apart, representations of this relationship appear to rest on a fundamental misconception of the essence and process of development. These representations reduce it to infrastructural artefacts such as roads, bridges, and power pylons. They do not grasp it as the level of the *social capacity* to harness and productively apply the forces of nature and society to meet human needs.[134]

These issues of obfuscation and misconception are already justification enough for a debate on Nigeria-China cooperation, but another trumps even them. It is that of that relationship's implications for Nigeria's present and future place and role in the world and, thus, for the self-liberation of its working people. These are the concerns in this section.

China's representations

China's "benevolence" and "humane approach to development" are the payloads of China's messaging to persuade other countries to grant it access to their raw materials, energy resources, and markets.[135] Their tone and stress varying according to circumstance and audience, these core messages pervade China's representations of Chinese relations with Nigeria and other developing countries. Already, we have seen how Liu Guijin characterised Afro-Chinese relations as "non-imperial," citing as evidence Zheng He's voyage to Africa 600 years since and insisting that China only aims to help Africa improve its "development ability."[136] Similarly, Yang et al. projected that China's 2013-2023 strategy would seek to sustain the "current development momentum" of developing countries and enhance their strength to reduce the gap between

134. For an immensely readable and insightful discussion of the subject, see Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Chapter One: Some Questions on Development.

135. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', p. 45.

136. See the introductory section. Of course, Liu's example is utterly specious as evidence that 15th-century China was not imperialist in the manner of 17th-century Spain and Portugal or 18th-century England and France. That China was yet a tributarist social formation and its ruling class had

them and developed countries and enhance their agency in global governance. In particular connection with Africa, China would in the period pursue a strategic partnership with Africa involving:

1. Deepening mutual political bonds and goodwill through relations between the governments, parties, and NGOs of China and their African counterparts;
2. Promoting "cooperative and common development;"
3. Strengthening cooperation on issues of regional peace, security, and stability, and enhancing Africa's capacity to play the leading role in addressing those issues on the continent;
4. Improving intellectual and cultural exchanges between China and Africa through such means as universities, think-tanks, and study centres.[137]

To crown it all, Zhou assures us that these results have moved from the realm of aspiration to actualisation in the Nigeria-China relationship. In his words, "the friendship and cooperation between China and Nigeria have delivered tangible benefits to both countries."[138]

Nigerian assessments

Some analysts of Afro-Chinese and Nigeria-China relations subscribe to these representations. Answering her self-posed question whether China is good for Africa, Osakwe argues that it is for Nigeria. How so? "China is good for Nigeria," she says, "because there has been an increase in the establishment of infrastructure, strengthening of skills and human capital, and the breaking of colonial interactions with the West."[139] Gold et al. concur. They posit that China's no-conditions, recipient-friendly aid policy affords Nigeria a unique opportunity to advance its socio-economic development and diversify its oil-

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successfully hampered and restricted the development of capitalism in the country. Thus, although tributarist China featured the expansionism that the tributarist mode of production generated, that imperative differed from that particular to developed capitalist formations. In contrast, those European countries were rapidly becoming or already identifiably capitalist formations in the period referenced. On tributarist China, see Amin, Ending the Crisis?; Amin, Global History: A View from the South; and Amin, Class and Nation.

137. Yang et al., 'China's Global Strategy (2013-2023)', pp. iii and 5.
138. Zhou, 'Why China Remains Nigeria's Friend'.
139. Osakwe, 'Exploring the Complexities of the China-Nigeria Relationship: Is China Good for Africa?', p. 7.
140. Gold et al., 'China's Aid', p. 1225.

based economy by developing the manufacturing and agriculture sectors.[140] That is in contrast to the principles and practices of development assistance by traditional donors. Similarly, Egbula and Qi hold that Chinese investments aid development and job creation in Nigeria's agriculture sector. They cite as an example the Chongqing Seed Corporation. The company cultivates rice on a 300-hectare property using local farm labour and sells half of the output in Nigeria and exports half to China.[141] The chief concern for these analysts seems to be that Nigeria has not made the best use of the opportunity proffered by China. According to Utomi:[142]

> While the possibilities certainly exist for Nigeria to derive higher value from China's growing influence, Nigerians have not fully capitalised on the potential benefits. Far more needs to be done to expand policy creation, institution building, human capital, entrepreneurship, and the culture and leadership capabilities to maximise gains. Most importantly, Nigeria needs to develop a comprehensive strategy to more effectively balance the engagement of China and the West to leverage its own strength and create a plan for sustainable development that resonates with its citizens.

We find similar views among Nigeria's political leaders and top civil servants. Utomi found concerns among Nigeria's career diplomats about China's intentions. Nonetheless, they agreed that Afro-Chinese cooperation is potentially more beneficial to Africa than Afro-Occidental relations, "which had left Africa impoverished despite half a century of aid." These officials argue that agreements with Western countries often infringe on the sovereignty of aid recipients and enable Western meddling in their internal affairs. That contrasts with China's strings-free aid and trade policy.[143] Feng quotes Jonathan Coker, a former Nigerian ambassador to China, as saying in defense of this view:

> "From agriculture to transportation, China has helped rebuild rail lines, roads and bridges that Nigeria could not do itself. The cost came out so much cheaper for us than going to [our] traditional friends such as France, the U.K., Canada."[144]

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141. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', p. 12.
142. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', p. 48.
143. Utomi, pp. 41-42. Examples include those between them and African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries since the 1975 Lomé Convention.
144. Feng, 'Chinese Investment Extends Its Influence in Nigeria'.

Comments in 2005 by Sahr Johnny, Sierra Leonean ambassador to China, suggest that this consensus is probably not peculiar to Nigeria. He reportedly said: "We like China…, we have one meeting, we discuss what they want to do, and they just do it…, there is no benchmark or preconditions."[145]

However, that is not to say that the Nigeria-China partnership is all positive in the view of these public officers. Utomi reports that Nigerian diplomats expressed several concerns about it, although they considered none to be threatening to the relationship.[146] These included that:

1. China has a monolithic approach to Africa and fails to recognise that each country has its distinct objectives and potentials, in contrast to the "healthier" individual approach by Western countries;
2. The partnership might result in an unequal relationship in which "the Chinese would become the dominant power, and Africans would lack the capacity to exert [any] influence;"
3. Actual technology transfer to Nigeria and job creation by Chinese firms is low because they import Chinese workers;
4. Labour practices by Chinese firms fall below African standards and involve "slave-like" conditions. An example is the September 2002 fire incident at a Chinese-owned factory in Lagos. "At least thirty-seven Nigerians were trapped after a factory foreman reportedly locked the building doors;"
5. China has not implemented some infrastructure development projects, such as the modernisation of the rail system. However, some others have been "very productive:" for example, the donation of fire-fighting equipment to a South-West state;
6. China's low "commitment to human dignity and individual freedom" deriving from its "collectivist tradition" might encourage human rights violation by the Nigerian government. "Applied appropriately," however, such a tradition could produce "a more disciplined society" in Nigeria and facilitate the fight against problems such as corruption;

145. Quoted in Gold et al., 'China's Aid', p. 1204.
146. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', pp. 42-43.

7. China might abandon its policy of non-interference in Nigeria's politics and internal affairs as its citizens become more involved in Nigeria's economy and, therefore, more exposed to security threats.

Utomi also reports that Nigeria's business community believes that the Nigeria-China engagement could deliver significant benefits to Nigerian businesses. These include the lower cost of Chinese merchandise and the opportunity to learn from Chinese business models. Despite Nigeria's poor infrastructure, these benefits "have enabled some Nigerians to manufacture and export profitably at a time when the country has been witnessing a collapse in manufacturing and deindustrialisation." Another benefit is the "willingness of many Chinese partners to arrange financing" for their joint-venture projects. Finally, Chinese expatriates accept the same living conditions as Nigerian workers—in contrast to their Western counterparts.

Nonetheless, members of Nigeria's business community think that the Nigeria-China partnership is "better for the Chinese than it is for Nigerians." They also believe that Nigerian businessmen who have benefited from it are "merely riding the coattails of the Chinese businessmen who are making the most money" from the engagement. One reason for this is the preferential tariffs for Chinese imports—granted by the Olusegun Obasanjo Administration—to the disadvantage of local manufacturers. This arrangement, they argue, enables the Chinese to dump cheap Chinese products onto the Nigerian market, thus "stifling the competitiveness of domestic production." Another [and aggravating this disadvantage] are the poor labour practices by Chinese enterprises—including "slave wages" and dangerous working conditions—that the Nigerian government has failed to check. Yet another is the effort by Chinese enterprises to exclude the Taiwanese from Nigeria-China trade, including going to "great lengths in the media to discourage Nigerian participation in Taiwanese trade."[147]

These assessments, including the critical ones, betray an unfortunate nose-to-the-grindstone empiricism. They approach the Nigeria-China relationship from the immediate, reified forms in which it objectifies and presents itself to the consciousness. The fundamentally transactional

147. Utomi, pp. 43-44.

perspective that dominates mainstream discourses of the relationship encapsulates and expresses this approach. What are China's needs, what are Nigeria's? What can each offer in exchange for the resources to meet its needs? Is this exchange equal? What are its impacts? Are they equitable? How can each optimise its benefits from the relationship? Who has the upper hand? These are the vital questions from this perspective. They are significant, unquestionably, as are the social problems they signify: Nigeria's infrastructure deficit, mass youth unemployment and under-employment, the devastating decline of agricultural productivity, and the resulting food insecurity.

However, a baseless idealism suffuses this transactional perspective thoroughly on the character of China as a social formation. Or, perhaps more positively, a failure to recognise the significance of China's capitalist essence and appreciate the implications sufficiently. As already suggested, a capitalist China is inescapably subject to the imperatives of the capitalist mode of production, especially as it long since entered the monopoly stage, with all the imperialist pressures that this implies. As a monopoly-capitalist social formation, therefore, the fundamental law of China's existence cannot but be an instance of capitalism's: self-expand or perish. China—or more precisely, Chinese capital—must extract surplus value and natural resources wherever it can to feed its endless accumulation. The Chinese tiger must continuously engorge itself.

In light of this, it becomes apparent that China's win-win messaging to underdeveloped countries is a function of its relative disadvantage in the power balance within the capital system. Confronted with the dominance of the triad powers in the competition for natural resources, markets, and strategic positions, China has had to promote a Global South value proposition to enhance its competitiveness. The messaging about south-south solidarity, mutual benefits, and cooperation is an ideological legitimation of China's effort to win a place as a major power in the capital system. It was to establish this that we undertook in previous sections to explore at some length the questions of China's political economy and its global goals and strategies. Indeed, a country like Nigeria could nonetheless benefit from an alliance with a rising China. However, there should be no illusions as to the direction in which the present dynamics are propelling the relationship. A monopoly-capitalist China must dominate and exploit where it can. Whatever immediate benefits Nigeria gains in

its alliance with this China will probably function ultimately as grist to the mill of that dominance and exploitation.

Reproducing Nigeria's neo-colonial status

The transactional approach measures the performance of the Nigeria-China relationship by the extent to which it produces demonstrable improvements in Nigeria's socio-economic infrastructures, human capacity, employment, etc. Such enhancements would impact popular conditions positively. However, this approach misses the point: those things are only artefacts and not sustainably reproducible without changing Nigeria's role and position in the capital system. That is because this combination of systemic function and place underlie the country's underdevelopment and poverty. Here then is the correct ground on which to assess the Nigeria-China relationship. We may summarise it in two questions. First, how and to what extent is that relationship enabling Nigeria to change its function and place in the global economic system; that is, to transform from a primary commodity producer under domination by the countries of the system centre to an autonomous industrialised country? Is this possible within the context of the capital system, which it is clear China wishes to preserve in its essence but only in a new structural configuration? With the question posed in this manner, the myopia of the transactional perspective on the Nigeria-China relationship becomes evident.

Attempting to address the question as posed can only lead to one conclusion: the relationship reproduces Nigeria's neo-colonial function and place in the capital system. Therefore, the partnership cannot solve its problems of underdevelopment and poverty. The Nigeria-China relationship perpetuates Nigeria's role and place in the capital system by two different but interrelated means. First, by reinforcing the material premises of Nigeria's structural dependency and underdevelopment and, second, by preserving the internal structures of power that guarantee the reproduction of its neo-colonial capitalist formation.

The elements, mechanics, and dynamics of this process require involved investigations that the scope of an explorative paper like this cannot accommodate. Therefore, the views expressed here are only preliminary observations and notions that might inform further research.

Reinforcing deindustrialisation and dependency

Socio-economic underdevelopment and demotic poverty are among the immediately visible results and expressions of the domination of Nigeria by foreign monopoly capital. Many others are not immediately visible but no less significant in their development and political implications. They include the structural disarticulation, dependency, and extroversion of its economy, the dominance of primary commodity production, and its unequal socio-economic development.[148]

The Nigeria-China relationship is reproducing Nigeria's neo-colonial status by reinforcing these features of its political economy. That includes by perpetuating the country's function as a producer of primary commodities, pillaging its natural resources, and exploiting relations of unequal exchange between the two countries. We will look here at the problems of deindustrialisation and dependency. Concerning the first, Zhou, the Chinese ambassador to Nigeria, wrote in 2016 that:

> Nigeria needs manufacturing and industrial development, whereas China has fairly strong capabilities in financing and spare production capacity in these fields. Each has so much to offer to the other side. Cooperation based on such complementary and mutual benefit will strongly boost China's and Nigeria's respective development.[149]

It seems, however, that the reality is that Chinese imports and products manufactured in Nigeria by Chinese firms are strangulating local manufacturers and taking over the local market. Already these imports and products dominate some sectors of the local consumer goods market, and Nigeria's manufacturing sector reportedly received about 13% of both public and private Chinese investments in 2015.[150] What we are witnessing seems to be the translocation of Chinese manufacturing capital to Nigeria. That would enable it to take advantage of the cheap labour-power and comparatively low organic composition of capital in Nigeria's manufacturing sector to obtain

148. For an analysis of these features of Africa's neo-colonial economies, see Ake, A Political Economy of Africa.
149. Zhou, 'Why China Remains Nigeria's Friend'.
150. Feng, 'Chinese Investment Extends Its Influence in Nigeria'.

higher rates of profit.[151] Zhou himself says China "supports the relocation of labour-intensive industries to Nigeria…and the localisation of Chinese companies to create more non-agricultural jobs…" Nigeria and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding towards this end during President Buhari's state visit to China in April 2016.[152]

The result has been the progressive crippling of indigenous manufacturing. As Utomi notes: "[Chinese businessmen were] establishing new manufacturing ventures for export and local markets at a time when Nigerian manufacturing was uncompetitive and collapsing into…deindustrialisation."[153] In effect, Chinese capital is undermining and destroying sections of Nigerian manufacturing and taking over portions of the sector. The issue here is not the nationality of the dominant capital. It is, instead, that the result is the erosion of Nigeria's indigenous manufacturing capacity and, thus, its restriction to primary production. This limitation being a crucial element of Nigeria's neo-colonial status, we see here that Chinese capital is aiding the reproduction of that status.

We observe a similar situation regarding Nigeria's structural dependency, of which we look here at the technological and financial dimensions. As mentioned previously in this paper, Nigeria has been importing immense magnitudes of manufactures from China. These include consumer items like mobile phones and computers but increasingly also means of production, such that significant portions of Nigeria's agricultural and manufactory production depend on Chinese technologies. Although these technologies undoubtedly contribute to raising productivity in these areas, there is also a problem of technological dependence emerging. China has awarded hundreds of scholarships to Nigerians to study in China; thus, it is building Nigeria's capacity to manage these technologies and *possibly* reproduce them.

However, Nigeria thus far lacks the knowledge production and utilisation

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151. Roughly, the organic composition of capital is the ratio of the value of the machines, raw materials, and other means of production in an industry to that of the labour power necessary to operate them. As Sweezy put it, "In non-technical language, [it] is a measure of the extent to which labour is furnished with materials, instruments, and machinery in the productive process." (See Sweezy, p. 66.) The more technologically advanced production is, the higher the value of its means of production and the lower that of the labour power necessary to operate them. That translates into the need for fewer workers to work the more advanced equipment and, thus, a higher organic composition of capital.

152. Zhou, 'Why China Remains Nigeria's Friend'.

153. Utomi, 'China and Nigeria', p. 41.

infrastructure to put this training to productive use on a sustainable and self-expanding basis. That is no fault of China's, but the result is to its benefit. To the extent that Nigeria cannot leverage the knowledge it receives from China, it will depend on the latter to manage the Chinese technologies that it applies in its economy. We are not in any doubt that the rentier mentality of the Nigerian bourgeoisie has a role in this situation. Nonetheless, the problem transcends questions of consciousness and will; it is at its core a problem of the material, structural conditions of achieving technological autonomy.

To illustrate: China trains hundreds and possibly thousands of Nigerians in Chinese technologies. The transfer of knowledge involves a powerful element of cultural imperialism, but let us lay that aside for now. These trained workers return to Nigeria or come into the labour market with the skills they have gained. However, Chinese imports and Chinese manufacturing capital operating in Nigeria are destroying Nigeria's domestic manufacturing capital. Chinese capital absorbs a portion of these trained workers, and the rest…where do they go? Some will become self-employed, but few can find sufficient capital to become competitive against already-established market rivals. The others will therefore wither away as entrepreneurs or stagnate in the informal economy. In one word, the dominance of foreign capital—including Chinese capital—in Nigeria's manufacturing sector neutralises any significant benefits the country might otherwise enjoy from technology transfers. It thus reproduces its technological dependency.

On Nigeria becoming financially dependent on China, Egbula and Qi report that China's state-owned financial institutions account for a large portion of infrastructure development financing in Nigeria. That is because the Nigerian government provides only a tiny fraction of the needed funds. These institutions include the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank), established specifically to finance offshore projects by Chinese multinationals. Another is Sinosure, which has provided credit insurance of over $113 billion for Chinese exports and investments.[154] This imbalance has raised concern among Nigerians in light of reports that Zambia might default on its debts to China and have to cede assets in lieu of payment. Supporters of the Nigeria-China partnership discount such fears regarding Nigeria. They claim the country can use its economic size—estimated at

154. Egbula and Qi, 'China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance', p. 15.

fourteen times that of Zambia—to gain a more equitable relationship with China. According to Jonathan Coker, Nigeria's former ambassador to China:

> Nigeria can work out its relationship with China in a way that does not hurt the Nigerian people as long as the relationship is well-managed… We are developing other things, such as mineral resources and gas, which can replace oil [revenues]… You have to work to pay back your debts when the time comes.

President Muhammadu Buhari dismisses the issue saying, "Some of the debts incurred are self-liquidating. Our country [can] repay loans when due in keeping with our policy of fiscal prudence and sound housekeeping."[155]

Still, the problem is real. As Harris argues, Chinese financial aid for infrastructure development in Africa might bring African countries into a debt trap.[156] That is because these countries secure Chinese loans using their strategic assets—oil, minerals, and land—as collateral. China can claim these assets should these countries be unable to repay the loans, as happened when Sri Lanka had to cede control of Hambantota port to China. It is an experience other countries have also suffered.[157] Harris reports Professor Brahma Chellaney of the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research as saying: "Several other countries, from Argentina to Namibia to Laos, have been ensnared in a Chinese debt trap, forcing them to confront agonising choices … to stave off default." In Harris' striking description: "Chinese debt has become the methamphetamines of infrastructure finance: highly addictive, readily available, and with long-term negative effects that far outweigh any temporary high." Assurances by Nigeria's leaders notwithstanding, this is a problem of dependency that could result in debt peonage.

Preserving the power structures

China's activities in Nigeria also preserve the superstructural relations that guarantee the reproduction of its neo-colonial formation. These are the internal and external political alliances and power relations that reproduce the dominance of the Nigerian bourgeoisie. For it is impossible to preserve the underlying relations of the neo-colonial formation sustainably but for that

155. Feng, 'Chinese Investment Extends Its Influence in Nigeria'.
156. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a $60 billion aid package in 2015 at the summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
157. Harris, 'China Is Loaning Billions'.

class's political and ideological dominance. As Wood has argued, monopoly capital—though global in its reach—cannot *directly* impose and exercise its political dominance in every part of the world. It must exercise its power through a local political vehicle, i.e., the nation-state.[158] Undermining and ultimately overthrowing the power of the Nigerian bourgeoisie is, therefore, a principal precondition for ending the country's neo-colonial capitalist formation.

It is from this perspective that the conservative and anti-revolutionary implications of the Nigeria-China relationship become most evident. China supplies the bourgeois state with security and military technologies and expertise to monitor and suppress the struggles of Nigeria's working classes. It trains Nigeria's security forces not only in surveillance but also in policing and military techniques. That is apart from the legitimating effect of the Nigeria-China relationship on the power of the Nigerian bourgeoisie. The ineptitude of this class and its vested interest in the capital system facilitate Nigeria's underdevelopment and the poverty of its working people. That is sufficient reason for its removal from power. If so, China's massive development aid to Nigeria amounts to purchasing a new lease on legitimacy for their continued dominance. In these and more ways, therefore, the Nigeria-China relationship helps to reproduce this dominance and the neo-colonial status of Nigeria.

Conclusion

In the following sections, we recapitulate the principal conclusions from this preliminary exploration of the Nigeria-China question. It threw up many loose and scattered ideas and half-ideas about aspects of the primary subject. This recapitulation involves pulling together and systematising the more significant of them. Finally, we outline some tasks and lines of actions that these ideas indicate.

Recapitulation and systematisation

On method

We can only plumb the depth and import of contemporary Nigeria-China relations by proceeding from their implications for Nigeria's liberation from its subservience in the capital system. The transactional approaches that dominate

158. Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View, Chapter 8: Capitalism and the nation-state.

analyses of those relations concentrate on the character and equality of the exchange between Nigeria and China. They also evaluate these questions by Nigeria's artefactual benefits from the relationship. How many bridges, roads, communication towers, engineers and technologists, etc., has Nigeria gained? How much have these increased its productive capacity, as measured by its economic growth or lack of it? At best, these approaches can produce a critique of the power and exchange inequalities of these relations. Alternatively, they critique Nigeria's internal failings that prevent it from adequately taking advantage of the opportunities the relationship presents.

However, they discountenance the implications of structure for agency and motion.[159] They do not appreciate that the relations that define Nigeria's neo-colonial position and function in the capital system constitute objective barriers to its "catching up" with the system's advanced countries. Regardless of how many bridges and railways China constructs for it. Much less do they grasp that this structure is not a mere thing, not simply a passive existent. It is, instead, an essential property of a global system that actively and perpetually reproduces itself on an ever-expanding scale. Extrication from this system of external and internal relations that at once entangles and defines Nigeria as a neo-colonial formation is the principal challenge of its socio-economic development. Here then is the proper measure of the import and value of the Nigeria-China relationship: to what extent does it facilitate the country's extrication or reinforce its entanglement? That, however, is precisely the question that transactional approaches do not even recognise, much less conceptualise and address.

Coming to grips with this question calls for a global political economy approach that prioritises, on the one hand, questions of the system-wide production and distribution of surplus value. On the other, it emphasises the related questions of global capital accumulation and its implications for the socio-economic development of the individual countries that constitute the capital system.

On China's political economy

It is crucial first, in comprehending the Nigeria-China relationship,

159. The problem of the relationship between structure and agency runs through an early work of Anthony Giddens'. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, see especially Chapter 2: Agency, Structure.

to understand China's motives and goals. These derive finally from the systemic imperatives of that country's political economy, which necessitates a determination of the character of its social formation. Our exploration of this question persuades us that China's social formation is capitalist, in that the demands of capital accumulation govern its systemic metabolism and development. That formation comprises various modes of production but the capitalist subjects the collective and simple commodity modes to its needs and laws. Further, indigenous monopoly capital is dominant in the economy, and this fact has imparted to China an imperialist tendency.

Therefore, Chinese monopoly capital is active in the direct extraction of surplus value in both the central and peripheral countries of the capital system. It is also taking advantage of the unequal exchange that constitutes this system to lower its production costs and raise its profit rate. Thus, it is active in obtaining cheap raw materials from peripheral countries for China's rapid industrialisation and export-driven capitalist development. Finally, the low prices of China's vast exports enable Chinese capital at once to earn profits above the global average and undermine the domestic competition in its foreign markets.

On China's global goals and strategies

A second factor crucial to a proper understanding of the Nigeria-China relationship pertains to China's global goals and the strategies the realities of its strategic environment have imposed on it. Primary among these goals is worldwide economic and military dominance. That derives necessarily from China's embeddedness in the capital system and its subjection, therefore, to the imperatives of global capitalist competition. These imperatives—operating in the form of the accumulation needs of Chinese monopoly capital—drive China to strive for global primacy: like they do every monopoly-capitalist country. That is especially regarding capital accumulation at the world level and securing access to natural resources, raw materials, and global markets. China, more than any other major non-member of the imperialist triad, embodies the conjuncture of this objective necessity and the material means to act on it with substantial success.[160] So much so that China today is a significant and growing threat

160. Those non-members are Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. The material means to which we refer consist of China's demographic, geographic, political, military, and economic assets.

to the previously unchallenged dominance of the United States in the capital system. That is, particularly, as the system's secular structural crisis since the late 1960s has progressively eroded the United States' capacity to control it.

The U.S. remains the system hegemon nonetheless and probably will remain so for a considerable time yet. Moreover, it has such an overwhelming strategic advantage over China that a direct hegemonic confrontation would likely have devastating results for the latter. That has constrained China, therefore, to pursue a strategy that enables it to avoid such a confrontation in the meantime while simultaneously undermining the United States' global dominance. A principal element of this involves forging counter-alliances to those of the U.S. and the triad countries. Hence, alongside other measures, China strives to build into a system of counter-hegemonic alliances the discontents of the existing configuration of the capital system, those countries it hampers or otherwise offends. The transactional basis of these alliances consists in:

1. On the part of China's counter-hegemonic allies:
    1. Support for China's geopolitical goals, including reforming the structures and principles of global governance to limit the power of the U.S. and other triad countries and enhance China's;
    2. The resource-rich ones grant China secure access to their natural resources;
    3. Those with significant populations with disposable incomes grant market access to Chinese products and capital;
2. On China's part:
    1. Support for the geopolitical goals of its allies, insofar as they do not conflict with its;
    2. Provide development aid for those that require it.

In this way, China kills two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it secures access to the natural resources, markets, and investment opportunities that its capitalist economy needs to develop further. On the other, it enhances its capacity for a successful future confrontation with the U.S. and its triad allies for dominance over the capital system.

On the implication of these conclusions

These conclusions on China's political economy and global goals and strategies imply that its underlying purpose in the Nigeria-China relationship

is to aggrandise Chinese capital and geopolitical power. Capital only continues to exist on the condition that it reproduces itself endlessly on an ever-expanding scale. That can only be by the extraction of surplus value, i.e., by the exploitation of labour. The principle applies to the capitalist formation as a whole: it must continue to expand by exploiting labour or perish. China's primary economic purpose in Nigeria, therefore, is to gain access to the things it needs for the self-expansion of its capitalist social formation. These include extra-territorial opportunities to extract surplus value and access to Nigeria's raw materials, natural resources, and market. Ultimately, Chinese messaging about cooperation and win-win partnerships is to facilitate and perpetuate this access. That is not to say that this messaging is devoid entirely of truth. Both parties in the Nigeria-China partnership have indeed engaged in significant cooperation and gained benefits from it. The point, instead, is that they deploy this part-truth as an ideological fig leaf to hide the more fundamental one of the relationship's exploitative and dispossessive character.

On reproducing Nigeria's neo-colonial status

This fundamentally exploitative and dispossessive character of the Nigeria-China relationship at once demands and facilitates the reproduction of Nigeria's neo-colonial function and position in the capital system. China possibly does not perceive the partnership and its impacts in these terms. Nonetheless, it has taken advantage of Nigeria's neo-colonial vulnerabilities to advance its interests; without, however, enhancing Nigeria's capacity to liberate itself from its subservient status. On the contrary, its activities in Nigeria actively aid the reproduction of that status. That is consistent with China's status as a monopoly-capitalist formation under imperialist imperatives. It is also consonant with its position as putative heir to hegemony over the capital system in whatever new configuration it will have to assume in the future.

Socio-historically, therefore, Chinese aid in developing Nigeria's infrastructure, agriculture, and human resources is little different in impact from similar British colonial activities in Nigeria. Colonial development of transport, healthcare, and educational facilities only facilitated colonial exploitation and domination of Nigeria. Likewise, current Chinese development aid to Nigeria enhances China's competitiveness vis-à-vis other monopoly-capitalist countries in the conflict over the distribution of surplus value and access to raw materials and natural resources. Perpetuating Nigeria's neo-colonial character is vital to this. For an economically autonomous and developed Nigeria would represent

for these countries, including China, a lost reservoir of cheap labour and cheap natural resources.

Tasks and lines of action

The principal task our exploration of the Nigeria-China question indicates is to conduct more investigations that transcend the predominant transactional approaches and instead adopt the one we have suggested above. There is a large body of anecdotal material on China's activities in Nigeria and significant, albeit insufficient, statistical data. However, most analysts have employed these in the service of what we have argued here is an ultimately barren transactional analysis of the subject. The research issues demanding close investigation include:

1. Nigeria's contributions to China's global accumulation of capital, including Chinese extraction of surplus value and natural resources from Nigeria and the latter's role in the circuit of Chinese capital;
2. Impacts of Chinese activities on Nigeria's capacity for autonomous development, reproduction, and deployment of scientific knowledge and technologies;
3. China's impacts on the reproduction of the internal and external power relations that sustain the dominance of the Nigerian bourgeoisie and Nigeria's neo-colonial status;
4. Processes and impacts of operations by Chinese capital in Nigeria productive and extractive sectors;
5. Labour practices by Chinese capital in Nigeria's manufacturing and agricultural sectors;
6. Extent and implications of China's role in Nigeria's security and military operations and infrastructure;
7. Terms and implications of China's loans to Nigeria and the risk of debt peonage;
8. Development of Nigerian financial, technological, and security dependencies on China;
9. China's ideological influence on governance and human rights in Nigeria, particularly regarding its implications for the country's democratisation and the development of its civil society.

Investigating these and other issues in the Nigeria-China relationship will take some time. In the meantime, there is a pressing need for action on a variety of immediate problems. These call for pressure on the Nigerian government,

the Chinese embassy, and Chinese enterprises in Nigeria on issues such as:

1. Improving the availability and usability of data on Nigeria-China cooperation;
2. Labour practices that violate the rights of Nigerian workers in the manufacturing, agriculture, or retail trade sectors;
3. Environmental pollution and degradation arising from the operations of Chinese enterprises;
4. Land grab practices by Chinese capital in the development of free-trade zones and agricultural farms. These often involve the dispossession of Nigerian communities of their land in violation of international and domestic law.

All contingents of foreign capital operating in Nigeria are culpable in these practices: American, European, Asian, Arab, South African. We have only named the Chinese here because the Nigeria-China relationship is the subject of this paper.

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APPENDIX

Table 1: Nigeria's imports, exports, and total trade with China, 2005-2014 (Naira)

YEAR	IMPORTS FROM CHINA	TOTAL IMPORTS	EXPORTS TO CHINA	TOTAL EXPORTS	NIGERIA-CHINA TRADE	NIGERIA'S TOTAL TRADE
2005	244,653,700.00	1,779,601,600.00	32,747,600.00	6,621,303,600.00	277,401,300.00	8,400,905,200.00
2006	403,319,800.00	2,922,102,500.00	40,419,900.00	7,555,141,300.00	443,739,700.00	10,477,243,800.00
2007	626,687,600.00	4,127,690,000.00	70,531,600.00	6,881,501,330.00	697,219,200.00	11,009,191,330.00
2008	502,302,300.00	3,299,096,620.00	76,895,800.00	9,568,949,200.00	579,198,100.00	12,868,045,820.00
2009	893,194,700.00	5,047,868,900.00	78,134,000.00	7,434,543,900.00	971,328,700.00	12,482,412,800.00
2010	1,100,780,500.00	6,648,525,900.00	216,506,100.00	13,009,905,700.00	1,317,286,600.00	19,658,431,600.00
2011	1,460,988,040.00	9,892,644,120.00	392,574,900.00	19,440,356,990.00	1,853,562,940.00	29,333,001,110.00
2012	1,209,780,100.00	5,624,870,400.00	933,306,500.00	22,446,320,230.00	2,143,086,600.00	28,071,190,630.00
2013	1,475,928,300.00	7,015,814,700.00	170,736,400.00	14,245,271,580.00	1,646,664,700.00	21,261,086,280.00
2014	1,616,790,900.00	8,169,964,900.00	264,610,400.00	16,304,041,160.00	1,881,401,300.00	24,474,006,060.00
TOTALS	**9,534,425,940.00**	**54,528,179,640.00**	**2,276,463,200.00**	**123,507,334,990.00**	**11,810,889,140.00**	**178,035,514,630.00**

Source: National Bureau of Statistics.[161] The author calculated total Nigeria-China trade figures from those for Nigeria's total imports and exports to China and total Nigerian trade figures from those for Nigeria's total imports and exports

161. For Nigeria-China trade figures for 2005 to 2009, see 'Annual Abstract of Statistics 2010', Table 508, 503 and Table 509, 504. For 2010-2011 figures, see 'Annual Abstract of Statistics 2012', Table 467, 501 and Table 468, 502. For 2012-2014, 'Annual Abstract of Statistics 2016 Vol. 2', Table 273, 73 and Table 274, 74.

Chapter 16 | Nigeria's Debt Crisis: Journey to Where?

Sylvester Odion Akhaine

How about the future? We must learn from the past. We must all show collective responsibility to prevent a return to the past. We must all commit ourselves to [protect], rather than [squander], the future of our children. We must all agree not to remove the solid blocks on which our nation stands by accumulating debts that we cannot repay. May God never let us go through this painful path again.

— Nigeria's former President Olusegun Obasanjo, 2005

Historical amnesia is a dangerous phenomenon, not only because it undermines moral and intellectual integrity, but also because it lays the groundwork for crimes that still lie ahead.

— Noam Chomsky, 2016

Introduction

The international financial institutions (IFIs) have been sounding the alarm bell since 2016 about borrowing by the Nigerian government and other African countries. The African Development Bank (AfDB) warned African governments that year to be cautious about reckless external borrowing given its consequences, including revenue decline, indebtedness, and budget deficits. Mr Hafez Ghanem, the World Bank Vice President for Africa, similarly advised the Nigerian government to reduce its borrowing. Researchers also have drawn attention to the deluge of bonds that Nigeria and other African countries are issuing (Kvangraven, 2016). These warnings are ironic given that IFI policies in the 1980s encouraged many Third World countries to go borrowing, laying the ground for their sorrowing over their current debt overhang. This irony did not escape The Guardian newspaper, which noted in its editorial of 21 November 2018 that:

> The incumbent administration has been especially fortunate to receive notes of caution from sundry international financial institutions…regarding its preference [for] borrowing. [That] is intriguing because, in the past, IFIs nudged distressed countries into more borrowing to the extent that they had their sovereignties undermined. As some have observed, the story behind lending is

not altruistic; neither is it based on enlightened self-interest (The Guardian, 2018).

Despite these warnings, the Nigerian government has tended to behave like the proverbial mad dog: hard of hearing and destined for sacrifice to the gods. Its officials argue that the country remains within a safe margin of borrowing and that its 21% debt-to-GDP ratio is within the international threshold of 55%.

According to the Director of Information at the Federal Ministry of Finance, Mr Salisu Na'Inna Dambatta,

Nigeria's debt-to-GDP ratio is low…compared to [those of] our contemporaries in Africa and across most of the developed world. We have headroom to borrow and are doing so aggressively in the short-to-medium term […] to address our infrastructure deficit and […] stimulate growth.

The Guardian described this official complacency as "…walking on the path of illusion given the character of the Nigerian state elite, who are not only disoriented but wasteful and unpatriotic. They lack [the] integrity to manage any form of foreign loans."

Nigeria: current realities

Sadly, Nigeria is in another debt loop, and the noose is tightening. In 2017, the Senate authorised the executive to borrow $3 billion from the international capital market by issuing a Eurobond, Diaspora Bond, or both, to refinance maturing domestic debts. The upper legislative house also authorised the executive to raise another $2.5 billion from multilateral donor institutions to fund the capital component of the 2017 budget. Nigeria's debt profile for that year was dismal, according to figures from the Debt Management Office. The country's debt stock hit ₦ 20 trillion as of 30 September 2017, of which the foreign component was 23.04% or ₦4.694 trillion ($15.40 billion) (see the table below).

Nigeria's Debt Profile as of 30 September 2017 (Source: DMO website)

External Debt	$15, 5.13	₦ 4,693, 913.75
Domestic debt (national)	$40, 869.29	₦12, 95, 784.04
Domestic debt (states)	$10, 412.86	₦3, 183, 730.80
Grand Total	$66, 634.27	₦20, 373, 428.59

This debt has risen to frightening levels in the past year. The external debt was $22.08 billion on 30 June 2018 whereas it stood at about $9.4 billion as of March 2015. Aggregate public debt was about $63.5 billion and is now on the threshold of $73.2 billion; besides, about two-thirds of government revenues will go for debt servicing. The government will require about $2.8 billion in external loans—for which it has issued Eurobonds—to bridge the apparent fiscal deficit in the 2018 budget. About ₦2.264 trillion in the 2019 budget is for debt servicing. The government still argues that Nigeria remains within the safe margin of borrowing. The Senate leadership is apprehensive about the rising debt profile, however. It notes that "…money must be sought for by any government to fund infrastructure; but it must not be [anchored solely] on borrowing, which in the long run will take the country back to a problem it had earlier solved."[279]

The path to overhang

As I have argued elsewhere, the relationship between the lender and borrower arises from a resource differential that makes inevitable some measure of interdependence (Akhaine, 2012). The unequal endowment of countries in human and natural resources makes interdependence inevitable. The character of the capitalist global economy is more than this, though. It engenders primary uneven development first through mercantilism and, subsequently, the slave trade and colonial plunder. What I call secondary uneven development reinforces this initial developmental inequality. That term refers to the Third World effects of imperialist policies that perpetuate the gap between rich and poor countries. My conception of it differs from the common usage, namely uneven development between the developed countries. That is why Bade Onimode (1989) was probably right to read the debt crisis as a "silent war of re-colonisation" and assumed contradictory status in terms of its affront on the continent of Africa and other Third World enclaves in Latin America and Asia.

Nigeria's ideology, structural characteristics, patterns of accumulation, and the collaborationism of its bourgeois elite are the causes of its external debt crisis. I shall explain these factors *seriatim*. The ideological is the neoclassical emphasis on the importance of capital in the development process, resulting in the conviction that countries without development capital must borrow. Onimode (1989:11) was correct in his view that the cause of the 1980s debt crisis "lies fundamentally in the bogus bourgeois theory that poor countries

must have foreign capital before they can develop." The structural factor is the extroversion of Nigeria's economy due to its colonial origins. Onimode called it the neo-colonial capitalist structure of an economy dependent on the international capitalist system. These extroversion and dependence arise from the "perverse logic of [the] colonial division of labour between Nigeria and global imperialism". The net effect is the excessive reliance on imports and the export of primary products. There is a fundamental shift today to the export of crude oil.

The primitive accumulation of resources in Nigeria's enclave economy is culpable in the external debt crisis. As Onimode (2005:389) observed:

> The pattern of capital accumulation in the country also has a built-in commitment to crisis. The basic issue here is that the profile of national accumulation is essentially unplanned and speculative. [That] generates frictions, and even conflicts, of accumulation between the three main branches of capital in the country—public (State), foreign and indigenous capital, and between productive and intermediary capital.

As in previous cycles of crises, the enclave economy continues to feed the greed of public officials; and the bleeding of national resources is unabated. Economic macro indicators show that the country slipped into recession between 2015-2018: the foreign reserve plummeted, and foreign direct investment took flight because of the unstable political environment. Nigeria's lean resources meant it had to borrow to balance a deficit budget and meet its balance of payment obligations. As Hertz (2005:113) has rightly observed on the debt question in the developing world:

> All the debt had produced was, in fact, more debt. There was a debt overhang that stifled private investment growth, and development, and took desperately needed resources away from cash-strapped government budgets. Tanzania, for example, spent $155 million on debt repayments during 1993 and 1994, twice of what it invested in that period in providing safe drinking water—this [although] 14 million people, half its population at the time, lacked access to clean water.

Debt management strategy

Let me enter a caveat *ab initio*. I am not concerned here with the debt

management strategies during the structural adjustment years. The debt-equity swap, rescheduling, and refinancing, among others, have been analysed sufficiently by scholars (Olukoshi and Magbadelo, 2005) that they warrant no repetition here. I focus instead on some new monetarist strategies that Kenneth Rogoff discussed in his short essay "Modern Monetary Nonsense" in *Project Syndicate*. They include risk balancing for long-term borrowing, financial repression for domestic debts, and quantitative easing (QE). I also look at Mohammed A. El-Erian's contribution in "Dialectics of Global Trade," a critique of sundry monetarist counter-measures to the debt issue within the contradictory dynamics of the American economy.

Rogoff (Rogoff, 2019) argues regarding risk balancing that long-term borrowing is preferable to short-term:

> The right approach to balancing risk and reward is for the government to extend the maturity structure of its debt, borrowing long-term instead of short-term. [That] helps to stabilise debt-service costs if interest rates rise. And if things get really difficult, it is far easier to inflate down the value of captive long-term debt (provided it is not indexed to prices) than it is to inflate away short-term debt, which the government constantly has to refinance.

Repression to lower the interest rate below the market rate could work if most of the debt is domestic. Rogoff (2019) averred that:

> True, policy-makers could again resort to financial repression, and force citizens to hold government debt at below-market interest rates, as an alternative way of reducing the debt burden. But this is a better option for Japan, where most debt is held domestically, than for the U.S., which depends heavily on foreign buyers.

Quantitative easing is another monetarist option, in which a Central Bank brings new money into supply. It could be counter-productive if wrongly applied and spark off an inflationary spiral. According to Rogoff (2019):

> In the years following the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed engaged in massive "quantitative easing"…, whereby it bought up very long-term government debt in exchange for bank reserves and tried to convince the American public that this magically stimulated the economy. Quantitative easing, when it consists simply of buying government bonds, is smoke and mirrors.

A new sheriff is in town, and all roads lead to Beijing. Loans from the

Chinese for infrastructure development could be deadly and lead Africa, including Nigeria, into re-colonisation. It may be proper to heed El-Erian's advice when he wrote that:

> …the international community must guard against regional arrangements, such as China's Belt and Road Initiative, which are intended to promote development but can end up undermining partner countries. [That] requires steps to enhance transparency on the terms and conditions of projects and debts undertaken through such initiatives, encourage greater reliance on local labour, and ensure […] recipient countries are [unencumbered] with excessive liabilities. Excessively one-sided debt-for-physical-assets swaps, which can also raise genuine national security concerns, must also be resisted (El-Erian, 2019).

This outlining of the above monetarist options in debt management is only for heuristic purposes, as I do not subscribe to them. I shall now conclude in what follows.

Conclusion: There's a destination—"Debt-endency"

Now to the question posed in the rider of this lecture's title: journey to where? Historically, nations that have entered the debt loop have lost sovereignty, national pride, and state capacity and suffered dependency. These have multiplier effects in the social sector. Noreena Hertz told two stories that illustrate the implications of indebtedness for sovereignty. In one, China had taken a loan from the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev in the 1960s. It paid back in record time. That was although the interest rate was 2% and the country not under Soviet pressure. Hertz (2004:25) described the Chinese leader Mao Zedong's rationale:

> He saw that loans from other governments often come at a huge political cost: binding countries to each other and creating a dependency that first establishes and then serves to reinforce pre-existing power symmetries, and he didn't want to risk being so dependent on the Soviet Union that he lost political manoeuvrability and endangered his…sovereignty.

Hertz's second story is of Thailand's Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who took a $12 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the wake of the Asian economic meltdown. He repaid the country's loan with

a dramatic twist:

> Against a backdrop of [a] massive national flag and with patriotic theme songs blaring, he swore to his audience that this was "…the last time the country would be indebted to the IMF, "…reminding them of what a "pain to the nation" the debt had been (Hertz, 2004: 25).

Liberia illustrates the polar extreme, the actual loss of sovereignty due to insolvency. The development set, comprising the United States, European Commission, World Bank, IMF, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme for Liberia (GEMAP). Under it, representatives of these bodies managed all revenue sources and authorised expenditure (Akhaine, 2012:15).

Nigeria similarly had little room for policy independence during its indebtedness. For example, while owing the Paris and London clubs of creditors, Nigeria cut ties with the International Financial Institutions in 2002 because of the impossible conditionalities they demanded of it. These included that it maintain single-digit interest and inflation rates as well as exchange rate stability. The country was already faithfully implementing its privatisation programme. Yet these institutions pulled the strings of global governance, and Nigeria found itself increasingly isolated internationally until it retraced its steps (Akhaine, 2006: 230). Unsurprisingly, the Obasanjo administration celebrated Nigeria's exit from the debt loop in 2005 as a second independence. While the debt overhang lasted, the country was under:

> …another form of bondage with our feet and hands bound behind us while we are told to run. We also contended that debt repayments and debt servicing obligations take away money from development (especially social policies), stifle creativity, deepen the vulnerability of governments, and challenge the processes of democratic consolidation. In other words, given that no African nation can fully service, much less repay its debt, development, stability, peace, growth, and democracy would not make progress or become consolidated in Africa, Nigeria inclusive. Under such conditions, governments would become vulnerable to all sorts of challenges and this would in turn precipitate suspicion, instability, violence, even civil war (Obasanjo, 2005).

We learned nothing—contrary to Obasanjo's wish. Nigeria is again dependent on the whims and caprices of creditors, with consequences that

bear emphasis:

> By exacerbating poverty, eroding national self-worth, and promoting behaviour on the part of states that is often to the detriment of society at large, debt has far-reaching consequences—consequences that directly impact…the air we breathe, the food we eat, the resources available to us, our health, and even our security. Debt equals danger, not only in the developing world but in the developed too (Hertz, 2004: 125).

These consequences stare us in the face. The national economy's structural over-dependence on a single volatile product (crude oil) will make exiting the debt loop hard this time. We, therefore, suggest the structural transformation of the economy; so that we produce what we eat and remove the economic extroversion that comes with over-reliance on imports. Economic diversification must move from rhetoric to praxis. Equally important is human capacity development, not only theoretical education but also vocational training. These measures will make it possible for the state to recover its capacity and exercise some autonomy in the global jungle.

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Chapter 17 | The Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007) and Nigeria's Debt Management

Onyeisi Chiemeke

Nigeria's Debt Burden

Modern economies require certain stimuli for growth, such as subsidies and loans. The former are cost differentials that governments absorb to maintain equilibrium in the prices of goods and services and, the latter, credit facilities repayable with interest. Private organisations and public institutions may acquire loans bi-laterally or multi-laterally. Foreign institutional lenders may require the borrower's national governments to guarantee loans that they make to the former. That makes it necessary sometimes to assess a country's foreign reserves held with its Central Bank. The health or otherwise of those reserve impacts the country's currency and its ability to engage in international trade.

Nigeria's foreign reserves have been stable over the past three years and, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), stand at $43,317,340,520.2 as we speak. The steady growth of these reserves notwithstanding, Nigerians worry about their country's growing indebtedness and the macro and micro-economic implications. Between 2003 and 2007, Nigeria's multilateral creditors cancelled its debts after it paid a portion of them. The national relief that this occasioned seems to have disappeared, however. Nigeria's debt has again been on a steep rise, and many fear that its governments are mortgaging the future of unborn generations. As the Holy Bible says in the Book of Proverbs, "the borrower is a slave to the lender." Indeed, foreign indebtedness has put countries in the Global South, particularly in Africa, in constant panic, with many seeing it as a new form of colonialism. As the late Burkinabe leader Thomas Sankara put it, "foreign debt has become the new slavery."

Managing Nigeria's Debt

Table 1, reproduced from the 2017 Annual Report and Statements of Accounts of Nigeria's Debt Management Office (DMO), shows why Nigerians

should worry about the country's debt profile. Nigeria's debt, like all others, has two components: servicing the interest and redeeming the principal. Fulfilling these obligations drains the national economy as the country spends resources that should go into human capital development on debt servicing instead. For instance, Nigeria has expended a higher percentage of its annual budgets on debt servicing than on education. Nevertheless, the DMO—the government agency in charge of debt management—argues that Nigeria remains under her threshold of safe borrowing. Its Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) supposedly ensures that GDP-related indicators "…remain below their respective thresholds for both the external debt and public debt, while the revenue- and exports-related indicators are mostly sensitive to…revenue and exports shocks." The agency's analysis offers three scenarios:

1. The *Baseline* stands on the 2017 federal budget and its assumptions and the provisional Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for 2018 to 2020; [1]
2. The *Optimistic* rests on the Federal Government's Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) and its ambitious growth projections of 4.80% and 7.00% in 2018 and 2020, respectively. The Buhari administration expects the ERGP to pull the economy out of recession, spur sustained growth, and stabilise the monetary and fiscal indicators;
3. The *Pessimistic* turns on three assumptions:
    1. Crude oil prices—at about $30 per barrel (pb) in 2017 continue their prolonged decline through 2019;
    2. Oil production stays at about 1.4 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2017 and 2018 and rises marginally to about 1.5mbpd in 2019 through 2037;
    3. Nigeria's fiscal and current account balances will deteriorate, and the Naira exchange rate will fall further.

The DMO presented the projected outcomes of these scenarios in the concluding summary of its DSA:

1. Nigeria's external debt portfolio remains at low risk of debt distress under the *Baseline Scenario*, as the debt ratios are well below their respective thresholds throughout the projection period;

1. The National Assembly was yet to approve the MTEF at the time of the DMO's analysis.

2. The Total Public Debt-to-GDP ratio, projected at 19.80% for 2017, remains below its threshold throughout the period in the Fiscal Sustainability Analysis for the federal, state, and FCT governments;
3. The revenue indicators (the Debt-to-Revenue and Debt Service-to-Revenue ratios) deteriorate under varying shocks in the External and Fiscal Sustainability Analyses. That suggested that, unless Nigeria improved its revenue-generation performance speedily, any prolonged revenue shock would cause debt distress in the medium to long term;
4. The debt indicators showed remarkable improvements under the *Optimistic Scenario* throughout the projection period but declined under the *Pessimistic*.

Fidel Castro intervened in the mid-1980s on the impacts of the Global South's debt crisis. His perspective resonates even today with the ordinary denizens of that zone, especially as indebtedness has become a sword of Damocles threatening to behead them. He argued that:

> "…the payment of the debt is an economic impossibility, a political impossibility. You would practically have to kill the people…to force them to make the sacrifices required to pay that debt. Any democratic process that tries to impose those restrictions and sacrifices by force will be destroyed. Lastly, it's a moral impossibility…"

The concern about the adverse impact of indebtedness on the countries of the Global South remains valid. For instance, Nigeria has operated deficit budgeting for a while now, i.e., its expected expenditure is higher than expected revenue. The reliance of those revenues on oil sales necessitates caution in the country's budget projections because of oil price volatility. Table 1 shows that, in the past 20 years, Nigeria has expended more than 20% of its annual budget on debt servicing. Interestingly, Section 43(1) and (2) of the *Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007)*, the subject of this paper, obligates Nigeria to service its debts. As the section said:

> 43. (1) Servicing of external debts shall be the direct responsibility of the Government that incurred the debt.
>
> (2) The cost of servicing Federal Government guaranteed loans shall be deducted at source from the share of the debtor Government from the Federation Account.

Arguably, this legislation derives from the demand by the global powers

that countries reform their local laws to increase "the ease of doing business." It is an insurance policy to doubly assure investors of the safety of their money and, thus, attract foreign investment.

The *Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission Act*[2] substantiates this conclusion. That law contains a diversity of interesting provisions, including on the following subjects:

- *Purchase of shares in domestic companies by foreign companies:*
  A foreign enterprise may buy the shares of any Nigerian enterprise in any convertible foreign currency.
- *Incentives for strategic investment:*
  For the purpose of promoting identified strategic or major investment, the [Nigeria Investment Promotion] Commission shall, in consultation with appropriate Government agencies, negotiate specific incentive packages for the promotion of investment as the Commission may specify.
- *Investment guarantees, transfer of capital, profits and dividends:*
  …a foreign investor in an enterprise to which this Act applies, shall be guaranteed unconditional transferability of funds through an authorised dealer, in freely convertible currency, of…dividends of profits (net of taxes) attributable to the investment; payment in respect of loan servicing where a foreign loan has been obtained; and the remittance of proceeds (net of taxes), and other obligations in the event of a sale or liquidation of the enterprise or any interest attribute to the investment.
- *Guarantees against expropriation:*
  Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section…no enterprise shall be nationalised or expropriated by any Government of the Federation; and no person who owns, whether wholly or in part, the capital of any enterprise shall be compelled by law to surrender his interest in the capital to any other person. There shall be no acquisition of any enterprise to which this Act applies by the Federal Government, unless the acquisition is in the national interest or for a public purpose and under a law which makes provision for…payment of fair and adequate compensation; and a right of access to the courts for the determination

2. CAP 117 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.

> of the investor's interest or right and the amount of compensation to which he is entitled. Any compensation payable under this section shall be paid without undue delay, and authorisation for its repatriation in convertible currency shall, where applicable, be issued.

These sections bind Nigeria against debt repudiation or asset nationalisation. Some might argue that the principle of the sanctity of contract requires that parties implement agreements they freely contract. Thus, it would be a breach of contract for nations to repudiate loan agreements they voluntarily consented to. Section 43 of the *Fiscal Responsibility Act* does not allow for circumstances that might warrant contract repudiation, which discountenance contradicts the general principle of contract law.

A Regime of Responsible Debtorship

Castro supported his call for debt repudiation, which we cited above, in the following manner:

> "Let me tell you what happened with that money. Traditionally, in recent years, that practice has been reversed. The banks amassed huge sums; among other things, they collected the financial surpluses of the oil-producing countries during the oil-price boom, and several industrialised countries accumulated huge sums of money and earned interest. The banks searched for new people to lend to, and they lent a massive amount of money.
>
> Some twenty or twenty-five years ago, Latin America had practically no debt. Now, it amounts to $360 billion. What did that money go for? Part of it was spent on weapons. In Argentina, for example, tens of billions of dollars went for military expenditures. The same was true of Chile and other countries. Another part of that money was embezzled, stolen, and wound up in foreign banks, frequently in Switzerland and the United States. Another part was returned to the United States and Europe as a flight of capital. Whenever there was talk of devaluation, the more affluent people, out of mistrust, would change their money for dollars and deposit it in U.S. banks. Another part of that money was squandered. Another part was used by some countries to pay for the high price of fuel. And finally, another part was spent on various economic programmes. Let's grant that.
>
> You say that these countries have a moral responsibility to repay their debts. When you talk about nations, you're talking about the people:

> the workers, the farmers, the students, the middle class (e.g., the doctors, engineers, teachers, and other professionals) —and the other social sectors. How did the people benefit from the $260 billion that was spent on weapons, deposited in U.S. banks, misspent, or embezzled? How did the people benefit from the over-valuation of the dollar or the interest spread? They received absolutely nothing. And who has to pay for that debt? The people. Everybody has to make do with reduced wages, reduced incomes, and make huge sacrifices. Where is the morality of imposing measures that result in a bloodbath…to make the people pay the debt, as was the case in the Dominican Republic, where the International Monetary Fund's measure resulted in dozens of people being killed and hundreds more shot? The people have to protest because they didn't contract and that has brought them practically no benefits."

Castro's position on debt repudiation was popular in the 1980s, but changes in the international balance of political forces since then now forbid expressions of support for it. That is perhaps why countries, such as Nigeria, have promulgated local legislation to guide public expenditure and external borrowing.

As we have said, this paper examines Nigeria's debt situation vis-à-vis Section 3(1) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. That section states that:

> 3. (1) The [Fiscal Responsibility] Commission shall.
>
> (a) monitor and enforce the provisions of this Act and by so doing, promote the economic objectives contained in section 16 of the Constitution;
>
> (b) disseminate such standard practices including international good practice that will result in greater efficiency in the allocation and management of public expenditure, revenue collection, debt control and transparency in fiscal matters;
>
> (c) undertake fiscal and financial studies, analysis and diagnosis and disseminate the result to the general public ;
>
> (d) make rules for carrying out its, functions under this Act; and Commencement. Establishment of the Fiscal Responsibility Commission. Responsibility, powers and functions of the Commission.
>
> (e) perform any other function consistent with the promotion of the objectives of this Act.

Further to Section 3(1) above, Section 48(1) of the Act states that:

> 48. (1) The Federal Government shall ensure that its fiscal and financial affairs are conducted in a transparent manner and accordingly ensure full and timely disclosure and wide publication of all transactions and decisions involving public revenues and expenditures and their implications for its finances.

These sections, seemingly, aim to address some of the issues that Castro raised, for instance, the mismanagement or diversion of loans under weak governance or dictatorships. It is perhaps overly charitable to say that some Global South governments diverted loans to ends other than their intended purpose: government officials stole loan funds outright in some instances. For example, officials of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) reportedly diverted $2.1 billion of public money to fund their campaigns in Nigeria's 2015 general elections. The money was initially for counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria.

How could such a financial outrage occur despite the existence of the Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC)?[3] A possible reason is the incapacity of Nigerian public institutions to exercise their authority without undue interference by the managers of state power. That incapacity derives from the mode of appointing the members of these institutions. Section 5 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act provides an example regarding the Commission in question. It states that:

> 5. (1) The Commission shall consist of:
> (a) A chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive and accounting officer of the Commission;
> (b) One member representing;
> I. The organised private sector;
> II. Civil Society engaged in causes relating to probity, transparency and good governance,
> III. Organised labour;
> (c) A representative of the Federal Ministry of Finance of a level not below the rank of a Director; and;
> (d) Ane member to represent each of the following six geopolitical

3. The Commission is responsible under the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007) for monitoring Nigeria's external and local borrowings and ensuring compliance with the Act.

> zones of the country, that is: North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-East, South-West and South-South.
>
> (2) All members of the Commission shall be persons of proven integrity and must possess appropriate qualifications with not less than ten years cognate post qualification experience.
>
> (3) The Chairman and other members of the Commission, other than ex-officio members, shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate.
>
> (4) The Chairman and members representing the six geopolitical zones shall be full-time members.

That the President appoints the Commission's members, subject to Senate approval as Section 5(3) of the Act requires, possibly undermines their independence in performing their duties. For their appointment may have been for prebendal reasons. That is a problem. The Commission also lacks the staff its responsibilities require. Further, those duties overlap with those of other government agencies. For instance, Part IX and Part X of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007) deal with debts and indebtedness under Sections 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45:

> 41. (1) The framework for debt management during the financial year shall be based on the following rules:
>
> (a) Government at all tiers shall only borrow for capital expenditure and human development, provided that, such borrowing shall be on concessional terms with low interest rate and with a reasonably long amortisation period subject to the approval of the appropriate legislative body where necessary; and
>
> (b) Government shall ensure that the level of public debt as a proportion of national income is held at a sustainable level as prescribed by the National Assembly from time to time on the advice of the Minister.
>
> (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1(a) of this section and subject to the approval of the National Assembly, the Federal Government may borrow from the capital market.
>
> (3) Non-compliance with the provisions of this section shall make the action taken an offence.
>
> 42. (1) The President shall, within 90 days from the commencement

of this Act and with advice from Minister of Finance subject to approval of National Assembly, set overall limits for the amounts of consolidated debt of the Federal, State and Local Governments pursuant to the provisions of items 7 and 50 of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Constitution and the limits and conditions approved by the National Assembly, shall be consistent with the rules set in this Act and with the fiscal policy objectives in the Medium Term-Fiscal Framework.

(2) Outstanding judgement debts not paid shall be considered part of the consolidated debts for the purpose of application of the respective limits set in pursuance of this section.

(3) For the purpose of verifying compliance with the limits specified pursuant to this section, the Commission shall, at the end of each quarter, determine the amount of the consolidated debt of each tier of government.

(4) The Commission shall publish, on a quarterly basis, a list of the Governments in the Federation that have exceeded the limits of consolidated debt, indicating the amount by which the limit was exceeded.

(5) Where at the end of any quarter, the consolidated debt of the Federal, State or Local Governments exceeds the respective limits; it shall be brought within the limit not later than the end of the three subsequent quarters with a minimum of 25% reduction in the first quarter.

(6) Violators of the limits specified pursuant to this section shall:

(a) be prohibited from borrowing from internal or external sources, except for the refinancing of existing debts; and Framework for debt management. Limits on consolidated debt of Federal, State and Local Governments.

(b) bring the debt within the established limit by restricting funding commitments accordingly.

(7) Where non-compliance with the limit specified pursuant to this section persists after the time limited by subsection (5) of this section, the affected tier of Government shall also be prohibited from receiving grants from any other Government in the Federation.

(8) Whenever the fundamentals of the proposals referred to in this section are changed due to economic instability or change in

monetary or exchange policies, the President shall submit to the National Assembly a request for a review of the current limits:

43. (1) Servicing of external debts shall be the direct responsibility of the Government that incurred the debt.

(2) The cost of servicing Federal Government guaranteed loans shall be deducted at source from the share of the debtor Government from the Federation Account.

44. (1) Any Government in the Federation or its agencies and corporations desirous of borrowing shall, specify the purpose for which the borrowing is intended and present a cost-benefit analysis, detailing the economic and social benefits of the purpose to which the intended borrowing is to be applied.

(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this section, each borrowing shall comply with the following conditions-

(a) the existence of prior authorisation in the Appropriation or other Act or Law for the purpose for which the borrowing is to be utilised; and

(b) the proceeds of such borrowing shall solely be applied towards long-term capital expenditures.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorise borrowing in excess of the limits set out in section 44 of this Act.

(4) The Commission shall verify on a quarterly basis, compliance with the limits and conditions for borrowing by each Government in the Federation:

(5) Without prejudice to the specific responsibilities of the National Assembly and Central Bank of Nigeria, the Debt Management Office shall maintain [a] comprehensive, reliable and current electronic database of internal and external public debts, guaranteeing public access to the information.

45. (1) All banks and financial institutions shall request and obtain proof of compliance with the provisions of this Part before lending to any Government in the Federation.

(2) Lending by banks and financial institutions in contravention of this Part shall be unlawful. Servicing of eternal debt. Conditions of borrowing and verification of compliance with limits. Lending by financial institutions.

These functions of the Commission duplicate some of the Debt

Management Office's. The Debt Management (Establishment) Act (2003) provides that the Office shall:

1. Administer the debt conversion programme of the Federal Government;
2. Perform the functions of the Minister with regard to the development fund rules; and,
3. Supervise the operation of the development fund under the Finance (Control and Management) Act, 1958 (as amended).

The DMO Act further provides that the Office shall have powers to:

1. Issue and manage Federal Government loans publicly issued in Nigeria upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the Federal Government and the Office;
2. Issue, from time to time, guidelines for the smooth operation of the debt conversion programmes of the Federal Government.

Has the Regime been Effective?

Some might dispute this charge of function duplication by noting that the DMO's are entirely debt-related, whereas the FRC's additionally include budgetary and other fiscal matters. However, this counter is problematic, given that the federal and state governments have offices of budget planning and monitoring. That would probably not be a problem where institutions were strong, but competition between these budget-related agencies seems to have undermined the FRC's performance of its regulatory functions. For instance, there is little evidence of the agency's effectiveness or otherwise in enforcing discipline among the states in internal and external borrowing.[4]

Rivers and Delta states of Nigeria's South/South zone exemplify the weakness of the FRC. Table 2 shows that they received significant allocations from the Federation Account between 2011 and 2015 due to a rise in oil prices. As Table 3 and Table 4 show, however, they also increased their domestic and foreign borrowing in the same period. That suggests that it is difficult for the FRC to regulate borrowing by state governments, possibly due to the challenges of Nigeria's federalism. It is difficult, otherwise,

4. It appears that the Commission has recorded some success in other regards, though. The *Vanguard* newspaper of 27 April 2018 reported that the agency's efforts resulted in the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) remitting ¦ 49.7 billion to the federation account from its taxes.

to explain increased borrowing by states whose earnings were rising, particularly as the loans sometimes financed economically unproductive recurrent expenditure. The FRC is arguably unable to regulate federal or state borrowing. Vanessa Ushie identifies other sources of the problem:[5]

> Corruption and mismanagement of public finances are problematic at all levels of government in Nigeria. Various forms of corruption such as theft, fraud, bribery, extortion, requests for kickbacks, nepotism, and political patronage exist in Nigeria. At the sub-national level, however, the major driver of corruption is the discretionary use of funds by the executive (i.e., governors and local government chairmen), and the lack of transparency and accountability in the utilisation of expenditures. State governors routinely utilise public funds without [properly] stated budgets. State legislatures are unable to exercise any control and tend to be stooges. Local government leaders often owe political allegiance to their governors and tend to be complicit in [the] mismanagement of public funds rather than challenge their Governors. Power is therefore concentrated largely in the hands of the governor and a few political accomplices, resulting in discretionary and arbitrary use of state and local government resources. The high level of fiscal profligacy at the sub-national level poses immense challenges for overall macro-economic stability, debt management and public financial management.

As of February 2014, twenty-nine states—including the Federal Capital Territory—had ignored their obligation to replicate the Fiscal Responsibility Act and its implementing Commission at their level. Only seven had done so, including Kwara, Kebbi, Ekiti, and Taraba.[6] This attitude of the states expresses resistance to the notion that the federating units are obligated to implement federal enactments.

Notwithstanding the consensus that the Fiscal Responsibility Act fosters accountability, one of its problems is the needless proliferation of transparency agencies. An African proverb says, "nobody can find a missing goat for which two persons are responsible:" there are too many chefs stirring the transparency

5. See her article titled "Implementing the Fiscal Responsibility Act at the State Level in Nigeria."
6.. See the *Premium Times* newspaper, 5 February 2014. The report did not name the remaining three states.

broth.

Nigeria has never had institutions that are truly independent of their appointing authorities. For instance, a constant charge against the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is the seeming dependence of its investigations and prosecutions on the interests and preferences of the government.

Further, the FRC has little prosecutorial power regarding violations of fiscal regulations. Only Section 51 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007) hints at such a power:

> 51. A person shall have legal capacity to enforce the provisions of this Act by obtaining prerogative orders or other remedies at the Federal High Court, without having to show any special or particular interest.

It is difficult from this section to determine who has the power to enforce the legislation: the Commission's officials or an independent third party? To be effective, the FRC needs the sort of power that the DMO has and must become proactive than rather reactive to government fiscal policies. For instance, the DMO must approve state applications for loans before the federal government agrees to guarantee them. The National Assembly is likely to reject the application where the DMO withholds such approval.

Conclusion

Vincent N. Ezeabasili and Wilson E. Herbert hold that:[7]

> The evolution of the fiscal responsibility law will, no doubt, go a long way in curbing most of the problems that militate against sound public sector financial resource management. Proper compliance is essential in promoting fiscal discipline, transparency, accountability and, therefore, foster macro-economic stability. It is therefore imperative that state and local governments in Nigeria should also embrace this law in other to enhance their fiscal prudence.

This position is problematic, not so much for its misplaced optimism as for the absence of structural provisions in the legislation to enable the Commission to enforce compliance. An effective FRC must have the power to recommend for prosecution state officials who cannot account adequately

7. See "Fiscal Responsibility Law, Fiscal Discipline and Macroeconomic Stability: Lessons From Brazil and Nigeria."

for the expenditure of loans. The state operates by command and obedience. Its laws must be able to compel obedience and apply sanctions where there is a breach. Otherwise, the state becomes only a church—where obedience comes from anything but command.

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Tables

Table 1: Nigeria's External Debt Service Projections ($ Million)

Category of Debt	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total 2018-2027
Multi lateral											
ADF											
Prin cipal	11.71	12.23	14.62	17.86	23.85	26.54	27.94	28.56	28.92	29.11	221.34
inte rest	9.02	7.87	8.74	9.44	10.09	10.47	10.60	10.43	10.20	9.97	96.83
ADB											
Prin cipal	13.61	23.33	66.67	73.81	130.48	130.48	130.48	130.48	130.48	130.48	960.27

Interest	25.96	31.42	33.11	33.96	34.07	32.45	30.07	27.51	25.00	22.50	296.07
AGIF											
Principal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	12.00
interest	0.13	0.16	0.30	0.43	0.56	0.62	0.58	0.54	0.49	0.45	4.26
IFAD											
Principal	3.56	3.51	4.65	6.19	6.19	6.19	7.28	8.36	8.36	8.36	62.66
interest	1.16	1.26	1.34	1.40	1.46	1.48	1.45	1.41	1.37	1.32	13.65
IDA											
Principal	106.93	153.70	207.48	248.63	283.08	322.53	332.06	339.10	338.37	339.60	2,671.48
interest	76.40	82.33	88.20	90.89	91.93	92.06	90.01	87.35	84.63	81.92	865.71
EDF											
Principal	5.28	5.29	5.35	5.41	5.46	5.50	5.57	5.63	5.69	5.75	54.92
interest	0.68	0.63	0.58	0.52	0.47	0.41	0.36	0.30	0.25	0.19	4.39
ABF EDA (BADE)											
Principal	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.75	0.75	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.41	4.61
interest	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.57
IDB											
Principal	1.24	1.22	1.96	2.69	2.69	2.69	2.69	2.69	2.69	2.69	23.25
Interest	0.41	041	0.15	0.15	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.23
IBRD											
Principal	0.00	0.00	7.90	21.47	22.57	23.67	24.86	26.14	27.48	28.88	182.97
Interest	3.45	4.76	6.60	7.81	7.55	7.18	6.81	6.39	5.96	5.51	62.03

Sub-Total	259.99	328.58	448.09	521.48	623.30	664.77	673.19	677.32	672.33	669.17	5,538.24
Bilateral											
Principal	84.74	96.41	174.27	269.56	318.26	332.57	353.37	492.378	492.38	492.38	3,106.31
interest	64.59	81.68	94.51	102.97	108.51	111.68	110.04	104.5541	93.03	81.46	953.03
Sub-Total	149.34	178.09	268.78	372.52	426.78	444.25	463.40	596.93	585.41	573.84	4,059.34
Commercial											
Principal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
interest	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sub-Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Euro bonds											
Principal	0.00	0.00	0.00	500.00	0.00	500.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,500.00	2,500.00
Interest	209.39	395.63	395.63	378.75	361.88	361.88	330.00	330.00	330.00	330.00	3,423.14
Diaspora Bonds											
Principal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	300.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	300.00
interest	16.88	16.88	16.88	16.88	8.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	75.94
Sub-Total	226.26	412.50	412.50	895.63	670.31	861.88	330.00	330.00	330.00	1,830.00	6,299.07
Others											
Oil Warrants											
Principal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

interest	41.72	41.72	41.72	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	125.16
Financial Service Fee	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05
New Financing (includes Diaspora Bond)	252.62	221.65	221.65	221.65	221.65	221.65	221.65	221.65	221.65	221.65	2,247.47
Total	227.44	296.07	483.28	1,146	1,095	1,352	886.62	1,035	1,036	2,539	10,09
Principal	702.50	886.49	909.48	.36 864.91	.33 846.72	.56 839.99	801.63	.73 790.17	.77 772.62	.65 755.01	9.81 8,169.52
Total											
interest	929.94	1,182	1,392	2,011	1,942	2,192	1,688	1,825	1,809	3,294	18,26
Grand Total (Debt Service)		.56	.75	.28	.05	.55	.25	.90	.39	.66	9.33

Source: DMO

Table 2: Federation Account Allocations to Delta and Rivers States

2013							
STATES	**JANUARY**	**FEBRUARY**	**MAY**	**JUNE**	**SEPTEMBER**	**OCTOBER**	**TOTAL**
	MARCH	**APRIL**	**JULY**	**AUGUST**	**NOVEMBER**	**DECEMBER**	
	4,344,213,852.90	4,344,213,852.90	3,643,012,855.31	3,886,740,465.38	4,311,335,346.28	3,387,019,807.93	
DELTA	13,040,950,188.41	17,800,665,821.76	15,173,562,735.06	15,173,562,735.06	15,778,256,073.92	13,895,677,170.20	189,750,572,940.57
	19,634,395,252.22	19,634,395,252.22	14,092,428,574.23	15,389,935,025.78	16,368,644,758.64	13,768,099,353.07	
	6,882,933,177.01	6,882,933,177.01	5,633,552,675.76	6,115,119,344.75	6,427,306,947.75	5,027,774,624.47	
RIVERS	16,158,026,006.28	22,922,246,991.05	15,460,963,943.60	15,460,963,943.60	14,713,299,391.53	13,289,651,780.51	199,191,805,172.89
	20,072,292,959.70	20,072,292,959.70	13,447,267,459.23	14,662,134,635.37	15,677,887,366.71	13,254,831,735.61	

2014							
STATES	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MAY	JUNE	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	TOTAL
	MARCH	APRIL	JULY	AUGUST	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	
DELTA	15,672,265,715.39	15,854,185,390.38	13,725,100,684.29	16,652,559,259.61	13,923,052,526.52	15,503,133,647.85	183,084,097,210.51
	16,485,269,434.87	16,484,957,859.89	17,030,389,060.63	14,464,625,010.00	12,609,570,304.41	14,678,988,316.07	
RIVERS	14,896,854,405.56	17,192,973,382.30	16,453,443,354.25	17,034,173,759.72	13,046,714,650.95	13,256,127,998.11	176,136,666,306.05
	16,630,218,677.65	15,036,776,428.81	15,000,852,369.91	13,124,255,978.57	11,281,895,374.15	13,182,379,926.07	
			2015				
STATES	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MAY	JUNE	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	TOTAL
	MARCH	APRIL	JULY	AUGUST	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	
DELTA	13,240,153,963.02	12,382,624,413.19	10,749,417,938.61	10,627,568,885.37	9,543,207,020.65	9,438,611,349.00	122,059,624,590.71
	9,337,412,177.97	8,465,233,383.04	9,798,727,246.68	9,587,555,308.38	9,286,589,506.00	9,602,523,399.00	
RIVERS	11,289,656,208.41	11,123,591,589.76	8,020,119,777.01	10,471,559,702.45	7,692,708,804.48	8,335,136,445.00	105,040,343,098.18
	8,928,150,987.44	7,311,510,905.87	9,333,050,668.62	8,542,732,328.20	7,712,357,615.00	6,279,768,066.00	

Table 3: Domestic Debt Stock of Delta and Rivers States

STATES	31 December 2013	31 December 2014	31 December 2015
DELTA	102,100,201,248.42	211,953,209,702.68	320,605,705,560.12
RIVERS	129,549,646,455.00	91,757,565,261.77	134,966,595,276.76

Table 4: External Debt Stock of Delta and Rivers States

STATES	31 December 2013	31 December 2014	31 December 2015 Provisional	30 June 2016
DELTA	19,665,800.31*	24,233,639.67	38,792,421.97	42,211,967.19
RIVERS	42,690,633.60*	44,725,095.71	46,922,403.74	48,411,900.26

*Total outstanding against each State excludes arrears owed to the Federal Government of Nigeria as a result of unanticipated disbursements or exchange rate gains.

Part 6 | Entrepreneurship and Employment

Chapter 18 | From Social Connectivity to Technopreneurship: Making the Best Use of Social Media

Abdulganiyu Rufai Yakub

Abstract

This paper explores popular uses of social media among Nigerian youth, some of which uses have hampered their productivity despite their access to—and dominance on—the internet. It employs qualitative content analysis and applies the Planned Action Theory and Personality Trait Model to demonstrate how youths might use social media to promote businesses and generate profits. It argues that a combination of technology skills, business management, and advertising opens doors of prosperity to youths. Also, it posits that expertise in digital technologies and innovative business ideas enhance their employability. The paper argues further that the adoption of social media by Nigerian youths, who represent more than 75% of users, demonstrates the complex and profound power of social media in contemporary business.

***Keywords*: social media, technopreneurship, best practice, attitude-change, customer, brand, digital, marketing, creativity.**

Introduction

Social media have become part of our lives. We are on one or another platform all day: during meals and work and just before going to sleep. And the number of social media users globally keeps increasing geometrically. Projections are that the number of internet users worldwide will grow from 2.77 billion to 3.02 billion between 2019 and 2021 (Statistica, 2019). Africa had 464,923,169 users by December 2019, representing a 35% penetration rate, of which population Nigeria alone accounted for 111,632,516.

Social media[1] are changing more than the way we communicate.

Communication has influenced real-world actions since the first caveman grunted at his wife once to say he was hungry and twice that he was lonely. When a society shifts how it communicates, the flow of world actions also changes. The concept of *influence*, a key one in this paper, pertains to altering minds. It becomes notably powerful when those minds in turn shape or direct action. People are beings of habit and, observed without interference, generally predictable. The ability then to change their conduct represents immense power.

Baran (2009) describes the internet, which makes social media possible, as a 'double-edged knife'—a tool of two-way communication. It has much appeal among young people because it provides instant feedback (Livingstone, 2010). This capacity of social media offers young people immense opportunities, including for business marketing and worldwide exposure. Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, WhatsApp are tools for actualising the potentials of modern business in today's globalised world. Social media have shrunk the distance between people and the time it takes to communicate with them. Most firms find it necessary, therefore, to be present on social media. That, unarguably, has increased their productivity and profits substantially. What makes social media such powerful business tools? How are they best used? These are some questions we address in this paper.

Objectives

This paper aims to show young people how to use social media profitably. Its specific objectives are to:

1. Expose young people to numerous uses of the internet, and
2. Motivate them to use social media for business purposes.

Problem statement

The uses of social media in journalism, political campaigns, and many more areas have been the subjects of much research. However, their potentials in business development by youths have received little attention (Livingstone, 1999). Young people globally have taken advantage of social media to connect with family, friends, and associates for fun and social activities. Nonetheless,

1. These are interactive computer-mediated technologies that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, career interests and other forms of expression via virtual communities and networks (Wikipedia).

Nigerian youths seem to be lagging in using them for digital marketing, art exhibition, blogging, video-blogging, stock photography, content development, outsourcing, fashion, public relations, podcasting, analytics, etc. That is despite their dominance on social media platforms.

This paper introduces them to the viability of the internet for business engagement and promotion.

Justification

Several studies have found that young people spend much time on social media for fun: chatting or streaming videos to watch. Meanwhile, other people use social media to boost their wallets. Technology provides the best instrument for modern business. Hence, we adopt the term *technopreneurship*.

Method

The paper employs content analysis of qualitative data from secondary online sources.

Theory of planned behaviour

Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) proposed the theory of planned behaviour, which gained popularity in 1991. It has wide application in studies of entrepreneurial intentions among students, making it applicable to young people generally. According to Reigiah (2013), it is a modification of the theory of reasoned action developed by Sheppard et al. (1988). It proposes that intentions are a predictor of planned entrepreneurial behaviour (Shapero 1982; Krueger 1993). The theory also posits that entrepreneurial intentions develop from a person's perception of what is feasible and desirable, which perception itself is a product of the cultural and social context. These intentions indicate a type of attitude towards behaviour and perceived behavioural control. These latter are affected by norms and engender social pressure to perform the behaviour in a particular place and setting (Turker et al., 2009).

Personality traits model

The personality traits model is an imperfect predictor of entrepreneurship, including intending to start a business (Shaver and Scott 1991). There are three attributes associated with entrepreneurial spirit: achievement motivation, tolerance for ambiguity, and locus of control. Some scholars consider achievement motivation the most reliable predictor of entrepreneurship (Babb

and Babb 1992). Risk tolerance is more common among people who chose to become entrepreneurs. The adventurous nature found in entrepreneurs indicates a significantly high tolerance of ambiguity among them. Individuals with an internal locus of control accept that outcomes result from their actions, such as hard work. This attitude correlates with entrepreneurial venturing and success.

Melting Pot: Social Media Technology, Knowledge and Business Skills

Internet technology shapes in many ways how we do business today. We discuss two of them below.

Social media aspect

Contact time

Generally, the longer a person remains in contact with another, the more that other influences them. The old saying rings true that you become those with whom you hang around. Even way back in the Garden of Eden, Eve got into trouble for hanging out with a talking serpent and touching something she was under orders not to. Social media have changed the way we communicate. They are a cross between the television (our old source of new information), social interaction (another source), and the telephone (our means of sharing and receiving knowledge). This digital love-child of social communication continues to creep into our lives and, the more time we spend on it, the more it influences us.

The amount of this influence is quantifiable. Multiplying the number of users on a social media platform with the average user time on the platform (UTOP) gives you a measure of its influence. Similarly, we can determine which platform likely influences a user the most by multiplying the number of their connections on each one they use with the time they spend on each. That highlights the marketing problem posed by the short attention spans of social media users for businesses seeking to influence them.

Real-to-digital-to-real (RDR) cycle

The real-to-digital-to-real (RDR) cycle refers to the cross-over from the real world to the digital and back. Digital gaming takes people from the real into a fantasy world, but the latter does not generally flow back into the former. With social media, people enter the digital world to communicate, and those digital deeds pass into the real through actions and changed relationships. Researchers hold that factors account for these media being among the

most powerful tools today: these transitions, the number of people on social media platforms, and the time they spend there. Two factors are vital to their successful business use, therefore: how many customers a business can reach and, most importantly, retain and keep satisfied.

Focus on a few selected networks

Social media networks are like shiny new objects. Therefore, we want to be on all of them simultaneously; we want to try all of them because we hope that this or another might be the one for us. The fact is, though, that we are all strapped for resources. Trying to be present on lots of social networks is setting yourself up for problems ahead.

We know—because we tried! We were everywhere at one time: on all the best-known networks and some lesser-known ones, like Anchor, Beme, Tumblr, and Whale. However, we were getting average results across the board, not to mention that it took whole days to post content to all the platforms. It was not sustainable!

It seems counter-intuitive, but it is better to focus on the two or three platforms that give you the best returns on investment. One reason is that crafting content unique to each is critical. Take writing a blog post about social media marketing. Copy that gets attention and clicks on LinkedIn is much different from what works on Facebook, which, in turn, is dramatically different from what works on Instagram, Snapchat, or Twitter. It is a laser-like focus on a platform that allows you to develop and hone successful tactics for it.

Business aspect

Commit to social media

Committing to social media is the first condition for success in using them for business. Social media-based marketing, like any other form of marketing, can be challenging. It is hard to grow an audience, create absorbing content, and increase engagement. We all too often see brands give up on social media after just a few months. However, it takes from eight months to one year to master the generation of a consistent content stream and discover what resonates with your audience and what does not.

It all starts with planning. Create and write down a social media strategy to guide your social media operations and provide a framework for their evaluation. It should include a mission statement, content plan, goals, and—most importantly—a statement of *why* people should follow you on social media.

Show off your personality

The second tip for businesses and entrepreneurs is to develop and maintain an authentic persona on social media. Take a second to think about the brands you follow on social media. What makes them successful? Why do you follow them? It possibly has to do with the content they post or how they post it; they possibly have a personality and are not just brand robots pushing out content. Creating a successful social media presence is not only about showing your audience the value of your product or service. It is also about connection and quality of customer experience. The best brands out there share a common viewpoint with their fans. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary—a dictionary that is enjoying tremendous success on social media!—is one of our favourite examples of this idea in action.

Listen to customers rather than promote

Tip Number Three is that successful social media programmes rest on listening, not promoting, to customers. Social media offer an extra-ordinary, open-ended platform that firms can use to communicate and engage with customers. They have become a customer-service platform and people today expect businesses to have them. The better an enterprise gets at using social media, the more its engagement with its customers.

Further, a business's customers are its best source of inspiration for content. Many firms are sitting on a bottomless goldmine of content ideas on their frequently-asked-questions pages. They could generate content from these questions or those that people are asking on social media. If you are stuck on what to post, look first to your customers for ideas before anything else. You might listen to your competitors' customers as well, as strange as that may sound. Tools like Twitter Lists, BuzzSumo, Facebook Pages to Watch, Google Keyword Planner, and YouTube are all fruitful places to find what is working in your industry.

Success follows passion

Lastly, on social media strategy for businesses and entrepreneurs, passion helps generate captivating and memorable content. Success on social media is a long road. We have mentioned that it took us about eight months of hard work to become satisfied with our social media programme. Imagine if we had used those months posting content about which we did not care! To follow your passion is the only way to ensure long-term commitment to social media

and that this does not become burdensome.

An advantage of social media is that your content does not have to be directly related to your brand or industry. That is, it does not have to be what everyone else is creating. Pick and stick with a subject about which you are passionate.

Experiment with video marketing

Content ideas: Video marketing is one of the most talked-about topics on social media right now; we want to share with you a few strategies for creating good video content. Many marketers struggle with *what subject* about which to make videos. The best solution for that is to start with what works. Sort your blog contents by the amount of traffic they generate and create videos around those topics with the highest traffic. Study *Facebook Pages to Watch* to find out the kinds of videos your competitors are producing; then generate content ideas from them. Use your customers as sources of content ideas. Look at your favourite brands outside your industry. The key is to start with what works and gain some confidence.

Best practices: Video length is a best-practice consideration in video production. For example, the most-viewed videos on Facebook are between 60-90 seconds, and the second most-viewed are between 30-60 seconds. That holds for Twitter too. So keep your videos short and to the point; save the best for first, if you will.

You will need the following if you plan to feature guests on your video: a *lavaliere* microphone, natural light from a window, and a tripod. Sound, lighting, and camera stability are crucial in creating good-quality videos. If animated or text-only videos (of which we do a lot here in Nigeria) are more your style, you need a source of stock videos, quality background music, and a video editor. Pexels and Videvo are two good websites for stock videos, and Animoto is an excellent video editor.

Get the most out of your content

In social media marketing, it is crucial to get the most out of your content. Success in this form of marketing does not require that businesses and entrepreneurs continuously create brand-new content. The more you can re-purpose existing content and make it appear fresh, the less content you will have to put out and the more you succeed. Throughout a post, experiment with embedding shareable graphics that people can re-use on Twitter, Facebook,

or LinkedIn. You could also create a series of Instagram Stories to promote the post. You might produce a short Facebook video summarising it—or even an in-depth YouTube video!

Every content you create should have at least two or three other shareable content to accompany it. That way, if the primary content does not resonate with your audience, the video might; and if the latter falls short, it might make for good Instagram Stories.

Boost organic content to a targeted audience

Social media advertising is excellent for businesses because you need not be an expert to succeed in it. Organic social media posting (i.e., traditional posting) is the perfect testing ground for paid advertising and boosted posts. In other words, it allows you to use your organic reach to determine what posts you should put money behind.

Also, you can target specific users on many social platforms. Let us say, for example, that your goal is to increase traffic to your website, and you have identified a top-performing post. You might create an audience that is likely also to like that post. It could be a look-alike of your website visitors, one that has shown interest in your competitors, or one defined by demographic factors such as location, age, or mobile device type. You would then exclude traffic to your website to eliminate people already familiar with your brand.

It is worth emphasising that you must choose the right networks for your business; it is a grave mistake to aspire to be on all platforms. You need to define your target audience clearly, identify the principal platforms they use, and create a presence there.

Planning for Successful Social Media Operations

The successful use of social media as a business platform requires a carefully designed, written plan to guide your business and enable it to maintain a unique presence. Such a plan should include the aims, goals and objectives of your business promotion. We lay out its key steps or elements below.

Step 1: Set social media marketing goals that align with business objectives

Set S.M.A.R.T. goals: The first step in creating a winning strategy is to define your objectives and goals. Write down at least three goals for your

social media operations. Without them, you have no way to measure success or return on investment (ROI). Each should be:

S—specific
M—measurable
A—attainable
R—relevant
T—time-bound.

Your S.M.A.R.T-goals framework will guide your operations toward successful business results.

Track meaningful metrics: Vanity metrics like re-tweets and likes are easy to track, but their real value is hard to prove. Focus instead on measures such as leads generated, web referrals, and conversion rates. You may want to track different metrics for different channels or even alternative uses for each.

Align goals and strategy: Make sure to align your social media goals with your overall marketing strategy. That makes it easier to demonstrate the value of your work and get executive buy-in and investment.

Step 2: Learn everything you can about your audience

Create audience personae: Knowing your audience—and ideal customer—and what they want to see on social media is key to creating content that they will like, comment on, and share. It is also critical if you want to turn social media followers into customers for your business. Try creating audience/buyer personae. These enable you to think of your potential fans, followers, and customers as real people with actual wants and needs. That, in turn, will allow you to think more clearly about what to offer them.

Gather real-world data: Do not found your social media operations on assumptions. For instance, is it your belief that Facebook is a better network for reaching Baby-Boomers than Millennials? However, the numbers show that Millennials still outnumber Boomers on the platform.

Social media analytics can provide a ton of valuable information about your followers: where they live, which languages they speak, and how they interact with your brand on social. These insights allow you to refine your strategy and better target your social media advertising.

Through Facebook Analytics, Jugnoo(an Uber-like service for auto-rickshaws in India) learned that 90% of their users who referred other customers were between eighteen and thirty-four years old. They also learned that 65%

of that group used Android phones. The company used that information to refine their advertising, resulting in a 40% drop in cost per referral.

Step 3: Research the competition

Your competitors are probably already using social media, which means you can learn from what they are doing.

Conduct a competition analysis: Competition analysis tells you who the competition is and what they are doing well (and not so well). It gives you a good sense of industry standards, enabling you to set your social media targets.

This analysis also helps you spot opportunities. You might find, for example, that a competitor is dominant on Facebook but has put little effort into Twitter or Instagram. Thus, it might be more profitable for you to focus on the networks where your audience is under-served rather than try to win them on those where a competitor is dominant.

Engage in social listening:

Social listening is another way to monitor the competition. Hootsuite streams are a helpful tool for this purpose. As you track competitor accounts and relevant industry keywords on the platform, you may notice shifts in how they use these channels. Alternatively, you might spot a specific post or campaign that hits the mark—or misses totally. Keep an eye on this information and use it to evaluate your own goals and operations.

Step 4: Conduct a social media audit

Examine your current efforts: If you are already using social media tools, you need to take a step back and review what you have done and accomplished. Ask yourself the following questions:

1. What is working, and what is not?
2. Who is connecting with you on social?
3. Which networks does your target audience use?
4. How does your social media presence compare to that of your competitors?

Information gathered in this audit provides a good starting point for re-strategising to improve your results. It should afford you a clear picture of the purpose each of your social media accounts serves. If an account's purpose is unclear, you might wish to decide whether it is worth having. Answering the following questions may help in reaching a decision and keeping your social media strategy on track and focused:

1. Is my audience here?
2. If so, how are they using this platform?
3. Can I use this account to help achieve meaningful business goals?

Look for impostors: The audit might reveal fraudulent accounts that are using your business or product names. These impostors can be harmful to your brand or steal your followers or customers. You should report them. You may want to verify your Facebook and Twitter accounts so that your fans and followers know they are dealing with the real you.

Step 5: Set up accounts and improve existing profiles

Determine what networks to use (and how to use them): As you choose your social media platforms, you also need to define a strategy and one-sentence mission statement for each. These statements will enable you to focus on a specific goal for each account on each social media network. You might phrase them as in the following examples:

1. "We will use Facebook advertising to target a specific audience to increase sales."
2. "We will use Instagram for promoting and sharing our company culture to help with recruitment and employee advocacy."

If you cannot create a clear mission statement for a social media network, you may want to reconsider whether you *need* to be on it.

Set up (and optimize) your accounts: Having decided which networks to focus on, you need now to create your profiles or improve existing ones so that they align with your strategic plan.

1. Ensure you fill out all profile fields;
2. Use keywords that people are most likely to use to search for your business;
3. Use images of the correct size for each network.

Below is a step-by-step guide for each network to walk you through the process. Create each of the following:

1. Facebook business page;
2. Instagram business account;
3. Twitter business account;
4. Snapchat account;

5. LinkedIn Company Page;
6. Pinterest business account;
7. YouTube channel;
8. WeChat business account.

Do not let this list overwhelm you. Remember, it is better to use a few channels well rather than stretch yourself thin to maintain a presence on every network.

***Bonus**: Get a free social media strategy template to quickly and easily plan your strategy. Also, use it to track results and present the plan to your boss, team-mates, and clients.

Step 6: Find inspiration

Your brand must be unique. However, you can draw inspiration from other businesses that are doing well on social media. Below are a few ways in which you might do this.

Social network success stories: You usually can find these on the business section of the social network's website. These case studies can offer valuable insights you could apply to your goals on each social media platform.

Award-winning accounts and campaigns: You could also review the winners of The Facebook Awards or The Shorty Awards for examples of top-performing brands on social media.

Your favourite brands on social media: Who do you enjoy following on social media? What do they do that compels people to engage with and share their content? National Geographic, for example, is one of the best on Instagram, combining stunning visuals with compelling captions. Then there is Shopify. The e-commerce brand uses Facebook to sell itself by exhibiting customer stories and case studies. Finally, IKEA is an example of superior customer service on Twitter. They use their 280 characters to solve problems and answer questions, often with a bit of humour.

Each of these accounts has a consistent voice, tone, and style. Consistency is key to shaping your followers' expectations from your brand, establishing why they should continue to follow you and what value they will receive for that. It also helps your brand maintain a unified and recurrent theme even when your social media team consists of multiple persons.

Ask your followers: Consumers also can offer social media inspiration.

What are your target customers talking about online? What can you learn about their wants and needs? If you have existing social media channels, you could also ask your followers what they want from you. However, you must follow through and deliver what they ask.

Step 7: Create a social media content calendar

Having interesting content is essential. To achieve the best results, however, it is necessary to have a schedule for sharing it. Your social media content calendar must also accommodate time for interacting with the audience (although you need to allow for some spontaneous engagement, too).

Create a posting schedule: Your social media content calendar lists the dates and times when you plan to publish content on each channel. It is the perfect place to plan all your social media activities, from sharing images and links to posting blogs and videos. It includes your daily postings, as well as social media campaigns. Your calendar ensures that you spread out your posts appropriately and published them at the best possible times.

Plot your content mix: Make sure your calendar reflects the mission statement you have articulated for each social media profile so that your posts support your business goals. For example, you might decide that:

1. Fifty per cent of content is to drive traffic to your blog;
2. Twenty-five per cent will come from other sources;
3. Twenty per cent will support enterprise goals (selling, lead generation, etc.); and
4. Five per cent will be about human resources and company culture.

Placing these different post-types on your content calendar helps you maintain the ratio upon which you have decided. If you are starting from scratch and not sure what types of content to post, try the 80-20 rule:

1. Eighty per cent of your posts should inform, educate, or entertain your audience; and
2. Twenty per cent could directly promote your brand.

Generally, a third of your content should promote your business and generate readers and profit; a third, share ideas and stories from industry leaders; and a third, interactions with your audience.

Once your calendar is ready, use scheduling tools or bulk scheduling to prepare your messaging in advance rather than updating content throughout the day. That allows you to craft the language and format of your posts rather

than writing them on the fly whenever you have the time.

Step 8: Test, evaluate, and adjust your strategy

Your social media strategy is a document of immense importance for your business, and you might not get it right the first time. As you implement your plan and track your results, you might find that some strategies are not as effective as anticipated or work even better.

Track your data: In addition to the analytics each social network provides (see Step 2), you can use UTM parameters to track visitors as they move through your website. That enables you to see which posts generate the most traffic.

Re-evaluate, test, and do it again: Once your analytics data starts coming in, use it regularly to re-evaluate your strategy. You can also use it to test and compare different posts, campaigns, and approaches. That enables you to identify what works and what does not and to refine your strategy in real-time. Surveys also are a crucial tool for strategic evaluation. Ask your followers, email list, and website visitors whether you meet their needs and expectations and about what they would like to see more. Then make sure to deliver on what they tell you.

Change is fast in the social sphere: new networks emerge, and old ones undergo significant demographic shifts. Your business also will experience it. Therefore, your social media strategy should be a living document that you review and possibly revise as needed. Refer to it often to keep you on track, but do not be afraid to make changes so that it better reflects new goals, tools, or plans.

Social media professions: Several functions have evolved from social media operations over the years and become mainstream occupations. Examples include:

1. Social media manager;
2. Social media specialist;
3. Chief marketing officer;
4. Creative director;
5. Digital marketing manager;
6. Content manager
7. Brand manager;
8. Community manager; and
9. Brand ambassador.

The principal functions of these positions include planning strategies for creation, managing and maintaining blogs, videos, and webinars, among others. The social media manager is probably the most common job title among social media professionals. It is also constantly changing, as we demonstrate in this infographic on the evolution of the position. The job title is a catch-all in many organisations for anyone whose work involves social media. This usage may make sense in a small business with only one social media functionary, but it becomes a bit unclear in a mid-size or large company.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The preceding sections demonstrate that young people need not rely on a single strategy for business success. They also establish that youths need to desist from the heavy use of social media only for chatting with friends and family, generating little or no revenue. They argue that young persons could reap much profit from social media by applying the techniques discussed.

In this regard, this paper addresses three aspects of social media: contact time, the real-to-digital-to-real (RDR) cycle, and the necessity of focusing on a few selected networks. It also discusses aspects of the business element: the needs to commit to social media, develop and maintain a social media personality, listen to the customer, develop video marketing skills, etc.

The paper recommends best practices in video production for social media operations. Specifically, it advises that videos intended for Facebook, Twitter and Instagram should be short, whereas those for YouTube could be longer. It also recommends developing SMART social media strategies to guide operations and provide a basis for performance evaluation.

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Chapter 19 | Entrepreneurship Development: A Panacea for Unemployment and Poverty in Nigeria

Asmau Mahmood Baffa

Abstract

Many scholars consider entrepreneurship the gateway to sustainable wealth creation for developing countries. To effectively manage its high levels of unemployment and poverty, Nigeria must pay attention to entrepreneurship. Its economic development is realizable by eliminating these social problems through encouraging entrepreneurial activities. This paper evaluates this position. It employs the exploratory research model, which entails an extensive review of literature on the subject. The key findings indicate that, despite several challenges confronting it, entrepreneurship development shows enormous potential as an alternative tool for employment generation and poverty reduction in Nigeria. The paper concludes that Nigeria can harness the full benefits of entrepreneurial development only by increasing its efforts in some crucial areas. These include providing entrepreneurial education, training and research, infrastructure, and financial and advisory services for young potential and existing entrepreneurs. Also, the government must revise its economic policies and improve the industrial environment to favour entrepreneurship, especially for small and medium scale enterprises.

***Keywords*: entrepreneurship, business development, unemployment, employment generation, poverty alleviation.**

Introduction

Only if its people are entrepreneurial can a nation create a steady stream of business opportunities. Properly nurtured, that inclination can create a strong economy. That is because entrepreneurship creates viable businesses that can

generate new value and high incomes. Therefore, it can positively impact the quality of life through employment generation, citizen empowerment, wealth creation, and poverty reduction. These, in turn, foster industrialisation and economic growth and development. It is impossible, consequently, to over-emphasise the significance of entrepreneurship and business management in national development.

Entrepreneurship is the incremental creation of wealth by risk-taking individuals through investments to produce goods or services. It is also the management of one's business enterprise. Entrepreneurs are often business owners and employees simultaneously, and many are small-business owners or managers. They are creative, industrious, innovative, self-determining, and risk-takers, and possess other qualities that drive entrepreneurial activities in the economy (Diyoke, 2014). Onugu (2005) posits that many countries have transformed their entrepreneurship sub-sectors into vibrant industries that have contributed considerably to economic development, unemployment reduction, and poverty reduction.[1] Unfortunately, one cannot say this of Nigeria.

Nigeria's estimated youth unemployment increased from 13.41% in 2017 to 22.7% in the second quarter of 2018 and 23.10% in the third quarter of 2018 (Trading Economics, 2019). The World Poverty Clock, a creation of Vienna-based World Data Lab, estimates that 91.16 million Nigerians live in extreme poverty. It indicates that at least 3 million Nigerians slipped into extreme poverty between November 2018 and February 2019. The Brookings Institution projected in June 2018 that Nigeria had overtaken India as the poverty capital of the world, with 86.9 million extremely-poor people. The World Bank defines an individual as living in extreme poverty if they live on less than $1.90 or ¦ 693.50 per day (The Cable, 2019).

These high unemployment and mass poverty rates have created apprehension in individuals, governments, and the world. It is urgently necessary that the government formulate an effective strategy to curb them because they have contributed to Nigeria's current economic and political crises. Tackling them requires the combined efforts of individuals and governments. Unemployment has affected the country's youths and economic development in many ways; for example, it has engendered economic waste and political unrest (Ipaye, 1998). Ezie (2012) decried Nigeria's unemployment situation

1. Cited in Asogwa and Dim (2016).

and the economy's inability to absorb a significant portion of the labour force, causing the continuous rise in crime and other social vices. The strategies that scholars and policy-makers have developed to address this problem involve entrepreneurship.

In 2005, Nigeria's government formulated the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), its sub-national devolutions,[2] and other programmes to finance entrepreneurship in the country. That was to curb increasing poverty and unemployment, especially among Nigerian youths. Mailafia (2016) reports that, between 1962 and 1985, the Nigerian government implemented four national development plans and a national rolling plan to achieve its development objectives. These included raising the real income of workers reducing income inequality, unemployment, and underemployment and improving the level and balance of development between the country's economic sectors and its geopolitical regions. Other goals were to increase the participation of Nigerians in the ownership and management of enterprises, increase local inputs in national development, maintain economic stability, etc. Nonetheless, Nigeria still has mass poverty and great income inequality, with most of the national income in the hand of a small group of politicians, oil magnates, and importers.

An unprecedented number of Nigerians, including most new graduates, have undergone entrepreneurial education and training this past decade. That is due to the introduction of entrepreneurship courses in Nigerian universities (in the 2007/2008 academic session) and the orientation programme of the National Youth Service Corps. However, the success rate among small and medium enterprises has been low; most barely survive beyond their gestation period, let alone flourish. Some have down-sised to the barest minimum, others press on in anticipation of better prospects, and yet others have shut down in frustration (Ihugba, Odii, and Njoku, 2013).

Joblessness and poverty have driven many Nigerians to become entrepreneurs without considering their business' prospects. Successful entrepreneurs thrive on challenges, which they pursue and overpower. It is insufficient merely to have an interest in entrepreneurship. Success requires the entrepreneurial personality (natural or acquired), experience, suitable lifestyles,

2. The State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS) for the states and the Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (LEEDS) for the local government areas.

resources, and personal suitability to the available options.

This study evaluates entrepreneurship development as the panacea for unemployment and poverty in Nigeria. It addresses the following questions:

1. Have entrepreneurship programmes contributed to the reduction of unemployment in Nigeria?
2. Have they contributed to poverty reduction in the country?
3. What factors hinder the development of entrepreneurship and its effectiveness against unemployment and poverty in Nigeria?

Conceptual Issues and Literature Review

Entrepreneurship has been receiving increasing scholarly recognition as an instrument of job creation, empowerment of the unemployed, and poverty alleviation in a rapidly globalising world. That is due to the high rates of unemployment and poverty in Nigeria and their deleterious impacts on youths (Emeh, Ikechukwu, and Okechukwu, 2012).

Entrepreneurship, Entrepreneur and Entrepreneurship Development

The term *entrepreneurship* derives from the French word "entreprende," to "undertake" (Olutunla, 2001). Hence, an entrepreneur is someone who creates a business. Emeh et al. (2012) see entrepreneurship as creativity and responsiveness to the environment. Other scholars view it as the capacity to identify viable business opportunities in an environment and the procurement and management of the resources necessary to exploit them (Hill and McGowan, 1999). Some refer to entrepreneurship as a "source of employment generation" because of its impact on economic growth and development. Studies have established its positive relationship with economic growth, employment generation, and the empowerment of disadvantaged groups, including women and the poor (Emeh et al., 2012).

However, Zimmerer and Scarborough (2006) note that entrepreneurship is more than creating a business, although it is undoubtedly its principal aspect. The entrepreneur introduces innovative change for the social good and, because they have faith in social betterment, serves the society with conviction. Thus, they accelerate personal and social development. Similarly, Diyoke (2014) holds that an entrepreneur fulfils dreams, invents, creates, and converts ideas into profitable reality. They are a change agent, society's hope, able to see and evaluate business opportunities, gather the necessary resources to exploit

them, and initiate action to obtain success. They are action-oriented and highly motivated and take calculated risks to achieve goals. Accordingly, Awe (2010)[3] described their role as *the entrepreneurial function* and its performance, *entrepreneurship*.

Entrepreneurship development is the process of enhancing entrepreneurial skills and knowledge through structured training and institutional programmes for individuals who intend to start or expand a business (Mwatsika, 2015). It aims to increase the economy's base of entrepreneurs and the rate of establishing new ventures. Thus, it hastens job creation and economic growth (Acs and Audretsch, 2003; Aidis, 2005; Bensing et al., 2009 in Emeh et al., 2012).

Some regard entrepreneurship development as a strategy to tackle such socio-economic problems as poverty and unemployment (Abubakar, 2012). It contributes to poverty alleviation when new or expanded businesses create employment. It boosts social wealth by creating new markets, industries, technologies, and jobs. The net productivity and real income gains it produces make higher living standards possible (Simon, 2005). Logically, then, a rise in the number of entrepreneurs in a country reduces its poverty indicators and *vice versa*.

Entrepreneurship Development and Employment Generation

Every economy features two populations segments: the economically active and inactive. The former is the portion willing and able to work and includes those actively engaged in producing goods and services and the unemployed. Fajana (2000)[4] and Udu and Agu (2005) define unemployment as a situation in which people are willing and able to work but cannot find suitable paid employment. It is a macro-economic problem that responsible governments should monitor and regulate: the higher the unemployment rate in an economy, the higher the poverty level and associated welfare challenges. The International Labour Organisation (2007) defines unemployed workers as those who are currently:

1. Not working but are willing and able to work for pay, or
2. Available to work, have actively searched for work, yet are unable to secure a job.

3. Cited in Bodunrin (2014).
4. Cited in Oladele, Akeke, and Oladunjoye (2011)

Hornby (2010) defines unemployment as the state of not having a job or the number of people without one.

Taiwo (2014) observes that entrepreneurship development always creates jobs. He investigated the relationship between them in Nigeria and found that the latter results from the former.

Entrepreneurship development has gained increasing recognition as a principal driver of economic growth, employment generation, innovation, and poverty reduction through the empowerment of youths (UNCTAD, 2010). Conversely, scholars have identified poor entrepreneurship development as a reason businesses in developing countries fail or stagnate. Salami (2011) notes that Nigeria is among the poorest countries globally and has one of sub-Saharan Africa's highest youth unemployment rates. That is despite its abundant human and natural resources and supposedly strong economic growth. Studies have identified some leading causes of youth unemployment in Nigeria (Adebayo, 1999; Alanana, 2003; Echebiri, 2005; Ayinde, 2008; Morphy, 2008; and Awogbenle and Iwuamadi, 2010)[5]. First is the rapid growth of the urban labour force due to rural-urban migration. The lack of rural infrastructure aggravates this factor, as it makes rural life unattractive and drives youth relocation to urban areas in the hope of securing lucrative employment. Other factors are the concentration of social amenities in the urban centres and the general absence of social and economic opportunities in rural areas.

Eme (2014) finds that Nigeria's economy was among the fastest-growing globally but its people the most impoverished in real terms. The country recently witnessed the spectacle of millions of job-seekers literally stampeding for about 4,500 vacancies at the Nigeria Immigration Service, resulting in the death of about eighteen persons. That incident betrayed the entirely formal character of the country's economic growth: that it has been growth without development. With projections that global unemployment will top 215 million by 2018, experts fear that Africa's, particularly Nigeria's, share of the joblessness burden might increase disproportionately. The country will suffer the unsavoury consequences of the problem unless it immediately adopts proactive and holistic measures to tackle it.

In their examination of entrepreneurship and employment generation in Nigeria, Akanwa and Akpanabia (2012) concluded that the government should

5. The last cited in Asogwa and Dim (2016).

encourage the entrepreneurial culture to tackle unemployment and boost economic development. Bandal's empirical study (2010)[6] on the relationship between entrepreneurship and job creation found that a variety of factors collectively drive entrepreneurial activity. These are talent, attitude, skills, and knowledge, and such contextual variables as social capital and access to credit, technology, infrastructure, information, and markets.

Nwachukwu and Ogbo's (2012) empirical research on the role of entrepreneurship in Nigeria's economic development analysed the subject through the prism of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The researchers found that SMEs have played and will continue to play a significant role in the growth, development and industrialisation of economies. They concluded that, before providing financial resources for the development of these enterprises, SME promoters should ensure the entrepreneurs possess the necessary managerial capacity.

It is a primary task of Nigeria's policy-makers and economic managers to fight the problem of unemployment. The consequences of neglecting it are dire. Already, many adverse developments in society are traceable to the unavailability of jobs for the teeming population of energetic youths. The government must lead in employment generation by providing the enabling environment for economic activities. However, the battle against unemployment in Nigeria must involve everyone. The incorporation of entrepreneurship in youth development programmes is the only strategy by which the country can achieve this. That could include training and the development of entrepreneurship capacities (Asogwa and Dim, 2016).

Entrepreneurship Development and Poverty Reduction

Adofu and Ocheja (2013)[7] identify poverty as one of the principal challenges of developing and underdeveloped countries. Most scholars attribute its prevalence to the high rate of unemployment that has become characteristic of these countries. Poverty is the principal hindrance to the optimum utilisation of human resources for social and economic development. It is becoming severe and widespread in Nigeria (Kudi, 2015), which has a low Gross Domestic Product (GDP), income per capita, and industrial utilisation capacity, and high unemployment and birth rates. That is despite the country's vast resources.

6. Cited in Asijwa et al. (2012).
7. Cited in Anekwe, Ndubuisi and Yusuf (2018).

Scholars and policy-makers have proposed entrepreneurship as an effective means to economic development and poverty alleviation in impoverished and low-income regions.

Nigeria's problem of poverty is multifaceted. Its aspects include a high infant mortality rate, infrastructure inadequacies (including healthcare facilities), unemployment, underemployment, and corruption (Olayinka, Olusegun et al., 2015). Poor people cannot participate meaningfully in the economy, whether as producers or workers. Employment performance and poverty prevalence correlate closely: the correspondence between poverty rates and unemployment rates has remained constant since the 1980s. Nigeria's poverty rate correlates with its inequality in resource distribution, low income per capita, and high illiteracy and unemployment rates, etc. Akpomi (2009) posits that ending poverty may be elusive unless the country emphasises the development of entrepreneurial skills. Poverty adversely impacts people's lives, and it is impossible to overestimate its devastating human and national development effects. For instance, it correlates with, among others, poor health and education and anti-social behaviour. Nigeria's high unemployment and poverty levels seriously threaten its development and security and the peaceful co-existence of its people.

Some scholars argue that global poverty would be far worse but for entrepreneurs who have created jobs and wealth (Singer, 2014). Thus, entrepreneurship is an effective tool in poverty reduction and alleviation. The former is the most difficult challenge facing developing countries, most of whose populations are poor people. The number of Nigerians in poverty has increased progressively (Raheem, 2015). Poor people have severely limited access to and control over primary assets, including land and physical and human capital. Lacking capital and marketable skills, the poor have low income and low consumption. Not only do many Nigerians live below the poverty line: they also stay poor for long. Many of these chronically poor emerge briefly from poverty because of seasonal employment but cannot contribute to technological change and economic growth and development. The Nigerian government has introduced various programmes, policies, and agencies to alleviate poverty in the country but has achieved very little success.

Poverty alleviation interventions aim for lasting quality-of-life improvements for citizens rather than short-term improvement that disappear at the end of the project cycle (Adofu and Ocheja, 2013). They seek, therefore, to maintain the natural resource base by appropriately improving social values

(Paul, 2007). Okpoko and Ezeadichie (2003) and Adofu and Ocheja (2013) define poverty alleviation as sustained improvements in the living conditions of a social group. They posit a close relationship between it and development. They describe the latter as a process featuring increased productivity, the equalisation of product distribution, and the emergence of autonomous indigenous institutions (Anekwe et al., 2018).

Problems of Entrepreneurship Development in Nigeria

Edokpayi (1962),[8] among the early studies of Nigerian entrepreneurship, found the inadequacy of capital to be the main challenge in establishing private businesses in Western Nigeria. Other impediments included the lack of organisational and management skills and the misapplication of loans. Onuoha (1994) and Obeleagu Nzebulo (2000) also identified the common problems: the insufficiency of capital, incompetent management, and the lack of technological and infrastructural facilities. Additionally, Ndubuisi (2004) named arbitrary changes in the administration of law by the government, which creates uncertainty for entrepreneurs. Other obstacles he listed include the lack of infrastructure, high cost of production, market imperfections—which deny potential entrepreneurs the resources they need—and the riskiness of new enterprises. Others include the low social status of businesspeople and the restrictiveness of customs and traditions. Aniete and Akpan (2012) identified other factors, including irregular power supply and other infrastructural inadequacies, fuel shortages, levies and rates, multiple taxes, and policy inconsistencies, reversals and shocks. Their list also included:

1. Difficulties in accessing credit;
2. Unfavourable fiscal policies;
3. Poor policy implementation;
4. Restricted market access
5. Obstacles in sourcing raw materials;
6. Competition with cheaper imported products;
7. Poor inter-sectoral linkages, given that most large-scale firms import some of their raw material instead of contracting SMEs to supply them;
8. Insecurity of people and property;

8. Cited in Diyoke (2014).

9. Fragile ownership base;
10. Inadequacy of requisite skills;
11. Poor management of financial, human and other resources;
12. Unfavourable monetary policies
13. Insufficiency of preservation, processing and storage technologies and facilities;
14. Lack of entrepreneurial spirit;
15. Poor capital structuring.

Onugu (2005)[9] also identified the following entrepreneurship challenges in Nigeria:

1. Insufficient capital;
2. Inexperience;
3. Lack of focus;
4. Inadequate market research
5. Over-concentration on one or two markets for finished products
6. Lack of succession plan
7. Poor book-keeping and record-keeping
8. Inability to separate business and family or personal finances
9. Confusion of revenue and profit
10. Staffing difficulties
11. Lack of business strategy and planning
12. Cut-throat competition
13. Low official patronage of locally produced goods and service
14. Over-concentration or personalisation of decision-making.

Duru (2011) found a growing interest in entrepreneurship among consumers, businesspeople and government officials, as evident in the increase in research on the subject. He attributed this to the realisation that it quickens industrialisation, employment creation, and poverty reduction. He named three factors of entrepreneurial success: creating a vision, leveraging one's strength, and identifying unmet market needs. Duru concluded that entrepreneurship is essential for rapid and sustained economic growth and development because it creates the required workforce and reduces unemployment and poverty. Nigeria

9. Cited in Anekwe et al. (2018).

would be wise, therefore, to assign it a significant in the country's effort to revamp its economy. The author recommended that the government create an investor-friendly environment that enables entrepreneurs to create wealth and employment opportunities. That should include ensuring stability in macro-economic policies and fixing Nigeria's dilapidated infrastructural facilities.

Onwubiko (2011) lists the following among the entrepreneurial challenges that small-business owners face: poor infrastructural facilities, inadequate working capital, low standard of education, and inadequate training. The potential entrepreneur—oftener a novice—also grapples with such economic problems as policy instability, high and double taxation, difficulties in procuring business approvals, high inflation, and exchange rate instability. Also, establishing a company is costly, as the intending entrepreneur must engage a solicitor and accountant to handle the legal and financial aspects. Politically, the government's policies favour the friends and associates of public officers sometimes. Cronyism is prevalent in the award of contracts and other types of government patronage, creating unfair advantage for some and disadvantage for others, who might be better qualified. Onwubiko notes further that systemic corruption and the government's lack of political will to address it dissuades entrepreneurship and hinder entrepreneurship development and unemployment reduction. Also, the neglect of vocational and technical education has robbed Nigeria of its graduates' potential contribution to economic growth and development.

Emeh, Ikechukwu and Okechukwu (2012) observed that the benefits of entrepreneurship notwithstanding, many barriers have prevented youths from fully realising their potentials and assuming their social responsibilities. People have migrated from rural to urban areas due to inadequate agricultural incentives but, as entrepreneurs, now confront continuous infrastructural deterioration in the cities: crumbling roads, irregular water supply, power outage, etc. Ihugba, Odii, and Njoku (2013) examined government interventions for entrepreneurship development in Nigeria. Such initiatives include establishing the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), industrial development centres, second-tier securities market, World Bank SME I and II Loan Schemes, and NERFUND (National Economy Reconstruction Fund). Others are fiscal and monetary policies, such as granting pioneer status or income tax relief, capital allowance to aid capital formation, and tax relief for investments in economically disadvantaged local government areas. Yet others include the imposition of tariffs on imports to protect domestic production, provision

of export incentives, mandatory credit quotas of 10% to 20% for SMEs. These interventions also include establishing the Bank of Industry, micro-finance banks, Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment Scheme-SMIEIS, etc. The study found that they failed abysmally: due to over-bearing bureaucracies, corruption, inadequate and inefficient infrastructural facilities, and maladministration.

Concerning the entrepreneurial environment, Diyoke (2014) contends that it significantly impacts the level of entrepreneurship. That fact is not lost on modern leaders, who understand that enabling people to become entrepreneurs harnesses their self-interest to the market's needs. The more the entrepreneur's freedom to meet their customers' needs, the more everyone's opportunity to buy what they want and live as they choose. That is not so in Nigeria, where socio-economic problems, political instability, and religious intolerance impede entrepreneurship development. They have produced violent armed robbery, arson, oil pipeline vandalisation, the Boko Haram insurgency and, recently, kidnapping. Entrepreneurship suffers in such conditions that harm investments, discourage established entrepreneurs, and cause new ones to relocate or change plans.

Prospects of Entrepreneurship Development

Entrepreneurship development has immense employment-generation capacity. Nigeria's government appreciates this; it also understands entrepreneurs' contribution to economic growth and development and their constraints and difficulties. Thus, in the past forty-five years or so, Nigerian governments have established institutions and relief programmes to assist entrepreneurs and address their problems. These include specialised banks to fund small and medium enterprises and agencies and departments to aid their development.

However, these interventions have been ineffective. They have been either defective in their conception and design or implemented poorly. Emeh et al. (2012) attributed this partly to the non-involvement of SME operators, managers or proprietors in their formulation, resulting in wrong policy priorities and emphases.

The depressing poverty of Nigerians indicates the challenges of the entrepreneurship strategy against poverty in the country. Current macro-economic trends suggest Nigeria might regain its wealth levels of the 1980s. However, without the necessary policy changes, it might take another forty

years to attain its income per capita levels of the 1960s. The situation calls for re-strategising in our entrepreneurship development programmes. Nigeria's ongoing economic transformation is creating a solid foundation for economic growth and an environment for profitable business development.

Therefore, Nigeria's entrepreneurs should recruit experienced management personnel or mentor and train their staff to build skills throughout their business. The federal government has converted the community banks into micro-finance banks to provide short-term credit entrepreneurs or individuals without requiring the traditional collateral. Many new firms fail not for lacking innovativeness but for competitiveness incapacity. Hence, business incubators exist, often with support from private or public entities, to provide start-ups with the services and support they need to mature and become competitive in the market. They play a crucial role in initiating entrepreneurial activities in Central and Eastern Europe where, as in Nigeria, entrepreneurial activity has been low. Their purpose is to:

1. Encourage skilled and professional people to return to their communities to start new companies.
2. Provide job opportunities for high-tech graduates.
3. Build the vocational skills of their members.
4. Improve access to capital for start-up firms.

Job creation through entrepreneurship results in the equitable distribution of income and higher living standards (Anekwe et al., 2018). Osunde (2003) and Nwagwu (2005) argue that poverty alleviation strategies should aim to break the generational chain of poverty through vocational training to make youths self-reliant.

Participation by all stakeholders in the SME sub-sector in the formulation and implementation of entrepreneurship policies is necessary for policy effectiveness. It is encouraging that Nigeria's local, state and federal governments have persevered in enabling SMEs to contribute to its economic growth and development. Their efforts include the establishment of the Bank of Industry (BOI), the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN), and the Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment Scheme (SMIEIS). Others include the drive to implement the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the government's endorsement of multilateral agencies and loans and support for international development finance facilities.[10] Yet other measures include the poverty

alleviation programmes and the proposed credit guarantee scheme for small and medium enterprises.

Theoretical Review

This study employs Robert's Human Capital Theory (HCT) of 1991, which posits education as the means to improve and stimulate labour productivity and technological innovation. Human capital development is a vital causal factor in the economic growth and development of many countries. Schumpeter (1934)[11] credits entrepreneurship training for new ideas, enhanced techniques, technological innovation, and new products. Thus, HCT advocates social spending on workforce development because expenditure on education, training, and development is a productive investment. Human capital can determine an individual's chances of poverty or wealth because it affects earning capacity. Rank (2004) and Darling (2002)[12] aver that individuals with more human capital tend to be more competitive in the labour market than those with less or without. Human capital is a set of skills and characteristics that enhance an employee's efficiency and performance. It positively impacts economic development, education, growth, innovation, and productivity, which justifies government subsidies of education and training. Therefore, human capital improvement should boost Nigeria's economic growth and development significantly.

The relevance of the human capital theory to this study lies in its thesis that with quality education and training, individuals contribute to economic growth and development by establishing new businesses. Thus, they create employment and improve living standards. Van Den Berg (2001)[13] found a correlation between education and product innovation in knowledge-based economies that invested massively in education, technology, and related growth factors. Odekunle (2001) and Ayeni (2003)[14] provided empirical backing for that claim. Odekunle established a positive link between human capital investment, the quantum of entrepreneurial activity, and the level of technological innovation. Ayeni demonstrated that education improves the status and job security of beneficiaries and attracts monetary and non-monetary benefits.

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10. These facilities include those of the European Investment Bank (EIB).
11. Cited in Oladele et al. (2011).
12. Cited in Ndubuisi et al. (2018).
13. Cited in Sofoluwe et al. (2013)
14. Both cited in Sofoluwe et al. (2013).

Methodology

This study explores the challenges of entrepreneurship development in Nigeria and its impacts on unemployment and poverty reduction. It employs an exploratory research model involving desk research, which entails an extensive review of relevant literature. Its conclusions and recommendations derive from the findings.

Discussion of Findings and Conclusion

This study has demonstrated the importance of entrepreneurship development and the necessity to facilitate it through supportive institutions. Despite the numerous challenges of Nigeria's entrepreneurial environment, entrepreneurship has promising prospects if furnished with capital, human resources, and favourable policies.

Most of the literature we consulted in this study were conceptual papers; only a few utilised the quantitative research method. The studies that produced these latter empirical papers employed questionnaires and interviews and tested their hypotheses with the chi-square statistical tool or simple percentages.

Findings from the studies reviewed indicate that entrepreneurship aids employment generation and poverty reduction. They also explored its problems as they pertain to entrepreneurs and the government. On the part of the former, they included inadequacies in capital, entrepreneurial and vocational skills, education, management, technological knowledge, business adaptability, and unfair competition. On that of the latter, they were inadequacies in credit and infrastructure provision (e.g., irregular power supply and transportation) and security (e.g., terrorism, kidnapping, looting, and arson). Others included corruption, policy inconsistencies, multiple taxation, market inaccessibility, political instability, and the accessibility of entrepreneurship programmes. The findings also revealed that most government initiatives in entrepreneurship development failed abysmally. That was due to over-bearing bureaucracies, corruption, inadequate and inefficient infrastructure, and maladministration. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that entrepreneurship development has great potentials as a means of employment generation and poverty reduction in Nigeria.

This paper concludes that Nigeria can only harness the full benefits of entrepreneurial developments by investing in entrepreneurial education, training and research, infrastructural development, and financial and advisory services. It must also undertake a massive sensitisation programme for potential

and existing entrepreneurs at the local, state, and federal government levels. Finally, the government should revise its economic and industrialisation policies in favour of entrepreneurship.

Recommendations

It is impossible to over-emphasise the importance of entrepreneurial development for economic growth. Therefore, the government needs to foster an entrepreneurial culture among citizens. That could be through enacting national entrepreneurship policies to aid the development of high-impact small and medium enterprises. The following suggestions should help in that regard:

1. The government should provide youths with entrepreneurship education and training to equip them with entrepreneurial skills, that they cease to depend on the government for employment. Such a programme should include entrepreneurship education at all levels of schooling to ensure that learners imbibe, practise, and develop their entrepreneurial skills and knowledge thoroughly.
2. The government should formulate and implement policies to reduce start-up costs and enhance access by small and medium enterprises to capital from micro-finance banks. They should encourage these banks to shift to sustainable, market-based micro-finance provision, eliminate unfair competition from public institutions, undertake regulatory reform, and improve the business environment. The government could also offer state loans to small businesses. Such measures will significantly facilitate access to short-term or working-capital loans by intending micro-entrepreneurs.
3. Policy-makers should provide an enabling environment for private sector-led investment. Their policies should reduce the impediments to business formation, improve tax laws, protect intellectual property rights, and guarantee loans to entrepreneurs.

Limitations of the Study

The paper relies on secondary sources. Its findings did not undergo testing to determine whether they were statistically significant or due to chance. Therefore, their validity is not generalizable with the same degree of certainty as in quantitative analyses.

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Chapter 20 | Career Guidance for Sustainable Development in Nigeria: Youth Employability as the Way Forward

Aisha Abdul-Ismail

Introduction

Nigeria's youth unemployment dropped from 38% in 2017 to 36.5% in 2018 (National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria 2019). Government interventions against unemployment have been mostly unsuccessful. Much of the labour force is underemployed, which Todaro defines as "a situation in which persons are working less, … daily, weekly, monthly or seasonally, than they would like to…" (1982: p. 426). Unemployment is synonymous with joblessness and occurs when a person remains without a job after actively seeking one in the past five weeks (ILO). It also designates the share of the labour force that is without but available and searching for work. However, is seeking a job sufficient to get one, or must the seeker have particular skills? Does sustainable development depend solely on employment or the discovery and transformation of ideas into values that improve living standards? It is meaningful only when it engages and equips the youths for effectiveness.

Nigeria's federal and state governments provide access to tertiary education through universities, monotechnics, polytechnics and colleges of education to prepare students for employment. Education imparts cognitive skills, knowledge, values, attitudes, and beliefs. Unfortunately, though, many graduates remain unemployed for several years. "The persistence of youth unemployment and under-employment suggests that mechanisms for anticipating and developing skills relevant to the world of work are not functioning to the level necessary." (UN Youth: p. 3) The idleness and desperation that this situation engenders in youths produce radicalisation, militancy, insurgency, thuggery, etc.

This paper examines the influence of career guidance and mentoring on youth employability and offers tips on some life skills to improve workforce quality. Youths can gain paid or self-employment only if they understand

the economy, recognise available opportunities, and know how to find their niche. Acquiring a certificate is the necessary but insufficient foundation for that. Hence, this paper proposes building youths' capacity to succeed in their future occupations. Table 1 presents figures for Nigeria's unemployment rate and Figure 1 for youth unemployment specifically.

Table 1: Nigerian Unemployment Rates

Nigeria Labour	Last	Previous	Highest	Lowest	Unit	
Unemployment Rate	23.10	22.70	23.10	5.10	Per cent	[+]
Population	190.89	185.99	190.89	45.14	Millions	[+]
Living Wage Family	137,600.00	135,300.00	137,600.00	135,300.00	?/Month	[+]
Living Wage Individual	43,200.00	41,800.00	43,200.00	41,800.00	?/Month	[+]
Employed Persons	69,542.90	69,165.60	70,665.90	66,951.00	Thousands	[+]
Employment Rate	81.20	83.80	93.60	81.20	Per cent	[+]
Wages High Skilled	57,200.00	57,200.00	57,200.00	57,200.00	?/Month	[+]
Wages Low Skilled	25,500.00	25,500.00	25,500.00	25,500.00	?/Month	[+]
Youth Unemployment Rate	36.50	38.00	38.00	11.70	Per cent	[+]
Unemployed Persons	20,927.60	20,343.60	20,927.60	4,672.00	Thousands	[+]
Minimum Wages	30,000.00	18,000.00	30,000.00	18,000.00	?/Month	[+]

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria; 2018.

Table 1 shows the youth unemployment in Nigeria, which reached 38% in 2017 in contrast to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) global estimate of 13.1%. It also reveals the wage gap between high and low skilled workers, the former earning ¦ 57,200.00 in 2018 and the latter ¦ 25,500.00. Figure 1 depicts pictorially Nigeria's youth unemployment rate between January 2016 to July 2018. The graph indicates a steady rise in the period until July 2018, when it dropped from the peak of 38% to 36.5%. Hopefully, the effective implementation of policies against youth unemployment will sustain the decline.



SOURCE: TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, NIGERIA

Career Guidance and Mentoring for Youth Employability

Career guidance assists youths make informed decisions about their lives and their future through their active involvement in identifying their interests, potentials, and opportunities. It bridges the gap between academia (theory) and industry (practice). Combined with effective mentoring, it facilitates career development—i.e., the planning of life and career. That involves "training on new skills, moving to higher job responsibilities, making a career change within the same organisation, moving to a different one, or starting one's own business"(Kumar, M. n.d.: p. 155). The International Labour Organisations (ILO) defines employability skills as the skills, knowledge and competencies that enable a person to get, maintain, and do a job effectively. They also give them the confidence to change employment or adapt to changes in the

environment. They include "… broad-based education [and] training and basic and portable high-level skills, including teamwork, problem-solving, information and communication technology skill and communication and language skills" (Brewer 2013: p. iii). A University of Ibadan student said, "employability entails producing an individual that is highly skilled, knowledgeable, with a practical and intellectual way of thinking, and [the] ability to solve problems within the immediate [community]" (A British Council Report on Graduate Employability, n.d., p. 2).

Youth employability requires not only educational certification and skill acquisition but also guidance on career choice. Entrepreneurship entails identifying and taking advantage of opportunities and involves initiative, willingness, change, and risk-taking. Its purpose is value creation. Employability skills enhance the capacity of youths, as employees or entrepreneurs, to contribute to Nigeria's sustainable development. Together with entrepreneurial skills, they are acquirable through functional education—for which Nigeria's National Policy on Education provides. First formulated in 1977, the policy underwent revision in 1981, 1989, and 2004 and states the country's education goals and objectives as including:

1. Inculcating national consciousness and national unity;
2. Imparting appropriate values and attitudes for individual and national survival;
3. Training the mind to understand the world;
4. Empowering the individual to contribute to the development of the society by imparting to them the appropriate mental, physical, and social abilities (FRN 2004: p. 8).

Mentoring is a relationship between persons who are unequal in learning or experience in which the more endowed (the mentor) imparts their endowment to the other (the mentee). It guides the mentee to discover their needs and potentials and acquire problem-solving skills. Commitment and a positive attitude are vital factors of the relationship, which is crucial for career progression. Mentoring might be in-person or remote (conducted through electronic means like emails or chat rooms). It can involve individual (one mentor-to-one mentee), team (one mentor-to-a team of mentees), and peer (mentee-to-mentee) relationships.

Significance of Career Guidance for Youth Employability

Career guidance can break the vicious cycle of poverty. Technological and communications advances and productivity improvements have created new employment opportunities: also, however, they have produced new challenges, such as joblessness. Youths are particularly susceptible to unemployment's damaging effects: the lack of skills, low self-esteem, marginalisation, poverty, and the wasting of enormous human resources (WPAY, 2010: p.18). That will cost society direly in the long run unless it finds effective solutions.

Career guidance can ensure the provision and strengthening of functional education, which equips learners to be productive and meet society's development requirements. It is practical in that it emphasises performance. The UN Youth report stated that:

> There is a need to align education policies, curricula, and training programmes, in a people-centric way, with national development priorities and needs, international development strategies and labour market requirements. Doing so will promote the situation of young people, fight extreme poverty, and allow for a maximisation of the benefits of globalisation for youth (UN Youth: p. 2)

Equipping youths with soft skills will enhance their capacity. A lecturer in one of Nigeria's premier universities argues that:

> Employers require graduates that can take decisions, act according to the instruction, find opportunities, take initiatives and produce results. However, these are not taught in the universities, as even many [graduates] with first-class [degrees] may not have these soft skills (A British Council Report on Graduate Employability: n.d., p. 2).

Empowering youths will transform the community. The International Labour Organisation estimates that the developing countries need to create more than one hundred million new jobs within the next twenty years to employ their growing youth population. Things are especially dire with youths of particular categories. These include girls, young women, and street children. Others are youths who have disabilities or are refugees, internally displaced, or migrants, or belong to ethnic minorities or indigenous groups (WPAY, 2010: p.18).

Sustainable growth and development will reduce unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The youth unemployment crisis deprives young people of the means to obtain personal homes in which to establish families and participate

in social activities (WPAY, 2010: p.18).

Factors Hindering Youth Employability

The attitudes of youths hinder their acquisition of the skills necessary for employment. Young people nowadays want to become rich immediately. They are sometimes unaware of the need for career guidance.

Nigeria's education curricula, which are obsolete vis-à-vis the continuous technological transformations of today, leave the youths without the skills to perform effectively in the twenty-first century.

Youth restiveness and its associated problems arise from bad governance and unemployment. Most state interventions to provide employment are ineffective, and there are no industries to absorb those youths with skills. This situation frustrates youths and prepares the ground for their engagement in social vices. It also does not help that young people only have a marginal role in the policy process and restricted access to state employment programmes because of systemic corruption. Further, low financial literacy and lack of access to micro-finance facilities hobble their imagination and creative abilities.

Figure 2: Soft Skills Framework

Source: The National Network for Business

and Industry Associations

Soft and Life Skills as Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development

The National Network for Business and Industry Associations created the framework depicted in Figure 2 from responses to its member survey. It categorised employability skills into four subsets: personal, people, applied knowledge, and workplace skills. Child Trends adopted a framework named "Key Soft Skills for Youth Workforce Success." These are communication, positive self-concept, self-control, higher-order thinking (problem-solving, critical thinking, and decision-making), and social skills. In contrast to these two, the Employability Skills Framework has three main categories: effective relationships, workplace skills, and applied knowledge.

Life skills are critical to finding, retaining, and performing well in

employment and being successful outside the workplace. They enable people to handle life's challenges effectively by inculcating adaptive abilities in them (WHO). Therefore, a curriculum for this purpose is necessary for secondary and tertiary education; and schools could implement it in stand-alone, on-the-job, non-formal, or formal programmes.

Soft and life skills comprise several psychosocial and interpersonal skills that enable individuals to decide and communicate effectively (UNICEF). According to Lipmann et al. (2015:11):

> Soft skills refer to a broad set of skills, competencies, behaviours, attitudes, and personal qualities that enable people to effectively navigate their environment, work well with others, perform well, and achieve their goals. These skills are broadly applicable and complement other skills such as technical, vocational, and academic skills.

Life skills are transferable cognitive and non-cognitive skills and abilities that connect behaviour, attitudes, experience, and knowledge. People acquire and can develop and retain them throughout their lives. They increase young people's well-being and their ability to secure good quality remunerative employment and help them become active and responsible members of their communities.

Soft skills are difficult to assess and measure. They are subjective and involve the abilities to communicate, work with others, make informed decisions, respect others, and solve problems effectively.

Recent research demonstrates that learning outcomes and completion and graduation rates improve when young people receive non-academic support to develop their social-cognitive skills. Hence, these skills improve their education outcomes.

The 2000 World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, adopted the "Education for All" (EFA) programme in part to "Promote learning and life skills for young people and adults" (UN Youth). That was to meet the basic learning needs of all children, youth, and adults and equip young people with soft skills that enable them to succeed.

Life skill programmes increase employer satisfaction with new hires because they strengthen young people's abilities in many areas that employers consider crucial. Employers often report greater satisfaction with entry-level employees who have undergone life skills training than those who have not.

Personal skills are intangible and unmeasurable but vital because they

shape an individual's work attitudes and productivity. They enable the employee to interact well with co-workers and clients.

Life skills programmes enable youths to create a life plan and equip them with the skills to achieve their goals. They also improve young people's behaviours and self-esteem, thus decreasing outcomes such as teen pregnancies, drug and alcohol use, and interpersonal violence.

Concluding Remarks

Youths, who are drivers of social, economic and political development, need core employability skills and job opportunities. That requires that government provide a conducive environment for business to flourish. Youths, particularly marginalised ones, must ensure they acquire the necessary knowledge, capacities, skills and values for their role as drivers. (UN Youth, p. 2). Although soft and life skills do not aid one to acquire the hard skills necessary to gain employment, they enable one to keep and succeed in it. Improved human strategies will improve living standards and, thus, build people's capabilities and expand choice. That will reduce poverty significantly.

Recommendations

1. Improve youth employability and entrepreneurship;
2. Engage youths effectively;
3. Mainstream youth issues in Nigeria's development policies;
4. Reduce youth unemployment;
5. Increase youth engagement in entrepreneurial ventures;
6. Review the education curricula.

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Part 7 | Women and Political Participation

Chapter 21 | Women's Participation in Leadership, Decision-making and Politics in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects

Ramatu Umar Bako

Introduction

In 2019, women are gaining recognition as playing a prominent role in building strong and stable democratic processes. Today there are more women in government than before. Women's direct engagement in public decision-making has long been seen not just as a matter of democratic process, but as a means of ensuring better government accountability for women. It has been seen that quotas have been an effective vehicle for supporting women's political engagement. However, increasing the numbers of women in politics is in itself not enough to ensure better public sector responsiveness to women's needs. It must be linked to gender-sensitive good governance reforms — understood as inclusive, responsive and accountable management of public affairs that increases state capacity to implement gender policies. Going by the details of the population of Nigeria released by the National Population Commission (NPC), women constitute about 50.5% of the total population. The National Policy on Women in Nigeria, in line with the Beijing Agenda, adopted the principle of reserving 30% of elective and appointive positions for women. Despite these laudable initiatives, women still perform below average in elections.

The European Centre for Electoral systems (ECES), has said that although women constitute the largest chunk of the country's voting population, they occupy only 5.8% of the political offices in the country. In 2015, there were only six women in the federal cabinet. There were seven female senators and six female deputy governors. Only one female contested for the office of president and four for vice president. Women are under-represented in Nigerian government institutions: of the National Assembly's four hundred and sixty-nine members, less than 5% are women. Global statistics for gender parity indicate that, out of one hundred and eighty-eight countries in 2015, Nigeria was 152nd in the Human Development Index in Gender Inequality. It was the

118th out of one hundred and ninety-two countries in 2017.

In 2019, the sudden withdrawal of Dr Oby Ezekwesill from the Presidential race caused disarray in the gender equality discourse (Premium Times, 23 February 2019). Before her withdrawal, only six females had been cleared to contest in the Presidential elections and all six withdrew and different times of the electoral process. This dealt a blow to women's political participation considering 47% of voters were women. According to a Premium Times article by Dr Chiedu Nwankwor and Elohor Nkereuwem:

> ˜In today's federal elections—Presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives—women's candidature is unimpressive. For the presidential elections, men swamp women by a 12:1 ratio. Women's presidential candidature stands at eight%. At the National Assembly, women's candidature is only 12% of the total seats available, given that a total of seven hundred and sixty-three women are vying for seats for the Senate and House of Representatives out of 6,563 places available. Simply put, at eight and 12% candidature for the presidential and National Assembly elections, respectively, the prospects for gender parity in Nigeria remains a distant dream.

The same article goes on to say:

> As gender issues and women's political and economic empowerment take centre stage [in] the global arena, Nigeria appears intent on maintaining its position at the bottom of the ladder of women's political empowerment. [Data for 2018] show that women's rates of participation in formal decision-making remain one of the lowest on the continent and across the world with women occupying an abysmal 5.6% (eighty-six out of 1,534) of all elective positions at both the national and sub-national levels.



According to the IFES Election Guide, the following figures comprise the gender data for the just concluded elections:

1. Female Population: 99,086,852 (2019 est.);
2. Is Nigeria a signatory to CEDAW: Yes (23 April 1984);
3. Has Nigeria ratified CEDAW: Yes (13 June 1985);
4. Gender Quota: No;
5. Female candidates in this election: Yes;
6. Number of Female Parliamentarians: 20/360 (House of Representatives); 7/108 (Senate);
7. Human Development Index Position: 157 (2018);
8. Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) Categorisation: Very High (2014).

According to the Nigerian Women's Trust Fund (NWTF), despite women's contribution to the electoral process, their participation in governance in the country has continued to decline. At a recent NWTF experience-sharing event for female political participants, Austin Aigbe of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), decried low women's representation in governance and argued for an inclusive democracy.

The low levels of women's participation in governance and decision-

making is a cause of concern, it appears with every election, the numbers keep decreasing instead of increasing. It is surprising that with women making up 47% of the voting public cannot increase and improve the numbers. We need to be asking salient questions:

1. Why are women not voting for women?
2. What accounts for their giving their votes to men?
3. Do they not have confidence in their fellow women?
4. Is it that they believe that women are not ripe for politics?
5. Are they only paying lip service to the principle of gender equality?
6. How can we address the factors preventing them from voting for women?
7. What are CSOs and NGOs not doing right in mobilising women to vote for women?
8. Is it necessary to review existing strategies?

Many people blame gender inequality for some of these problems. We may need to discuss some of these issues to gain some insight into their magnitude.

Structural issues that affect women's political participation

The following factors influence the status of gender equality and the situation of women in Nigeria:

1. Patriarchy: the patriarchal nature of our society deeply embedded in traditions and cultures that subjugate women and treat them as second-class citizens;
2. Constitutional rights: archaic laws that justify the second class status of women such as inheritance laws in some parts of the country;
3. Gender roles and division of labour: long-held traditional roles that see women as solely homemakers, cooking and cleaning while men are sole breadwinners and those perceived as 'working;'
4. Economy: men having the power balance of earning the so-called 'real' income. Policies that prevent women from accessing loans and funding to start or grow a business to a large scale;
5. Health and HIV/AIDS: some perceive women who are ill as a burden and send them to the village to die. They treat them as social pariahs and leave them to die;
6. Legal and human rights: women not having access to legal representation due to the prohibitive costs. Illegal policies that prevent women from bailing suspects;

7. Agriculture: women participate fully in agriculture but cannot get loans and other resources to engage in large scale farming;
8. Gender-based violence: in the form of domestic violence perpetrated by partners or spouses;
9. Justice and law enforcement: women are likely to be treated worse at the hand of law enforcement officers due to their vulnerability. They are also prone to be sexually assaulted by these same security officers while in custody and/or in the cause of seeking help. These cases go investigated;
10. Civil disturbance and conflict: women tend to be the main victims during these conflicts. They make up most of the refugees, they watch their husbands and sons killed. They are raped, assaulted and forced into sex slavery and labour;
11. Information and technology: women are usually less technologically inclined due to a lack of the wherewithal to access modern technology as a result of prohibitive cost.

Importance of encouraging women's political participation

Research has shown that encouraging more women to participate in politics offers tangible gains and benefits. According to Women Deliver, these include:

1. Greater responsiveness to the needs of citizens;
2. Increase in cooperation across ethnic and party lines as women are bridge builders;
3. Improved gender equality, which affects responses to policy issues;
4. Women in politics tend to focus on issues that affect the quality of life as they tend to prioritise family and women and consider ethnic, racial and other minority issues.

Policies and legal frameworks that promote women's political participation

Several key policies promote women's participation in politics. These include the National Gender Policy, National Gender Strategic Framework, African Protocol on People's Rights and the Rights of Women, National Mandate for Gender Equality, and National Gender Management System. The goal of the National Gender Policy is to build a just society devoid of discrimination and harness the full potentials of all social groups regardless

of sex or circumstance. It also aims to promote the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and protect the health, social, economic and political well-being of all citizens to achieve equitable rapid economic growth. Additionally, it seeks to evolve an evidence-based planning and governance system where human, social, financial and technological resources are efficiently and effectively deployed for sustainable development.

How to achieve the strategies in the National Gender Policy

1. Policy, partnership and programme reform through mainstreaming of gender concerns at all levels;
2. Gender education and capacity building to enhance necessary technical expertise and positive gender culture;
3. Legislative reforms to guarantee gender justice and respect for human rights;
4. Economic reforms for enhanced productivity and sustainable development especially that which addresses the needs of women and children and other vulnerable groups.

Strategies to achieve the objectives of the National Gender Policy include:

1. Partnership with donor agencies;
2. Programme reform through mainstreaming of gender concerns at all levels;
3. Gender education and capacity building to bring technical expertise into conformity with international standards;
4. Encouragement of a positive gender culture;
5. Legislative reforms to guarantee gender justice and respect for human rights;
6. Economic reforms for enhanced productivity and sustainable development, especially that which addresses the needs of women and children and other vulnerable groups.

2019 elections in Nigeria

The three factors of election analysis in Nigeria are the general mood on election day, security at the polling booths, and overall turnout. According to numerous sources, mixed moods prevailed on election day. Many were reportedly excited and others apathetic because of the postponement of the elections by one week. As this is controversial, I would not like to go into

further details. However, it was clear that a great number of women came out to vote: the female turnout was impressive.

Barring some states that had some security issues, such as intimidation, harassment, kidnapping, killings, and alleged interference by security forces, the elections were relatively peaceful. However, there have been many calls for an improvement of security at polling booths across the country. Videos from some states were worrisome and some personal testimonies show that we are a long way from the ideal situation. Election observers have expressed some concerns that we hope INEC and the government will address in preparation for subsequent elections. This will help ensure that women do not become discouraged from voting in future.

Regarding election turnout, according to an IFES report published on 28 February 2019, voter turnout had been 34.7% as against 43.6% in 2015. It had been predicted that the turnout in 2019 would be either the same or lower than it had been in 2015. The INEC website states that there are 84,004,084 registered voters, 119,973 polling units and ninety-one registered political parties.

It has been difficult getting up to date statistics on the numbers In this election and no doubt the relevant bodies, agencies and organisations are working on publishing their reports and figures. We look forward to reading these reports.

However, electoral experience indicates some fundamental challenges that have contributed to women's poor performance in politics generally. We summarise them in the following sections.

Challenges

Key factors responsible for the poor performance of women in elections include:

1. Money politics: This is one of the banes of women's participation in politics. This generally means you need to have a lot of money to be able to participate. The prohibitive cost of nomination forms, the cost of campaigns and logistics around contesting, and the peculiar political practices in Nigeria are factors that sideline and discourage women from full participation;
2. Electoral Violence: This is the cankerworm that is destroying Nigeria's electoral system and discouraging women from participating in elections and on electoral issues. Violence perpetrated on the campaign trail,

violence at the polling stations and various threats to life that candidates suffer during and even after elections is a cause for concern;

3. Sexual discrimination and harassment: These still pervade the electoral system. Sexual predators see women who participate in politics as fair game. They believe women should be at home and should be assaulted and exploited once they come into the public square;
4. Cultural, religious and traditional factors: Many of these still serve to deter women from participating in politics. These same factors serve to deter women from voting for other women. Many men still openly share the view that 'they will not take instructions from women' in the workplace. The issue of women submitting to men on the home front is still at the back of a woman's mind in the workplace. That affects some women's ability to be firm and assertive when dealing with junior male colleagues at work. Many women have had to deal in professional settings with insults like "I have your type at home." We see situations where people ignore women's suggestions or contributions at meetings and ridicule women, irrespective of the importance of their input. Such attitudes silence women and discourage them from speaking out for fear of being shamed.

According to the Electoral Knowledge Network (EKN), elections comprise several integrated building blocks, with different stakeholders interacting and influencing each other. Electoral components and stakeholders do not stand alone: they are interdependent. Therefore, the breakdown of one element (for example the collapse of a particular system of voter registration) can impact others negatively, including the election's credibility itself. This adverse impact could spread to the legitimacy of the elected government and the democratisation process of a partner country and its overall development objectives. It seems, then, that social factors overtly or covertly discourage women at every stage from having a voice; they collectively silence women.

Nevertheless, it is not all doom and gloom for women's political participation in Nigeria. There is hope for improvement, as there have been some notable achievements over the years.

Prospects

Global statistics show that one in five members of parliament worldwide are women, due to the quotas that some political systems give them. The

European Centre for Electoral Systems (ECES) states that, although women constitute most of the country's voting population, they occupy only 5.8% of its political offices. In 2015, there were only six women appointees to the federal cabinet in Nigeria. There were seven female senators and six female deputy governors. Only one female contested for the office of president and four for vice president. Women are under-represented in Nigerian government institutions: of the National Assembly's four hundred and sixty-nine members, less than 5% are women. Nigeria was the 152nd of one hundred and eighty-eight countries in the Human Development Index in Gender Inequality in 2015 and 118th of one hundred and ninety-two countries in 2017.

Many of the women that will be elected into various political offices will have little or no knowledge of governance and the art of leadership. Political accountability to women begins with increasing the number of women in decision-making positions, but it cannot stop there. It requires governance reforms that equip public institutions with the incentives, skills, information and procedures to respond to women's needs.

Political accountability for women requires:

1. **Strong mobilisation**: Women's movements have played an important role in challenging authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Nepal, Peru and the Philistine. They have helped build pressure for peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Burundi, Timor-Leste, and the Balkans. Women have also lobbied for legislation against genital mutilation in Senegal and Burkina Faso, to guarantee inheritance rights in Rwanda, and to promote rights in marriage in Brazil and Turkey;
2. **Strong representation**: Quotas and other temporary special measures, such as reserved seats, are proven means for supporting women's engagement in political competition. Ninety-five countries now use them at national and sub-national levels:
    1. In 2007 elections, the average representation of women was 19.3% in those countries with electoral quotas, as opposed to 14.7% for those countries without, regardless of the electoral system;
    2. Eighteen of the twenty-two countries that boast 30% or more women in national assemblies applied quotas in some form;
3. **Strong legislation and policy**: Higher numbers of women in parliament generally contribute to stronger attention to women issues:

1. A 2008 study of U.K. politics confirms that issues of importance to women—childcare, social protection, etc.—have received more attention since women parliamentarians doubled in number to 18.2% following the 1997 elections;
2. At the local level, examples from India and Norway suggest that women in decision-making positions tend to have a positive impact on the delivery of services to women and children;

4. **Strong implementation**: Even when the political will does exist, many governments lack the capacity, resources, or know-how to implement gender equality policies:
    1. Bureaucracies that mirror the patterns of diversity in the public they serve are more likely to be responsive to the specific needs of a variety of marginalised social groups. In Afghanistan, the government recently committed to fast track the increase of women's participation in the civil service at all levels to 30% by 2013.

How to make this happen?

We need to promote initiatives that will support and create an enabling environment for women to participate in politics and leadership. Some things we could do include:

1. Promote the leadership and participation of women in various levels of decision-making processes in government, public sector, private sector, financial institutions and other key agencies;
2. Increase women's representation in decision-making at various levels within the current electoral cycle ahead of the 2023 general election;
3. Support women's political participation and empowerment through specialised capacity building training geared towards leadership;
4. Provide targeted capacity building training to women candidates about the electoral process and other aspects of leadership.

I would like to share three key steps that may prove helpful. The most important being, you need to start with the 'self.' Politics is not for the faint-hearted. To take up a career in politics, you need to do your homework and prepare effectively. The individual who seeks political office or a leadership position must do her research and set out her action plan. How do you do this? First, she must undertake introspection. Assessing one's self and putting one's

self across positively is important: This is done by asking yourself certain key questions: Who am I? What is my purpose? What do I hope to achieve?

We do self-assessment by:

1. Establishing core values, your attitude — your whole self;
2. Developing assertiveness and knowing what to say and when to say it;
3. Setting goals/strategy and implementing action plans;
4. Balancing home life and work /life balance;
5. Gathering information, understanding the issues that affect women and mapping out an action plan.

Achieving excellence through adequate preparation

1. Finding appropriate support and assembling a dream team;
2. Developing speech writing skills or finding a good speech writing that can capture the essence of your message;
3. Assessing the political environment within your immediate environment and your role in shaping its future;
4. Knowing your audience and how to capture their attention;
5. Understanding the scope of women's rights and barriers to their achieving those rights and what you can do to promote those rights and bring down the barriers;
6. Constructive use of feedback as a tool for leadership;
7. Using questions as a tool to examine your leadership capacity;
8. Identifying stress management techniques — staying relaxed on the campaign trail.

The campaign and advocacy process needs to be well researched and there needs to be adequate and proper planning put in place to ensure maximum success. You need to have a strategy in place.

Strategies to use on the Campaign Trail

1. Developing appropriate and effective communication skills — communicating in the right manner to the right audience — tone of voice and body language;
2. Building effective presentation and public speaking skills to adapt to different types of audience and backgrounds;
3. Developing the appropriate poise, diction, and eloquence;
4. Taking into cognizance little things like make-up, grooming, dressing

appropriately for the audience and even colour co-ordination of outfits;
5. Making a grand entrance and making a physical statement by your arrival;
6. Preparing for the debate — rehearsing and getting it right. Ensuring you have researched the key issues, have the latest statistics available, and can discuss them confidently and eloquently;
7. Spend some time on developing your image, your public relations campaign, your message. Letting people know what you stand for;
8. Developing strategies for sustainable initiatives, networking, partnering supporting peace and trust initiatives within and across the regions;
9. Designing and co-creating new innovative interventions — using technology to promote your message to keep you in the public view.

Women need to be able to speak to other women. This means understanding women's issues and addressing them. You cannot say you are a women's activist but say the same things the men say. You cannot say you want women's votes but are not canvassing women's issues. I believe women political participants should have a long introspection and identify the real issues that affect women. Women should stop parroting general issues. They need to show sincerity and do due diligence. They need to stand out from male candidates by showing knowledge of women issues and showing what plans they have to address them.

We need to change the mindset that issues do not matter, that it is all about money politics. The 2019 elections just like the 2015 elections have shown us that we can conduct issues-based campaigns and that issues do matter. The 2019 elections have shown us that having money is not enough to secure a seat in politics. It may make it easier, no doubt, but, to succeed, you must have some solid issues that the people are in tune with.

It is not too early for women to start laying the foundation for the 2023 elections. There are so many learnings from past elections that serious candidates can study and prepare. We must stop this habit of last-minute campaigns and start early to woo the constituency by engaging in voluntary, charity and advocacy within the community. Women must start to be known for their stand and what they believe in. We must start seeing them and hearing their voice from now. So, that when we see their posters, we can say, "I know her. She stands for what I believe in. And I will vote for her. I will mobilise other women to vote for her too."

Having discussed the above, we must understand certain key concepts: women's participation in leadership, women in decision-making, and women in politics. These are broad terms that mean different things, which necessitates their unpacking to enhance understanding. Being in a leadership position is different from being in politics and being in leadership and politics puts you in a decision-making position. Being in politics may put you in a leadership or decision-making position. However, not all politicians are in leadership positions, and being in leadership does not translate to being in politics. Also, not all female politicians are in leadership. I agree that these are debatable definitions nevertheless, let's see why understanding these definitions matter.

Women in leadership are women in positions of influence because they hold a senior executive position, such as Director-General, Managing Director, Country Director, Executive Secretary, etc. When I think of women in leadership positions, I think of the Managing Director, Nigeria Ports Authority, Mrs Hadiza Bala or the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Mrs Aysha Ahmed. I also think of the Principal of Schools, the Heads of CSOs and NGOs and other women who lead various boards, organisations and committees. These women may not be politicians but professionals who have risen through the ranks. Or they may have been appointed due to their professional expertise.

Women in decision-making refer to women who are in positions to make or contribute to decisions with far-reaching impacts on others. Here, I would refer to women that are members of boards, committees, management teams and panels. Here I would be thinking of, for example, Mrs Abike Dabiri-Erewa who is on the Presidential Management Team as the Special Advisor to the President on Foreign Affairs. I would also have in mind Mrs Maryam Uwais, Special Advisor to the President on Social Investment. In many of these cases, they may be appointed either due to recognition in professional or political experience. They may also be appointed due to political party affiliations or nominations by politicians. In some cases, it is by self-recognition.

Women in politics would refer to women who are actively engaged in politics and the electoral process via campaigning, contesting, mobilisation etc. Here I would be thinking of women like Mrs Binta Koje-Mashi, in the Senate and Nkiruka Onyejeocha, in the House of Representatives. I would also refer to women who are party members, women leaders, card-carrying members and the women voters etc. For this paper, I have limited my discussion to women in politics and the decision-making process per the above definition.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that we need to encourage more women to participate in politics. We need more women in leadership and decision-making positions in and outside politics. We can only do this by advocating for affirmative action and placing women in strategic positions. Also, we must advocate for more qualified women to hold leadership positions in government, industry and politics. Women must encourage more women to aspire for available leadership positions and contest for political office. We must encourage women to vote for women and advocate for men to vote for qualified and competent women by pushing for gender equality and gender parity.

In summary, having women participate effectively in public life is key to building and establishing strong and vibrant democracies. Let's start this advocacy now!

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Chapter 22 | Women and Political Participation in Nigeria

Samuel Egwu

Introduction and the problematique

The exclusion of women and other disadvantaged groups from representation and decision-making is a growing concern today, even as democracy spreads globally since its "third wave" began in the 1990s. This situation persists although the constitutions of all modern democracies guarantee equal rights for women, including the rights to citizenship and suffrage. The disparity between theory and practice raises fundamental questions of social justice, given that most of the electorate but few elected leaders are women. It also has negative effects on future generations, as ongoing imbalances in equal opportunities can affect the prospects for social and economic development in the longer term.

At the core of democratic politics and its legitimacy as a mechanism of representing citizens and constituencies is the extent to which it captures the diversity of society. Consequently, scholars have to recognise the level of participation of women in electoral competition and subsequently in decision-making processes as the litmus test of the growth and maturity of democracies (Rai, Nelson and Chowdhury, 1994).

Most African countries, including Nigeria, have not given women adequate opportunities to participate in governance.[1] The progress of women in these few countries has resulted from a combination of historical and political factors including the adoption of Affirmative Action principles. These factors have significantly contributed to ensuring improved representation of women in parliament and other decision-making institutions, women lag behind their male counterpart. Thus, alongside the general concern about the relative under-representation of women in parliament and other organs for the "authoritative allocation of values," is its specific manifestation in Africa and Nigeria in

1. The few exceptions, including South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania, have witnessed dramatic increases in women representation.

particular.

In the context of the post-2019 general elections, there is a need to return to the drawing board to reinforce Nigeria's democracy by the greater inclusion of women and other disadvantaged groups. This is the issue the paper seeks to address.

Women's participation in politics: global and national rights regime

Several international instruments recognise that gender equality in political participation is an undeniable element of democratic governance. Foremost among them is the 1948 United Nations *Universal Declaration on Human Rights*. The regional ones include the African Union's *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance* and the Economic Community of West African States' *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*. These instruments and conventions recognise that men and women should have equal rights and opportunities fully in all aspects and at all levels of political processes.

However, the 1979 United Nations *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* marked a turning point in expanding the "Bill of Rights" for women. The global commitment enshrined in CEDAW and the progress made during the United Nations Decade for Women, 1976-1985, created the momentum for the 1995 United Nations Beijing Conference. Not surprisingly, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action mandated Member-States to "take measures to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making."

Similarly, the 2000 *United Nations Millennium Declaration* committed the global community to promote gender equality and women empowerment as effective ways to combat poverty, hunger, and disease and stimulate sustainable development. It contains a statement of values and principles and eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Millennium Development Goal 3 sought to promote gender equality and empower women. The 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security reaffirmed the importance of women's participation in the security sector and peace processes. It emphasised the importance of women's "equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security." There is continuity between the MDGs and the successor Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These latter goals commit the world, among other things, to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable

development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

Inspired by the National Gender Policy, Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has formulated its gender policy. It commits the body to the promotion of gender equality and access as part of institutional reform and consultations with stakeholders in the electoral process. The policy adopts as its broad goals the federal government's 35% Affirmative Action policy and women's political advancement and representation. More importantly, it focuses on a combination of strategies including engagement with the political parties as gatekeepers to women's participation.

These include ensuring that INEC policies, plans, and operations are gender-responsive and encouraging gender equity within political parties, especially in the selection of candidates. They also include increased budgetary provisions and mobilising partners to effectively provide funding for gender-sensitive actions within their purview. Finally, the policy calls for and supporting an enabling legislative environment to achieve gender quality and bridging gaps in political representation in elective posts at all electoral levels (INEC, 2014, p.11).

Women and democratic elections since 1999

The representation of women in Nigerian parliaments, at both national and sub-nation levels, is far from mirroring the demographics of women in the country's population profile. Available evidence from elections since 1999 shows that women constitute less than 8% of elected public officials. Additionally, it is worrying that women representation appears to dwindle election after election while Nigeria's democracy show signs of consolidation. There appears to be a mismatch, therefore, between the level of women's participation as voters and electoral aspirants and their representation in elective positions in the executive and legislative branches of government.

For instance, in 2002, 2007, and 2011, women were only 3, 7, about 5%, respectively, of elected officials. Also, few women emerged as candidates from the party primaries for the 2015 general elections. In the twenty-nine states where gubernatorial elections held this year, women were only eighty-seven (22.9%) of the three hundred and eighty candidates for the office of governor or deputy governor. In the senatorial contests, INEC cleared one hundred and twenty-two women out of seven hundred and forty-seven candidates, representing 16%, to run in the 28 March election. The number was not better

in the contest for the lower chamber of parliament. Two hundred and sixty-seven women out of a total of 1774 candidates ran for seats at the House of Representatives, representing 15% (Gabriel, 2015:4).

In the 2015 general elections, fourteen females won elections into the House of Representatives and eight women won as senators in the just concluded National Assembly election. What this means is that there are only fourteen females out of three hundred and sixty lawmakers for this current House of Representatives. The outgoing seventh assembly had twenty-seven women and only eight of them were re-elected for the 8th Assembly. Similarly, the 8th Senate has eight women out of one hundred and nine senators. Again, out of the fourteen candidates that contested for the seat of the president, the only woman among the contenders came out in the 12th position (Akor, 2015:8).

There are contending explanations of why Nigeria's electoral politics are gender-exclusive. Some include patriarchy and dominance, culture and religion, violence, money politics acting as impediments, deliberately excluding women from sharing power as equals with men. Others dispute this argument, claiming, absence of government-regulated quotas. However, while some of these explanations are valid confirmed by the experience of female politicians, the least considered explanation is the blockage constituted by political parties to effective participation of women in politics.

A study by Lai Olurode (2013) on the state of women's participation in the 2011 elections is revealing. The study focused on the manifestos of political parties to understand their positions on women both in a general and specific sense. Only three—the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and the People's Democratic Party (PDP)—exhibited coherence and understanding of women's political empowerment. Two parties—the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the Labour Party (LP)—seemed unconcerned or to think that gender issues were unimportant. However, even APGA, ANPP, and PDP had no strategy to right discriminatory practices against women. Some examples would suffice.

It is to the credit of these parties that they recognised the imperative of change in women's status. However, the best indicator of the translation into action of their manifestos is the representation of women in party executive bodies and among election contestants and victors.

Lai Olorude's study further illustrates this point by the positions women occupy in the leadership of five political parties—ACN, ANPP, APGA, LP and PDP. Women held the following positions in the ACN: National Women

Leader, National Auditor, Vice-Chairperson of North-West and National Auditor (four offices in all as at 2011 elections). The ANPP conceded eight party positions to women. These included those of Assistant National Financial Secretary (North-East), (South-East), Deputy Welfare Secretary, National Women leader, Financial Secretary, Assistant National Auditor (South-South and North-Central) and Assistant National Publicity Secretary. The APGA conceded three executive positions to women: National Welfare Secretary, National Women's Leader and Deputy National Women's leader; Labour Party conceded none to women. The PDP only gave them the position of National Women Leader.

Unquestionably, these positions are mere tokens in that they rarely attract "serious" male contenders, who are more interested in the more powerful party executive positions. The party positions that women occupy are rarely competitive and of little importance in inner-party decision-making. In other words, they are essentially ceremonial and most parties can even do without such positions and this would not hurt. With women's absence in respected executive party positions, it is challenging to insert their views into the party agenda.

There are lessons to learn from the 2019 elections to advance the political participation of women and as candidates. One is the lack of will on the part of the mainstream political parties to conduct party activities, including leadership and candidate selection openly and transparently. In this regard, the casualties are not only women but all the underprivileged members of the political parties. The fact of targeted exclusion of the womenfolk is an entirely different matter. The second problem is the lack of capacity in the political parties to conduct their affairs openly and transparently in manners that accord with their constitutions, bye-laws and the feelings of their members. The parties lack documented membership, the resources to conduct direct primaries, and a distinct agenda for women.

Engaging the Political Parties

Political parties are the institutional foundations of competitive and democratic elections. Therefore, experts, regulators, and party members increasingly accept the need to regulate them to the extent necessary to ensure effective, representative, and democratic governance that includes women and other disadvantaged groups.

The fundamental point is that political parties are gatekeepers,

unfortunately, often of women's political participation. The challenges women face in them and as electoral candidates include gender-based discrimination in party procedures and practices, gender insensitivity in candidate selection and outreach, and the inequitable distribution of party resources.

The key areas of engagements are:

1. Legislation to govern political parties can directly or indirectly discriminate against women. For instance, the high deposits required of candidates can work against women, who might be unable to fulfil the requirement due to their political and socio-economic disadvantages vis-à-vis men.
2. Another is requirements for advanced educational qualifications or minimum years of public service can unduly limit the right to stand for public office and may disproportionately affect potential women candidates.
3. Focusing more closely on the generic role of political parties in democratic elections, including providing campaign funding to its candidates, rallying voters, and creating national platforms to enhance the visibility of women as candidates.
4. Reform of the party system to include proportional representation, where parties nominate candidates and can by this means ensure better women's representation in electoral processes and parliament.
5. Campaign for the adoption of party quotas, either voluntarily or due to a legislative requirement, so that parties compulsorily implement gender quotas.

A review of global best practices

Implementing political quotas

Three main types of political quotas for gender representation exist:

1. ***Voluntary Quotas****;* adopted by political parties in some countries, which involve a party committing itself to nominate a certain percentage of female candidates for electoral lists;
2. ***Candidate quotas,*** required by the law, stipulate that a certain number of candidate positions must be reserved for women. They sometimes include conditions on the position of women on the electoral list, for instance in any candidates list one in every two successive ranking names

must belong to the same gender;

3. ***Reserved seats*,** positions for which only female candidates can compete and are used as a more direct way of regulating the number of women in elected positions. Of the countries that have gender quotas, 61% have voluntary party quotas (often in combination with other types), 38% have legislated candidate quotas, and 20% have reserved seats for women.

Even then, it is the strength of the nominating political—rather than money—that determines the chances of women. Ethnicity, language and familiarity with the constituency are often equally crucial for any candidate. Respondents also noted that women face challenges that are not directly related to money, in particular parties' unwillingness to nominate them and some voters' reluctance to vote for them.

Development of strong women's wings of political parties

Women's wings and committees of political parties are internal party sections that aim to strengthen women's representation within the party and in the political process in general. Creating women's wings of political parties is not a new phenomenon and has been promoted by parties and women activists since the last century. Often, women's wings help promote women's interests in party policy platforms and strengthen the demand for increasing women's representation in party nomination lists and decision-making processes. A good example is the Women's League of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. The advocacy by the ANC Women's League against all Forms of discrimination and gender imbalance led to the ANC resolution that one-third of its representatives in Parliament must be women. That decision significantly transformed the newly-elected democratic Parliament of South Africa.

Providing financial incentives and aid to women candidates

Political parties can also adopt policies and special measures that provide women candidates financial assistance during campaigns and while they hold public office.

Creating incentives for political parties to promote women

Sometimes relying on political will is not enough. Research shows that financial and other incentives for better representation of excluded groups are an important motivator for political parties to place more women candidates

on their nomination lists and party structures. Such incentives can be in the form of additional public funds provided to political parties ensuring gender balance in their nomination lists. For instance, in Ethiopia, international organisations jointly provided a basket fund with allocations of goods and services for parties and individual candidates in the 2005 elections. Parties fielding women candidates received an extra allocation.

Conclusion and Way Forward

Our reflections on Nigeria's post-2019 elections should commit us to build a more inclusive democracy and to return to the reform agenda where we left it. The wave of reform, which reached its height in 2007, generated several recommendations, including for reform of the country's electoral and party systems.

A return to the reform agenda requires that we:

1. Reform of the party system to build the political parties as strong and functional democratic institutions;
2. Introduce a mixed electoral system that tempers the first-past-the-post system with an element of proportional representation based on closed party lists;
3. Amend the constitution to take party and electoral matters out of the constitution to avoid the bumpy path of constitutional amendment;
4. Regulate the parties by EMBs to enforce mandatory quotas for women and minority and disadvantaged groups;
5. Ensure the equitable representation of women in all aspects of national life, including party organs and the workforce, in line with the UN Conventions on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.

Democracy is a long haul.

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Part 8 | Youths, Leadership and Political Mobilisation

Chapter 23 | Youth, Leadership, Democracy and Development in West Africa

Asuzu Echezona

Each generation must, out of relative obscurity,
discover its mission, fulfil it, or betray it.
—Frantz Fanon

Introduction

The United Nations celebrated World Youth Day on 12 August 2017, with the theme "Youth Building Peace." The day offered world leaders and young people the world over an opportunity to reflect on the challenges and opportunities for youth. Thus, there cannot be a better time to put the concerns of young people on the front burner than now. This Roundtable Discourse's leading thought is also apt: "Youth, Leadership, Democracy and Development in West Africa."

One can hardly discuss the youth question outside the context of forces that shape society and influence its development. The United Nations recognises this and captured from inception the youth question in its broad developmental framework. In 1965, its member states endorsed the Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples. Twenty years on, the United Nations reaffirmed its commitment to the global youth by declaring 1985 as the International Youth Year. A decade later, the UN institutionalised its commitment to promote the interests of young people by adopting the World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY), a condensate of fifteen priority areas, proposals, and implementation handles.

The African Union birthed its Youth Charter in July 2006 in Banjul following the recommendations and policy course of action of the African Union Constitutive Act and Strategic Plan of 2004-2007. The thrust of the charter is to prescribe responsibilities to AU member states for the development of youth. It also aims at including young people in the developmental agenda of the continent and effective participation in the debates and decision-making

processes. Finally, the African Youth Charter provides a legal basis for improving access by young people to social services and mainstreaming the youth of the continent into governance processes and leadership.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) initiated the sub-regional youth policy in 2003. The ECOWAS Youth Policy, like the AU Youth Charter, aims to increase youth access to lifelong supporting facilities to optimise youth participation in politics and decision-making processes. Some ECOWAS countries have developed, adopted and domesticated their own National Youth Policy, albeit, taking their bearing from established global and regional youth instruments.

Pardon me if I refrain from dwelling much on the definitions of youth, leadership, democracy, and development, concepts that the lead paper has adequately espoused.

The recognition of youth by global, continental and national institutions as a demographic with special needs underscores the critical role of young people in nation-building and development. Yet, despite diverse initiatives by many African countries, the youth question remains largely unanswered. Young people in Africa and the sub-region still bear the heaviest toll of illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, disease burden, armed conflict and exclusion from the political process. I have no doubt that the organisers of this roundtable discussion has the foregoing inequities against African youth in mind when it themed this event "Youth, Leadership, Democracy and Development in West Africa." Unfortunately, today's youth are so docile that most accept their stereotype by the ruling class as social aggressors. Throughout history; pre-colonial and colonial, African youth have never been this quiescent. A conscious youth population would insist that they are only victims of a deliberate demographic war.

The historical role of youth in the development of West Africa

Leadership succession in many pre-colonial African societies was usually from king to heir. Therefore, pre-colonial African youth had opportunities to not only participate in decision-making processes but also lead their people. This was the experience in the ancient Mali Empire, Ashanti Empire, Nri Kingdom, Oyo Empire, Sokoto Caliphate, Fon Empire (Dahomey), Borno Empire, Kaabu Empire and many others. In pre-colonial African societies, youth were the ones that tilled the land, hunted for meat, built houses, maintained the village square, paved the roads, guarded the water sources and

went to war. Thus, youth in pre-colonial African states occupied a special place in the evolution and development of many African communities and societies.

I am sure there are a few people who do not know that the richest man ever is not King Solomon of the Bible days but a young King from West Africa. Forbes rates King Musa Keita as the richest man to have ever lived. Musa Keita 1, otherwise known as Mansa Musa (which translates as "Emperor" or "Conqueror"), was the 10th Musa of the Mansa Dynasty. Musa Keita became the king of Mali at the age of thirty-two. Under his reign, Mali became the wealthiest kingdom on planet earth. Musa Keita 1 is famed for enriching the great trading city of Timbuktu and epitomising social governance by building libraries and Islamic universities. Musa Keita also developed urban centres in Mali and erected many historic edifices. He undertook a legendary pilgrimage to Mecca, with over 60,000 attendants draped in pomp and pageantry, elaborately spraying gold coins on the poor of the Sahel region. Many historians believe that this was what drew the attention of the Spanish crown and European economic explorers and soldiers of fortune to West Africa.

There were other great young kings, princes, business moguls and intellectual giants that happened upon the consciousness of pre-colonial West Africa. King Jubo Jubogha, also known as King Jaja of Opobo, was born in Umuduruoha, Amaigbo in present-day Imo State but enslaved in Opobo in today's Rivers State. He purchased his freedom while yet young and became an astute businessman, influential community leader, and civil rights activist. Jaja of Opobo rose from the shackles of slavery to not only become a great business tycoon but also the King of the loose ruling houses of Bonny Kingdom. He resisted British imperialism in the creeks of the Niger Delta. He went on to establish the Opobo City State and transformed the city into a renowned trading post. Under his business prowess, Opobo was shipping palm oil directly to Liverpool without the intervention of British middlemen. His civil and business activism made him one of the talking points of the 1884 Berlin Conference. This eventually led to his arrest, exile, and incarceration by the British imperialists, culminating in his death in 1891.

Also, there was a young great African literary giant and intellectual known as Olaudah Equiano, otherwise known as Gustavus Vassa. Mr Equiano bought his freedom from slavery and went on to become a literary giant, merchant, explorer and renowned slave trade abolitionist. Usman Dan Fodio prosecuted the Jihad war as a young man. He became famous for establishing the Sokoto Caliphate, whose influence continues in northern Nigeria and beyond. There

was also Lewis Howard Latimer, the son of escaped slaves. He overcame the stigma of slavery to become one of the greatest inventors ever, working with great scientists such as Thomas Edison and Alexander Bell to secure many patents. He was particularly renowned for his work in improving the carbon filament in electric bulbs. Oba Ewuare (1740-1773) of the Benin Kingdom was only thirty-three when he died. Before his demise, he had established one of the most sophisticated trade route of his time complete with a robust policy framework and administrative support.

Time and space would fail me to write about other great young Africans in the pre-colonial era such as Sonni Ali who took the Songhai Kingdom to the pinnacle of its power. Like most West African rulers of his time, Sonni Ali assumed leadership at a young age and became renowned as a great military tactician. His military prowess helped to expand the Songhai Kingdom to cover parts of Mali, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria. There was also the Great Osei Kofu Tutu (1660-1717), the great King of Ashanti Kingdom who became the first ruler in sub-Saharan Africa to use modern fire-power in his army.

The pattern of bravery, heroism, consciousness and responsible leadership transcended the pre-colonial era as young Africans were to rise against colonial misadventurers. In West Africa, most of the liberation arrowheads were young people. The great Kwame Nkurumah who is regarded as the founding father of modern Ghana was only twenty-one years when he founded the Nzima Literary Society—his first political outfit. At the age of forty-three, Kwame Nkurumah was already the Prime Minister of Ghana. Dr Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe, who inspired Dr Kwame Nkurumah to study at his alma mater, Lincoln College, was only thirty-four when he became Editor of the *African Morning Post*, an Accra-based newspaper. He used the newspaper, and later the *West African Pilot*, to champion a Renascent Africa built on the pillars of spiritual balance, social regeneration, economic determinism, mental emancipation, and national resurgence. At forty, he joined active politics and co-founded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) with Dr Herbert Macaulay.

Chief Jeremiah Obafemi Awolowo was about thirty-five when he and others founded the Egbe Omo Oduduwa political movement in London. His co-founders included Dr Oni Akerele, Chief Akintola Williams, Chief Ayo Rosiji, Professor Saburi Biobaku. At thirty-eight, he published *The Path to Nigerian Freedom*, the first systematic federalist manifesto by a Nigerian

politician. Awolowo was only forty years when he founded the Nigerian Tribune, today the oldest surviving newspaper in Nigeria. He used the newspaper to promote nationalistic consciousness among Nigerians. In 1932, at the age of twenty-seven, Felix Houghouet-Boigny, the first President of Côte d'Ivoire, organised farmers in his country to resist French imperialist policies. That was the first cutting of his political teeth and marked the beginning of his rise in Ivory Coast's political echelon.

It is not always about young Africans who excelled in their partisan political career. There were also young Africans who provided strong leadership against the imperial siege of colonialists. One of them is Pa Michael Imoudu. Comrade Michael Imoudu organised and led what we could describe as the biggest trade union solidarity and action against colonial rule. In 1939, at age thirty-seven, he became the President of Railway Workers Union—the militant trade union that was pivotal to a series of popular actions that brought the British imperialists to their knees. In 1945, Pa Michael Imoudu acting in concert nationalist politicians of his day organised the 21-22 June 1945 general strike. The success of the 1945 strike action was the most profound message to the colonialists that Nigerians were no longer willing to tolerate their rule. That strike accelerated the chain of events that culminated in Nigeria's independence on 1 October 1960.

Mrs Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti was an impressionable young lady when she cut her teeth as a civil rights activist. Though married with children, she surmounted the stereotypes against women and mounted one of Africa's most virulent women activism against colonial rule. She led a popular demonstration in 1949 against the colonial authority, represented by the Alake of Egbaland, over high-handed taxation policies against women. It was so successful that it resulted in the reversal of the colonial tax policies and abdication of Oba Ademola II. Aeons before Mrs Kuti, another African Amazon; Queen Amina of Zaria bestrode the landscape of our political history. Legend has it that Queen Amina was just above thirty-five years when she assumed the leadership of the Zazzau emirate. She went on to rule for thirty-six years. During this period she extended the frontiers of her kingdom to Katsina, Kano, Nupe and Kwarafa. She was not only renowned for her military skills but also for her great business acumen. She transformed Zaria into a major trading post.

The heroism of these founding fathers of West African nation-states was remarkable. They matched the Western colonial usurpers intellect for intellect, wit for wit and excelled above the imperial outposts in political

organisation prowess. The results were outstanding. In less than twenty years of liberation activism, the young African nationalists were able to rout the army of imperialism and emancipated the mother continent from colonial tyranny. Their achievements, especially in laying a social and economic foundation for Africa's development, prove that youth is not a hindrance to good governance but offers real value in imagination and energy.

Even the military entrepreneurs that unleashed the darkness of despotic rule on the continent in the post-colonial era were all young when they seized power from Africa's founding fathers. In Nigeria, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, who led the first military coup, was barely twenty-nine years when he toppled Nigeria's First Republic. General Yakubu Gowon, leader of the counter-coup against forty-two-year-old General Aguiyi Ironsi, was twenty-eight years when he became the Head of State. In Togo, Gnassingbe Eyadema was only twenty-eight when he and Emmanuel Bodjolle, aged thirty-five, overthrew President Sylvanus Olympio in 1963. Eyadema went on to become the Head of State of Togo in 1967 at age thirty-two. Moussa Traore was thirty-two years when he overthrew the democratically elected government of Modibo Keita.

The "classless" class war on the youth demography

I crave the indulgence of the organisers of this Roundtable and indeed our highly esteemed audience to steer the ship of this discourse a little farther from the shores of the lead paper. This plea is because I am concerned and alarmed that the wounds of West African youth have been allowed to fester, deteriorate, and degenerate into an open, malignant sore. It is even worse when Africa's political elites orchestrate this ugly situation for self-serving reasons. According to Professor Okwudiba Nnoli (2011), the political elite in Africa have over the decades largely transformed itself into a predatory force of occupation. Professor Okwudiba prefers to call them the class of "petty bourgeoisie." This predatory and parasitic ruling class has by their actions and inactions plunged the continent into an intractable and internecine 'classless' class war. Unfortunately, youths are the cannon fodder and the most active frontier in the execution of this war. That war informs the emasculation of African youth from active participation in political leadership, democracy, and development in the sub-region and the continent.

The problems of Africa and, by extension, its youths transcend social, economic, and management theories. They are fundamentally a fallout of the class war between the only two real and distinctive tribes on the continent: "the

rich" and "the poor." By "rich", I mean members of Africa's ruling class and their friends who command unrestricted access to public wealth and goodwill. The membership of this class spans across the top echelon of the political establishment, the military institution, the cream la cream of the civil service and their lackeys in the so-called "portfolio private sector."

This class of the rich maintain their caste estate by expropriation, looting, subversion, confusion, and oppression. The unique selling point in their manifesto is "divide, conquer and rule." They only agitate like spoilt babies when there is a threat to their loot or political patronage. Their best choruses whilst at it are religious and ethnic lullabies. Once it is time to raid the commonwealth, they drop their ethno-religious cavalry pretensions and assume the mantle of "fellow compatriots." I pity anyone who is not a member of that class, or at worse a friend to members of that class; you are regarded and treated worse than the dreg of the earth.

Some would even ask, "Is there a class war in Nigeria?" This might be for two reasons. First, the class war in Nigeria and elsewhere on the continent is "classless:" it is bereft of morality, values, ethics, and principles. Even the basal virtue of "honour among thieves" does not apply to Africa's oppressive class. Today's African political elites are unlike the bourgeoisie in other parts of the world, who accumulate private capital principally by innovation, inheritance, talent, enterprise, lawful conquest, professional expertise, and organisational acumen. We know that most of their progenitors were the poorest of the poor. They only achieved importance, affluence, and "classless" class by misappropriating public office for "self-service." Worse still, they are unwilling to give up their status as they continue to indulge Draconian tendencies that portray them as most ungrateful to a system that gave them the best.

Second, the question of a class war in Nigeria and West Africa will persist as long as the looting class does not productively plough back its ill-gotten wealth to the countries they have robbed. Real classes only exist as a function of man's relationship with the production and distribution of wealth. Not the criminal plundering of the commonwealth!

A major tragedy of colonial rule in Africa was the disruption of our value system as founded on our productive and consumptive culture—the so-called "clash of civilisations." The plundering of latter days leaders compounded our woes in the post-colonial era: it disrupted our productive energies, diverted the attention of our youth and distorted our value system.

Tragically, those prosecuting the "classless" class war against Nigerian

youth of today were youths of yesterday who enjoyed free tuition and surplus scholarship throughout their education life. They were the ones who enjoyed excellent public facilities whether at school, hospitals or on the street. Also, they received instant job offers upon graduating from the university but are dishing out the worst social conditions to today's youth. They are the ones that have ingeniously supplanted genuine progressive student unionism with violent cultism in our citadels of higher learning. After looting the carbon resources in the Niger Delta, they have given youth guns and bombs to "finish" themselves. They are the ones who have armed youth to prosecute electoral wars for them and thereafter abandon them to a life of misery.

Someone asked one of them from South-East Nigeria why he was reluctant to bring the "boys" over to Abuja to enjoy what he was enjoying as a Senator. His reply: "Agbero anaghi abia Abuja." This translates into "there is no room for touts in Abuja."

They are the ones who have created the material condition for the virulent epidemic of prostitution, substance abuse, kidnapping and armed robbery on our streets. Boko Haram and their fellows in terrorist insurgency appear to be the last born of the ruling class licentious affair with our common patrimony. As I write this, the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) just declared a national strike. Once again the destinies of millions of Nigerian youth would be put on hold as a result of the ruling elites' recalcitrance in attending to the dilapidation in our public education.

Unfortunately, more than 99.9% of African youth belong to the perpetually vulnerable tribe of the "poor." In anti-thesis to this text's opening quote from Frantz Fanon, today's youth are more eager to be hangers-on around the corridors of the oppressors than active participants in the power equation. The long years of ceaseless siege on impressionable minds have reduced the populace into entranced spectators. We all watch in crass docility as the "ruining" class continues to hold our youth down, reduce the country into a jungle and perpetuate themselves and their kin as the kings of the jungle. And they have us where they want us. Most of us have lost touch and hope for a government that aspires to work for the greater good, a system that is committed to the public good.

Toppling democratic governments: The forerunner of youth emasculation

The long years of military rule in Africa, precisely West Africa, marked the beginning of the de-construction of the core values inherited from our forebears

and fruits of the struggle against colonial rule. The most significant value that got eroded with military dictatorship was a pattern of youth succession in political leadership. With the advent of military regimes came the "sit-tight" syndrome as military rulers held on to power for as long as possible. The suspension of democratic governance and prominence of despotic rule from the early 1960s to the turn of the millennium in the sub-region took its heaviest toll on the youth population. When military juntas took leave of absence from political power, they either transmuted into civilian dictators or handed over power to family members, friends, or cronies. Beneficiaries of such fraudulent power transitions were largely members of the same age demography as the military despots they replaced. Thus, the exclusion of youths from political leadership processes in West Africa became entrenched.

Even worse is the destruction of the supporting social structures that prepared young people for leadership. This became the totem for West Africa's military bourgeoisie and their civilian collaborators. To maintain a vice grip on their illegal regimes, West African military despots struck anti-people pacts with foreign governments, swallowed their economic pills hook, line and sinker and thus became vassals of powers elsewhere.

Writing in "Growing Apart", Professor Peter Lewis (2007) described as predatory the temperament and approach of Nigeria's military rulers, particularly Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha. He posits that their leadership style eroded the rule of law and public service delivery and greatly undermined state institutions. These latter included, especially, the principal agencies of economic management, crucial regulatory agencies, the civil service, and even the military institution they supposedly represented. Their implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) became the death knell on socio-economic services, especially regarding education, health, energy, agricultural, and public works. Youths were the worst hit by their neo-liberal policies. A similar scenario obtained in many countries of the sub-region, where military dictators or quasi-democrats that were at best only civilian governments held sway.

Comrade John Odah reveals in an article the findings on the development performance of six West African countries—Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria,

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1. Odah is the immediate past General Secretary of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and current Executive Secretary of Organisation of Trade Unions of West Africa (OTUWA). His article is in the Journal of the Centre for Trade Union Right.

Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo—during the period of structural adjustment.[1] A common thread runs through them: all went into serious economic decline, political chaos, and social unrest a few years after introducing the IMF's structural adjustment programme. Ironically, as foreign exports in the six study case countries increased, local implosions escalated.

Military dictatorships in the sub-region and elsewhere deployed SAP for three major ends. First, they used SAP as a placebo to appease western powers and thus maintain the grip of Africa's military adventurists on political power. Second, African dictators hid under the banner of SAP to collaborate with their friends in Western capitals and elsewhere to loot the commonwealth of state. Third, SAP became a potent tool in the "classless" class war against the youths. In Nigeria, the first hit was the education sector. In 1978, General Olusegun Obasanjo through Ahmadu Ali increased the cost of feeding in Nigerian universities resulting in the "Ali must go" protests. General Muhammadu Buhari continued the same pattern of arbitrary user cost increases in 1984. Despite promises that such neo-liberal policies were to improve access to quality education, the state of Nigeria's public education decades later proves otherwise. The same results appeared in the health and agricultural sectors as productivity greatly declined. That fall followed the reduction or outright removal of subsidies, subventions, grants, and other support services by the government, and the introduction of so-called "service charges" for public goods.

Statistics show that GDP grew reasonably for all six countries before SAP (1965-80), but the adjustment period (1979/80-87) recorded discouraging indices of production. For the period 1961-80, GDP for Cote d'Ivoire grew by 6.8% but declined to 2.2% during the period 1980-87. Nigeria's pre-adjustment growth rate of 6.9% in GDP drastically reduced to a negative growth rate of 1.7% following adjustment. Agricultural production during adjustment declined for all countries except Senegal, as did production in industry, manufacturing, and the service sector components of GDP. The industrial component for Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo registered negative growth rates during adjustment. In absolute terms, per capita income between 1978 and 1987 dropped for all countries except Senegal and Sierra Leone. (Akpan, 1987)

Even when the selected countries began some sort of stabilisation programme, the evidence shows that such efforts did not expand production. The high rate of inflation was, therefore, expected. During adjustment, the rate of inflation for Ghana and Sierra Leone stood at 48.3% and 50.0% respectively.

These high rates reduced real wages and worsened the standard of living of the populace especially the youth.

The provision of quality food, health, clean water, and other basic needs was below pre-adjustment levels in all the case study countries. Furthermore, the daily calorie supply per capita decreased in 1986 when compared to that of 1965. This was far below World Health Organisation's standard. In addition, public expenditure, consumption, investment and financial requirements also declined during the period of IMF/World Bank's structural adjustment. Governments of West Africa responded to the unpleasant reality by removing subsidies and retrenching workers; mainly youth. This only exacerbated social tensions.

The footprint of SAP in other parts of the African continent is no different. Asad Ismi (1998) submits that the so-called integration of African economies into the global economy through SAP did not achieve many of the claims by which its proponents justified it.[2] Africa failed to increase its economic growth, address poverty, reduce its debt, create sustainable jobs, quell social turmoil, improve the living standards, or enthrone accountable and democratic leadership. Under SAP, Africa's external debt increased by more than 500% since 1980. According to him, SAPs have transferred $229 billion in debt payments from Africa to the West since 1980. This is four times the region's debt as of 1980. In the past decade alone, African countries have paid their debt three times over, yet they are three times as indebted as ten years ago. Africa, the world's poorest region, pays the richest countries $15 billion every year in debt servicing. This is more than the continent gets in aid, new loans or investment.

A popular African adage instructs that anyone that cannot improve the living conditions of others should leave them where they are. The band of African military opportunists not only left their countries worse than they met them but have also refused to admit their guilt. Instead, they parade themselves as statesmen who deserve our everlasting tribute for offering themselves to the service of misappropriation, looting, and destruction. They have left the youth of the continent and sub-region with not only scars but also many questions.

Answering the West African youth question: The compelling issues

There is no gainsaying the fact that African quasi-bourgeoisie have not

2. See Ismi, *Impoverishing a Continent: IMF and World Bank in Africa* (1998).

only engorged themselves in primitive expropriation of our commonwealth but has left the continent in a sorry state. It is even worse in West Africa, where quasi-democrats and their accomplices in "khaki" combine the liquors of iniquity and impunity, all in a bizarre rat race of "who would loot the most!" Whilst they are at this scramble for public resource diversion and reprehensible convolution of political patronage, they have mortgaged both the today and the future of our youth.

The Social Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) recently released a report titled *From Darkness to Darkness: How Nigerians are Paying the Price for Corruption in the Electricity Sector.* The report reveals that successive PDP governments, from the Olusegun Obasanjo administration to Goodluck Jonathan's, spent more than ¦ 11.1 trillion on power generation. Guess what we got in return. Terabytes of darkness! The report warned that Nigeria is likely to lose another ¦ 20 trillion in the next decade if it does not fix the rot in the power sector.

In December 1994, the Chinese government initiated the Three Gorges Dam Project in the Yiliing District of Hubei Province. By May 2012, the Three Gorges Hydroelectric dam, with a capacity of generating 22,500 Megawatts of electricity, was ready for use. Guess the cost? The largest hydroelectric dam in the world cost the Chinese government $22.5 billion. That is a fraction of what Nigeria's "ruining class" expended on a phantom National Independent Power Project (NIPP) that has only generated terabytes of darkness. Of course, the NIPP generated life to the political and economic dreams of many of its operators. Two high-ranking members of Nigeria's Power Reform Committee transited from that important national assignment to the commanding heights of their State Governments as Governors. Please, do not ask me how they got the money to finance their elections. I am not Magu!

How can the youth be constructively active when the electricity to power their dreams is perpetually unavailable? What persuasive power can the sermon by the hypocritical "ruining class" have that youth should behave well, seek self-development, pursue entrepreneurship, and embrace God? How can it move the receivers when they see that the wealth and power of these politicians completely insulate their children from the harsh realities their policies create? Their offsprings school at Harvard, holiday in Dubai, and only return to Africa to lord it over the wasted victims of their parents' rule. How would the youth pursue entrepreneurship when inflation occasioned by non-transparent management of the economy cripples most start-ups even

before their engines gather steam? I do not want to dwell much on the de-industrialisation of our economy, i.e., the transformation of our factories into churches and mosques. Neither on the "individualisation" of governance, where citizens have become personal local governments providing water, security, education, and health-care for themselves. Nor on the polarisation of our politics along ethnic, religious and commercial lines.

A 2007 Human Rights Watch Report indicted Nigerian politicians of being the brain behind the recruitment of youth for election brigandage, rigging, violence and mayhem. The report states that political violence in Nigeria is most often the work of gangs, whose members public officials, politicians, party officials, and their representatives openly recruit, finance and, at times, arm. These gangs comprised primarily unemployed young men (lately, young women too!) are mobilised to attack their sponsors' rivals, intimidate members of the public, rig elections and protect their patrons from reprisal attacks.

The "ruining class" sabotaged a recent effort by Nigerians, using the Justice Uwais Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) Report, to re-shape the political landscape to accommodate young people. The Umaru Musa Yar'Adua and Goodluck Jonathan governments tossed the ERC Report into the rubbish can. That report's recommendations included the rehabilitation and reform of our political space, especially regarding the political independence of the leadership of the Election Management Body (EMB). They also included the establishment of an Election Offences Commission and the adoption of parliamentary proportional representation to accommodate disadvantaged groups. The result is that elections in Nigeria continue to be reduced to commercial transactions with the youth as perpetual pawns. This is contrary to the United Nations perspective that elections should be popularly perceived as reflecting the will of voters.

Restoring the dignity of African youths

Karl Marx said, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered from the past."

The youth of Africa cannot afford to lay supine on the deliberate agenda of dislocation from democratic participation, economic empowerment and political emancipation as orchestrated by the petty bourgeoisie class in the continent. That would be most cowardly. Such a mindset only mocks what their forebears had accomplished. This is the time for West African youth

to quit expecting power to drop upon their laps. Political power is never *given*. If political power must retain its essence, those who aspire to it must contest for it. The youth must be ready to contest for political power because contestation is the soul of democracy. I prescribe the following suggestions to create a conducive and fair space for an effective contestation of political power by African youth.

Renaissance of the "can-do" spirit

The youth of the sub-region must be willing to re-discover the "can-do" spirit. They must quit waiting for the older generation of the "ruining class" to unshackle them from the yoke of subjugation and oppression. It is never in the character of the oppressor to grant liberty to the oppressed. Out of the obscurity of their insufferable conditions, our youth must fight for their freedom. To achieve freedom, the youths must free their minds to regain their voices for political emancipation. That is possible with the following action steps:

1. Revival of conscious intellectualism

Tragically, intellectually-driven social consciousness became the first victim of the dismantling of the leftist movement. Our youth were the worst hit. Before politicians gave our youth guns and axes to decimate each other on our campuses under the banner of cultism, intellectual debate was the order of the day. Professor Wole Soyinka and his friends (Ralph Opara, Ikhehare Aig-Imokhuede, Sylvanus Egbuchie, Nathaniel Oyelola, Pius Oleghe and Olumuyiwa Awe) established one of the first conscious student organisations: the Pyrates Confraternity. The confraternity was a critical intellectual hub that engaged with the political issues of the day. Unfortunately, student union governments and the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) exist today not to organise and engage intellectually. Instead, they exist for the crumbs from the oppressor's table, hoping one day for an invitation to dine also at the table of oppression. Our youth, especially student leaders must quit the tomfoolery. There is more to gain from conscious, dignified struggle than from waiting as errand boys in the gates of those who aim to humiliate, rob and destroy the destiny of youths.

2. Political organising

It was Kwame Nkurumah that led the charge "Africa, do not agonize… organize!" This counsel is most apt for the youths of the sub-region. This

paper has laboured to make the point that those who have captured the political space in our countries for self-preservation will never be willing to relinquish political power voluntarily. The only way for our youth to push them out of the space is to organise politically. This political organising must start from our campuses. We must bring back the days when student union elections epitomised the beauty of democracy. If Nigerian youth must have the confidence to engage in political processes in the broader society, they must take the space to institutionalise democracy on campus. And consciously so!

There was a time when intellect and social consciousness determined election into student union offices. There was a time when perceived affiliation with government or politicians by those contesting student union elections meant automatic disfavour with the student community. The intellectually weak, politically subservient and socially irresponsible had no space to thrive. Nigerian students, for the sake of the political freedom they seek, must bring those days back. It is now time to roll back this decadent practice of seeking endorsement by political godfathers to win election into student union governments or the NANS leadership.

3. Economic emancipation

There is no democratic freedom without economic emancipation. The re-design of the global economy around information and communication technology offers the youth of the continent an opportunity to break free from economic enslavement as imposed by the "ruining class." Imagination, ideas, organisation, and networking are the forte of the ICT economy. This is the domain of young people. That is why the new billionaires of the millennium are young people: Mark Zuckerberg, Travis Kalanick, Elon Musk and the founders of Twitter—Jack Dorsey, Evan Williams, Biz Stone and Noah Glass. They all followed the success trajectories of young pre-millennial such as Bill Gates and Steve Jobs. Not long ago, a Nigerian youth; Chinedu Echeruo's ICT company; HopStop.com was bought by Apple for $1 Billion. Youths also have many opportunities to benefit from West Africa's largely untapped agriculture value chain. All that the youth of the sub-region needs to re-position themselves to tap into the global ICT goldmine is to seek new knowledge, skills, and network better. Once our youth are economically free, they will organise better to take the political space from a generation that has left fire, fury, and frustration in its wake.

Revival of intellectual mentoring and role modelling

Comrade Ezenwa Nwangwu recalled how the late Professor Abubakar Momoh, one of Africa's finest political scientists, would buy leftist literature for students who demonstrated an interest in critical thinking. That was an example of intellectual mentoring and role modelling. There is a need for the academic community to consciously work towards restoring intellectual mentoring and role modelling. The reactionary student unionism on our campuses has gained ground chiefly in the absence of intellectual mentoring and role modelling.

Our lecturers must critically re-examine the practices that have deepened the gulf between the lectern and lecture aisle. There is little chance that a young impressionable mind would trust and respect a lecturer who sells a hand-out of ten photocopied pages at ¦ 1,000. There is little possibility that our female students would be encouraged to join the struggle for a better society when they can describe in great details the groin architecture of our male lecturers. Taking it on a lighter note, I am ready at this point to be accused of gender stereotyping! If the academic community wishes to inspire young people to aspire to a life of dignity, it must rid our campuses of the "sex for marks" and "cash for good grades" scourges. Furthermore, we must do something about the obfuscating intellectual arrogance that exalts lecturers to the status of tin-gods. Genuine intellectualism truly humbles especially as it exposes the mind to the fact that knowledge is like the waters of the ocean—vast and boundless.

Restoration of youth-support structures

There is no better time than now to begin to restore the broken walls of our social spaces. The youth needs standard education facilities for better learning outcomes. The sorry state of our student hostels and classrooms explains the persistent tension on our campuses. You cannot rob another of dignity and expect peace. The organised academic community, especially the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and similar bodies, have waged a protracted struggle for better funding of our universities. This struggle must be taken more seriously now as it is indeed a fight for our youth. Nigerian students, though casualties in the strike fight by ASUU, must awake to the consciousness that the fight is actually for the greater good.

Also, civil society, especially the trade unions, has a critical role in restoring youth support structures. The bridge between student unionism and civil society cum trade unions needs urgent rehabilitation. Student activists must

have hope that, when the oppressors refuse them employment upon graduation, they can earn a decent income from civil society and trade union activism. Also, organised labour and civil society should partner with the progressive intellectual community to design and implement a road map to the restoration of genuine and progressive student union activism. This would arguably be the biggest gift from this generation to the next.

It is also important for all of us to get involved in "catch them young" political initiatives. It is important to strengthen youth structures such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Guild and Islamic Boys/Girl Brigade. This will help our youth to imbibe the spirit of self-determination, community service and responsible leadership at a young age. The academic community also has a critical role to play in revving the advocacy for the restoration of history and robust civic cum voter education in our school curriculum. This will help harness the political consciousness and energy of our youth at dawn.

Wider political reform

Political contestations take place within a legal framework. The current legal framework in Nigeria asphyxiates the aspiration of young people. The promoters of the *Not too Young to Run* bill have done a fantastic job. That bill prescribes the reduction of the constitutional age limits for candidates for political offices. However, it only scratches the surface of the challenge. There are many more hideous mines strewn in the pathway of effective youth participation in democracy and development especially in Nigeria and elsewhere in the sub-region. The most potent threat to effective youth participation in politics in the sub-region appears to be the commercialisation of the electoral and democratic process. The commercialisation of the political process is more than just a threat to the political aspirations of young people: it is the centre of gravity for the pervasive corruption in our countries. Just for political preservation, politicians steal much more than they and their infinite generations would ever need.

The real fight against corruption will only start when we have serious political reforms that criminalise political commercialisation and merchandising. The voter can only make an objective electoral choice when politicians do not attempt to influence them with bags of rice, tins of tomato, wrappers, and mint currencies.

Election violence scares young people and women from effective participation in the electoral cum democratic process. We must institutionalise

quick sanctions in our laws against the purveyors of election violence. In Nigeria, the Justice Uwais led Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) recommended the unbundling of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for the establishment of an Election Offences Commission (EOC) and similar bodies. The "ruining class" rejected this, fully aware that an EOC would greatly weaken their ability to employ violence in political campaigns.

Finally, the ERC suggested Proportional Representation. The idea is to accommodate members of the demographically disadvantaged groups, especially the youth, women, and the physically challenged. Unfortunately, as earlier stated, the Yar Adua and Jonathan governments rejected this aspect of the political reform proposal.

Overhaul of critical economic support infrastructure

Tragically, society has denied our youth the critical economic support infrastructure to realise their aspiration to a life of dignity. The collapse of our energy sector is unacceptable. Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Singapore, which gained independence at about the same as Nigeria, can generate between 25300 and 200000MW of electricity. Nigeria has no reason to stagnate at less than 4000MW every year. We must also pay serious attention to our roads and railway system. No country ever developed that did not invest in an efficient transportation system. Finally, we must rebuild our refineries, build new ones and make serious investments for a green economy.

Closing thoughts

In 1980, Mr Lee Kuan Yew set out to attract and retain young talents in Singapore. He set up two committees. One was to attract academically sound, talented, and skilled Singaporeans from universities in Europe, United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. The other was to place them on a special leadership track and in jobs that would enable them to contribute their best to Singapore's development.

Dan Senor and Saul Singer described how Israel elevated the hunt for, harnessing, and strategic deployment of youth talent as a core policy of the government.[3] The Israeli government dedicates an entire government ministry to this. The Ministries of Immigrant Absorption and Education run a Centre

3. See Senor and Singer, *Start-Up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle*.

for Absorption to attract Israelis especially the youth from all over the world and match them with Israeli employers. This is aimed at keeping their mill of innovation running. The same is true for many immigrant countries. With millions of young Nigerians excelling in different parts of the world, the Nigerian government should think of implementing a sincere Nigerian youth diaspora skills bridging initiative. This will go a long way in priming the country for knowledge transfer, innovation, and skills impartation for national development.

A 2010 British Council Next Generation Report describes Nigerian youth as Nigeria's most important and precious resource. It notes that the country stands on the threshold of possibly its greatest transformation, and asserts that, by 2030, it will be among the few countries with young workers in plentiful supply. The report posits that youth, not oil, will be Nigeria's most valuable resource in the 21st century.

At independence in 1966, Botswana was the world's poorest country. It had twelve kilometres of paved roads, twelve university graduates, and one hundred school-leavers. It was almost surrounded by the white regimes of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which were all hostile to independent African countries run by blacks. You can rightly say that, like Singapore, Botswana was doomed to fail from the start.

Yet, over the next forty-five years, Botswana rose to become one of the fastest-growing economies of the world. Today, it has the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa and is at the same level as many successful Eastern European countries. How did Botswana achieve this? In the book *Why Nations Fail***,** Dan Acemoglu and James Robinson wrote how Botswana developed an ambitious economic regime, established a stable democracy and built pluralistic institutions.

The best guarantee for the future of young people is to provide an environment of thriving democracy, pluralism, effective service delivery, inclusive social justice, and world-class infrastructure. It is not too late for countries of the sub-region, particularly Nigeria, to learn from other successful climes and make amends.

Last word

The records of the plunder of Africa's "ruining class" are no longer stashed away in the archives of our libraries. The perpetual television images of the corpses of our youth on the Sahara Desert's dunes and Lampedusa's

seashores are macabre metaphors for the pillage of mother Africa. Today, our youths are on the run away from the tyranny of their oppressors. Tomorrow is coming when they will run no more! They will come back to their senses and march straight against the castles of their oppressors. On that day, they will not ask for crumbs from a whole that was originally theirs. They will demand accountability on what our so-called leaders did with the commonwealth meant to feed, clothe, shelter, and empower young lives for a fulfilled adulthood. I do not wish for that day to be adorned in scarlet. Yet, I make no pretensions that those who make peaceful change impossible always make a violent one inevitable. The 2011 Arab Spring and the Nigerian Harmattan of 2012 are only a foretaste of what is coming!

One final charge to those who make a quiet and purposeful tomorrow impossible for the youths of the sub-region: history has judged you harshly!

Is the "ruining class" asking for redemption?

O native doctor, heal thyself!
O jailer, free thyself!

Please, pardon my ranting. Thanks for giving me your ear and time.

Long live African youth!
Long live West African youth!!
Long live Nigerian youth!!!

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Chapter 24 | Youth, Leadership, Democracy and Development in West Africa

Magdalene Agbor Igbolo

Introduction

Youths are one of the most pressing issues for Africa due to, among other reasons, their enormous population. About 60% of the continent's population is below twenty-five years old. Yet it marginalises its youths, excluding them from policy formulation, leadership, and decision-making. Many are unemployed and many more underemployed, leaving the continent to grapple with millions of energised youths who are investing their energies in stirring up conflicts and violence.

Young people participate less than older citizens in most formal political processes in many developing countries and Africa in particular, although persons below twenty-five years constitute more than half of their populations. This undermines the representativeness of their political systems, disenfranchises young citizens, and reinforced the stereotype of young people as uninterested in political issues and troublemakers. Therefore, Rather than exploring ways to involve youths in the political process, debates about their political participation have centred on motivating them to vote and preventing youth groups from resorting to political violence.

The youth-led uprisings in the Arab world—the Arab Spring—brought young people back on the world stage as important political actors with the right to participate in politics and governance. There have been extraordinarily creative experiments across the world in recent years, with young people leading in many cases. However, youths face new social challenges in an increasingly complex world—one with greater diversity, intense pressures on families, and market, employability, and skill challenges. It is also a time when millions of young people are aware as never before of the scale of the leadership challenges we now face on a global scale. Some predict that economic difficulties will aggravate many of these challenges and pressures. For Africa and West Africa to address this situation successfully, we must

invest in young people to enhance their abilities as agents of change.

Yet many communities continue to waste their talents as millions of young people face acute difficulties in making the transition to adulthood. The public perception of young people can often be negative, reinforced by unfavourable media portrayals, with young people often being perceived as part of the problem rather than the solution.

Societies still deny young people adequate representation in the organs of power, from parliaments to businesses and even voluntary organisations.

Carnegie U.K. Trust (2006) reports that a crucial role of political parties in the past was to develop generations of leaders, equipping them with the skill and confidence to campaign and govern. Many young people learned more through party activism than through formal education. This role has atrophied in recent years in part because of increasing professionalism in the world of work and political life. Educational qualifications tend to be the most important determinant of attainment later in life, while the role of judgement and life experiences now have relatively less weight. Party politics, aligned as it is to this set of values, has ceased to engage a broad range of young people in its activities. Therefore, party leadership has become increasingly less representative, particularly of low-income groups without affluence, politically powerful families and networks, educational opportunities, or political power.

The routes that once helped to identify and nurture leaders from different backgrounds—the trade unions, churches, mass political parties, etc.—are no longer working. Building the skills and capacities of young people to take up leadership roles in the communities is vital/crucial for democracy to thrive and for development to take place in the sub-region.

West Africa's population is about 320 million people, with children and youth aged below thirty-five years constituting 70%. According to predictions, 29% of the total youth population will reside in Africa by 2050. Since this cohort is a key segment of the population, the region's countries must take proactive measures to ensure that they contribute concretely to regional integration. However, the question that preoccupies scholars is how to ensure that these countries benefit from this demographic dividend.

Clarification of concepts

Youth

The definition of "youth" or "young people" is contextual, depending on cultural, social, political, and environmental factors. The concept has been

operationalised in different contexts, therefore vary from country to country and from region to region (Zeb, 2008).

By definition, a youth in the West African sub-region is any male or female between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five years. Young people in this age group require social, economic and political support to realise their full potential. While it is true that energy, enthusiasm, ambition, creativity, and promise characterise young people, they also face high levels of socio-economic uncertainty and volatility, making them the most vulnerable population segment. This youth age grouping is in congruence with the African Union definition. ECOWAS arrived at this categorisation after harmonising the classification of different member states within the sub-region. Note that each member state has its particular grouping and classification of what constitutes youth. The New Oxford American Sociology Dictionary defines youth as the "stage between childhood and adulthood." In this definition, youth is a transitional phase between childhood (when a person is dependent) and mature adulthood (when they should be independent and responsible). This is why institutions, agencies, and countries define youth by age brackets. The United Nations and its organs define it as individuals of fifteen to twenty-four years (UNESCO), and the African Union Charter and Nigeria's Constitution as those from eighteen to thirty-five (Njonjo, 2010).

Estimates put Africa's population at more than a billion people, of whom above 65% is below thirty-five years. The demographic significance of this large young population is increasingly taking centre stage in discussions to achieve the socio-economic development agenda of the continent. For example, of the eight Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's), five of them seek to improve the situation of young people (UNESCO, 2011; AU, 2011; UNFPA, 2011; UNECA, 2009). ECOWAS has committed itself unequivocally to the empowerment and development of youth and their adequate involvement in regional integration. Article 61 of the revised ECOWAS treaty of 1993 states the sub-regional body's disposition in this regard. To various degrees, youths in West Africa have been at the centre of the struggle for democracy before, during, and after independence. Uprisings of young people in Africa are a clear manifestation of youth struggles against unemployment, socio-economic marginalisation, unsound economic and social policies, corrupt governments and exclusion, political dictatorship and denial of basic rights.

Youths constitute most of the productive population of every community. This group therefore cannot be ignored. They are also an important element of a

society's physical power base: they prosecute wars and conflicts. Intellectually, this is the stage at which the brain is most active and develops its full capacity. Youth are at the centre of spectacular inventions and discoveries that have changed or revolutionised the world. That capacity is not characteristic only of this age group. Therefore, it behoves every society or nation to harness the potentials of its members (youth inclusive) for its development. Not doing so could affect it negatively. Thus, it is necessary to develop a strategy now that emphasises youth employment, entrepreneurship, education, and political inclusion.

Leadership

The concept of youth leadership is difficult to pin down. Leadership literature includes a host of theories investigating leaders, their roles and essential qualities and whether they are made or born and if they are made then how to make them. Examining youth leadership specifically adds another layer of complexity, tied as it is in popular conception to other ideas such as youth development, citizenship, youth action and engagement as well as participation. Youth leadership can serve many purposes: it is simultaneously an end in itself (in that it promotes healthy youth development) and a means to an end (by enabling youths to contribute to society).

There is considerable debate about the nature and meaning of leadership and the skills and attributes it requires in leaders. In particular, there is a growing shift away from top-down, (hierarchical) towards participatory and inclusive leadership. The latter emphasises social and emotional competencies, including self-awareness, collaboration, empathy, relationship-building, and leadership by authenticity rather than authority. Additionally, leaders recognise that they need a repertoire of leadership styles for different circumstances.

Interest in leadership increased during the early part of the 20th century. Early leadership theories, such as the "great man" and "trait" theories, tended to assume that the leadership capacity is inherent, i.e., that great leaders are born rather than made. Later theories such as contingency, situational and behavioural theories tend to view leadership in less deterministic terms. Broadly speaking, these theories reject the notion that there is a single optimal profile of a leader, seeing effective leadership as contingent on the situation.

Evidence shows that the nature of leadership, including the skills and qualities required for effective leadership, is changing in response to changes in the social world. Practising managers believe that the definition of leadership

changed dramatically in recent years and will even more in the future, with social and emotional skills, collaboration, and change management becoming increasingly crucial. Numerous commentators have attributed this changing definition to the rise of complex challenges for which no pre-existing solutions or expertise exists. Today, globalisation, technology, and the relentless pace of change are challenging the skills of leaders. As one author notes:

Today leaders are being called upon by necessity to respond to complex challenges brought on by unexpected events and situations. Leaders of the future will have to embrace complexity and the skills needed to harness it.

Thus, leadership is not what the leader does; it is instead a process that engenders and results from relationships in the interactions between leaders and collaborators. The focus is on these relationships instead of the competencies of leaders only. It is also the empowering of young people to inspire and mobilise themselves and others to create positive change. Youth leadership is the engagement of young people to take action on issues that impact them; it is to offer them opportunities to make decisions and create change.

Democracy

It is one of the most contested concepts in the world. Most political systems refer to themselves as democracies. Many preach it in Africa but do not practice it. For example, Uganda, which seldom has competitive elections, considers itself a democratic republic. Democracy equates with popular power; it is rule by the people and for the people (Platter, 2013). In contrast to dictatorship, oligarchy, monarchy, and aristocracy—in all of which the people have little or no say—democracy, theoretically, seeks input from the citizenry in decision-making.

Democracy in its classic sense seeks to realise human potential through active popular participation and has therefore been historically associated with the struggle against social injustices that mostly arise from tyrannical leadership (Adejumobi, 2003). In Nigeria, as in other multi-ethnic and multi-religious states, democracy ought to ensure that minorities participate in decision-making. Williams (2003), asserts that democracy is not a state but a process that protects the liberty of citizens and residents by holding those in power accountable, enabling the political representation of the ruled. Important in this definition is the fact that the governed have a say in the decisions that affect their lives.

The definition of democracy affects the outcome of different plans of a particular context. For example, it affects leadership recruitment and succession. Indisputably, the definition of democracy greatly influences the direction and pace of development (Mustapha and Whitfield, 2009). In many African countries, including Nigeria, citizens see democracy as an aspiration rather than an achievable goal. In practice, especially in developing countries, democracy is an illusion. It equates with liberal democracy, featuring multiple parties, periodic elections, and the right to vote. However, it also equates with economic liberalism, which emphasises private property, generalised individualism, and the dominance of market forces.

Under these circumstances, democracy, as the government of the people for the people by the people, becomes a myth. This means that the equal rights of citizens to vote and be voted for and of groups to form political parties is not attainable under market forces (liberal) democracy. Thus, even when governments change under liberal democracies, the apparatuses of the state established by the ruling class and the fundamental economic and cultural institution remain.[1] That makes it difficult or impossible for the citizens (the youth inclusive) to acquire political power.

For example, the political system in Nigeria and most developed democracies like America and Europe require political aspirants and candidates to spend great amounts of money to purchase party nomination forms and in campaigns. How many ordinary citizens can afford such monies who have no connection with people in government or not stolen from our commonwealth? Thus replacing the definition of democracy with liberal democracy devalues and trivialises the essence of the concept. That is because, in this form of democracy, the concepts of socio-economic rights and equality are abstract, resulting in the marginalisation of the lower social classes (Adeyemo).

Democracy and development

During Africa's democratisation in the 1980s, multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the IMF insisted on the inseparability of the free-market economy and liberal democracy. They coerced African states to accept that there was no alternative to modes of economic and political governance. These

1. The state apparatuses include the armed forces, police, the laws, and the courts. The cultural institutions comprise, among others, the educational system, popular culture, and religion.

institutions exploited their support for the continent's democratic reforms to introduce neo-liberal structural adjustment into Africa. That those efforts were successful is evident in that African states continue today to pursue liberal democracy with a strong element of free-market economics. The return of multi-party democracy and the emergence of the good governance agenda played a crucial role in transforming the democracy trajectories in most African states.

The nexus between development and democracy is a subject of contestation: there is a dispute over which facilitates the other or comes first. Adejumobi, (2000) classifies some discussions that have arisen in the relationship between democracy and development. Some authors have argued that liberal democracy—which involves multi-partyism, the rule of law, and elections—provides the basic foundation for economic development. These neo-liberal values favour a healthy environment for economic development. An example that has been used to support the argument above is the success of adopting the liberal policy in different contexts between 1965 and 1990. Botswana and Mauritius had an economic growth rate of 8.4% and 3.2% respectively during this period. This is in contrast with nations like the Republic of Congo and Nigeria, which had an economic growth rate of 2.2% and 0.1% respectively during the same period (Adejumobi 2000). Others argue that linking democracy to development overburdens the former, and approach it as a separate project. They are careful to dissociate economic development and democracy, because human rights that are crucial to citizens may not bear tangible and economic benefits. They are concerned about the reduction of democracy to economic development.

Other empirical studies have found a poor correlation between democracy and development and concluded that the former may not affect the performance of some nations. That is because popular participation slows down the formation and implementation of important policies. Makori (2015), representing the third group, argues that development is not dependent on the nature of the political regime, and caution is necessary, therefore, in linking development—especially economic growth—and democracy. The democratic state is not the prerequisite for development but a state that emphasises the building of development structures. So the quest for building democratic states should also encourage developmental friendly structures. He gives an example of East Asia in the 1980s and early 1990s. The countries in these regions had authoritarian regimes but managed to show remarkable economic

growth and development. To enhance economic growth and development, African states should determine what to adopt from these success stories while simultaneously building democratic polities.

Youth participation in democracy in West Africa

According to Kayinga (2014), participation requires the youth to be at the centre of decision-making. That is critical because rule by the people is the underlying principle in democratic governance. Thus, participatory democracy requires the meaningful and active engagement of all citizens to build their abilities to hold the government accountable for their actions (Kayinga, 2016).

Youth participation in politics provides opportunities for leadership training and nurturing and for influencing government policies at every level. All citizens, including the youths, have the right to participate meaningfully in politics through political parties, youth leagues, and youth associations.

The factors that influence political participation include the nature of the political systems and the institutions of society, which could be open or closed. A closed system often hinders youth participation, leading to agitations for change through revolution—as demonstrated recently in the Arab World.

Nigeria and the entire West African sub-region have progressed towards full democratisation, but several factors have hindered them in this regard. They include the institutionalisation of political parties and ethnicity. The latter encourages political entrepreneurship, the mobilisation of people along ethnic and religious lines, and sectarianism. The institutional and ideological weakness of political parties in the region constrains effective youth participation in party politics, with negative implications for democratic consolidation (Kayinga, 2014).

It is important to note that participation should not be only in the formal structures of governance but in the informal as well. As UN Youth (2015) have indicated through studies carried out across the globe, that the participation of youths in informal, institutional political processes has been relatively low compared to the older citizens. This brings to the fore questions about the representativeness and inclusiveness of political systems (UN, 2015).

Effective participation of youth in politics and governance depends fundamentally on the creation of opportunities to engage meaningfully and effectively in policy and decision-making especially on matters that directly affect the youths.

The youths make up an increasing share of the world population, yet they

are often excluded from national and international decision-making structures that affect them. The African liberation struggle benefited immensely from the contributions of renowned pan-Africanists. These included Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Aimé Césaire of Congo. The leaders of the struggle in Nigeria included youths like Herbert Macaulay, Ernest Okoli, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Tafawa Balewa, and Obafemi Awolowo. The efforts of these youths led to the acquisition of political independence for Africa and contributed to driving the struggles for democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then the youths have been at the forefront of the campaign for good governance and demand for credible leadership and democracy in the continent and the sub-region in particular.

The foregoing therefore brings to the fore such questions as; why is there a decline in youth participation in political governance across the globe? Is the problem with the youth or with the institutions of society? Berg (2005) argues that a conditioning factor of youth participation is the extent to which democratic institutions are open to the concerns, interests, and involvement of young people. Their participation depends largely on whether they see their interests sufficiently reflected in the political process and its outcome. He sees the situation as two-way traffic in which democratic practices place general and specific demands on the institutions of governance and the youth. Also, he admonishes the youths to accept, comprehend, and develop democratic institutions through their participation, even if the issues, processes, and outcomes are not always to their liking or in their immediate interest. Both the government and the youths have responsibilities to nurture political participation in the policy.

Resnick and Casale (2011) reinforce these assertions, claiming that youth in Africa, like in other parts of the world, have little interest in party politics due to unemployment and socio-economic powerlessness. They also observe that nationalists through history have relied on the youths to legitimise their regime. However, although the African population is predominantly youthful, national leadership is mostly in the hands of the older generations who recycle themselves in power in every election.

In the 2010 Afro-barometer study of nineteen Africa countries, only three presidents at the time were younger than sixty years (Resnick, 2010). President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe are two examples that puzzle many. The former has ruled since 1986 and the latter, in power since the 1980s, has done everything to prevent Prime Minister

Morgan Tsvangirai, himself past sixty, from ascending to power. These political leaders exemplify the gap between the median age of the population in Africa (twenty years) and the median age of its leaders (sixty-two years). That is one reason for low interest among youths in political participation.

With a population exceeding 280 million people and a 3% annual growth rate, the ECOWAS sub-region is Africa's most populous regional community and about 35% of sub-Saharan Africa's population (Barsisa, 2009). Youths constitute 33% of the sub-region's population, but many suffer from poverty, discrimination, inequality, inadequate access to education, etc. Thus, youth and youth issues are today critical indicators of the socio-economic, political and security situation of West Africa. This has been attributed to the twin challenges of a youth bulge and the socio-economic underdevelopment in West Africa.

Thus, despite their demographic strength, youths in West Africa are under-represented in key decision-making processes and institutions like parliaments, and only a few get political and leadership appointments. In Ghana, for example, less than 9% of the two hundred and seventy-five members of parliament are youths although the latter is 58.45% of the total population and 76% of registered voters. In Nigeria, the 1999 constitution stipulates that a person who wants to be a president must be at least forty years while governors and senators must be thirty-five years and above.

That means anyone below those ages cannot contest in any elections to these positions, thus marginalising youths in leadership and politics although they represent 55.4% of the voting population. Those in power often see the appointment of youths to leadership positions as only a token to pacify young people rather than their due. They forget that, contrary to the appearances, it was the youths who drove nationalism and politics in the past. This has led to protest and agitations as recently witnessed in the Arab world. There have been similar agitations in Nigeria by the "not too young to run" group. The group is advocating the amendment of sections 65, 106, 131, and 177 of the 1999 constitution to allow youths to participate in governance.

Supporting the idea of increasing youth participation in politics, Jega (2017), states that "youth political participation plays an important role in shaping our institutions and embedding and legitimising them socially." He advocated the adoption of an approach to youth development that recognises youths as active participants in societal development rather than passive recipients of largesse from old politicians. He argued that it is impossible to adequately address youth marginalisation and dis-empowerment unless

and until larger numbers of young people, male and female, participate in political, legislative, policy, and decision-making processes. That requires, he posits, reconnecting with the youth and empowering and mentoring them. It also necessitates giving them responsible leadership roles and enabling them to become the key agents of change in Nigeria's development (Daily Trust newspaper of 16 July 2017, p.9).

Challenges of youths in leadership, democracy and development in West Africa

The African young people today face challenges from every area of existence, making youth a frightening developmental stage for many of them. These challenges continue to increase and assume new dimensions, and range from unemployment, underemployment, unemployability, irregular migration, wars and conflict, drug trafficking, disease, and poverty. Their adverse impacts have increased despite efforts to ameliorate them. Youth unemployment especially has reached a crises stage, with all the countries in the sub-region enmeshed in the problem. The significant impact of this challenge is evident in all ECOWAS member states, with some recording as high as 70% rate.

The democratisation of Africa was to multiply the channels for young people's participation in leadership and political life. Most countries in the sub-region have government agencies with the mandate to address youth issues, and many have youth policies and councils in line with their obligation under the African youth charter. The youth councils have actively sought opportunities for young people's involvement in policy development. However, as indicated in the 2009 UNECA Youth Report, it is hard to find success stories. Youth political participation may even be declining in the continent, as evident in the proportion of youths who register and vote in every election.

The report noted that African youth have been only marginally involved in civic participation, electoral participation and political voice. This has been partly attributed to the lack of a quota system in Africa's political and party systems. Thus, youth leagues, youth councils, and other youth associations in most African countries have remained as just youth wings to the political process. As the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, said, "the youth lack political space to make their contribution to society, and it is political, social, and economic alienation that is leading youth to social and economic problems" (AU, 2011).

Unemployment

Employment creation is a major challenge that confronts all African countries regardless of their different levels of socio-economic development. Youths in Africa account for 60% of the total number of unemployed persons (ILO 2010). Youth unemployment remains a security issue for Africa driving youth crime and violence. Just as youths are instruments of democratisation, they can also be instruments of violence and crime, in which capacity they engage in armed robbery, armed conflict, kidnapping, and electoral violence. That is happening in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, DR Congo and other African countries. The UNECA Report (2015) attests that countries are likelier to experience rioting and internal armed conflicts where young people are prominent in the adult population, the economy is weak, and governance is poor. It also reports that one in two young people who join a rebel group cites unemployment as the major reason for doing so.

The high rate of unemployment was the powerful catalyst for the revolution in North Africa (the Arab Spring) that overthrew governments in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. The trigger for the protests was the death of one man, which created enormous outrage. Thousands of young people came out in solidarity, complaining about massive unemployment and the high cost of living and demanding jobs and a decent life. Addressing youth unemployment with appropriate policies should be a major policy initiative of governments across Africa and beyond (ILO, 2010, Smepler, 2010, Winer, 2011). Unemployment casts a dark shadow on the prospects of the youth, and to confine the youth to idleness has grave consequences for the future of society.

Financial resources and security

Another challenge youths face is the lack of finance and security. Poverty is high because the unemployment rate is high, and the lack of financial resources associated with the former is a major limiting factor for young people. Campaigns are so expensive and this disadvantages the youth as most of them are unemployed or have just entered gainful employment and are unable to raise required fees. Control of campaign financing and expenditure in the West African sub-region have not been put in place, this breeds unfair competition between the youth and older members of the society. Again the problems of intimidation and violence during campaigns scare most young people from presenting themselves for election. The violence is often among

the youth themselves who have divergent opinions or supporting different candidates.

Lack of capacity

In addition to the dominance of a culture that highly values social and tribal status. One of the barriers to effective youth engagement in leadership and decision-making is the lack of capacity and expertise. The lack of knowledge is due mainly to weak capacity building and poor planning by the leadership. Some believe this is intentional because the leaders are afraid that highly skilled youths might surpass them and eventually take leadership of their country. There is also culture-based prejudice against women politicians in most communities, such women would be required to get married before they can be allowed to vie for any position in the polity.

Absence of a culture of positive engagement

Scholars often use concepts like patrimonial culture, generational conflict, and authoritarian leadership to describe the barriers to youth participation in democracy, leadership, and decision-making. This is because the leadership is almost permanent and does not include young people except as youth leaders, which is only one position in the whole party executive organ. The leadership is responsible for decision-making, and they are rigid with leadership. This is further compounded by the weak communication between the older leadership and the younger base of society. Poor communication patterns have meant that young people have perceived their leadership as ageing. Closely linked to the generational gap is the lack of a culture of positive engagement, which excludes young people from decision-making. Positive engagement is a two-way thing, which leads to effective communication and adequate exchange of information. Instilling democratic practices in schools and universities is an important step to building a culture of consultation and positive engagement.

Conflict and violence

Experts estimate that 1.6 million people die each year as a result of violence including homicide and wars. Violence is one of the leading causes of death for youth and young adult. Political instability and conflict leave young people especially vulnerable to violence. Boys and young men make a large proportion of those recruited or forced into conflicts and wars. These include male children: there are more than 300,000 child soldiers around the world. Girls and young women are especially vulnerable to rape and coercion

into sex slavery for older military leaders. Violence and conflict also affect young people by interrupting schooling, disrupting basic health services and inflicting psychological trauma.

Young women suffer specific forms of violence. For example, experts estimate that between 700,000 to 2,000,000 women and female children were victims of sex trafficking in 2001 alone. Most of them were young women. There is also the problem of female genital cutting and more than two million girls and female children undergo this painful and harmful procedure every year. This problem bedevils all the countries of the region, and they are earnestly evolving programmes to address it.

Irregular youth migration

Closely related to the problem of youth unemployment is that of illegal migration from Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean countries to Europe. Most of those involved are young people, who—because of factors associated with conflict, unemployment, poverty, etc.—risk everything to embark on dangerous migration through the seas and deserts. This has resulted in tragic deaths and other terrible predicaments. Many are from ECOWAS member states. This migration problem and other illicit trafficking activities present a desperate situation, which must attract desperate counter-measures.

Several structural and systematic challenges also prevent young people (men and women) from making their voices heard and participating actively in leadership and the political process. If not addressed with proactive youth-based interventions, these problems can have adverse consequences for the sub-region. Youth is a productive age range that its countries should harness the development of West Africa. Anything short of providing tangible solutions to these problems will have grave consequences and can lead to social disorder with bitter repercussions.

Youth and development in West Africa: How far, so far?

An exhaustive look at the issues confronting the youth shows that they are at the receiving end because of their vulnerability. The economic and social conditions in the region have impacted negatively on the youth. The rate of unemployment among youth in the region stands at 13%. Many refugees are victims of trafficking and poverty-stricken illiterates with a bleak future. With these predicaments, they stand exposed to social vices and are vulnerable targets to be manipulated and exploited in the penetration of evil.

Political instability, war, and conflict besiege the sub-region, leaving legacies of down-trodden, agitated, and restive youth. Child soldiers engage in gun-running, killing, and the ravaging of communities.

Scourges like HIV/AIDS and other epidemics ravage the sub-region. The youths are the most vulnerable in all of this, being the most active group with risky behaviours. The rate of illiteracy is also alarming, fuelled by the level of poverty and the state of insecurity. Education in the midst of all this is not a right but a privilege, given the looming poverty. Every year, universities and polytechnics churn out graduates who lack the skills that the labour market demands. Consequently, many are unemployed. The labour market is shrinking because our economies are creating only a few jobs. Countries post lofty economic growth indices that do not translate to growth in jobs and wealth creation. All these present a picture of a generation that is seriously threatened.

The former UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, observed on International Youth Day in 2004 that young people everywhere were preparing for productive lives at work and in society and the family. To be successful, they needed access to education and health care. They must also overcome obstacles such as crime and persistent unemployment, which frustrates the potentials of too many young people at a crucial stage in their lives. Eighty-five per cent of the world's more than one billion people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five years live in developing countries, where they comprise more than half the workforce. The slowdown of the global economy, conflict, internal security crises, point to alarming downward employment for these young people and their economic life prospects. Despite many new opportunities for productive work in today's high-tech business environment, work opportunities for youths lag in the developing world.

Worldwide, youth play an increasingly essential role in the solution to major problems. They can contribute positively to development and security. The importance of carrying them along and providing them with national, regional, continental and global initiatives would help them to square up for the challenges. The development of key economic activities and programmes in the public, private, and social sectors would provide economic empowerment and job creation for youth.

In recognition of the challenges stated above, the world is implementing programmes at the international, regional, and national levels to address youth issues. At the global level, UN programmes of action for youths seek to assist governments in fifteen priority areas that are relevant for the African youth

agenda. At the continental level, the African Union has adopted and brought into action the African Youth Charter. The charter provides a framework for developing and implementing policies and programmes for young people in several areas. These include employment, sustainable livelihood, education, health, youth leadership and political participation, peace, security, and enforcement. It also calls on governments to guarantee participation by young people in parliaments and other decision-making bodies at the national and regional level.

Other action areas include the approval of a plan to accelerate the ratification and implementation of the African Youth Charter and the declaration of 2009-2019 as a decade for youth development. They also include the approval of an implementation plan for the priority activities for the youth decade and the establishment of youth networks as platforms for engagement and advocacy (AU, 2011). The AU's Agenda 2063 is also instrumental in promoting youth rights in Africa. It arose from the debates and consultations with youth, women, and Diaspora representatives during the 2013 OAU/AU 50th anniversary celebration in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The youths are a vital component of the Agenda, which links the past, present, and future to create a new generation of pan-Africanists. These activists will harness the lesson learnt over the years and use them to realise the hope of our founding parents and ignite a true renaissance of Africa.

At the sub-regional level, there is full recognition of the enormous challenges and opportunities the youths present. Therefore, most countries within the sub-region are making efforts to involve youths in political and decision-making.

Several countries are also making progress by developing appropriate policies and allocating more resources to youth concerns. Nonetheless, young people in West Africa still face such challenges as unemployment, underemployment, lack of skills and relevant education, and exclusion from leadership and decision-making. Above all young women particularly face heightened barriers and vulnerabilities within the sub-region that has persistently excluded them from leadership and development.

The ECOWAS established programmes such as the *ECOWAS Youth Policy and Strategic Plan of Action (2009)* to mobilise youths and involve them adequately in regional integration. The ECOWAS Youth Employment Act Plan 2012 creates the right environment for job creation and provision of decent work in the region. Also, the body has institutionalised the ECOWAS

Youth Forum, ECOWAS Youth Volunteer Scheme. It also organises capacity-building, sensitisation, and awareness activities to mobilise, train, empower, and integrate youths into the development process.

Conclusion

The African Union declared 2009-2019 as the decade of youth development in Africa. During the decade, which ends in two years, the AU Commission and member states focused on implementing the AU's plan of action in youth development. The plan's priority areas include youth empowerment, education, employment, creating safe spaces for recreation and leisure, and health issues. ECOWAS too has adopted a youth policy to promote youth development and empowerment in the sub-region, although it has been only marginally successful. The onus now is on youth organisations, youth councils, and youth associations to study these policy instruments to see how they can work with these organisations to ensure their implementation.

Young people must accept that the "youth honeymoon" is over. The polity is fraught with challenges that require them to be innovative and to excel in all aspects of human endeavour. Resorting to violence and crime only compounds these. It is more profitable for youth to develop and possess visions and dreams that will turn the sub-region and member states into what we desire.

Recommendations: The way forward

The *African Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections*, the African youth charter, and Agenda 2063 provide the framework for the involvement of youths in leadership and decision-making on the continent. Youth participation turns on the extent to which democratic institutions are open to the concerns, interests, and involvement of young people. Their participation depends largely on whether they perceive that their issues receive adequate attention in the political process. We offer the following recommendations to help in address these matters.

1. African governments (West Africa inclusive) should hasten the ratification and domestication of the *African Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections*, the African Youth Charter and Agenda 2063;
2. They should promote youth employment schemes, including education and curricular reform, to equip youths with basic business skills and resources, minimise their economic marginalisation, and build peaceful and democratic societies;
3. African governments should increase youth participation in governance

at all levels including considering affirmative action for young people in governance structures like the parliament and executive. Inter-generational leadership change is highly desirable and necessary in Africa. There should be inter-generational dialogues to ensure that young people take over the leadership of African countries. The continent's leaders must create a new culture of national and regional solidarity that emphasises an African citizenship devoid of ethnic, religious, race, colour, and sectarian divisions;

4. These governments must ensure the full development of the potentials of the youth by creating greater economic opportunities, incentives and rewarding youth innovation and creativity in the economic sector. It is critical to involve the private sector in youth employment strategies in this regard as the sector has the resources, expertise, and capacity to generate wealth and employment. Integrate youth capacity building programmes into the polity's strategic plan to enable young people better understand political processes, articulate their needs, and advocate for policy action on them. Provide vocational capacity-building programmes to help the youths advance in their careers and overcome financial struggles that may impact their focus and dedication;
5. African governments should expand the social and economic infrastructure necessary to cope with the rising youth population. This should include quality, affordable, and skills-based education, health-care, recreational facilities, and labour market information, which is a key factor for better youth employment programmes. Once the governments have bridged the information gaps, governments, development partners, civil society, and the private sector should undertake consultations to formulate strategies to address youth unemployment;
6. These governments and the African Union should intensify efforts at enhancing the free movement of people on the continent. Africa can only construct its future on regional integration that allows the free movement not only of goods, services, and capital across the continent but also of people. Africans, especially young people, must be free to move on the continent. However, the practice in many African countries gives easy and free access to western nationals but closes the borders to fellow Africans or impose severe restrictions on them;
7. Socialisation and sensitisation of the youth on politics and their roles in a democracy could lead to improvement in youth support and participation

at all levels. One option is the intensification of civic education and sensitisation campaigns among the youths on the importance of party membership and maintenance of party loyalty. The political education of the youths is equally important, starting in the early years, through formal and informal educational institutions, the media, among other agents of socialisation;

8. To confront low levels of youth political participation, it may be necessary to train and socialise the youths and alter aspects of the political process that discourage political participation. This may include the practice or lack of intra-party democracy, constitutional amendment, societal values, and youth perception of their political efficacy;
9. Reducing nomination fees for youths aspiring to political office, setting aside positions for the youths (particularly women), reducing the eligibility age for electoral contestants, and institutionalising controls on campaign expenditure;
10. Create youth mentorship and guidance programmes through forums for youths and youthful elected or nominated leaders at all levels of governance. Also, facilitate connection and linkage between the young people and political or community leaders;
11. The youths should evolve alternative platforms—other than the traditional spaces and methods such as rallies—for sharing ideas and information with other youths from other regions and other electorates. They should intensify the use of social media networks for online mobilisation strategies to increase information flow and reach. Increased communication with the young people will expose them to strategic development plans and challenges those in leadership and politics face.

Economic growth in the continent has been commendable but needs to be inclusive and empowering for young people through better planning and coordination and the implementation of progressive economic policies. The youths on their part need to continually organise for political change on the continent through strong ideological positions and activism. African youths have to develop great ingenuity in economic entrepreneurship to create not only economic independence but also wealth for African countries. Modern technologies, including social networking platform, are good for social and political mobilisation, but they cannot replace active and practical engagement in political processes. Youths must adopt these tools for concrete political

engagement.

I wish to conclude this presentation with a famous quote by the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. He said, "No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime. Young people must be included from birth. A society that cuts off its youth, severs its lifeline."

Thank you for listening.

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Chapter 25 | The Youth and Inclusive Governance in Nigeria, 1999-2016

Oluranti Edward Ojo

Abstract

Nigeria has neglected youth inclusion in governance in the last two decades, causing an increase in youth restiveness and crime. This paper examines the failure of Nigerian governments in integrating youths into the governance and development of the nation from 1999 to 2016. In Nigeria, 1999 remains significant for at least two different but related reasons. First, the military relinquished power, promised to draft a new constitution, and hand power to a democratically elected president. Second, democracy opened the hitherto closed political space and created opportunities for participatory governance. However, society has misconstrued youths as a mere demographic group, one with negligible political consciousness and that needs to understudy older politicians. So they were side-lined in the configuration of governance. This paper unearths the contributions of youths in pre-colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. It argues that Nigeria has not engaged its youths as human engineering and the nucleus of its developmental drive and aspiration. It also discusses the effects of youth alienation from governance.

Keywords: Nigerian youth, inclusive governance, nation-building, democracy, Fourth Republic.

Introduction

After many years of authoritarian military rule and dictatorship, Nigeria returned to democratic governance on 29 May 1999, a transition that ushered in psychological relief and high expectations. General Abdulsalami Abubakar, whose regime mid-wifed the transition, assured Nigerians of the new government's inclusiveness.

A cloud of uncertainty hovered over Nigeria as Chief Olusegun Obasanjo received the mantle of leadership in May 1999. To reassure Nigerians that

military incursion into governance had ended, President Obasanjo retired many high-ranking military officers. However, many of them returned to the mainstream of power by joining political parties, just as the old politicians refused to vacate the political stage for the younger ones. They remained "godfathers or king-makers," appointment holders, career politicians and professional lobbyists. The combination of ex-military men and old politicians further alienated youths from mainstream politics and governance. Youth exclusion remains a major issue among other challenges confronting Nigeria in the Fourth Republic. To grow democracy and engender efficient development, Nigeria must integrate youths into the power-equation and national discourse.

Nigeria's politics, which features a winner-takes-all, do-or-die attitude, or garrison mentality, has also lost its focus because the politicians are not living up to their responsibilities (Babawale, 2007).

With a population of about 170 million people, Nigeria is the largest country in Africa and accounts for 47% of West Africa's population with a median age of eighteen years. However, things have fallen apart in 21st-century Nigeria because the centre cannot hold. It has displaced youths, the pillar of support and engine of growth and development.

To interrogate their bleak future, fit into the national configuration, and gain relevance, the youth deploy crime, criminality, immorality, assassination, kidnapping, abduction, fraud, armed robbery, militancy, insurgency, thuggery, advance-fee-fraud, etc.

The picture of Nigerian youth since independence has been that of a marginalised group. As the military continued to hold on to the country's political power up till 1999, the life of an average Nigerian youth kept deteriorating. Thus, that Nigeria re-entered liberal democracy in 1999 did not change matters. Hence, to save their future, Nigerian youths organised themselves into resistance militias. Today, some to whom the society looked as youths have become adults and are doing in government like their predecessors: stealing public money and fabricating lies to cover up their illegalities. What hope do Nigerian youths have in this world of misery, violence, HIV/AIDS, assassination, examination malpractice, sexual promiscuity, and joblessness?

How can any nation develop economically and politically when it marginalises rather than engages its youths, the human capital of the 21st-century? It means, therefore, that Nigerian leaders should make deliberate and concerted efforts to integrate youths into democratic governance. The government should promote inclusivism because society is the ultimate

beneficiary. Inclusive government involves a holistic approach, providing merit-based opportunities, constructive interrogation and engagement, transparency and collaboration in decision-making. This is what democracy is all about.

Conceptual issues

The terminologies that continually feature in this discourse are "youth" and "inclusive governance."

The youth

The youths are young and energetic people whom many call the engine room of any society. However, the definition of youth varies from one nation to the other. The United Nations defines youths as persons between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four years while the African Youth Charter puts youth as those from fifteen to thirty-five ages. In Nigeria, the age classification of youth is between eighteen and thirty years as stipulated in the National Youth Development Policy (Fanl, 2001).

The South African National Youth Policy put the youthful age between fourteen and thirty-five years of age. Kenya's National Youth Policy defines the fifteen to thirty years range as the period of youth. "Youth" refers to an age when humans fully develop and utilise their strengths and abilities. Generally the most productive period of human life, it straddles adolescence (the teenage years) and adulthood. Psychologists describe it as a time of "stress and storm," because the individual has become conscious of self and society. It is a period in which the latent energy can be given a kinetic release in many ways. Nigeria's youth policy defines the youth as all young persons of the ages eighteen to thirty-five years (AU: 2006). Although the age range that constitutes youth is in dispute, this study adopts the period between eighteen and forty years. That is because this is the time the young are restless, take risks, and assume the burdens of society as they seek meaning in their existence.

According to the 2006 population, the youth constitute almost one million and translates into over 60% of the population, but this quantum has not been harnessed and utilised for development. Indeed, Nigeria must devise a good plan to tap the energy and resourcefulness of its youths to quicken its economic development if it is to remain a viable entity.

Youths are the labour force for development. Every society prepares its youth, and by extension, its leaders, for the dynamics of building the next

generation. The society that prepares its youth for future aspirations will not only secure her future development; but, will prepare her next set of leaders with the challenges of national reconciliation and development. (Adeline Idike. A: 2015). Youth is normally the most turbulent period for the individual (featuring deviance, non-conformism, and rebelliousness) but also the most productive (Babawale, 2007).

More than other segments of the society, youths have been cannon-fodder and sacrificial lambs in every community: They were enslaved and forcefully transplanted to the West Indies, Europe, and the United States of America. Research shows that young slaves of Igbo extraction from Nigeria are a distinct sub-group in Maryland and Virginia. Communities at war draft their youths to fight or transport weapons, food, and other resources to the fighters. Youths are always victims because society considers the aged and infants vulnerable.

Youths are the foundation of every country because no nation can develop its politics, economy, society, or culture without them (Ajetunmobi: 2002). It is a common cliché that "today's youth are tomorrow's leaders." However, this holds only if today's leaders properly harness youthful energies, inculcate virtues into the youth, and include them in governance. The sustainability of a society depends on its youths because it has no future without them. They are the centre of development and progress.

Inclusive governance

Inclusive governance is the inclusion of all segments of Nigerian society in government regardless of ethnicity, education, environment, gender, or religion. It enhances bridge-building across ideologies and orientations instead of building walls and creating gaps. Inclusive government remains the only antidote to the horde of centrifugal forces threatening to disintegrate Nigeria. That is because it promotes justice, fairness, equity, and honesty in the allocation of the national wealth among the federating units and constituents. It includes the freedom to freely express opinions and hold a dissenting viewpoint without fear of reprisal.

Therefore, deliberate exclusion and marginalisation remain the bane of youth inclusion in governance. Basic ingredients of inclusive governance such as sensitivity, responsiveness often facilitate empowerment rather than marginalisation of the minority and the poor. Other features, which are intrinsic aspects of democracy, include accountability, respect for fundamental human rights, promotion of egalitarian society and youth empowerment. Participatory

governance and the involvement of every group promotes the government's popularity and earn it acceptability and legitimacy among the people. It also produces public systems that are more resilient and adaptive. Democracy thrives on consultation, dialogue, and the inclusion of citizens and organised groups in decision-making. Unfortunately, many African societies use the instrumentation of parochialism in excluding their citizens and numerous groups from the political process and decision-making. Inclusive governance in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria means that all minority ethnic groups would be integrated into governance. Nigeria under the government of late Umaru Yar'Adua in 2007 declared a government of national unity. Under this political arrangement, all the political parties had representation in the executive arm of government.

Historians see inclusive governance as a means of synchronising and connecting successive generations for society's continuity. They use the past to interrogate and interact with the present. The sociologist regards it as a form of interaction between social groups to develop society. Geographers use it to explain the diverse groups and their roles in nation-building. Political scientists use it as a prism of participatory governance and a veritable tool of national unity. Ethnographers, regard it as including minority ethnic groups in the administration of the country. Marxists regard it as a way of closing the gap between the bourgeoisie and the proletariats.

Civil society groups see it as a government of egalitarianism that respects fundamental human rights and in which everybody is equal before the law. Welfarists see it as the government of the poor by the poor and for the poor. To economists, it is a means to improve the economy, generate revenue, and break the yoke of poverty.

Inclusive governance offers a platform to grow democracy. Aiyar and Tiwari (2009) reveal that the key component of progressive socio-economic and political growth lies in inclusive governance that empowers the disadvantaged to overcome socio-political and economic deprivation. Therefore, to accelerate socio-political development that breeds national cohesion in a multi-ethnic state, it is necessary to hitch the horse of the political system to the wagon of inclusive governance.

Such governance must build good structures for every member of the society. Inclusive governance is equally the participation of disadvantaged groups in society (UNDP, 2007). Political inclusion of such groups is essential to overcome the deeply embedded social inequities and economic inequalities

prevalent in the region.

Adetiba and Rahim (2013) note that inclusive governance in Nigerian politics is a process through which every ethnic group and particularly the traditionally under-represented ethnic groups participates in governance. The system seeks participation/representation from every group in a multi-ethnic state thus ensuring socio-political and economic growth of every ethnic group. What informs political inclusion in Nigeria is the degree to which governance excludes the socio-political interests of some ethnic groups, resulting in national incoherence. Every ethnic group has representation in every sphere of governance, in the executive or other arms of government. Significantly, this process will help stem the potentialities of ethnic conflict.

Inclusive governance caters to the desires and aspirations of the poor, women, youth, ethnic and religious minorities, physically challenged, indigenous peoples and other disadvantaged groups. It gives them the platform to participate meaningfully in governance and influence decisions that affect them. It also means that governance institutions are accessible, accountable, and responsive to disadvantaged groups, protecting their interests and providing public services (justice, health, education, etc.) equally to diverse populations. Inclusive governance is synonymous with participatory governance.

Youth inclusion in governance in pre-colonial Nigeria

Every ethnic group in pre-colonial Nigeria assigned the youth significant roles. Youths were central to community life, having imbibed the community's ethos, virtues, and values during "rites of passage" that equipped them to perform their roles as members or leaders. Youths performed roles assigned to them. Through the division of labour on farmlands, for instance, they pooled resources (labour, time, and expertise) and increased production at planting and harvest time. They also thrived in social, cultural and political functions. These activities reinforced the sense of oneness, promoted good neighbourliness and corporate security. Unfortunately, the colonial personnel vehemently disregarded and disparaged the cultural practices that united the youth and promoted industry among them.

Pre-colonial Igbo society, like the Greek city-states, expected young men to participate fully in governance, publicly expressing their views without fear and voting in elections—which were usually consensual. Igbo youths belonged to age-grades that performed some social function: policing, public

works, community defense, and tradition reinforcement through socio-cultural activities. The Igbo youth took part in judicial and decision-making policies. The youth in Igboland remained the pillar of economic development in the pre-colonial era.

European visitors misconstrued the liberalism of the Igbo for political statelessness, maliciously imputing anarchy to an otherwise peaceful society. Sometimes to pacify the youth, the elders call them "leaders of tomorrow" but deny them leadership empowerment. At the other end of the spectrum, they denigrate them as the "hordes of a discordant mob who are neither knowledgeable nor possess the requisite sagacity to efficiently manage the affairs of government."

In Yorubaland, youths had charge of security and construction works. They worked as hunters, farmers, traders, and craftsmen for the economic growth of their societies. Youths imbibed the values of discipline, hard work, accountability, and honesty through these occupations, which prepared them for leadership and responsibility in society. The leader of the youth in every community, who often bears the title of "Olori-Odo", coordinated their activities and played prominent roles in the political development. Youths spearheaded public activities such as spiritual cleansing, festivals, entertainment, community development, and policing. Also, kings and queens were often young inheritors of thrones from their royal forefathers. No tradition barred youths from ascending the throne.

For instance, Idris Alooma of the Kanem Bornu Empire was ten years old when he ascended to the throne. He ruled the kingdom excellently and conquered so many kingdoms that historians describe his time as a golden age.

The historical evidence above establishes that the exclusion of youth from governance is alien to Nigeria. Individualism did not exist in pre-colonial Nigeria. Unfortunately, the Western ethos introduced it alongside colonialism. Individualism engendered elitist ideas, promoted suspicion, and created sharp antagonisms that instigated conflict along lines of economic and social status. Although Nigeria's class stratification existed before colonial rule, the society experienced little discomfiture arising from wealth allocation. We are not unmindful of the prevalence of the lazy blame game in which some blithely attribute our development failings to the effects of colonialism.

Nigerian youth, liberation struggles and politics up to 1999

The history of the Nigerian state may not be complete without a

comprehensive reference to the history of Nigerian youth. Nigerian youth played prominent roles in the 1919 formation of the National Congress of British West African States (NCBWA) in Ghana. In the bid to fight for African independence and self-government, Ladipo Solanke, a Nigerian youth, founded the West African Students Union (WASU) in London in 1920. Other prominent Nigerian youths who played commendable roles during the struggle for independence include Kofo Abayomi, Obafemi Awolowo, H.O. Davies, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Ernest Ikoli, Samuel Akinsanya, Dr J.C. Vaughan, and Dr Randle. Between the 1920s and 1950s, various youth movements actively participated in the nationalist agitations. Most of the early political parties before independence (such as NNDP, NCNC, NYM, NPC, AG and NEPU) were founded and dominated by the youth. Many of these youths paid for Nigeria's independence with their blood, most of them in their twenties.

In the first republic and during the first phase of military rule, young people played an active role in the governance of Nigeria. Alhaji Shehu Shagari and Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri became Federal Ministers in their twenties. Matthew Mbu became an ambassador in his early twenties. Col Yakubu Gowon became head of state at the age of twenty-eight.

Nigerian nationalists waged the struggle for independence largely on the intellectual plane through pamphleteering, pungent newspaper articles, public lectures and negotiations, except for rallies, demonstration, and occasional violence. Even then, it was the youths who spearheaded the struggle from the 1920s through to the establishment of Nigeria's first indigenous administration in 1954. Put differently, the history of Nigeria's nationalist and anti-colonialist struggle is the history of youth activism. Youths formed a political party in 1934 called the Lagos Youth Movement (which became the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1936) to eliminate colonial rule in Nigeria.

In the colonial period, they organised rallies, staged protests and demonstration against British policies. They created awareness and sensitisation programmes through the mass media, symposia and public lectures. Indeed, the youth condemned the colonial administration using more powerful and sophisticated media and political fora. Although manhandled, intimidated, harassed, and imprisoned during these agitations, they remained resilient and focused. The embattled youths—brutalised, maimed, frustrated, imprisoned, and impoverished at the height of the struggle—managed to sustain it. Nigerian youths, perhaps more than youths elsewhere, are dogged, thick-skinned, possessed of good shock absorbers, able to swim to safety in

troubled waters.

The West African Pilot, which members of the youth movement founded, assisted with the dissemination of information and the political education of the colonised Nigerian people. It published nationalist attacks on the British colonial administration. The activities of elite youths hastened the decolonisation in Nigeria. The leaders of the epoch-making group—the Nigeria Youths Movement (NYM)—were students in Britain. Notwithstanding their youthfulness, they understood that the call to national emancipation transcended age barriers and that "the wisdom of Solomon" was more productive than "the age of Methuselah." Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, one of the most visible of them, justified their activism in one of his newspaper articles in the 1930s:

> The era of submission without constitutional opposition is gone. The Nigeria of today and…tomorrow [referring to our age] must realise that it is part of a sleeping African giant. It must, therefore, harness its energy to usher in a new Nigeria.

This striving for a new Nigeria, prevalent among the youths of Azikiwe's generation, persisted throughout the 1950s and laid the foundation for the student activism of that period and after. It was manifest, for instance, in the successful patriotic agitation by the students of the University College, Ibadan, against the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact, intended to come into effect on Nigeria's Independence Day.

At Nigeria's independence in 1960, most of the politicians and administrators were young people. Most of the appointees in the First Republic were below forty years. However, there was a lull in youth activism after the country attained independence. Its unifying spirit began to wane and wither under the pressure of tribal politics and ethnic affiliation. Only after an avoidable civil war did the government officially support rekindling the fire of unity in Nigerian youths, in whose hands the nation's future rested. Among other things, the war had created estrangement among the youths. (Ajetunmobi: 2002)

The youths have a greater stake in the survival of the nation and can hardly pretend not to see the seed of the social vices the adult generations are planting. Their western education has taught them that education is not only to transmit culture and create cultural homogeneity but also to change culture and transform society. Therefore, the contributions of the youth to social development will always include resistance to outdated values, the

mismanagement of public funds, violation of constitutional rights, poverty, disease, and short life expectancy (Ajetunmobi: 2002).

After the Nigerian Civil War, it was necessary to revamp Nigeria's socio-political and economic potentials. The government's first initiative towards that was the adoption of the policies of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation (the Three Rs). To implement the policy of reconciliation, the federal government established the National Youths Service Corps (NYSC) in 1973, immediately after the war. Its main thrust was to use the youths as the nation's bridge-builders. Nigeria's then Head of State, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, said it sought "to bring our young men and women together, with the primary objective of inculcating into them a sense of discipline, dedication, [and] national pride and consciousness…."

However, it had become apparent by the turn of the last century that the scheme had not elicited the love of country that the youths of Azikiwe's generation effortlessly offered. Many youths were victims during conflicts, used as sacrificial lambs in troubled times. For instance, they paid the ultimate price during the civil war, ECOMOG operations, the Maitatsine and Sharia riots, the 12 June crisis, and religious and political crises.

Today, many Nigerian youths have become desperate to get rich quickly. Nation-building is a distant matter to them. In their vaulting ambition for affluence at all cost, the young men get into fraud, crimes, robbery, and other vices while the ladies get into prostitution and endure the attendant social cost. Moral decadence and laxity are the twin maladies that affect the youths, through accessing information and ethos of an alien culture without interrogating its merits to their social milieu. The prevalence of cybercrime shows a fundamental and fatal misjudgement by the youths, who ignore the values of hard work and embrace the get-rich-quick syndrome.

There has been a terrible reversal from the "age of productivity" into an "age of national embarrassment." On the international scene, the negative perception of Nigerian youths outweighs the outstanding feats of other Nigerians in the Diaspora. At home, the situation is even more pathetic. Less than 10% of graduates of Nigerian universities have jobs, and many students have joined violent cults. Many youths traffic in or take illicit drugs, so that Nigeria—previously a non-user nation—has become infested by drug peddlers. A bloody clash on 6 August 2017 between two young drug barons led to the massacre of about eleven people during early morning mass at a Catholic Church in Ozubulu, Anambra state. At the other end of the spectrum

are other young men in ethnic militias who terrorise people and heat up society. Many more, called 'Yahoo' boys, engage in cybercrime.

Researchers have traced Boko Haram's terrorist insurgency in North-East Nigeria to youth marginalisation in governance and economy. Some scholars have described the organisation's violent reaction to social neglect as a protest against bourgeois imposition.

The horrific consequences of the civil war notwithstanding, the government has not devised a comprehensive policy to address youth exclusion from the mainstream of national development. It was only in 1990 that it made concerted efforts in this area. The euphoria its youth development policy generated was short-lived. As the authors of the *2009 National Youth Policy* observed:

> The first attempt to introduce a National Youth Policy was in 1981, which was followed by the drafting of an inclusive social development policy for Nigeria in 1989, providing the basis for a review of the first policy on youth. Regrettably, by the early 1990s, these commendable efforts aimed at Youth development started to suffer tremendous neglect. Besides, the policy attempts hardly provided a concrete framework for addressing the heightened problems confronting the youth. This was partly because the implementation mechanisms of the policy were weak and ineffective, and…partly because the macro-economic and socio-political environment was not conducive.

The youth, Nigerian society and politics of exclusion, 1999-2016

On 29 May 1999, the military administration of General Abdulsalam Abubakar handed over the mantle of leadership in Nigeria to a democratically elected president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. The transfer initiated the country's 4th Republic. Before the handover date, the youth were active in pro-democracy activities and participated actively in enthroning democracy. After 1999, however, the new regime did not properly integrate the youths into the political system. One of the few exceptions was Mr Franklin Nweke, who at years was the youngest minister in the 2003 cabinet. Another was the governor of Cross River State, Donald Duke (1999-2007), also thirty-eight and the youngest governor in the Obasanjo administration. The government dismissed youths as inexperienced and too young to be in governance, like their denigration of women. Obasanjo's administration marginalised the youth and only appointed a few of them with influential parents or family members. Most of his cabinet members were retired military officers and old politicians.

Though the federal government under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo created a Ministry of Youth Development in 2006, the youths remained on the fringes of Nigeria's socio-economic and political architecture. His administration did not harness the contributions of the youths. They embraced social vices in their efforts to develop, and the crime rate escalated. It was evident by the late 1990s that Nigerian youths were probably the most neglected group by the government. This further alienated the youth from governance and politics.

Rather than young people with cutting-edge ideas, Nigeria has between 1999 and 2016 recycled as public officers the retired soldiers who have ruled the country since 1967 and perpetuated corruption. Eventually, they became a class of "king-makers." They include late Samuel Ogbemudia, Shehu Yar'Adua, Olusegun Obasanjo, Ebitu Ukiwe, Olagunsoye Oyinlola, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Buba Mar'wa, David Mark, Aliyu Gasau, Muhammadu Buhari, among others. The need to survive drove some youths into the service of soldiers-turned-politicians as thugs and henchmen to rig elections and perpetrate other electoral malpractices and kill and kidnap political opponents. Some others became personal assistants and secretaries to these politicians and performed their duties with pride and satisfaction.

Between the 1950s and 1990s, the student unions fought government injustice and maladministration. However, by 2003, the malaise of the wider society had crept into student unionism. Student unionism had drifted from fighting social injustice to a "government" of social opportunities. That was because students had compromised their ideologies and genuine collective activism had given way to individualistic struggles for personal survival. The government had infiltrated the universities and its agents had taken hold of the union and compromised the student activists. By 2016, the student union was no longer independent and was often taunted as a business venture and fast way to get rich.

Nigerian students have suffered death,[1] unlawful arrest, detention, expulsion, suspension, etc.; nonetheless, they remain a check on the administrative and financial recklessness of school authorities and the Nigerian government.

Evidence abounds that the Obasanjo and Yar'Adua administrations (1999–2009) grossly neglected youth participation in government as 75% of their cabinet members and other political appointees were over forty. The

1. For instance, police killed Kunle Adepoju, a University of Ibadan student, in 1971.

state governments also toed this path. However, the administration of Dr Goodluck Jonathan (2009-2015) attempted to integrate youths into governance by appointing Mr Jude Imagwe special adviser to the federal government on youth and student matters. It also initiated different policies and programmes to enhance youth inclusion in governance. Nonetheless, 80% of highly educated youth remained shut out of governance.

The Ministry of Youth and Sports, which should educate youths on governance and political issues, focused on other matters. Those concerns included economic empowerment, skill acquisition, conferencing, NYSC support, and sports. It offered little regarding political orientation, sensitisation, and participation in governance.

The United Nations' Dauda Toure stated the plight of Nigerian youths during the 2012 commemoration of the World Youth Day, themed "Youth Political Participation: Setting an Agenda for Good Governance and Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria." He averred that, although youths constitute over 50% of Nigeria's electorate, the absence of measures to involve them in electoral processes has hindered their participation in the country's nascent democracy. Nigerian youths are the most marginalised social group, the most affected by what Aina has called a "situation of powerlessness" (Olawale: 2012). Their deprivation and exclusion from the Fourth Republic politics have caused them to turn to violence.

Youth alienation transcends ethnic and religious boundaries. In virtually no region have governments treated youths as a population that can contribute to Nigeria's growth and development. However, the two most volatile regions (Northern Nigeria and the Niger Delta) have attracted global attention for the grave systemic neglect they portray. The problems ravaging Nigerians in these areas include poverty, illiteracy, youth unemployment, HIV/AIDS, and religious extremism. Indeed, the activities of Boko Haram insurgents in the North and the militants in the South-South and South-East result from the neglect of the youth in the regions.

The inability of the Fourth-Republic governments to engage the youths has driven them to destructive activities, social unrest, crime, kidnapping, terrorism, militancy, piracy, political thuggery, etc. Ike Okonta argues that a combination of these vices elicits violence and wanton killings in the north when political calculations do not have the expected outcomes. In his view, the political class has prepared the tool of violence for activation when they perceive threats to their interests.

Efforts to initiate youth development programmes have been made in other subsequent policy documents, promotion of Small Scale Enterprises, and the National Poverty Eradication Plan 1999-2015, among others. Despite these efforts and an increase in the number of agencies dealing with youth issues, problems affecting young people have continued. This situation is attributable to the lack of a comprehensive policy to integrate the youths into governance. Civil organisations have devised innovative programmes to remedy youth exclusion from governance, but they have been in vain.

Nigeria's beautifully crafted Second National Youth Policy Document of 2009 and other youth development policies since 1999 have not achieved their goals. These programmes include the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), the Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YOU-WIN), and the Osun State Youth Employment Scheme (O-YES). The current administration has also attempted to include youths through N-Power, various MSME support schemes, entrepreneurial programmes, and the National Youth Empowerment Programme (NYEP) established in 2015. Many other notable youth policies introduced by the government have not achieved the desired objectives due to lack of funds, weak management and complex structures.

Youth inclusion in governance is the bedrock of national development. It will transform every facet of life: health, poverty, economy, and governance. The agitation for regional self-determination by a group of people, which was blown out of control since 1999 (the Fourth Republic), is because of the exclusion or alienation of the virile youth from governance. If democracy is a numbers game in which the majority have their say and political participation involves citizen-government interaction, why cannot Nigerian youths (i.e., most of Nigeria) participate in governance? The aged politicians are shrinking the political space deliberately. This is because of the greed and high level of corruption among the elites and elderly class. Nigerian culture has a profound respect for the elderly, naturally attributing wisdom and competence to them and assuming that they always guide the youth wisely. In contrast, the culture conceives of youths in often unflattering terms: lacking in wisdom, rash, excessive, inconsistent. Thus, youths are led, directed, protected, guided, and, indeed, controlled.

Religion is another major impediment to youth inclusion. Christianity and Islam, the two major religions in Nigeria, emphasise respect for elders and constituted authorities. Thus, youths tend to obey injunctions unquestioningly,

allowing the elderly to take advantage of their submissiveness. Youth marginalisation has not only undermined their potentials but has also perpetuated their dependence and powerlessness.

Having failed to create a strong base for national unity, politicians employ the services of the youth as, among other things, thugs, assassins, and ballot box-snatchers to further their objectives. Persons are hard to find in Nigeria between eighteen and thirty-five years who are local government chairmen, members of state houses of assembly, the House of Representatives, or Senate, or ministers. When President Jonathan appointed Mr Nurudeen Mohammed minister of state for foreign affairs, the latter—then thirty-five—was the youngest cabinet member. Most of President Buhari's cabinet are over forty. Abubakar Malami, (forty-eight), Finance Minister Kemi Adeosun was also forty-eight years but a month older than Malami and Senator Heineken Lokpobiri (forty-eight) were almost the youngest in his cabinet. The members of the national assembly are old 'recycled' politicians. Even the judiciary marginalises the youths through its unduly strict promotion protocol. Solomon Dalung, the current minister of youth and sports, was fifty-one at his appointment in 2015. This confirms that Nigerian society does not allow youths to manage even their affairs and ministry.

Nigerian youth and leadership qualities

Youths are an engine of growth and development in every nation. Frantz Fanon, in *The Wretched of the Earth*, wrote that "every generation must out of relative obscurity discover its mission, fulfil it, or betray it." Nigerian youths are always in search of some mission or another to fulfil for the nation, but the older generations and the power structures have not allowed them. If today's youths are not to become what Professor Wole Soyinka has termed "a wasted generation," society must give them more opportunities to serve. It must no longer apply labels, such as "youthful exuberance," to them and their activities.

They have a reputation in cultures across the world for enormous creativity and capacity for risk-taking. Research confirms that they are responsible for most scientific, technological, and humanistic discoveries. For instance, Isaac Newton invented calculus at twenty-four and Albert Einstein discovered the law of relativity and Brownian motion at twenty-six. Also, Charles Darwin formulated the law of natural selection at twenty-nine and P.A.M. Dirao developed the mathematical theory of the positron at twenty-six and won a Nobel Prize at thirty-one.

It is inimical to Nigeria's rapid development to ask that youths "wait for their time" (i.e., old age) to make their contribution. After all, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was the youngest ever president of "God's own country"—the United States of America—and he shocked the world despite his youth. Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in the Caribbean despite many hurdles. Cuba is one of the advanced countries in Latin America. He successfully increased life expectancy, reduced infant mortality rate and improved social and welfare facilities to the benefit of all.

The youths of yesteryears, condemned as the "wasted generation," are mostly the leaders of today, embattled, assimilated, and, in some cases, consumed by society's evils. Hon. Sina Adejobi said that Gen. Ibrahim Babangida wondered in 1989 that the youths were yet unready to assume leadership, that they still lived in the shadow of their old leaders. The 'New Breed' was still in the old bottle hence could not perform better than their environment has permitted.

Events have demonstrated globally that youth is golden and youths can provide good governance if they get the opportunity. Elsewhere in the world, young men and women have had the opportunity to govern or hold key positions in society. For instance, twenty-nine-year-old President Venessa D'ambrossio of San Marino is the world's youngest. Yemeni President Salah Ali al-Sammad is thirty-nine and Emil Dimitrier, thirty-nine, is the acting Prime Minister of Macedonia. Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, thirty-six, of the kingdom of Bhutan and Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, thirty-six, is the Emir of Qatar. Kim Jong-Un, thirty-three, is the supreme leader of North Korea and a key player in world politics. Emmanuel Macron, thirty-nine (born on 21 December 1977), is the president of France.

The Reverend Martin Luther King Jnr. was barely thirty when he started his non-violent campaign for the equality and brotherhood of all Americans. His action turned out to be the tonic the American society needed to weld itself together and forge ahead in building the most powerful nation on earth. Proclaiming his dream that African-Americans would rule America, King at the height of his activism inspired his generation to the utmost sacrifice to reach the Promised Land. He urged them: "if you cannot run, walk; if you cannot walk, crawl. Do whatever you can, but don't stand on the same spot."

In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings was a Flight Lieutenant in his twenties when he thrust forth his head, in 1978 then again in 1981, to carry the burden to re-build a collapsing Ghana. Captain Thomas Sankara took a similar pathway

in Upper Volta, which he transformed in a few months from a dying nation into a land of a people of dignity and renamed Burkina Faso. Yakubu Gowon became Nigeria's Head of State in 1966 at the age of twenty-nine years and successfully took us through a civil war. His successor, Murtala Mohammed, died in a failed coup at thirty-two, after ruling the nation for one year and effecting fundamental and constructive changes.

Fidel Castro was barely thirty when he ignited the fire of the Cuban revolution in 1956, telling all men of his generation:

When men bear the same ideals in their hearts, nothing can isolate them. Neither prison walls nor the sod of cemeteries, for a single spirit, a single conscience, a single dignity and a single idea will sustain them.

Joseph Kabila became the youngest at the age of twenty-nine when he was elected President of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001. He is now forty-five. Faure Gnassingbé of Togo is fifty years, Adama Barrow, the incumbent president of The Gambia, is fifty-two. Letsie III of Lesotho is fifty-three. He was twenty-seven years old when he became the king of Lesotho. Uhuru Kenyatta (fifty-five) is the president of Kenya. Unfortunately, most of Africa's young presidents inherited power from their fathers, and those who got it democratically refused to relinquish it at the end of their lawful tenure. For example, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza, fifty-three, entered the office in 2005 at thirty-six and refused to leave when his second term ended.

Challenges of youth governance

The independence that marked the beginning of self-government had faced many challenges on how to establish a stable democratic government. These challenges include youth restiveness, unemployment, thuggery, militancy, political and religious violence, unequal distribution of wealth, and corruption. Others include instability, electoral abnormalities, politics of godfatherism, insecurity, and the insincerity of political gladiators (Mohammed, 2013).

The military assumed power through a coup d'etat on 15 January 1966, and the putschists were mostly young men such as Gen. Yakubu Gowon (thirty-two). Unfortunately, the military did not involve young, civilian men in governance. As with others who had seized power by coups, the new governors destroyed all the democratic structures of the First Republic. They banned all political parties and elections and arrested, imprisoned, or even killed some young politicians. By the 1970s, the military deployed several Decrees for ousting the youth from governance in preference to aged politicians just

to get rubber-stamp approval and pseudo-legitimacy. The military adopted a commandist, centralised power structure and shut out the citizens from governance.

Governance is no tea party: it is all-inclusive and encompasses all facets of life—socio-political, economic, and even spiritual. It demands endless sacrifice and, sometimes, thankless service to one's fatherland. Commitment to governance derives from selflessness, expressed as ones' love for future generations and absolute consciousness about posterity. No nation has completed its formation in the lifetime of an individual or a generation; nation-building is a process in which each generation passes on the torch to the next. Indeed, the recent history of many nations confirms that the task of governance is primarily the responsibility of youths.

Regrettably, the family, which should guide children and youths and instil the society's norms in them, has lost its moral authority. Babawale (2007: 127) opines that materialism, urbanisation, and poverty have robbed the family of its values and virtues. It and the school can no longer perform their socialisation functions that should help prevent youth crime. Peer-group pressure, foreign cultural influences, and material acquisitiveness have made our youths an endangered species (Babawale, 2007).

Prerequisite to youth inclusive governance

Education

Youths should, as a matter of urgency, embrace western education. The relevance of education in human and national development cannot be over-emphasised. The first ability education gives is that of reading and writing. This ability brings enlightenment and enables the educated to understand and analyse government policies and follow world events. It also gives everyone an equal opportunity to achieve "the good life" and participate in the political process. The importance of education in socialising citizens, national integration and nation-building can be seen in this statement of Lenin:

> …an illiterate person stands outside, he must first be taught the ABC. Without this, there can be no politics; without this, there are only rumours, gossips, tales and prejudices but not politics.

Awolowo agrees with Lenin and goes further. He sees education as a catalyst for social and economic progress and an ingredient for citizens' liberty and to build a democratic and stable polity. Through education, a society can

inculcate national values and ideologies in its members, what Almond and Powel call political socialisation. Even the legendary Socrates, Plato's teacher, says "virtue is knowledge." Education's crucial role in development is what motivates patriots.

Formal education is an instrument for effecting inclusive governance and this has been demonstrated in many countries especially by the Youths who embraced it. Rebuilding from the wreckage of World War II, France decided in 1952 to re-organise its educational system from the elementary level up. The result of the re-organisation seemed to have amply justified the expectation. The USA followed the French initiative in reforming its educational system. The country, which believed it was ahead of other superpowers in science and technology, was embarrassed when the Soviet Union successfully launched its Sputnik into space in 1957. In response, it identified and provided—at the expense of the less gifted children—special schools, facilities, and attention for some young eggheads. Consequently, America regained the lead within a short space of time when it successfully landed a man on the moon in 1969.

This has far-reaching implications for the rest of the world, whether in politics, education, or the development of science and technology. Even the so-called advanced industrialised societies are acutely aware that formal education is the kingpin of development.

Education, just like culture, not only an all-embracing phenomenon but also the key to unlocking the treasures naturally embedded in each person. It paves the way for quality and good governance. An educated society is socially, politically and economically reinvigorated to meeting the challenges of nation-building. However, education must not be for its own sake. It must focus on the good of the individual and society. In other words, a person acquiring education must have a mission or set goals. These must emanate from a strong vision that resides in the individual's subconscious as a picture. Every mission emanates from a vision, every vision begins with a picture, and the laws of nature indicate that no man, no matter how educated, is permitted to experience what he cannot perceive.

Job creation

An idle hand is the devil's workshop. Therefore, the Nigerian people—governments, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, institutions, parents and even the youths themselves—must embark on massive job creation. It is only by gainfully employing the youths that the nation can get

to channel its energy and intellect towards good and quality governance. The emphasis should not be on government jobs alone but also on self-employment. Nation-building is like cleaning a nation: the nation is clean when everyone is. So the youths must begin to think about how they can generate employment. We must focus more on what we can do for this nation and not what the nation should do for us.

Political mobilisation

Poverty, greed, insecurity, and many years of military dictatorship have monetised the Nigerian polity. The challenge to the youths is to mobilise themselves to galvanise the nation to evolve a free and fair, all-inclusive political order. The only way to stop money politics is to collect money from those who niggardly dole them out and still refuse to vote for them. Unfortunately, the youths are the bodyguards and tools to the money politicians. They are the ready instruments for intimidating perceived political opposition and invariably they are responsible for sustaining bad political leadership in Nigeria. The day Nigeria's youths decide to change the colour of the country's politics will mark the beginning of our return to sanity and prosperity.

Benefits of youth inclusion in governance

Most significantly, youth-inclusive governance leads to inclusive growth and development. The health sector, information and communication technology (ICT), entrepreneurship, creative arts and entertainment industries will develop.

Youth inclusiveness in governance would also strengthen democracy and democratic processes in the country. It will reduce tension, conflicts, and militancy. Since most perpetrators of crises are young men and women, they will desist from perpetuating crises if meaningfully engaged in the administration of the state. Social vices, such as drug addiction, drug trafficking, prostitution, and human trafficking prevalent among the young citizens, will also reduce.

Many youths indulge in "dirty" businesses because they are neglected in governance. Although the Government may have spent a lot in the name of fighting crime without understanding that the formula or solution is youth inclusion. Any nation that wants to fight crime should start with youth empowerment morally, academically and financially. Youths who are aware

of the dangers and sanction associated with arm robbery and other social vices, would likely not take part in them. In a nutshell, youth inclusion in governance reduces crime.

Youths provide the bulk of the security departments of many nations. They are full of energy and ability and always ready to confront challenges. However, the country must equip them with the required skills before they can perform their security functions. Youth inclusion enhances national protection and youth patriotism when they receive such training (Babalola et al., 2015).

Poverty will not only reduce but also job creation and opportunities will increase. The recent rural-urban migration, common among youths, will reduce. That is because, aware that they would be able to participate in grass-root politics and decision-making, many would rather stay in their villages to contribute their quota. Hence, this will aid rural development, reduce rural-urban movement and de-congest the cities.

In the developed nations throughout the world, the youth are the brain behind their technological advancement in the areas of electronics, automobile, mechanical, construction (civil engineering) and other manufacturing industries. They are creative and innovative. Youths make possible what seems impossible. They influence the environment positively for the development of the state.

Youth inclusion strengthens democracy. Most of the political parties, especially the national parties, are dominated by the youth. They serve as party agents, mobilisers and hold key posts. While performing these responsibilities, they acquire skills, experience and knowledge for governance. The youth would therefore exhibit whatever experience they might have gathered through their political apprenticeship into good governance.

It would also eliminate discrimination, segregation and ethnicity in Nigeria. Since cultural identity is more prevalent among the youth, including them will contribute to national integration, dignity, respect and national identity rather than sectional, regional, or ethnic solidarity. Hence, it will enhance national unity.

Negative effects of youth exclusion from governance

One disturbing development was the rise of ethnic-based militias across several sections of the country. Politicians have shown increasing willingness to rely on these militias for political vendettas and election-related intimidation (Egbefo: 2015).

Youths engage in violence before, during, and after elections. The effects of their exclusion from governance in Nigeria include communal conflict, the abduction of a sitting governor in Anambra state, and unsolved high profile political murders. Among the last was that of Chief Bola Ige, the Minister for Justice and Attorney General of the Federation. Other results of youth exclusion include the escalating violence in the North-East and the activities of heavily armed youth militias and criminal elements.

Recommendations

The results described above make youth inclusion in governance at all levels imperative. Nigeria could achieve this by the following measures:

1. Reduce the age for contesting elective posts to youthful age and encourage the youth to participate actively in politics;
2. Constitutional provisions to provide for more post for the youths;
3. Discourage money politics;
4. Economic empowerment through funding, training and government supports;
5. Re-orientation of the youth through institutionalised agencies. The youth themselves must play active roles in this re-integration exercise. They must depart from old politics played by the old politicians. Nigeria's future depends on the effort of youths, and they must take charge of its politics now. Babawale (2007:74) argues that Nigerian youths should not engage in politics for money, the bane of our society. He said that if the youth fold their arms and watch events as spectators or cowards it would amount to a generational suicide;
6. Inculcation of the right and democratic attitudes by the youth themselves. The youth should try to tolerate each other and accommodate diverse opinion. They must imbibe the habit of resolving differences and conflicts amicably through dialogue without resorting to arms and destructive methods;
7. Nigeria should recognise and integrate into the political space the many youth-dominated ethno-regional groups. They include the Arewa People's Congress (APC), O'odua People's Congress (OPC), Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM), and Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). Others are the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND),

and Egbesu;

8. Youth inclusion in governance should be made a result-based project because Nigeria is an ongoing development project in all ramifications.

Conclusion

Economic crisis, political instability, and ethnic and religious conflict have marred the Fourth Republic. Nearly two decades after the return to democratic rule, governance in Nigeria still features youth exclusion, unaccountability, lack of transparency, electoral fraud, and the personalisation of public resources. This situation presents particular challenges to the Nigerian youths. Among the several justifications for youth inclusion in Nigeria's political growth and development is, first, that they tend to be more educated than the older generations. Therefore, they can better absorb new technologies and ideas and adapt them to the African environment. Second, they tend to take more risks than their older counterparts. The youth are more likely to challenge certain norms and socio-political processes that may be hindering the country's economic and socio-political development. The challenge to Nigerian policy-makers is how to harness young people's desire for change that has the potential to translate into positive outcomes. The consequences of not fully developing and harnessing youth's potential could be dire, including significant economic losses, armed conflict, and political and social upheaval and instability—as demonstrated by the current Boko Haram insurgency and the militant attacks.

Youths are more likely to become frustrated because of legitimate grievances, including lack of employment opportunities, low educational attainment, little participation in decision-making and low social mobility. In this volatile situation, greedy and opportunistic politicians could even exploit these grievances by involving these frustrated youths in violent overthrows of legitimate governments—creating massive instabilities that could limit the economic growth of Nigeria.

Nigerian youths are a hidden force whose power and potentials are yet to be fully tapped. The youths of Nigeria still have a lot to offer the nation. In recent times they have realised that they are not to live like robots but that they exist for the pursuit of virtue, happiness, good life and knowledge. They have developed the humility to see themselves as instruments of development and culture change. Consequently, youths are ready for the change from ineffectiveness to effectiveness, mediocrity to excellence, inactivity to activity,

poverty to prosperity, death to life, darkness to light, bondage to freedom, and followership to leadership. Nigeria must teach the youths to eschew bitterness, tolerate other people's views, and be patient in the face of criticism. It must allow them to participate in running the government because their brain is fresh and their ideas correct, they are focused and innovative.

The development of Nigeria is the responsibility of the old and young. As a nation, we must work for near-perfect unity even in diversity without losing our peculiar identities. Let the youths and adults work hard to uplift Nigeria. The adults should see the youths as partners in progress in the development of Nigeria and not as usurpers. They should be given every opportunity to develop and participate in the affairs of the nation. The youths should see adults as reference points regarding their strengths or weaknesses; they must realise that experience is not purchasable. The "youths shall indeed grow and the adult shall not perish but prosper."

The Nigerian youths must reject the present pessimism about the nation's unity and assume a more positive role in the building of a stable nation and advancing democratic growth. The traditional responsibility of acting as the catalyst for improving and changing the decaying value of hard work, honesty, selfless service, humility and patriotism should be kept alive. As the youths constitute a major voting bloc, it devolves on them to vote for excellence and not mediocrity or money. Adults must allow youths to perform. Currently, leadership and governance are gerontocratic.

To give a place to youths in the building of a virile nation, adults must change their attitude. They must show that the legacy they are leaving behind is that which youths can deploy in building a better society. Otherwise, they will remain perverted and corrupt and accept the existing debased values as the norm.

Generations of youths in Nigeria are proud to have produced leaders. They include Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Balarabe Musa, Bala Usman, Ijaola Asiwaju, Herbert Macaulay, Audu Ogbeh, Tunju Otegbeye, Ebenezer Babatope, and Wole Soyinka.

This paper has tried to highlight how Nigeria has excluded youths from governance. It shows that the ex-military men and the older generation politicians were among the reasons for this. The paper emphasises the benefits of youth participation in governance.

Finally, it calls for a cultural renaissance, political reorientation, social liberation, and economic empowerment to allow the youths to participate in

governance for Nigeria's sustainable development. Indeed, the youth are not too young to rule.

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Chapter 26 | Connecting the Youth to the Economy and Politics

Samson Itodo

Introduction

The plight of the Nigerian youth, the largest chunk of the country's population, is not only deplorable. It is also an exemplary case in point in discussions of youth under-empowerment anywhere. The nature and effect of the under-utilisation of their capacity are regrettable. Whereas most countries attribute their economic development to their youths, Nigeria describes its youths as an economic liability. This paper submits that the productive workforce, most of which is the youth, is central to national development. The nature, depth, and quality of this workforce decide the quality of national development.

Johnson (2014) opines that youths are among the greatest assets of any nation. They are the greatest investment in a society's development and future and engineer, foster, and shape its cultural, economic, and political change. Meanwhile, Nigeria has marred the potentials of its youths by disregarding their personal growth. Thus, rather than assets for national development, they are ready tools for electoral violence, armed banditry, political thuggery, exam malpractice, internet fraud, etc.

I intend in this paper to study the youth and their role in sustainable national development. It is in five parts. The first has given a background to the problem under investigation; the second clarifies its key concepts. I consider the current economic condition of Nigerian youths in the third part, particularly regarding employment. The fourth looks at their political and economic exclusion of the Nigerian youth and counter-measures by the government and the youth. The fifth offers recommendations and conclusions on the challenge of the Nigerian youth.

Conceptual clarifications

This section explains the concepts of youth, empowerment, and national development.

Youth

The youths are the young and energetic, to whom most refer as the engine room of society. Countries have different definitions of youth. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines it as those aged between eighteen and twenty-four years. Nigeria's National Youth Development Policy classify as youths persons between eighteen and thirty years (Fanl, 2001). These are the able-bodied males and females, energetic, intelligent, and independent-minded, and able to influence society by their will, strength and independence of mind. Onwunah (2011) lists other attributes of youths as creativity, exuberance, hard work, courage, altruism, and adventure. They are daring and willing to test new ideas (Babalola and Fasiku, 2015). Bimbola, Ayodele, and Adedayo (2014) describe adolescence as a time of identity-formation, self-exploration, development of views on personal, social, educational, and vocational matters.

The 2005/2006 national household survey found that persons eighteen to thirty years old made up 50.8% of Nigeria's 20.9 million-strong labour force. Those fifteen to twenty-four accounted for 32.3% (NBS, 2018).

The situation in Nigeria is bothersome. Isibor (2011) reports that approximately 33% of youths in Nigeria have no access to formal education or source of livelihood. Many without familial protection live on the streets: in uncompleted buildings, wastelands, bus stops, abandoned vehicles, and under bridges, etc. These are the youths of Nigeria, and their vulnerability indicates its low investment in human capital.

According to Omeiza (2018), we may also associate youths with protests, social revolution, or violent change. This viewpoint affiliates youth with energy, activism, sacrifice, and the ever-readiness to work for social transformation (Obi, 2006: 6). It captures the youthful spirit of the 1960s civil rights movements in the United States, the June 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in China, and the recent anti-globalisation movements. However, youths can also engage in violence or criminality where they are victims of social decay, manipulation, or exclusion. Their place in a mode of production and their access or lack of it to the social surplus influences their politics. Survival is paramount for some youths, particularly in the poverty-stricken economies of the developing world, Nigeria inclusive. They first must survive before they can fight for a future. Indeed, as Obi (2006: 9) notes:

Where the very fact of survival is embedded in conflict, then the struggle for survival for the future is ambushed by more violence that sucks in young

people into the vortex of class, ethnic, generational, communal, and political agendas.

Hence, society views them as a liability rather than assets for national development. Their obvious lack of skills and professional expertise accounts for Nigeria's development difficulties.

Empowerment

Youth empowerment is an old concept in the social sciences and development economics. It concerns equipping youths with the knowledge they need to contribute to social and economic development. It involves increasing the economic, political, social, educational, gender, or spiritual strength of individuals and communities. The term covers a vast range of meanings, interpretations, definitions, and disciplines, from psychology and philosophy to the commercialised self-help and motivational industries. Sociological empowerment often pertains to groups that society has excluded from decision-making through, for example, discrimination based on disability, race, ethnicity, religion, or gender. We could, therefore, see empowerment as a means the society assists or encourages people to be self-employed or self-sufficient.

The current state of the Nigerian youth

Nigeria's population reached about 200 million in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics). Youths, defined as individuals between fifteen and thirty-four years of age, comprise about half of that number (National Population Commission, 2016). Unfortunately, the unemployment rate has grown along with the youth population. Unemployed persons were 31.1%, 13.6%, 12.6%, 14.8%, 13.4%, 11.9% of Nigeria's population in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. They comprised 13.7%, 14.6%, 14.9%, 19.7%, and 33.10% in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2017 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018).

As of March 2009, 41.6% of Nigerians between fifteen and twenty-four years and 17% of those between twenty-five and forty-four were unemployed. Similarly, 14.8% of those with primary education, 23.8% of those with only secondary education, and 21.3% of those with post-secondary education were unemployed. The rates among those who never attended school and those with below primary education were 21.0% and 22.3%, respectively. They were 17.0% among males and 23.3% among females (National Bureau of

Statistics, 2010:3).

Unemployed youth numbered about 11.1 million in 2012. First, regarding age, younger youths struggle even more to find jobs: At least two-thirds of unemployed youth are between fifteen and twenty-four years of age. Regarding gender, available statistics show that most unemployed youths are female. Women accounted for over 50% of unemployed youth between 2008 and 2012. Location analysis of youth unemployment (i.e., by rural-urban distribution) indicates that youth unemployment is mostly rural and growing. From 2010 to 2011, the share of unemployed youth in rural areas increased from 47.59% to 59.95%. The population of unemployed youth in rural areas rose from 2.9 million in 2008 to about 5.9 million in 2012. Regarding education, from 2008 to 2012, over half of unemployed youths had no education beyond primary school. This group has consistently accounted for over 50% of all unemployed youth. However, unemployment seems also to hit graduates of tertiary institutions badly. They contributed about 20% of youth unemployment and often remained unemployed for upward of five years after graduation (NISER, 2013).

However, these figures have changed recently. Nigeria's youth unemployment rate increased from 29.50% in the second quarter of 2017 to 33.10% in the third. It averaged 21.73% from 2014 to 2017, reaching a zenith of 33.10% in the third quarter of 2017 and a nadir of 11.70% in the fourth of 2014 (NBS, 2018).

Addressing the youth challenge

Reasons for non-inclusion and under-empowerment of Nigerian youths

Unemployability is chief among the reasons for the exclusion and under-employment of Nigerian youth. The literature on youth unemployment in Nigeria has identified various causative factors other than governance failure. (For instance, see Adebayo, 1999; Alanana, 2003; Awogbenle and Iwuamadi, 2010; Ayinde, 2008; Echebiri, 2005; and Morphy, 2008). The first of these factors is the rapid growth of the urban labour force arising from rural-urban migration. Scholars often explain this movement in terms of push and pull factors. The former includes the pressure resulting from the rising human-land ratio and seasonal underemployment in the rural areas. The lack of infrastructural facilities exacerbates factors by making rural life unattractive. Youths move to urban areas hoping to secure lucrative industrial employment. Additionally, the urban centres have most of the social amenities whereas the

rural areas lack infrastructure and social and economic opportunities (Okafor, 2011).

Sarr (2000) reports that youth migrants in Africa are thrice the number of other migrants. He reports also that the 1990 urbanisation rate among youths was 32%, compared to below 25% for the non-youth population. By the end of 2010, he estimated, over 50% of Africa's youths would live in urban areas, where job opportunities exist in only a few modern sectors.

Rapid population growth is the second cause of youth unemployment. Nigeria's population was 140,431,790 in 2006, and, given a 3.2% growth rate, projections indicated it could be over 180 million by 2020 (National Population Commission and ICF Macro, 2009:3). That makes Nigeria Africa's most populous nation. Some argue that its high population growth rate has resulted in the rapid growth of the labour force, far outstripping the job supply. Its impact on Nigeria's unemployment problem is multifaceted. For instance, it affects the supply side through the rapid increase in the labour force relative to the absorptive capacity of the economy (Okafor, 2011).

The outdated school curricula and lack of employable skills among the youths are the third cause of youth unemployment in Nigeria. Some scholars and commentators argue that the average Nigerian graduate lacks the skills that formal-sector employers need and is, therefore, unemployable in that sector. They often attribute this to the liberal bias of the education system. Courses in most tertiary institutions in Nigeria lack entrepreneurial contents that would enable graduates to become job creators rather than job seekers.

The fourth cause is the excess of labour supply over demand due to the rapid expansion of the education system, thus worsening youth unemployment in Nigeria. Manning and Junankar (1998) report that, whereas Nigeria's higher institutions produced 73,339 graduates in 1986/1987, the number had risen to 131,016 by 1996/1997. Nigeria has over ninety-seven universities today, and the demand for higher education is increasing. It faces the problem, therefore, of providing suitable employment for the graduates these higher institutions turn out yearly.

The Nigerian economy is too weak to absorb their large numbers (Utomi, 2011). It lacks a manufacturing sector that can take in unemployed youths. Instead, over eight hundred industries collapsed and over thirty-seven factories closed in Nigeria in 2009, according to a January 2010 survey by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN). About half of those still operating is "ailing," demonstrating the great threat to the survival of

manufacturing in the country.

Any discussion of the causes of youth unemployment in Nigeria is incomplete without a look at the massive corruption that successive military and civilian administrations have perpetuated. Corruption, which has permeated Nigeria's social structure, has prevented it from developing a strong economic base. Public officials have misappropriated, diverted, or embezzled public funds for development and stashed them away in foreign banks. Also, incompetent and corrupt administrators of public parastatals have liquidated them (Okafor, 2007). Nigeria earned an estimated $500 billion in oil revenue over the last fifty years. However, the political and business elites, by inflating government contracts, have prevented it from using that wealth to develop an economy that could create jobs for the youths. The ruling political class failed because they replaced the vision, policy, and strategy, which should be the thrust of every leadership, with a transactional, pecuniary approach. Successive governments took turns to prey on the nation's wealth by using public power, resources, goodwill, utilities, instruments of abuse, and personal gains (Okafor, 2005).

Nigeria has excluded its youths from the political process and reduced them to political thugs for the political elite. Until recently, it legally prevented them on account of age from vying for elective office. The "Not Too Young to Run" Act has lifted this barrier to a large extent. Sadly, the political elites have devised new measures to bar the youths. They include the high nomination and expression-of-interest fees the political parties charge, as we witnessed in the just-concluded party primaries in the run-up to the 2019 general elections. Also, the political establishment hampers youth participation in politics by imposing godfather-anointed candidates in contests for party electoral tickets. The rising trend of vote-buying, in which candidates with deep pockets buy elective offices, ensures that youths will remain marginal in the political process.

Nigerian youths and self-help initiatives

Given their continued political and economic marginalisation, Nigerian youths have resorted to self-help to eke out a living and ventilate their political sentiments. These means have both positive and negative impacts on Nigerian society. They include:

The Entertainment Industry

Entertainers accessed $200 million to finance their operations from the

Nigerian Creative and Entertainment Industry Stimulation Loan Scheme, which President Goodluck Jonathan launched in 2011. The industry is creating astute entrepreneurs, cultural ambassadors, and global brands. Three years later, Nollywood, Nigeria's film industry, was second in global film markets by volume of production, and third, behind India's Bollywood and America's Hollywood, in revenue. The entertainment sector is now reportedly Nigeria's second-largest employer after agriculture, providing jobs for over one million people, most of whom are youths. Current estimates put Nollywood's annual revenue at $590 million, with Nigerian musicians and comedians selling out arenas from London to Los Angeles. One example of such success is Nigerian comedian, Basket Mouth's February 2014 tour of the United Kingdom, which sold out in various venues a week before the concert date. A growing number of young people are finding their niche in the budding industry, as they straddle a broad range of economic activities, contributing to the country's economy.

Sports

Nigerian youths have taken up sporting activities as a means of empowerment. Most play football beyond Nigeria's shores, especially in Europe. John Austin Okocha, Mikel Obi, and Kelechi Iheanacho are examples of these youths.

Crime

Many youths also engage in illicit activities when government alternatives are not forthcoming. Most display illicit wealth from internet fraud, which Nigerians call informally *"Yahoo-Yahoo."* They also participate in drug trafficking, hostage-taking, and vandalisation of oil pipelines. The last of these, militant attacks, and piracy undermine Nigeria's economy: they have reduced its crude oil output by more than half. Thus, youth deviant behaviours—caused by joblessness—threaten the country's security, stability and economic development. It is necessary, therefore, to integrate youths into the development process, thus ensuring that they join and sustain it.

Some youth empowerment programmes and quest for sustainable development

Nigeria has a plethora of government policies and initiatives to improve the conditions of Nigerian youths. Akande (2014) discusses them comprehensively:

> Ascertaining policies that have worked in addressing unemployment in Nigeria is rather difficult in light of the incredibly high and rising unemployment rate—and at least around 1.8 million youth are entering the labour market every year (Falusi, 2014). Since it is unclear to what extent any given intervention may have reduced the youth unemployment rate in aggregate, it may be more helpful to think of effective policies as those [that] have delivered on their stated objectives. The sustainability of a programme could also be considered an indicator of success. Different programmes have been introduced by various administrations over time to address youth unemployment, which has been an issue of significant public concern since the days of SAP. In fact, youth unemployment became the focus of the social policy of the military government that ruled Nigeria for much of its years as an independent nation. The initial reaction of the government was to draft unemployed youth to public programmes such as Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) and the Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), which provided immediate and direct jobs to participants interested in agriculture (Akande, 2014:1).

With the transition to civilian rule in 1999, successive civilian administrations—including the current leadership (with its NPOWER initiative)—have tried to refocus unemployment programmes. They have discontinued many, restructured some, and created new ones. This new concern about unemployment has made youths the focus of attention at the three levels of government—federal, state, and local. These governments have established arrangements and agencies to promote youth employment. The three most prominent are the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), the Youth Enterprise With Innovation in Nigeria (YOU-WIN) and the Osun State Youth Employment Scheme (O'YES).

The SURE-P commenced in February 2012 and focuses on managing and investing federal government savings from the partial removal of the subsidy on petroleum products. It is the flagship programme to provide jobs for graduates of tertiary institutions. The initiative involves various schemes, including the Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS) and the Community Services Scheme (CSS). It also includes the Vocational Training Scheme (VTS) and the Community Services, Women and Youth Empowerment (CSWYE) Scheme (Akande, 2014:1).

The GIS is among the more successful schemes of SURE-P. It places

unemployed graduates on a one-year internship with firms, banks, ministries, government departments and agencies, and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that apply to their disciplines. It aims to equip them with the mental and practical skills that the job market demands. About 50,000 of 85,000 applicants partook in the first phase. Around 2000 firms expressed interest to host GIS graduates, but only two hundred and ninety-three firms won approval, as most of the firms fell below the rigorous selection criteria.

The successful ones enjoyed many benefits, including tax rebates and free labour from their interns (the government paid the latter a monthly stipend of ¦ 18, 000, approximately $110). They could also claim that they were fulfilling their corporate social responsibility to the host communities. Testimonies by participants indicate vast acceptance of the scheme. Many say it enhanced their skills, practical knowledge, chances of gaining employment. Others say it provided them with the initial capital to establish their businesses. The number of participants in the scheme was to rise to 100,000 in the 2014/2015 phase (Akande, 2014).

The purpose of YOU-WIN is to create employment for graduates of tertiary institutions who choose entrepreneurship. It requires them to develop and implement their business ideas to provide jobs for themselves and other unemployed youths. The programme had provided 40,000 to 50,000 new jobs by 2015 and facilitated the expansion and specialisation of existing businesses. It also helped to establish a professional and business network of young entrepreneurs (NPC, 2013).

The Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES) is a non-governmental organisation that Hajiya Kure, the former first lady of Niger state, started in April 2000. It is a registered non-profit venture with the Corporate Affairs Commission with registration number RC13705 (Ohise and Adamu, 2009). Kure describes YES as a human development intervention to provide a wide range of vocational training for youths (Kuti, 2006). It empowers them economically and socially and facilitates their development of positive behaviours.

The Junior Achievement of Nigeria (JAN), another youth empowerment initiative, is the world's oldest non-profit that helps students fit into the world of work and reach their full potential. Using trained volunteers from the private sector, it provides entrepreneurial and leadership programmes in schools in one hundred and twelve countries. The organisation began operations in Nigeria in 1999 and has reached over 6,000 students in thirty

primary and secondary schools in Lagos, Abuja, and Enugu (Sesan, 2002). It seeks to inspire and educate young people (ages five to twenty-five) to become business leaders who can compete with their peers worldwide. To achieve this, JAN runs economic education programmes to equip them with the attitudes and skills necessary for personal success and social responsibility. Its programmes include practical schemes in which the students establish and run their company.

JAN's Elementary school programme provides role models for elementary students and explores business and workplace experiences. It also builds connections between young people and the business world, researches economic concepts, and develops interdisciplinary skills in various fields. JAN's Venture in Management Programme introduces members of the National Youth Service Corps, through mini-MBA sessions, to the rewards and challenges of general management and entrepreneurship. The Leadership Empowerment, Achievement and Development Programme develops and empowers girls to become young women leaders and achievers. The Personal Economics and Economics of Staying in School scheme enlightens students on the cost of leaving school early and the benefits of an education. JAN's Career Programme aims to bridge the gap between Nigerian university students and their peers in other countries. Its Enabling-the-Future Scheme is a partnership between JAN and Microsoft to establish an information technology and business acquisition centre.

Measures that will aid career development among youths include loans grant to farmers, incentives to employment-generating ventures, and schemes to encourage youth employment. Others are the formulation and sustained implementation of suitable youth and agriculture development policies. Youth empowerment is the backbone of national development.

The challenges of these policies

The challenges of youth employment programmes include inadequate funding, bad administration and implementation, policy inconsistency, youth apathy, and a dearth of qualified personnel. We outline in the following sections several issues that impinge on their performance.

The programmes target training poorly and do not provide loans

Youth unemployment programmes concentrated more on training than activities that create actual openings for immediate employment (NISER,

2013). This strategy has failed because it rarely provides soft loans along with training, thus denying graduating trainees start-up capital for their prospective businesses. Poor targeting is also a challenge. These programmes often lump together all categories of unemployed youth as though they were homogeneous regarding education, skill, capabilities, etc. The lumping together of primary, secondary, and tertiary education graduates renders ineffective the training the programmes provide.

Poor management, complex structures and inadequate funding hinder success

Confusion and ineffectiveness result from running multiple programmes simultaneously and doing so under a weak management structure, with inadequate funds, and under multiple, sometimes bickering authorities. That is the state of Nigeria's youth empowerment programmes. There is no central authority to monitor and coordinate their activities. Indeed, a wide range of ministries and agencies, often operating in isolation and competition with each other, split between them the responsibility to implement the country's youth employment policy. Consequently, implementation lacks a coherent strategy, resources are likely to be misapplied, and funding is often insufficient and erratic.

The necessity of structural solutions

Nigeria's youth empowerment initiatives take some youths out of unemployment but are grossly inadequate to accommodate the army of unemployed youths. Besides, they pursue short-term goals and ignore the long-term ones that can radically change the structural dynamics of youth unemployment. The necessary structural changes require a comprehensive approach to employment issues that encompasses the educational, training, and labour market factors that inform those dynamics. Only such a perspective can yield effective policy interventions.

The importance of demand-side factors

Finally, one may ask whether Nigeria's youth empowerment policy addresses the factors that limit the demand for labour. It encourages youths to become entrepreneurs, thus creating employment for themselves and other youths. Ultimately, however, the industrial sector also must expand to absorb unemployed youths. That expansion must rest on local agricultural resources, the exploitation of solid mineral, and value addition in those sectors.

Infrastructure development, particularly electricity generation, will boost industrial production, and create employment for millions, especially youths. That would contrast with the petroleum industry that has dominated Nigeria's external trade since the 1970s. It has not generated mass employment—and so has not helped with youth unemployment—because of the high level of technical know-how it requires. Nigeria is now considering the opening up of the petroleum downstream industries and training young people to provide the services that they require, including welding, pipeline maintenance, security provision, etc.

Other problems of youth career development in Nigeria include:

1. A constitut
1. The inability of governments the federal, state and local government to create the enabling environment. Various governments in Nigeria are yet to appreciate the critical function of human resource development in building indigenous entrepreneurship;
2. Lack of technical, vocation and entrepreneurial skills in the curriculum of tertiary institutions;
3. Quest for white-collar jobs by our youths;
4. The high rate of illiteracy in Nigeria hampers career development;
5. Poor planning and execution of employment programmes for youths;
6. The concentration of the national wealth in a few hands;
7. Insufficient fiscal and monetary measures for business growth in Nigeria;
8. Absence of an organised database of unemployed youths.

Conclusion and recommendations

The literature on the subject shows that vocational education is central to any meaningful youth policy. We cannot over-estimate the benefits of youth development and the high cost of not educating the youths. An under-performing education system can only produce an under-performing society. Therefore, youth education is vital to harvesting the inherent potential of youths for national development. A system in which many children do not complete even elementary education is an enormous waste.

The development of human capital requires giving all stakeholders the right incentives. This demands an education strategy that aims to enhance youth employability and promotes universal and equal access to early childhood education and care for all pre-school children in Nigeria. It also

requires a strategy to eliminate child poverty, efficiently transfer income to disadvantaged families, combat gender discrimination, eliminate social exclusion, and provide vocational education.

We offer the following recommendations:

Direct education at imparting holistic learning; this is necessary for the career development of youths;

1. Intensify programmes for career development and youth empowerment;
2. Integrate entrepreneurship in the curriculum at all levels of the education system to equip the youths with the skills they need for business management, analysis, and operation;
3. Establish a central body to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the government's youth empowerment programmes and policies;
4. Create employment opportunities for youths in every section of the government;
5. Integrate the family and religious bodies in the government's youth policy as potent forces in youth education and socialisation.

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Chapter 27 | Connecting the Youth to the Economy and Polity

Kachollom C. S. Best

Abstract

We have no uniform classification of youth populations by their chronological ages. However, scholars recognise that their physical and intellectual capabilities—energy, vitality, and creativity—are critical to social development. Estimates put the global population of youths (persons between fifteen and twenty-nine years) at 1.8 billion, with 87% living in developing countries. Characteristic of the state of youths are unequal access to health and education, joblessness, and low political influence. Unemployment rates among youth are about double that of the adult population in both developed and developing countries. Nigeria's estimated population as of 2012 was 167 million, of which 50% of the population were youths (eighteen to thirty-five years old). The UNDP Report of 2016 estimates that 38.2 million Nigerian youths are in the job market, and about 47% are unemployed or underemployed. Youth unemployment figures vary in states. Rural areas and female youths form the bulk of the unemployed. The Human Development Report, Nigeria 2016 shows slower growth of formal employment: new formal sector jobs declined by 1.27% between 2012 and 2013 from 438,203 to 432,720. Job opportunities in the informal fell 20.8% from 759,896 in 2013 to 628,845 in 2012. The multiplicity of overlapping government programmes to address youth unemployment are ineffective, uncoordinated, corruption-ridden, and sometimes under-funded. Stakeholders have criticised them for being discriminatory, as political, religious, and ethnic sentiments influence beneficiary selection. Thus, they often marginalise prospective beneficiaries with real entrepreneurship potentials and leave unemployed youth with little choice but to become instruments of the nefarious agenda and interests of old politicians. Youths remain disenfranchised despite the Not Too Young to Run Act because their high poverty levels make them unable to contest for office. For instance, the exorbitant price of nomination forms in the dominant political parties effectively excludes youths—particularly females, whose poverty levels

are higher—as electoral contestants. This paper recommends that Nigeria entrench the rule of law among its organising principles. Youth employment initiatives need reorganisation for coherence for effective implementation, monitoring and accountability. The country must entrench youth inclusion in all programmes concerning them, outside the control of the political class, and ensure gender mainstreaming through affirmative action. The paper also recommends legislative changes to empower the judiciary to apply sanctions on defaulters in the discharge of their duties.

Keywords: employment, gender, female/male youth, underemployment, unemployment, development, political participation.

Introduction

Scholars and policy-makers recognise youths as an important segment of society. Youth is the period of developing and using critical physical, social, economic, psychological, and intellectual capacities for productive and reproductive activities. These abilities enhance personal and societal well-being in an environment conducive to their development and expression but produce woes and social problems without it. (See Human Development Report—Nigeria, 2015; Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme, 2014). Organisations and countries define youths differently. The World Bank, United Nations and International Labour Organisation (ILO) define them as persons aged fifteen to twenty-four years. In contrast, the Commonwealth Youth Programmes define them as those between fifteen and twenty-nine. Nigeria's National Youth Policy defines youths as individuals eighteen to thirty-five years (Oduwole, 2015, NYP, 2009).

The global population of persons aged fifteen to twenty-nine years is around 1.8 billion, 87% of whom live in developing countries. Their conditions unequal access to health and education, joblessness, and political powerlessness. In both developed and developing countries, unemployment rates among youth are more likely to double that of the adult population. The Commonwealth developed eighteen youth development indices (YDI) to rank the state of youths, the primary ones of which are health, education, and employment. Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest YDI among the nine regions in the ranking, with ten of its countries also scoring the lowest among countries. However, the survey also rated the region as recording the

most improvement in ratings between 2010 and 2015. Nigeria fell among countries with medium YDI's (4.94-0.507).[1]

The condition of the Nigerian youth in the past ten years

Akande (2014) estimates that 50% of Nigeria's 2012 estimated population of 167 million were youths of eighteen to thirty-five years, but the NRSP (2014) estimates a higher share of 60%. The UNDP (2016, p. 11) reports that Nigeria's population had risen to 170 million, with 62% living on $1.25/day. The country placed one hundred and fifty-third of one hundred and eighty-six countries on the 2013 Human Development Index. It was also one hundred and eighteenth of one hundred and forty-three countries on the Gender Inequality Index. Strangely, the 7% growth in Nigeria's economy, principally in agriculture and trade, did not translate into better living standards for most of the populace, as poverty, inequality, and unemployment increased. Female employment is predominantly in the small, semi-formal, and informal sectors, where 70% of employed women work. Only 11% of them are industrial workers, virtually none are in the extractive industries, and 24% are in the federal civil service. Of this latter group, just 14% are in senior management, which violates the principles of affirmative action and gender equity (ActionAid, 2012, p. 6). Unemployment was 23.9% in Nigeria in 2011 and 27.4% in 2012 (NRSP, 2014, p. 12).

The population of those living in absolute poverty rose from 80 million (64.2% of the population) in 2003/2004 to 102.2 million (62.2%) (UNDP, 2016, p. 12). The contributory character of social security in Nigeria—which requires beneficiaries to be in formal employment—exacerbates poverty in the country, given the most vulnerable do not have such employment. That contributes to insecurity in the country (UNDP, 2016, p. 12; Adekola et al., 2016).

The International Labour Organisation defines the unemployed as those who are economically active, without work, but actively seeking employment. This includes those who have lost their jobs or left them voluntarily for up to five weeks. The Nigerian definition of the unemployed includes persons from fifteen to sixty-four years who cannot secure

1. See http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/state-worlds-youth-population-new-index-underscores-urgent-need-invest-young.

employment in which they work for over twenty hours in a week. It considers people without employment at which they can work for forty hours a week as underemployed (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2016, Adekola et al., 2016; NRSP, 2014).

Unemployment among Nigerian youths is the worst in sub-Saharan Africa (NRSP, 2014). Youth unemployment doubled in five years from 12.7% in 2006 to 23.9% in 2011. In 2016, 38.2 million youths were in the job market and 15.2 million (42.24%) are unemployed (UNDP, 2016, p. 11). Nigeria's average rate of youth unemployment is 38%, but the rate varies widely across states, with Benue, Kano, and Niger at 64%, 50% and 47% respectively (NRSP, 2014, p.12, 13).

Figure one below provides estimates of youth unemployment among fifteen to twenty-four-year-olds in Nigeria:



Source: TheGlobalEconomy.com. The World Bank

The Nigerian economy performed well between 2014 and 2015, and youth unemployment dropped appreciably in that period. However, its performance has since declined by 1.6% because of falling global oil prices, fuel shortage, erratic power supply, pipeline vandalism, and insecurity (UNDP, 2016, p. 6).

Unemployed youths in Nigeria are not a monolithic group but feature distinctions between their various contingents. The unemployment rate is higher among rural youths (33%) than their urban counterparts (28.3%) and rose from 4.8 million in 2010 to 9.3 million in 2012 (HDR, 2015). Female youths also experience higher levels of unemployment, and the rate among them was 50% between 2008 and 2012. Also, youths with primary education or less account for 50% of unemployed youths (Akande, 2014). Figure two below provides the estimates for four years:

Fig. 2: Youth unemployment by educational level (2008-2012)



Source: NISER, 2013

Graduates and professionals too are experiencing growing unemployment, some for up to five years (Adekola et al., 2016; Akande, 2014). Youths of the eighteen to twenty-four years constitute the bulk of the unemployed population. Two-thirds of them are unemployed, which increases their vulnerability to pressures to take to illegal activities to make a living (NSRP, 2014, pp. 12, 13). The marital responsibilities of unemployed youths can stress their marriages, as the inability to meet family needs is a major source of marital conflict (Best, 2016).

Job creation has been inadequate, and only about 10% of youths (of whom only a third are females) find employment in the formal sector (NSRP,

2014, p.12). The 2014 stampedes for vacancies at the Nigerian Immigration Service demonstrate the gravity of the situation. The agency had 4000 to 4500 openings but 6.5 million youths applied, buying their application forms for ¦ 1,000 each. Their stampedes at several locations in the country on the day of the interview resulted in several dead and injured (Adekola et al., 2014, p.3).

The formal sector's job creation fell by 1.27% from 438,203 new jobs in 2012 to 432,720 in 20123 (Human Development Report, Nigeria 2016). Informal sector jobs grew by 20.8% between those years, 759,896 new jobs in 2013 against 628,845 the previous year (HDR, 2015, p. 36). Also, according to the report, people identified having a formal sector job as a source of personal security. Nonetheless, the rate of total job growth is grossly inadequate for Nigeria's growing population, which needs 4.5 million new jobs annually for new labour market entrants (NRSP, 2014, p.6).

Youths face political marginalisation all over the world. However, they are participating increasingly in digital media activism, protests and volunteerism despite their declining political participation.[2] The role of social media is noteworthy in the youth-led Arab Spring that produced massive socio-political changes. Nigeria's youths do not participate in decision-making on matters concerning them because of their high levels of unemployment. Nigeria is a patriarchal society, where most communities determine participation in decision-making by gender and age. The Igbo had a decentralised system: a man, his wives, their children, and their sons' wives were the basic political unit, with the oldest man as the family leader. A similar structure obtained among the Berom. The *Dalo* (father of the house) exerted influence over his immediate family, brothers, and close kin, who deferred to his authority in all matters (Coleman, 1958, Jacobs, 1997).

An Action Aid study found low women's participation in local-level decision-making and governance in eight states: Akwa Ibom, Delta, Bauchi, Gombe, Ebonyi, Ondo, Kogi, and Kwara. The major household matters in which women had sole or joint decision-making powers with their husbands were food, school fees, and the purchase of assets. Most cultures do not give women a voice in traditional councils, but some allow men to represent women's views in the council (ActionAid, 2012, Shut 1995). Women had little representation in local government affairs, whether as top management

2. See http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/state-worlds-youth-population-new-index-underscores-urgent-need-invest-young.

or key stakeholders, and local government budgets and projects did not provide for their concerns and needs. Therefore, the study concluded, grass-roots governance flouted the principles of gender inclusion and equity. It found women's participation to be 67% in the household, 16% in the community, and 16% in local government matters (ActionAid, 2012 pp. 15-18).

Political participation includes membership of a party, vying for office, taking part in public advocacy or protests, and engaging policy-makers and administrators on issues of concern (ActionAid, 2017, p.18). Older men, who control political decision-making, have marginalised youths in public affairs and only engage them to execute their wishes and plans. Many scholars and activists have argued that political leaders perpetrate violence, and electoral malpractices using unemployed youth, who depend on them for a living (NRSP, 2014). Participation by those eighteen to twenty-nine years in the 2015 General elections was around 38.8%.

The constitution itself institutionalised ageism and youth marginalisation by requiring that aspirants for the office of president, vice-president, governor, deputy-governor, or senators be at least forty years old. Youths vied for office in the 2015 elections mostly on the platforms of the lesser-known political parties. Four per cent of them ran for the presidential ticket and 11% for governorship. Ten per cent vied for the Senate, 29% for the House of Representatives, and 29% for state houses of assembly (ActionAid, 2017, p. 42). The rate among female youths was dismal, the highest percentage being 6% for houses of assembly (ActionAid, 2017, p.42).

As a group, 54.1% of women participate in politics as voters, 4.6% contest for positions, 3.2% canvassed for other aspirants, and 0.9% are party officials. The table below provides data on women's electoral participation since 1999.

Table 1: Participation of women in elective positions 1999-2015

	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015
SENATE	2.8% (3/109)	3.7% (4/109)	8.2% (9/109)	7.3% (8/109)	7.3% (8[1]/109)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	1.9% (7/360)	5.8% (21/360)	7.5% (27/360)	6.9% (25/360)	5.8% (20/360)
NASS AVERAGE	2.3%	4.7%	7.8%	7.1%	6.5%

Source: Nigerian Women Trust Fund, 2015

As we noted already, Nigeria has performed poorly on gender equality. The National Assembly is yet to pass the Gender Equality Bill although the country is a signatory to international conventions and declarations to entrench gender equity. The narrow passage of the bill for affirmative action in the Federal Executive Council indicates the existence of significant—though crumbling—resistance to gender equality. So far, the Federal Executive Council is yet to reflect gender equity in its composition.

Marginalisation and non-inclusion of youths in development

A myriad of issues bedevils governance and development initiatives. Nigeria's transition from colonial rule to self-rule did not harness the resources and expand the colonial structures to benefit the people. Rather, the new ruling elite did not restructure the economy, education, and health for the inclusive development and sustainable growth of the indigenous economy, particularly agriculture and cottage industries. The dependence on oil revenues has produced a precarious economy that is incapable of generating sufficient employment for the teeming youth population. Data from Adekola et al. (2016, p. 4) shows that eight hundred industries and thirty-seven factories shut down in 2009, weakening the economy and reducing employment. Also, high turnover rates in the banking sector add to unemployment. Alabi et al. (2011) report that a study found that large industrial firms with the capacity for mass employment are disappearing, undermining the Students Industrial Work Experience Scheme (SIWES).[3]

Government policies, particularly regarding the importation of foreign goods, have further hampered major businesses. For instance, cheap Chinese textile imports have displaced local manufactures. Nigeria's one hundred and seventy-five textile industries, which employed about 250,000 people, had shrunk to twenty-six with 24,000 employees by October 2007 (Umejei, 2015, pp. 56, 57).

Correct data on unemployment in the country is scarce, particularly for the informal sector and rural areas. That impedes planning because planners lack full knowledge of challenges, especially in entrepreneurship (Akande,

3. The Industrial Training Fund and the University of Jos conducted the study to evaluate the development of technical skills in tertiary institutions through the Students Industrial Work Experience Scheme (SIWES) in Nigeria.

2014).[4] This data dearth and the low budgetary priority that political leaders accord education account for the sector's deterioration and the failure of Nigeria's educational policies (Salami, 2013). The results: low education quality, poor training and remuneration of teachers, deteriorating facilities, outdated education curricula, urban bias in education provision (Adekola et al. 2016; Akande, 2014). Also, the dearth of technical skills for socio-economic development arises from the lack of the political will to encourage and continue vocational schools (Salami, 2013).

The gender gap is significant in tertiary education, as evident in the poor representation of females in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) courses (Jaja, 2013; Fapohunda, 2011; Oanda and Akudolu, 2010). Their poor access to tertiary education also explains their predominance in unemployment figures.

Massive and endemic corruption also bedevils the country. The theft of public funds, bribery, and maladministration of public enterprises result in economic under-performance and incapacity to generate employment (Adekola et al., 2016, p. 4). The 2015 HDR found that Nigerians rank corruption high as a problem and demand for a bribe for service delivery as common. Such demands further restrict access by youths to the limited opportunities and services in the public sector.

The non-regulation of political expenditure is responsible for youth exclusion from the polity, especially in contests for elective office. Political parties charge prohibitive fees for expression-of-interest and nomination forms, putting them beyond the reach of youths. Also, wealthy politicians buy votes in primary and general elections and financially induce electoral officers to manipulate elections in their favour (Ojo, 2008; Sha, 2008).

Higher poverty levels among female youths further incapacitate their political participation. Other factors include prejudice arising from patriarchal ideologies that relegate women to the domestic realm and limit their political participation to supporting male electoral candidates. Godfatherism is also a key determinant of who gets elected into political office. Godfathers invest money in aspirants who are likely to win elections and make returns on their investment. Female aspirants rarely qualify for such support because godfathers consider them as possessing little social and economic capital (Ayoade, 2008;

4. We experienced this challenge in finding data for this paper.

Best, 2008). They also face discriminations within their political parties, which pressure them to step down for their male counterparts—who they consider more promising candidates (ActionAid, 2017). Sometimes, their male opponents attack them in primary elections for benefiting from their party's affirmative-action policy of waiving the required fees for female contestants (Best, 2008). These contestants also experience discrimination for being single or marrying outside the constituency in which they are running for political office (ActionAid, 2017).

The threat or use of political violence, particularly during elections, further discourages women's political participation (Smah, 2008). Women politicians have been murdered, injured, maligned, and humiliated (including being stripped naked) to intimidate them (Best, 2008).

Government attempts to address the youth challenge

The Nigerian government has formulated several policies to tackle unemployment in the country. These include the National Action Plan for Employment Creation, National Policy on Youth, and National Policy on Small and Medium Enterprises.[5] We discuss them and other similar programmes in the following sections.

National Directorate of Employment (NDE)

The government established the National Directorate on Employment in 1987 to address mass unemployment. Its activities included a national apprenticeship scheme, providing training for business start-ups and rural agriculture development, and disseminating information on job opportunities. However, the Directorate did not significantly reduce unemployment (NRSP, 2014). Also, Tanko and Best (1990) have critiqued its centralisation of training programmes in state capitals and the two-week duration of those programmes. That arrangement excluded women who were from distant locations and could not leave their households for that length of time.

National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP)

The National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) aimed to provide vocational training, micro-credit, and conditional cash transfers to the most vulnerable Nigerians. It selected beneficiaries by a transparent process that

5. The National Policy on Small and Medium Enterprises aims to increase micro, small and medium enterprises from 17.2 to 50 million.

involved communities and their leaders. The programme reportedly released ¦ 2.8 billion to the members of state houses of assembly under their constituency projects in 2013 to distribute to unemployed youths. Such measures enable politicians to buy the political loyalty of their beneficiaries and exclude youths who are not their followers. Another NAPEP scheme was the distribution of goods and tricycle taxis, popularly called "*keke* NAPEP." Critics assailed it for being too ambitious and thinly spread, spending too much on overhead costs rather than providing soft loans and start-up funds for trainees. Further, it provided training for young school-leavers but not employment opportunities (Akande, 2014).

Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P)

The government introduced the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) in 2012 in response to the general outcry at its removal of the fuel subsidy. It aimed to reinvest savings from the removal to enhance human security for graduates of tertiary institutions (Akande, 2014; ActionAid, 2014). Among its schemes to enhance the social safety of vulnerable Nigerians was the Community Service, Women and Youth Empowerment Programme (CSWYE). This scheme employed 185,000 youths, of which at least 30% were female, to work on community projects. The Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS) aimed to equip 150,000 graduates with practical knowledge and skills to improve their employability. They received a stipend of about ¦ 25,000 during the internship. Only two hundred and ninety-three of the 2000 firms that applied to participate in the scheme met the stringent criteria. The conditions included corporate registration, payment of all relevant taxes, capacity to accommodate the requested number of interns, and the provision of training and mentoring plans for them. Successful companies enjoyed free labour and concessions on taxes and scheme considered part of their social responsibilities.

The second component of SURE-P was for infrastructural development (roads, bridges, and railways) and the Niger Delta Project. It was also to provide unemployed youths with employment on a transparent and fair basis under the Federal Road Maintenance Agency (FERMA), to maintain public infrastructure, roads and pavements.

The SURE-P Committee comprised serving ministers, political figures, and civil society representatives. However, some criticised the politicisation of the state committees' composition. For instance, the state chairpersons of the president's campaign—then President Goodluck Jonathan—chaired

the committees although they lacked the requisite qualifications for the office. Budget approval delays affected the programme's take-off, and the allocation of funds to the three tiers of government generated allegations of the misappropriation of funds. Critics also attacked the programme lacking a uniform policy for the composition of committees to ensure the adequate representation of youths and civil society.

Youth Enterprise With Innovation in Nigeria (YouWin)

Youth Enterprise With Innovation in Nigeria (YouWin) programme introduced in 2013 under the Ministries of information and Communication Technology and Youth Development with technical support from international partners. The scheme supported youth innovation and entrepreneurship through awards of ¦ 1 million to ¦ 10 million to expand their businesses. It was to aid them to create between 40,000 and 50,000 jobs (Akande, 2014; ActionAid, 2014). Participants received initial training before the selection, and successful beneficiaries received further training and mentoring (Akande, 2014). One thousand two hundred beneficiaries participated in the first round, but few were female. The programme sought to remedy this in the second by positive discrimination in favour of women, allowing only females below the age of forty-five to compete (ActionAid, 2014). It has supported 3,900 beneficiaries, but its future under the present administration is unclear.[6]

Youth Empowerment and Social Support Operation (YESSO)

The Youth Empowerment and Social Support Operation (YESSO) launched in 2013 to provide a safety net for unemployed youth aged eighteen to thirty-five, for at least two years. It did this by employing them in public works and providing them with skill-enhancement training and conditional cash transfers through a transparent process. The programme targeted the poorest and most vulnerable, who received regular cash transfers or exchanged them for health or education services during the award cycle. However, its implementation has lacked uniformity at the state level, and its approach—providing periodic aid to reduce vulnerability to poverty—may fail in the long run.

6. See https://.tribuneonlineng.com Tribune, 30 July 2018.

N-Power

N-Power is an innovation of the current regime that commenced about a year ago to tackle youth unemployment through skill training and providing employment opportunities. The programme aims to employ 500,000 volunteers of eighteen to thirty-five years in various economic sectors and to establish eight technological hubs to produce entrepreneurs from among youths.

N-Power Build has the goal to engage 75,000 unemployed youths without a university degree in the building and construction industry after a three-month training in the required skills. These include building and construction management, furniture making and design, electrical maintenance and repairs, and plumbing and welding. *N-Power Agro* trains youth who will provide information and services on the agricultural sector as well as provided the needed data on the diverse agricultural resources in the country. They will be engaged for two years and may choose career paths in the sector. *N-Power Health* seeks to bring health services closer to the populace, employing graduates of medical, health, and related institutions for two years to deliver health services in communities. *N-Power Teach* has the goal of training support staff/assistants with post-secondary qualifications (NCE and OND) to serve in communities for two years. Some graduates have been unemployed for up to five years, and the efficacy of a two-year employment as a solution to the problem is questionable.

Most youth unemployment initiatives have come under criticism for bias in their selection of beneficiaries, which critics have attributed to political, ethnic, or religious influences. Such exclusions serve to further alienate the youth and perpetuate the cycle of violence and insecurity. The initiatives have also been more favourable to the male gender as most discussions of "youth" do not have females in mind.

Youth self-help projects

Youth are increasingly deploying their energies and networking to create sources of employment among themselves. However, Nigeria offers little protection of intellectual property, innovations, and inventions despite the acknowledged creativity of Nigerians, as Table 2 shows:

Table 2: Patents registered in Nigeria 1971-2013

Year	Value	Change
2013	50	19.05
2012	42	-34.38
2011	64	433.33
1990	12	20.00
1985	10	66.67
1978	6	-25.00
1976	8	33.33
1975	6	50.00
1971	4	

Source: https://knoema.com

The number of patents increased noticeably after military rule. Nigerian youths increasingly deploy their creativity and energies in diverse sectors, including information, communication and technology, entertainment, hospitality, and renewable energy (Salami, 2013). Developing problem-solving computer and mobile applications is one way in which youths are directing their energies creatively.

The entertainment industry has showcased music and film talents that have won international recognition. It is by far the sector with the greatest potential for innovation, revenue generation, and employment. The hospitality industry is a growing sector, as globalisation has increased the appreciation of foreign cuisines. It has become a potential sector for youth employment.

Nigerian youths are introducing scientific innovations in renewable energy and agriculture into the economy at a rising pace, with positive implications for the country's ecological sustainability. It also has the potential to boost power generation to overcome the challenge of stable electricity supply and meet the growth needs of micro, small, and medium industries. Poor governance and weak investor interest are the major challenges the innovative youths face in this sector.

Youth are increasingly partaking in the polity through civil society advocacy. A youth organisation pushed through the *Not Too Young To Run*

Act; the body also monitors elections to enable Nigeria to conduct credible, free, and fair elections.

Recommended alternative strategies to integrate youths in economy and polity

Nigeria must urgently overhaul its law enforcement apparatus to ensure its laws work. This requires youth advocacy and engagement across political, ethnic, and religious divides to achieve accountability, transparency, and efficiency in the management of national resources.

Since youth unemployment and disenfranchisement are global phenomena, Nigerian youths must network more within and across national borders to share experiences about what works or does not in peculiar situations.

Young entrepreneurs should approach other youths who have made money in entertainment or sports for start-up capital. Furthermore, they could network as a community to promote each other's products, particularly those in the entertainment and hospitality industries. They should campaign, using media, executive, and legislative advocacy, against the importation of sub-standard goods and the neglect of indigenous products. Also, they should sustain the advocacy to overhaul the agencies in charge of protecting intellectual property rights to provide user-friendly procedures for patenting innovations.

We must create gender awareness in society generally but particularly among youths. Exposure to ideas that challenge gender stereotypes will realign their thinking in favour of gender equality and respect for all.

Nigeria must de-militarise youths who have adopted violence to make a living and bring them into a positive sub-culture that is free of violence and drugs. It should engage more social workers to help youths traumatised by insecurity and insurgency to return to normalcy. Institutions could outsource certain jobs to create opportunities for students to earn income and learn the dignity of labour.

Poverty alleviation programmes will be more effective when society more sustainably provides social safety nets to meet the basic physiological needs of the most vulnerable population.

Conclusion

For youth to connect properly to the economy and polity, it is necessary

to harmonise and streamline programmes to increase their economic and political participation. To achieve this, policy-makers need to engage with youths and civil society groups as partners in decisions affecting their welfare. Periodic needs assessments to know the expressed need of youth and where to direct their energy and interests is important.

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Chapter 28 | Democracy and Political Mobilisation: The Role of Students and Youths

Anne Kpason

Introduction

Students and young people worldwide are a strategic factor in the mobilisation of forces towards economic, social, cultural, military, or political goals. The re-enthronement of democracy in many African countries after decades of military rule has opened the floodgates of mass participation and mobilisation, which are central to democratic consolidation.

Thus, the student and youth movements, like the "not-too-young-to-run" campaign, have laboured to channel the zest of young people into the invigoration of majoritarian rule. We could say democracy is shifting from being the government of the people by the people for the people to that of the young by the young for the young. The youths are systematically weakening the hold of gerontocracy on governance. This is not surprising—especially in Africa, which statistics reveal has the most youthful in the world.

However, the paradox is that just as the energy of youths is a vital force for democratic consolidation, so it is amenable to mobilisation to destroy democratic governance. Thus, they have often facilitated the burning of bridges rather than help to build them. This accounts for the grave factionalisation of youth groups and student unions and their infiltration by anti-democratic and pecuniary elements. This has produced vices such as hooliganism, thuggery, arson, assassination, violent protests and riotous ramifications in the country's political space and life.

The thrust of this paper, therefore, is to examine the role of students and young people in advancing and engendering democracy in Nigeria via appropriate and adequate political mobilisation.

Definition of key terms

Democratisation, democracy and elections

Scholars define democratisation as the systematic enthronement and entrenchment of the democratic ethos of freedom, liberty and equality in the

body politic. It is a striving for majoritarian rule, for the greatest good for the greatest number without marginalising the minority, the "exorcising [of] permanent tyranny from man's lived experiences" (Omelle, 2005). Thus, democratisation is the actualisation of democracy in a polity against the forces of despotism.

That is because democracy, the endpoint of democratisation, must not only "be credited with [being] the [greatest] avenue… for individual and group self-actualisation." It must "be affirmed… that of all forms of governance ever devised by man, (it)… remains the best…" (Omelle, 2005).

In post-colonial Africa, democratisation is "the struggle [to expand] the democratic space… the frontal challenge [to]… military dictatorships" to end "the brutality of military rule" (Egwu, 2004). It aims to end "the ubiquity of violence… in the repressive character of the [post-colonial]… state… [which developed from the colonial state]… an instrument of conquest and subjugation…" (Tyoden, 2005).

Democratisation involves "revolutionary pressure" or a shift from authoritarianism to populism, forced collectivism to volitional individualism. That is, a movement from a leader-centric order that locates power in the leader to a citizen-centric culture that allows popular mobilisation and participation in governance. As Lord Bryce, who first used the term in 1888, said, "democratisation" is "the process of becoming a democracy", and began "with the French Revolution" of 1789.

Political mobilisation and political participation

The concept of political mobilisation is not new. Deutsch (1961: 494) defines mobilisation as "the process in which major clusters of old… commitments are… broken and people become available for new patterns of socialisation and behaviour." Huntington (1968: 33) says it is "a change in the attitudes, values, and expectation of people from those associated with the traditional world…."

The Political Bureau (1987: 202) noted that history is replete with examples of massive efforts to mobilise societies to achieve goals. It says "to mobilise a people is to increase their level of awareness of certain set objectives with a view to achieving [them]." The body stated further that:

> Mobilisation must be seen in terms of involving the people in taking part actually and freely in discussions and decisions affecting their general welfare…. It should aim at increasing people's… awareness…

> of political and other issues so that they can… participate actively in the social and political life of the country.

Thus, political mobilisation relates closely to political participation. What then is political participation? It is citizen involvement in the political system. Eakin, cited in Adelekan (2010), describes it as the process through which the individual plays a role in the political life and governance of his society. This implies that political participation is an aspect of political behaviour, and pertains to how individuals take part in politics. It is a voluntary activity and one may participate directly or indirectly. The people can take part in the political system by electing political leaders, formulating policies, community activities, and other civic engagements.

Arowolo and Aluko (2010) posit that the purpose of political participation is to obtain power and influence decision-making. Political participation is a means of contributing one's quota to the political system and the overall development of the nation. Political participation is one of the fundamental requirements of democratic governance. Hence Adelekan (2010) emphasises that democracy means individual participation in the decisions that involve one's life. Citizen involvement in the decision-making and the effective communication of public policies are necessary in a democratic system. A state that claims to be democratic must feature competitive elections, openness, respect for civil liberties, and citizen participation in politics (Arowolo and Aluko, 2010).

The extent to which people take part in the political system differs. Falade (2008) identified six types of political participants. These are:

1. The *inactive* take no part in political activity;
2. *Voting specialists* partake eagerly in voting but are apathetic to other political activities;
3. *Parochial participants are* politically active only when their interests are at stake;
4. *Communalists* vote regularly and take part in community affairs but not in political campaigns;
5. *Campaigners* are active in politics but not in other community affairs;
6. *Complete activists* are intensely active in all political matters: voting, political campaigns, community activities, and public advocacy.

The cultural, economic, political, religious, and educational backgrounds of individuals are among the factors that determine political participation.

Others are the level of the person's political awareness and confidence in the political system. Money, ethnicity, and religion influence politics in Nigeria. Since independence in 1960, religious and ethnic politics characterise elections in the country (Adeyemo, 2011).

Falade (2008) reports that Nigerians regard politics as a dirty game and that politicians practise it with bitterness, hatred, and rancour. Consequently, Nigeria is in a vicious cycle of political crises and instability. The deceit and unfulfilled promises of political leaders discourage some Nigerians from participating in elections and other political activities. Politicians make promises during election campaigns, most of which they do not fulfil in office, causing some voters to lose interest in elections.

Youth and student unionism

Human life is in stages: babyhood, childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age. The definition of *youth* varies by country, depending on the average age and cultural factors. It also varies from age to age and by class, stratum, and segment (Adeyemo, 2011).

Youth is a period of change and seeking. This period is melancholic because the young person is searching for his ego, personality, and identity. He experiences the pain of exploring himself and changing his shell. He can display incoherent attitudes towards his family and environment. Most families consider as problematic the young person who comes and goes as they wish, dislikes everything, and gives sharp responses to moderate warnings.

Scholars have offered many definitions and ideas about "young" and "youth" but have reached no consensus on them. Yet, some definition and ideas are of importance. UNESCO defines youth as the period in which a person develops capabilities and social skills required to be ready for the financial gain and responsibility to be brought by the status of adulthood. Accordingly, youth is a special period of life with unique social, economic, psychological, and political characteristics rather than a period delimited by age boundaries.

Youthful exuberance plays out nowhere more than in the higher institutions, among students and student leaders who bear the torch of tomorrow's enlightenment and progress.

Historical Background to democracy in Nigeria

Nigeria's history with democracy and democratisation pre-dates the country's independence. It dates to 1922 with the introduction, for the first

time, of the elective principle via the Clifford Constitution. Sequel to this, Herbert Macaulay and others formed Nigeria's first political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), in 1923. This opened the era of national politics, leading to the formation of the National Council for Nigeria and Cameroun (NCNC), Action Group (AG), and Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). The leaders of these parties were all youths: the youths initiated the struggle for and won independence for Nigeria in 1960.

It is noteworthy that efforts to build democracy in Nigeria have existed alongside attempts to overturn it. The first military coup of 1966 was not the first of these attempts. That place belongs to the 1962 events in which certain politicians of the former Western Region elevated themselves over and against the demos. The incident revealed that Nigeria's post-colonial political situation was not significantly different from the colonial. Personal interest, rather than popular sovereignty, was the determinant of governance, which was distant from the interests of the people.

The conflict of personal interests degenerated into factional wars, which aided the factionalisation of Western Nigeria. As Onyekpe (2003: 35-36) noted, "the party (that is, the Action Group)… split into two factions reflecting the antagonisms between Chief Obafemi Awolowo and S.L. Akintola." That led to the carving out of the Mid-Western Region from the Western Region in 1963.

Not only the Action Group split: the polity in the entire Western Region disintegrated as open violence erupted between the Awolowo and Akintola factions, destroying lives and properties. The democratic structures in the region consequently collapsed, and, for the first time in Nigeria's history, the federal government declared a state of emergency and martial law there.

Such a declaration usually means the suspension or proscription of democracy and fundamental human rights. The national government appoints a sole administrator with powers to act on its behalf in all matters, just like colonial Governors-General did for the Queen of England. Thus, the 1962 declaration of a state of emergency in Western Nigeria was a return to colonial autocracy.

Nigeria's 1962 census exercise generated much bickering between regional leaders. This was because the census data was for the delineation of federal constituencies and districts, and, therefore, had significant implications for the balance of power and resource allocation. The Action Group, Northern People's Congress, and National Council for Nigerian Citizens stridently demanded that the figures show that the regions they governed had the largest

populations. Thus, they politicised the exercise heavily, creating grave political tension and uncertainty.

The government cancelled the census results and conducted a fresh census in 1963. The (preliminary) results showed that the country's population stood at 55.6 million. The North had 29.7 million, the East 12.3 million, the West 10.2 million, the Mid-West 2.5 million, and Lagos, the federal capital, 665,246 (Owunwa, 2003: 30-31).

These results did not go down well with all the regions, especially the Eastern and Western regions. The crisis in the latter had occurred by this time. Due to it, Awolowo was serving a seven-year sentence of imprisonment and Akintola had established a new party that allied with the NPC to form the Nigerian National Alliance. Thus, unlike other regions, Western Nigeria did not present a collective rejection of the 1962 census figures because of the ruling Action Group's factionalisation.

Just as politics and irregularities marred the 1962 and 1963 censuses, so did malpractices attend the 1964 general elections and 1965 Western regional elections (Adigwe, 1977: 257-264; Chikendu, 2005: 60-64). These censuses and election were abortive attempts to undermine democracy, and the people were the greatest losers.

These attempts continued in Second (1979–83), Third (1989-93), and Fourth (1999-date) republics, as evident in the misconduct of elections and undermining of judicial and legislative independence. Chikendu (2005:71) contends that politics in the Second Republic was "a monumental failure" because it "witnessed a recrudescence of election rigging of most stupendous proportion." Similarly, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida's military administration annulled the 1993 presidential election, which Chief Moshood K. O. Abiola won, although it was free and fair and witnessed massive popular participation. This anti-democratic deed delayed Nigeria's return to democracy for another six years.

The country did some modest democratic engineering in 1999, a process that witnessed little electoral malpractice. That was chiefly for two reasons. First, the Nigerian people wanted to end the dictatorship that the military had imposed on them since 31 December 1983; second, both presidential contestants were from the South-West. In the 2003 elections, however:

> All the tricks in the game of election rigging were fully employed. The rules of the game were brazenly flouted, party discipline was jettisoned… fraudulent practices permeated the ranks of electoral

> officers, the security agents, and the law enforcement personnel (Chikendu, 2005:19).

Further:

> Voting…was made irrelevant by the fact that returning officers wrote election results without… reference to the actual votes cast at the polling booths. All these were made possible by the fact that the incumbents who were seeking second terms used their official position to achieve their desires. They used public funds to run their campaigns; they made exclusive use of the publicly-owned media to brow-beat their political opponents, leaving them [with no] "last resort" save the so-called election tribunals, where unnecessary delays and technicalities were bound to work to the disadvantage of the plaintiffs (Chikendu, 2005:19).

I have taken this lengthy excerpt from Chikendu to portray the sordidness of the efforts to undermine democracy in Nigeria.

The 2007 general elections, which lacked fairness, reduced Nigerian democracy to the status of a judicial democracy. Many of its losers contested its outcomes in court, including the President's victory, and the judiciary nullified many results and ordered the electoral umpire to re-run some elections. It reversed outcomes in some other cases, ruling that the declared losers were the actual winners and ordering the electoral body to certify them as such. Thus, and with dire implications for Nigerian democracy, electoral contestants trusted the judiciary rather than the electoral commission to determine the outcome of elections. Hence, the characterisation of democracy in Nigeria as judicial democracy.

Nigerians have also witnessed the perversion of public authority and the subversion of constitutionalism by political leaders who came to power through undemocratic means. The National Assembly even had to adopt the "doctrine of necessity" to save democracy when, against civil-society protests, President Obasanjo in 2007 sought an unconstitutional third term in office.

Democratic engineering has continued till today, and in 2015 the country witnessed, for the first time, the defeat of an incumbent party by the opposition. There has also been a rise in youth and student involvement in the democratic process. No longer only serving as election thugs, they are now contesting and winning elections.

Nigerian youths and students in democracy and political mobilisation: A synopsis

A proper synopsis of youth and student involvement in democracy and political mobilisation in Nigeria must start with the evolution of student unionism in Nigeria. This entails tracing the development of higher education in the country. Historical schools locate its origins differently. One traces it to the abolition of slavery and the settlement of the freed slaves in Sierra Leone in 1787 (Fafunwa, 1974) and the establishment of the Fourah Bay in 1827. Akintoye (1973) traces the history of university education in Nigeria to the nineteenth century, when the first Nigerians found their way to Fourah Bay College. Another school of thought argues that higher education in Nigeria started with the nationalist movements. What is certain is that university, as we know it today, has its ancestry in the Middle Ages in Europe with the revival of learning in the twelfth century.

By 1945, Nigerians were no longer satisfied with the small educated elite produced yearly by mission schools and government colleges. The diploma-awarding Yaba College of Technology also became inadequate for their demand for higher education. Their pressure on the colonial government to establish universities in the country resulted in the establishment of the University College, Ibadan, in 1948. The college remained the only institution of university standing for more than a decade, new ones only coming into being in the early 1960s.

Nigeria and other African countries established universities (like those in Ibadan and Nsukka) as part of the decolonisation and nation-building that followed the attainment of political independence. The nature and processes of the anti-colonial movements have therefore left a legacy of strong student unionism, student political activism, and idealistic radicalism. The defensible belief among university students that they are the conscience of society is a product of this historical circumstance. Also, student political activism adopts the strategy of confrontation (when consultation has failed) whenever the need to deal with institutional authorities arises. With the establishment of the University College, Ibadan, student unionism became institutionalised in the country. Early administrative problems handicapped the students—like the West African Students Union (WASU) and Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM)—until 1956 when they formed a national student body. That was the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS). From then on, autonomous unions sprouted in institutions of higher learning across Nigeria.

The NUNS remained the voice of Nigerian students until April 1978, when General Olusegun Obasanjo's regime banned it following a violent conflict over proposed fee increases. As soon as the government banned NUNS, the students regrouped under a new name—the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS). They considered NANS an offshoot and continuation of NUNS; they had only changed its name to circumvent legal obstacles in the ban. However, the Obasanjo regime never recognised NANS. Lifting of the ban on NUNS became a major campaign issue between the five political parties during the 1979 elections and all promised to lift it. President Shehu Shagari did that on assuming office in October 1979 and pardoned all NUNS officers who the Obasanjo regime had dismissed or rusticated following the 1978 conflict. However, the student body did not change its name back to NUNS until it was itself banned by the Babangida regime in 1986.

The central student bodies remained active in national affairs despite the bans in 1979 and 1989; they only could not negotiate with the government on behalf of their members. The government refused to have anything to do with it officially. One experience from the universities, since their inception, is the convergence of youthfulness and idealism. Such idealism often derives power from effective organisation and targeting. Student activism, as Anise (1979) once put it, finds a natural habitat in the halls of academia.

Nigeria's experience shows that schools become factories for the production of social reformers and revolutionaries when students' susceptibility to radicalisation combines with an outraged sense of social justice. Anise (1979) identifies some characteristics of Nigerian university life that have probably contributed to the establishment of strong, activist unionism on campuses. The first is locational exclusivity and isolation: most Nigerian universities are in secure, exclusive areas that are physically removed from major population centres. Second, most of Nigeria's early university students were mature adults, many already in their twenties and early thirties when they got into university. Several had established families and homes and already had long work experience. Generally, they held strong nationalist opinions. Their disposition already made them candidates for student activism and unionism (Biodun, 2008).

Third, most university students were nationalists because the university system began during the anti-colonial struggle. This struggle engendered their culture of radical activism that has persisted over the years. The fourth issue raised by Anise is that successive governments in Nigeria have given official

and legal recognition to student unionism, to their various campuses and their national executives. Nigerian student unions have always received subsidies from governments to supplement their revenues from levies and dues. In short, the government itself has encouraged student unionism. Governments have used students and their unions as reservoirs of progressive support to gain legitimacy and popular appeal (Jacob and Izu, 2011).

Under civilian electoral regimes, most political parties and leaders establish student wings to harness the progressive forces, which were usually vocal on social matters. However, when government and student interests diverge—and they often do—this "solidarity" often breaks down. Such disagreements often produce crises, to which the powers-that-be respond by scapegoating or banning student organisations. Mostly, such measures fail to solve the problem; rather, they escalate the crises.

Two major schools of thought exist regarding the political role of students and young people: the positivist and the negativist. The former see students as part of the major forces of societal development and advocate that society should assign them specific roles in nation-building. In contrast, the latter contends that students are immature, irrational, and possessed of immature emotions and should be under control. Positivists believe that students and young people can shape political processes, and society must recognise their crucial role in state-formation, nation-building, democratisation, and democratic governance.

That is why increasing numbers of young people participate in democratic politics as lawmakers, campaigners, party delegates, and grass-roots mobilisers. Nigeria's "not-too-young movement" has added a great impetus to this development. Youths and students did not mobilise only to get old politicians into office in the 2019 general elections but also contested and won elections themselves. Their role is changing from only political mobilisation to running in elections and holding office (Jibrin and Ibeanu, 2009; Jacob and Izu, 2011).

Feuer, one of the greatest Negativists, posits in the *Conflict of Generations* (1969) that student movements emerge from amorphous emotions seeking to attach themselves to a cause. He also argues that students revolt because of an intense heightening of emotions of guilt and self-aggression, as well as aggression towards the elders. This is because the university culture reinforces these sentiments and provides an ideological justification for the rejection of their father's ideology. Thus, each demonstration in which a student partakes

is a puberty rite of passage. He also asserts that students demonstrate because the university setting is the last community of comradeship before the competitive, unfeeling adult world envelops them. Putting all the causes of student revolt in psychological terms, Feuer asserts that student movements indicate generational disequilibrium, as, he argues, a normal country is one in generational equilibrium.

His arguments represent the position of the ruling class. It is necessary, therefore, to critique his generational conflict theory. First, if university students should revolt against lack of employment, for example, it would be unrealistic to explain their action in generational conflict terms. The frustration of students might result from their inability to satisfy occupational interests rather than an expression of hostility towards the older generation. The second objection to Feuer's generational conflict theory is that he stresses the psychological aspect to an incredible degree. It is naïve to suggest that students cannot differentiate between authoritarian and democratic systems. Nothing should prevent Nigerian students from confronting their universities and society when necessary. Students in other countries confront their universities and the entire system on issues vital to them. The third point that makes the theory unacceptable is that Feuer thinks that student movements have no demands or have only irrational ones (Biodun, 2008; Jacob and Izu, 2011). This is untrue. From 1999 till date, student unions and youth groups have been instrumental in deepening party politics in Nigeria (Jibrin and Ibeanu, 2009).

Role of students and youths in the advancement of democracy and political mobilisation

Youth and student involvement in politics lays the foundation for strong political engagement in the future. It is necessary to involve them, as future leaders, in shaping the future. Youth and student activism for democracy is not a phenomenon only of the past but also a contemporary one. Growing numbers of young people are joining political parties or active in political activism. Despite these giant steps, we expect much more from them, as Oluwafemi (2018) enumerates:

1. *Active Political Participation*: Political participation is a prerequisite for governance participation in Nigeria. Many young Nigerians are successful in business, academics, journalism, entertainment, law, engineering, management, etc., who society can entrust with political leadership. Omoyele Sowore and Fela Durotoye are good examples

who are now aspiring to occupy the highest office in the country. These young people may not win elections on their first try, but they would have encouraged political participation among young people. Having youths at the helm of affairs may not solve all our problems, but it will awaken a consciousness in the youths of their responsibility in the governance of Nigeria. Belonging to political parties, being actively involved, contesting political positions, developing ideologies and political alliances are necessary steps in which our youths must take as part of their political consciousness and activeness in politics. The old story in politics is that politicians used the youths as instruments of violence and election malpractices. That story is changing as young people are now striving to be major players in our politics;

2. *Nation-building and policy formulation*: Young people are abreast of modern trends in governance, innovation, and leadership. Nigeria needs a leadership that is part of and understands modern realities. Therefore, youths and students must develop policies that are current and meet the needs of tomorrow. Nation-building requires much energy, expertise, a high sense of responsibility and productivity. Therefore, the political participation of young people in it is necessary;
3. *Science, technology, ICT development, and innovation*: Science and technology are changing our world and how we live and do things in every area: business, security, banking, agriculture, etc. Young people understand better the role technology will play in building an efficient economy, enhancing security, and fighting corruption. Therefore, they have a great responsibility to lead technological innovation in Nigeria;
4. *Grass-roots political development*: Youths can leverage their performance at the grass-roots to attain higher political positions. Youths have the responsibility to develop political consciousness at the grass-roots. Young people do not have the financial strength to contest higher political positions; however, the grass-roots offer a platform to develop their political abilities;
5. *Agricultural development and innovation*: Today, agriculture is becoming one of the means to sustain our economy. Young farmers are emerging everywhere, their knowledge and expertise will be necessary to lead this innovation. Biotechnology is developing in Nigeria. The youths need to advance democracy and development in this technology for commercial production;

6. *Poverty alleviation*: Nigeria must combat the menace of poverty. Youths will fight poverty in Nigeria majorly through empowerment and commercial agricultural activities;
7. *Developing new political ideologies*: Nigerian politics lacks clear ideologies. Most of the political parties are corrupt and under the influence of relatively old people. This is the time for young people to develop new political parties that stand on strong political ideologies;
8. *Education*: The standard of education has declined in Nigeria. It is necessary to revamp and improve the education system to meet global standards. Most youths are its products and understand its challenges well. It is their great responsibility to participate in governance and save our educational system;
9. *Sports*: Sports are for young people and only the youths can lead their development. They received enough attention and resources in the past. Nigeria is a complex multi-ethnic society and requires much energy, expertise and sensitivity. Nigerian youths have much to do to achieve its dream.

The youth increasingly engage with the political process through social media. These media are the major avenue through which youths and students express their position on public issues.

Achievements of students and youth in advancement of democracy and political mobilisation

Aliyu (2019) reports that Nigerian youths participated more in the 2019 general elections—after the passage of the *Not Too Young To Run Act*—than in previous years. This was an influencing factor that awoke the political consciousness of the Nigerian youths and made the election outcomes better. Another notable influencing factor was the visit of one of the World's youngest and powerful head of government of France to Nigeria—forty-year-old French President Emmanuel Macron.

Some achievements of youths and students in the advancement of democracy and the democratic culture in Nigeria are evident in the following areas:

1. *Democratic inclusiveness*: Students and youth have succeeded by relentless pressure in widening the democratic space to accommodate them. Across Nigeria, especially since 1999, young people have had a

pride of place in the political positions up to the position of Speaker of House of Representatives when Rt. Hon. Dimeji Bankole became the Speaker of the Green Chamber. In 2019, four young Nigerians between thirty-five and forty years contested the Presidential seat. These were Mathias Tsado (forty years), Ahmed Buhari (forty years), Enyinnaya Nwosu (forty years) and Eniola Ojajuni (thirty-nine years);

2. *Social cohesion*: Youth and student groups have also served as vehicles of social cohesion, harmony, national unity across ethnic, religious, regional and other primordial lines. Student unions have been the bastions of solidarity and camaraderie of peoples of diverse socio-cultural backgrounds;
3. *Good governance*: Youth and student groups have become a formidable force for good governance in Nigeria. These groups have constantly fought bad governance, failed leadership and general insecurity. This is because they have also been victims of these maladies, especially students in North-East Nigeria, and other volatile areas. The youth and students also in this light fight against tendencies that go against transparency and accountability;
4. *Credible elections*: Youths have also been instrumental to the pursuit of credible elections through organisations such as the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), YIAGA Africa, and the Not-To-Young Movement. The TMG, which observed the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 general elections, recruited youths and students mainly to conduct its "Quick Count" to assess the authenticity of election results. YIAGA Africa deployed the "Watching the Votes" and "Parallel Vote Tabulation" methods to verify vote casting and counting, and to validate the outcome of the elections.

Challenges of students and youths in political mobilisation and democracy

Youths and students have confronted several challenges in the quest to make their mark on the democratic space. These include:

1. *Lack of governance knowledge*: It is necessary to equip students and youths with information to enhance their participation in government and politics and develop value-based leadership among them;
2. *Political apathy*: Dr Jay Osi Samuels, the national coordinator of Alliance for New Nigeria, ANN, said in a recent interview that years of recycled

leadership have hampered Nigeria. So much so that the front-runners in every election were predictable. He said less than 35% of Nigerians above eighteen years took an active part in politics as contestants or voters. The remaining 65% are young professionals (This Day, 2017). Samuels lamented that for too long the nation has left its political destiny in the hands of a few career politicians, who only think of the next election;

3. *High cost of running for office*: The *Vanguard* (2018) reports that, in the 2015 general elections, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) charged ¦ 22 million per nomination form and the All Progressives Congress (APC) ¦ 27.5 million. However, persistent pressure by youths caused the PDP to reduce the cost of its presidential and governorship nomination forms to ¦ 12 million and ¦ 6 million, respectively. Yet, these sums were too high in a country where about 87 million of its 180 million live in extreme poverty (World Poverty Clock, 2018);
4. *Socio-economic factors*: Nweke (2005) lists poverty, lack of education, unemployment, and ideological control by political elites among the factors responsible for youths' low political involvement and availability for use in electoral violence. Some politicians exploit these weaknesses to engage them as thugs, touts, hooligans, and arsonists during electioneering campaigns;
5. *Political interference*: one of the strongest challenges confronting young people's involvement in the political process today in Nigeria is large-scale political interference from the elites. These elites use the power of money and deception to sway youths and students, causing internal division and acrimony among them. Good examples are the NANS factions, which misrepresent their so-called members for selfish gain.

Recommendations

Therefore, the paper puts forward the following actionable recommendations for consideration:

1. The creation of governance awareness among youths must start from in secondary or high school;
2. For student unions and youth councils to function properly and contribute to the deepening of a democratic culture in Nigeria, politicians must refrain from interfering with their activities;
3. Union members and leaders should avoid situations that make them

vulnerable to external control or conscription. They should build walls of self-preservation around their organisation;

4. The older politicians and leaders must support youths and students by providing them with learning space, tools, and opportunities, and steer their political participation in the right direction;
5. Political parties should limit fees for party nomination forms. Such fees should not exceed the followings: House of Assembly: ¦ 200,000; House of Representatives: ¦ 400,000; Senate: ¦ 600,000; Governorship: ¦ 1,000,000; and Presidency: ¦ 2,000,000.

Conclusion

The paper has shown that democracy today in Nigeria cannot survive without the contributions of students and young people. For democracy to be representative, it must represent all sections of the population; and Nigerian students and youths are as relevant as any other group. Youths and students have a historical responsibility to mobilise people, raise their consciousness, and educate them to participate in governance. The *Not Too Young to Run Act* increased participation, political consciousness, and civic responsibility among youths. This Act has also increased the willingness of political parties to present youths as electoral candidates. However, youths and students must shy away from being used. They must insist on working only with responsible and responsive politicians to entrench the nation's democracy.

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Chapter 29 | Democracy and Political Mobilisation: The Role of Students and Youths

Peter U. Nwangwu

Introduction

The Oxford English Dictionary defines democracy as a system of government by all the eligible members of a state, typically through elected representatives. Dictionary.com defines it as government by the people, in which they hold supreme power and exercise it directly or through their elected agents under a free electoral system. Finally, Merriam-Webster defines democracy simply as government by the people.

Political mobilisation is a process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to active participants in public life. Wikipedia defines political mobilisation as the mobilisation of the civilian population as part of contentious politics.

Democracy and political mobilisation are two sides of a coin: none can exist without the other. Democracy must involve political mobilisation and the full participation of the people, including students and youths. Cayne defines true democracy as the system of government that is controlled by the people through their representatives.[1]

It is well-established that the democratic process falls short of its goals without citizen involvement.[2] Democracy is subject to degradation when citizens do not take part in elections and governance.

The role of students and youths

Students and youths constitute about 70% of Nigeria's population. Unfortunately, their country has marginalised them socially, politically, and

1. Cayne, B. S. (1993): *The New Webster Dictionary of the English Language*. International Edition. New York: Lexican International Publishers, Guide Group.
2. Ogunna, A. E. C. (2003): *Dynamics of Military and Politics in Nigeria*. Owerri: Whyte Publishers.

economically. We may consider the Nigerian youth an endangered species, on the verge of extinction, irrelevant in piloting public affairs. The less than 1% that rules the country has mortgaged their future without their input. Nwanze and Ibrahim pose the logical question: What are Nigerian youths doing about this? How is the most vibrant group in the country responding to this injustice?[3]

Some problems of Nigerian students and youths

Youthful self-destructiveness

The African Democratic Congress (ADC) approached me thrice in 2010 to run as their candidate in the 2011 presidential election. I accepted on their third attempt. Then, I was Professor of Pharmacy, Executive Assistant to the Vice-Chancellor, and Chief Development Officer at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. The news spread throughout the campus shortly after my acceptance, and a large, passionate group of student supporters flooded my office. This did not surprise me, as I was an advocate for student rights. They requested to meet with me the following week to submit a budget for my campaign, to which I agreed.

What happened next was a big surprise. They came back with a budget of ¦ 8.4 billion. Young students at the university wanted their favourite professor to give them ¦ 8.4 billion to campaign for his election. I was shocked and disappointed. Where would a clean University Professor find ¦ 8.4 billion to pay students for political mobilisation for his election? I simply thanked them and closed the door. That was the end of political mobilisation for me by those group of students.

Years of bad leadership and relentless destruction of Nigeria's moral fabric and foundation have created a generation of Nigerians with a twisted mind-set. That accounts for most crimes and social problems in the country, including bribery and other corrupt practices, and lawlessness. Greed and avarice have blinded some students and youths, and render them myopic and impotent in dealing with important issues cannibalising and destroying their future.

3. Nwanze G. and Ibrahim J. (2017): The Role of the Nigerian Youth in Building a New Nigeria through We the People Nigeria movement. Chapter 14, p. 326. In Nwangwu P. U. (ed.), *We the People: Building a New Democracy in Nigeria As a Model for Africa*. American Congressional Press LLC.

Lack of role models and youthful impatience

Most Nigerian youths and students are vulnerable to misleading noise and glitter in their environment. Most youths lack the benefit of learning from solid upright adult role models with great positive life experiences. Some youths who can learn from elders distrust those role models, sometimes because they consider them archaic from the old school, with nothing modern to offer them for 21st-century living. Such youths reject delayed gratification; they want what they can get now. Unfortunately, they end up making mistakes that they often regret for the rest of their life.

Many youths and students do not have the discipline and psychological maturity to play their role in governance and political mobilisation. As stated by Akindele and Ajiola, "The attainment of democratic governance in a society is contingent on the psychological readiness and positive mental state of the citizens."[4]

Fractured youth and student leadership

Youth and student leadership and mobilisation for democracy is impotent because of ethnic and religious divisions among them. They have scattered themselves across many campaigns, including the Arewa, Niger Delta, Afenifere, and Biafra movements. Politicians know how to use these splinter groups to divide and rule, making youths unable to speak with one voice, not even when their future is at stake.

Control of Nigerian governance by the political cabals

Nigerian political parties often hand-pick electoral candidates without citizen participation. Political mobilisation has nothing to do with election outcomes in such circumstances. Youths and students could challenge party cabals more effectively were they united, disciplined, informed, properly guided, and persistent. That would allow greater citizen participation in elections and create a more democratic order.

Youth and student alienation

Odumosu argues that a sense of ownership spawns a sense of responsibility.[5]

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4. Akindele, E. and Ajiola, B. (1992): Democratic Transition in Africa: A Psychological Perspective. In Caron et al. (eds.) *Democratic Transition in Africa*. Intec.

The Nigerian youths are often self-absorbed because they feel the society has failed them.[6] The leaders of Nigeria have raised a generation of Nigerians who have no sense of ownership in Nigeria, and so lack a spirit of patriotism and accountability in the Nation. To be accountable, you must have a sense of ownership and inclusion in your environment and community.

The spirit of lethargy and nonchalance among Nigerian youths is a great liability to the nation because it breeds lawlessness, corruption, and impunity. They lack a sense of belonging and engagement with their nation, accounting for their having no vision for its future. It is difficult to mobilise students and youths for a fake democracy in a country that has not given them a sense of ownership.

Difficulty of political mobilisation by youths and students

Youths and students have a big role to play in political mobilisation for democracy. Unfortunately, Nigerian political parties buy votes, through the glorified *Trader Money* scheme or the more primitive cash-for-votes schemes at polling stations. About 95% of the votes cast in the 2019 General elections were direct cash-for-votes deals. How effective can political mobilisation for true democracy by youths and students be in the face of vote-buying by political parties?

The role of youths and students in the mobilisation for a new democracy

The New Clean Nigeria project is a platform for Nigerian youths to take control of their destiny and build a democracy that benefits all Nigerians. It stands on three legs. The first is the Peoples Grass-roots Association for Corruption-free Nigeria, a non-political, educational entity committed to growing a new breed of accountable, corruption-free, and law-abiding Nigerians at the grass-roots. The second is FANAFI Worldwide Ventures Ltd., which runs empowerment and job-creation programmes for unemployed Nigerians at the grass-roots. The third leg is a registered political party, We the

5. Odumosu, A. O. (2017): Destruction of the National Fabrics and Foundation: Evils of Persuasive Lawlessness and Role of Individual Accountability. Chapter 3, p. 114: In Nwangwu P. U. (ed.), *We the People: Building a New Democracy in Nigeria as a Model for Africa*. American Congressional Press LLC.
6. Ibid.

People Nigeria. It plans to mobilise, unite, and empower 50 million new-breed Nigerians grass-roots to use their vote to replace corrupt and inept politicians with clean God-fearing and decent Nigerians.

We have embarked on a nation-wide educational mission under our registered non-political NGO, "Peoples Grass-roots Association for Corruption Free Nigeria." Years of bad leadership and relentless destruction of Nigeria's moral fabric and foundation has created a generation of Nigerians with a twisted mind-set. That is the source of most crimes and social problems in Nigerian society. The mission of our NGO is to clean up Nigeria from the bottom, as the first necessary step to building a new clean Nigeria. The project implements its educational and mind-set re-engineering component through the book *We The People: Building a New Democracy in Nigeria as a model for Africa*. Edited by Prof Peter Nwangwu, it has a foreword by Thomas Hutson, former U.S. Consul-General at the American Embassy, Lagos. It has eighteen well-researched chapters on important subjects afflicting the Nigerian nation, written by eighteen exceptional Nigerians from all six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. They speak with one voice in the book and offer practical solutions to Nigeria's problems.

Its distinguished reviewers, who recommend it to every Nigerian, include His Eminence, Cardinal Francis Arinze, Senator Ken Nnamani, Prof Is-haq Oloyede, Prof Nuhu Yakub, and the Rev. Dr Foley Beach. Our NGO is partnering with religious and civic groups for the birth of a new clean nation, including churches, mosques, other NGOs, youth and student groups, and individual Nigerians. It will continue this mission even after the 2023 elections and the emergence of the new clean Nigerian Government. We are also partnering with the mainstream and social media to re-engineer the mind-set of Nigerians for a new and clean society.

As we re-engineer mind-sets to create a new breed of Nigerian grass-roots, we mobilise and unite this new breed of clean Nigerian bottom. The goal is to attain a critical mass of 50 million new-breed Nigerians. It is difficult to achieve but necessary for the birth of a new Nigeria.

FANAFI (Find A Need And Fill It) Worldwide Ventures Ltd. is registered in Nigeria and the United States of America and runs empowerment and job-creation programmes for unemployed Nigerians.[7] It has the sole world-wide

7. See www.fanafiworldwide.com.

distribution and marketing rights to Splendora, a feminine pad, and Bouncing Baby diaper. We will acquire and make available an additional fifteen to twenty products to increase the range of products and profit centres available to unemployed Nigerians to empower them. That is crucial for the New Clean Nigeria Project because it will enable needy Nigerians to resist the corrupt offer of money-and-rice-for-votes by corrupt recycled politicians.

The third leg of the New Clean Nigeria project is a registered political party, We the People Nigeria, whose mission and work mirror those of the NGO. The model party will set new standards for clean politics and selflessness in the service of the grass-roots and will sanitise politics in Nigeria. This clean party will provide the handle for the clean bottom to clean the top and set Nigeria free permanently. We the People Nigeria is the clean alternative to the parties that have failed Nigeria and offers Nigerians a platform to retake their country, mutilated by inept, corrupt politicians.

We are focused, deliberate, give thought to our work, and have a strong foundation. Our party is totally unlike any other in Nigeria. Our manifesto is clear and direct, an open book for every Nigerian to read and hold us accountable for. All Nigerians can download our manifesto and join our party on our website.[8]

The ward is our administrative unit of operation for the New Clean Nigeria Project. We plan to have an active unit in the 8,809 wards in Nigeria's seven hundred and seventy-four local governments areas. Our party will have two units in each large ward and one in each tertiary institution to encourage students involvement. Altogether, we plan to have 9,000 active centres nation-wide that will be our units of operation and political mobilisation. This platform and blueprint give the youths and students absolute control in their mobilisation for clean democracy in Nigeria.

8. www.wethepeoplenigeria.org.

Part 9 | The 2019 Elections and Election Systems

Chapter 30 | Review of the 2019 General Elections and Women's Participation in Politics

Jide Ojo

Introduction

The 2019 general elections were the sixth the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had conducted since the return to civil rule twenty years ago. Previous ones held in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. Nigeria has also held several off-season elections. The INEC under Prof Mahmood Yakubu conducted about one hundred and ninety-five off-cycle elections between November 2015 and February 2019. These include seven governorship elections in Anambra, Bayelsa, Kogi, Ekiti, Osun, Edo, and Ondo states and several bye-elections arising from deaths or court orders.

According to the INEC chair, Professor Mahmood Yakubu:

> The 2019 General Elections (presidential, national assembly, governorship, state houses of assembly and FCT area council elections) are the largest electoral exercise undertaken by any electoral commission in the history of Nigeria. The elections were contested by ninety-one registered political parties with a total registered voting population of 84,004,084. The elections took place in 1,558 constituencies and seven hundred and seventy-four local government areas. The collation of results took place in 8,809 registration areas and wards… 119,973 polling units, and 57,023 voting points nationwide.[1]

He also said that:

> The presidential election was contested by seventy-three candidates while 1,068 candidates contested the governorship election in twenty-nine states of the federation. The one hundred and nine Senate seats were contested by 1,904 candidates, while the three hundred

1. Address by the INEC chair, Professor Mahmood Yakubu, at the 12th National Delegates' Conference of the Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria on 9 May 2019.

> and sixty seats in the House of Representatives were contested by 4,680 candidates. Fourteen thousand seven hundred and eighty-five candidates contested the nine hundred and ninety-one state constituency seats, while eight hundred and six candidates contested the sixty-eight area council seats in the Federal Capital Territory. The implication is that INEC conducted elections in 1,558 constituencies involving… 23,316 candidates.[2]

Reports by international and domestic observer groups and the media show that the elections substantially complied with Nigeria's electoral laws. They also indicate that its outcomes majorly reflected the wishes of the electorate. Conversely, they also suggest that most voters were apathetic and boycotted the polls. The overall turnout was about 30%. Also, violence and massive vote-trading marred the elections in some states.

Preparations for the elections

The INEC announced the date for the 2019 elections on 9 March 2017, two clear years to the elections. On 9 January 2018, it released the timetable for the nationwide polls—the first under the new, Yakubu-led management that had assumed office in November 2015. The Commission conducted about one hundred and ninety-five off-season elections between November 2015 and February 2019 before the 2019 general polls.

It undertook numerous activities preparatory to the general elections. They included strategic planning, continuous voter registration, party registration, voter education, recruitment and training of poll workers, and publication of regulations and guidelines for the elections. The Commission also held stakeholders meetings, activated the Inter-agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES), and published the access framework for persons with disabilities. Additionally, it reviewed the framework for voting by internally displaced persons (IDPs), procured sensitive and non-sensitive election materials, and accredited election observers, media workers, and party agents.

Party activities ahead of 2019 polls

Many of the political parties conducted their elective congresses and

2. Ibid.

conventions before the 2019 General Elections. These intra-party elections were fraught with irregularities and claims of violation of internal party democracy. The parties also reviewed their codes of conduct, held their primaries, and nominated their electoral candidates. Candidate nomination was rancorous, combustive, and deeply flawed. The imposition of candidates was rife, as the parties observed Section 87 of the Electoral Act (which prescribes the modalities for party primaries) mostly in the breach. Aggrieved party members filed over seven hundred petitions in courts across the country. Indeed, the situation was so bad that courts barred the All Progressives Congress (APC) from fielding candidates for over fifty elective positions in the oil-rich Rivers State. Also, the party received court authorisation to participate in the presidential and national assembly elections in Zamfara State only a day before.

Electoral reform ahead of the elections

President Muhammadu Buhari established a constitution and electoral reform committee under the leadership of Senator Ken Nnamani to revise the electoral framework ahead of the elections. Its task was to "review [Nigeria's] electoral environment, laws, and experiences… and make recommendations to strengthen [the electoral system to achieve…] free and fair elections…."[3] The twenty-four-member committee submitted its report in May 2017 to the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Abubakar Malami. The committee's recommendations included the unbundling of INEC and the establishment of new agencies to handle some of its duties. The panel also recommended the adoption of independent candidacy, Diaspora voting, and more use of election technologies.[4]

The National Assembly also passed about thirty-three amendments to the 1999 Constitution, but only twelve got the required passage by twenty-four state legislatures, of which only five received presidential assent. The five included the Not-Too-Young-To-Run bill, which lowered the requisite age for presidential candidates from forty to thirty-five and for federal and state legislative candidates from thirty to twenty-five.[5]

3. See https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/211851-buhari-appoints-nnamani-head-electoral-reforms-committee.html.
4. See https://punchng.com/nnamani-electoral-reform-panel-submits-report-wants-inec-unbundled.
5. It is noteworthy, though, that the age qualification for the Ghanaian parliament is twenty-one.

One of the successful amendments increased in the period for presidential run-offs from seven to twenty-one days. Another required that applicants file pre-election matters within fourteen days of the issue in dispute and the High Court rule on it within one hundred and eighty days. It also gave sixty days for appeals at the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Yet another amendment limits to one additional term a vice-president or deputy-governor who serves out the term of their principal. Others granted financial autonomy to state legislatures and judiciaries and empowered INEC to de-register political parties that did not win a seat in a general or local government election.

In contrast to the successful amendment of the constitution, the National Assembly failed in its four attempts to amend the 2010 Electoral Act. The president found fault with the draft bill on each occasion and withheld assent.

Funding the elections

The National Assembly approved ¦ 242 billion for INEC and security agencies to conduct the 2019 elections. The Commission received ₦189 billion of this sum, and the security agencies shared ₦53 billion.[6] The approved sum did not include the millions in foreign currencies that international donor agencies and several embassies in Nigeria spent to support INEC and civil society organisations. This support was crucial as government funding for the elections came late. Only in June 2018 did President Buhari submit the request to the National Assembly, which passed it for virement in November.

Role of civil society ahead of the polls

Nigeria's civil society played a critical role ahead of the 2019 elections. Organisations such as the Nigeria Situation Room, made up of over seventy CSOs, YIAGA-Africa, Nigeria Women Trust Fund, and Inclusive Friends Association, advocated for electoral reform. YIAGA-Africa, for example, spearheaded the advocacy for the passage of the Not-Too Young To Run bill. Clement Nwankwo of Policy and Advocacy Legal Centre (PLAC) was a member of the Senator Ken Nnamani Committee. These organisations ran advocacy, voter education, and sensitisation activities and observed the elections.

6. The agencies included the Nigeria Police Force, Directorate of Security Services, Nigeria Civil Defense Corps, and Office of National Security Adviser.

The National Peace Committee of retired General Abdulsalami Abubakar twice got the seventy-three presidential candidates to sign a peace accord at the national and state levels.

Inconclusive elections

The 2019 elections recorded a high level of physical, structural, and psychological violence, causing the cancellation of votes. These cancellations and the intense competitiveness of the elections produced narrow margins of lead in the first ballot, compelling INEC to declare some races inconclusive and conduct supplementary elections. These included six governorship and about twenty-four parliamentary elections. The six gubernatorial elections were those of Plateau, Sokoto, Benue, Adamawa, Bauchi, and Kano states. The INEC suspended the collation of results in Rivers State governorship and State House of Assembly elections due to violence. All these elections have now been concluded.

The 2019 elections were extremely competitive in some states. In Sokoto, for example, Aminu Tambuwal, the incumbent governor, won re-election by a mere three hundred and forty-two votes, the slimmest margin in Nigeria's history of governorship polls.

Women's participation in Nigeria's politics: The 2019 experience

Women's participation in Nigerian politics has been a major issue of debate. From 1923 when Nigeria had the first election, the womenfolk have always been part of that process as members of political parties. The absence of authentic membership registers makes it impossible to determine what sex is the majority in the parties. Nevertheless, Nigerian women play an active role in politics. Yet few of the ninety-one registered political parties in Nigeria have female chairpersons. Also, few women win election into party organs. Women experience many challenges in vying for party tickets to contest at general elections: the party gatekeepers usually scheme them out in party primaries. The few who win their primaries often fail in general elections because their male opponents employ violence and the corrupt inducement of voters, election officials, and security agents.

The factors impeding women's active participation in Nigerian politics include patriarchy, cultural barriers, electoral violence, vote-buying, voter apathy, and the unevenness of the playing field.

Nigerian women and party primaries in the 2019 elections

This section presents some views of Nigerian women on what transpired ahead of the 2019 general elections, especially during the party primaries.

Aisosa Amadasun, the State Organising Secretary of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in Edo State, led a protest of aggrieved female politicians in Benin City on 2 November 2018. She said during the event:

> The level of impunity has assumed a frightening dimension under the leadership of our national chairman, who once prided himself as an apostle of change and the curative medicine to godfatherism. The primaries conducted so far by the leadership of the APC across the thirty-six states of the country are not only shameful, disgraceful, undemocratic, and a charade, but also threw many states into mayhem…. Any party that fails to recognise the inputs of women and reward them with positions commensurate with their painstaking efforts to ensure victory is not only doomed but will suffer defeat.

The ripples generated by the party primaries of 18 August to 7 October 2018 continued after the exercises. In a series of tweets on 7 October 2018, Aisha Buhari, the wife of the president, described them thus:

> It is disheartening to note that some aspirants used their hard-earned money to purchase nomination forms, got screened, cleared and campaigned vigorously yet found their names omitted on election day. These forms were bought at exorbitant prices. Many others contested and yet had their results delayed. Fully knowing that *automatic* tickets have been given to other people. The All Progressives Congress, being a party whose cardinal principle is change and headed by a comrade/activist whose main concern is for the common man, yet, such impunity could take place under his watch. Given this development, one will not hesitate to *dissociate* oneself from such unfairness, be neutral and speak for the voiceless. It is important for the populace to rise against impunity and for voters to demand from aspirants to be committed to the provision of basic amenities such as potable… water, basic health-care… education within conducive and appropriate learning environments. Let us vote wisely! Long live [the] Federal Republic of Nigeria!

The president's wife was not the only person who was bitter. The Nigeria Women Trust Fund, under the leadership of Mufuliat Fijabi, observed thus in

a press statement of 8 October 2018:

> … mixed feelings have trailed the conduct of the primaries. Gender and Election Watch observed the pattern of participation by both men and women as voters and… aspirants and have deep concerns and reservation about the conduct of the primaries as quite a number of the women aspirants… faced… intimidation, harassment, and threats to their persons and properties in their aspirations into various positions. The primaries were also not truly reflective of democratic principles of fairness as some… women [candidates] were asked to step down under threats and intimidation for candidates who had not been part of the process before. The intensity with which voters who participated in the primaries were induced and very well-reported by the media was quite undemocratic. This is not just a threat to women who are the most vulnerable but men as well.

Toun Okewale Sonaiya—the founder of Women Radio 91.7 FM, the first radio station promoting exclusively women's interest in Nigeria—on 18 October 2018 said:

> The just-concluded political party primaries are one of sadness caused by the non-fulfilment of democracy to Nigerian women. Our women were intimidated, violated, harassed and disenfranchised by the system that should protect them. This is against the outcomes of interventions by several stakeholders.

She observed in a paper delivered at the 5th Women and Girls Summit that:[7]

> [Some] women won their primaries and were asked to step down for other candidates. Some were not allowed to take part in the primaries after purchasing forms. Some others had favoured candidates imposed on them. There are widespread indicators of lack of fairness to women aspirants, intimidation and outright disenfranchisement. Although some men faced challenges during these primaries, women suffered more, and we worry that again the primaries are pointers to the fact that the percentage of elected women may drop after [the] 2019 elections.

Women of the Edo State APC observed that the primaries conducted

7. The paper is "The Pains of Nigerian Women at the 2018 Primary Elections." The Summit organisers were the office of the wife of the president and the National Council for Women Development.

"without… equity, justice, and fair play" exposed it as "a party of hawks, swallowing chickens as… prey." They noted that female aspirants suffered harrowing experiences: they paid exorbitant fees for nomination forms, but the party screened them out even when "eminently qualified." The group lamented that, despite their sacrifices, the national leadership of the APC denied about ten women tickets in the three senatorial districts of the state.

On 2 November 2018, Ms Ebere Ifendu, President of the Women in Politics Forum, observed thus:

> When we look back at the last primaries, we… discover that the number of women candidates at the National Assembly is small even though we have ninety-one political parties. This is not good for us as women. I want Nigeria to walk the talk as we have agreed to have more women in politics. The major problem is not with the women. We have women of capacity, integrity, and competence…. What we are [demanding] is a level playing field for all.

It is disheartening that women's political fortunes have continued to dwindle over the years. We have a 2006 National Gender Policy that proposes 35% affirmative action for women in elective and appointive positions. The 1999 Constitution (as amended) recognises in Section 42 the right to freedom from discrimination. Yet women and other vulnerable groups, such as youths and persons with disabilities, suffer blatant marginalisation. Among the barriers impeding women from realising their political ambitions are the over-commercialisation of politics, electoral violence, poor internal party democracy, harmful cultural practices, and patriarchy.[8]

Women and the 2019 general elections

Nigerian women played many roles before and during the 2019 general elections. Many contested to bear the flags of their parties and many others served as poll workers. The INEC launched a gender policy on 25 November 2014 to promote women's participation in the electoral process. It has made efforts since then to mainstream gender into its activities. These included the appointment of Mrs Augusta Chinwe Ogakwu as the first female Secretary to the Commission. The body appointed another woman, Mrs Rose Oriaran Anthony, to replace her when she completed her term in 2018. Three of its

8. See https://punchng.com/party-primaries-and-nigerian-womens-cry-for-justice.

twelve national commissioners are women: Prof Antonia Okoosi-Simbine, Hajia Amina Bala Zakari, and Bar. May Agbamuche-Mbu.

In summary, Nigerian women participated in the 2019 general elections as:

1. Candidates;
2. Poll officials;
3. Polling agents;
4. Accredited observers;
5. Accredited journalists;
6. Accredited security agents.

The INEC took measures to make the elections inclusive. Through its Gender Directorate, under the leadership of Deputy Director Blessing Obidegwu, it conducted many voter education and sensitisation activities that targeted women. It mobilised women during the Continuous Voters Registration exercise to register as voters, collect their Permanent Voter Cards, and vote during the elections. The Commission also accredited women-focused civil society organisations, such as the Nigerian Women Trust Fund (NWTF), to conduct gender-focused election observation.

For this, the Trust Fund established a Gender and Election Watch (GEW) Room and deployed two hundred and ninety observers across Nigeria. Its press statement after the 9 March 2019 governorship, state legislative, and area council elections noted with concern the voter apathy, corrupt inducement, violence, and militarisation that attended them. These, it said, had serious implications for Nigeria's democracy. The statement read in part:

1. … women were mostly affected [by] the low voter turnout as most of them were reluctant to come out to perform their civic duty because of the militarised environment and the eruption of violence in… polling units in some states.
2. … the few women who came out to vote were victims of voter inducement as some of them voted under instructions. According to the Centre for Democracy and Development, Nigerian women performed woefully at the polls during the just concluded 2019 general elections.[9]

9. See http://nigerianwomentrustfund.org/nwtf-gew-post-9-march-2019-governorship-state-house-of-assembly-and-federal-capital-territory-area-council-elections-press-statement.

Unsurprisingly, given the violence and voter inducement during the elections, female contestants fared badly. All six female presidential candidates, including the former minister and World Bank Vice-President, Dr Oby Ezekwesili, pulled out of the race. Others who ran for gubernatorial, federal or state legislative, or local government positions fared badly at the polls. Some claimed that INEC collaborated with desperate politicians to rob them of victory. These included Hon. Mulikat Akande Adeola, the former Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, who contested for the Oyo North Senatorial seat under the Peoples Democratic Party. Another was ace broadcaster Adaora Onyechere, who contested for the Okigwe State Constituency in Imo State under the Action Alliance. These two filed petitions at the Election Petition Tribunals to reclaim their stolen mandate.

The tables below show how women electoral in the last ten years.

Table 1: Female elected candidates and representation by major political parties in 2019

Positions	Number of Candidates	Number of Position	Number of Women Contestants	%	APC Female Candidates	PDP Female Candidates	Total Women Elected
President	73	1	6	8.22%	0	0	0
Vice President	73	1	22	30.13%	0	0	0
Senate	1,904	109	235	12.34%	7	10	7
House of Rep	4,680	360	533	11.39%	15	16	11
Governor	2,412	36	74	3.07%	0	0	0
Deputy	2,412	36	275	11.49%	2	3	4
State Assembly	14,583	944	1,825	12.51%	28	39	40
Total	26,137	1,487	2,970	11.36%	52	68	62

Source: Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)

The Centre for Democracy and Development reports that seven hundred and sixty-eight female candidates, representing 11.66% of contestants, contested in National Assembly elections, of which 3.84% succeeded. Two hundred and thirty-five women (12.34% of the candidates) contested for Senate seats, of which seven (6.42%) were successful. That is a drop from their representation in the 8th Senate, in which women accounted for 6.42% of all senators. The two dominant political parties fielded seventeen (seven APC and ten PDP) female senatorial candidates. Many of these women lost at the general elections, including the only female senator in northern Nigeria, Binta Mazi Garba. Her claim to fame arises from being the first politician to represent two different federal constituencies, Kano and Adamawa states. Finally, the minority leader of the 8th Nigerian Senate, Senator Abiodun Olujimi, also lost her re-election bid.

Figures from the House of Representatives elections show a steep decline from the 8th House. Five hundred and thirty-three women contested, with the major parties fielding thirty-one candidates (fifteen APC and sixteen PDP), representing 11.39% of nominees. However, only eleven (3.05%) won their elections, halving the count in the 8th House—which had twenty-two female lawmakers representing 6.11% of candidates.

No woman won election as state governor, and female gubernatorial candidates represented 3.07% of contestants. Of the two hundred and seventy-five women (11.40% of candidates) who ran for Deputy Governorships, four (in Enugu, Kaduna, Ogun, and Rivers) won their races. Thus, female deputy governors have similarly declined from six in the 2015–2019 regime to four. Women have held the deputy governorship in Lagos State since Princess Sarah Adebisi Sosan (2007–11); however, the APC fielded a man (Obafemi Hamzat) for the post in 2019.

With polling still pending in some states, forty women have won seats in state assemblies—down from fifty-five female state lawmakers in the 2015–2019 regime. Table 2 shows that the PDP has thirty-two (51.61%) of the sixty-two women in elective positions, the APC twenty-three (37.10%), and APGA two (3.23%). The ADP, APM, and AA have one (1.61%) each. Women's representation in state legislatures dropped from 5.83% in the current legislative year to 4.24% in the forthcoming.

Table 2: Female elected positions by party

Positions	Number of Candidates	Number of Position	APC	PDP	ADP	APM	AA	APGA
President	73	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vice President	73	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Senate	1,904	109	2	5	0	0	0	0
House of Rep	4,680	360	8	2	0	0	0	1
Governor	2,412	36	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deputy	2,412	36	2	2	0	0	0	0
State Assembly	14,583	944	11	24	1	1	2	1
Total	26,137	1,487	23	33	1	1	2	2

Source: Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)

Table 3: Elected candidates (9th Assembly)[10]

S/N	STATE	DISTRICT	CANDIDATE	(%)	PARTY
Senators-Elect					
1	Adamawa	Central	Dahiru Aishatu Ahmed	7.3%	APC
2	Akwa-Ibom	South	Eyakenyi Akon Etim		PDP
3	Anambra	North	Oduah Stella Adaeze		PDP
4		Central	Uche Lilian Ekwunife		PDP
5	Cross River	North	Oko Rose Okoji		PDP
6	Lagos	central	Tinubu Oluremi Shade		APC

10. Note that these are only some of the new members-elect of the National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives).

7	Rivers	West	Betty Apaifi		PDP
8	Delta	Central	Evelyn O. Oboro		PDP
Members-Elect of the House of Representatives					
9	Abia	Isuikwuato/ Umuneochi	Nkeiruka C. Onyejeocha	3.1%	APC
10	Anambra	Onitsha North/ Onitsha South	Lynda Chuba Ikpeazu		PDP
11	Benue	Otukpo/ Ohimini	Onuh Onyeche Blessing		APGA
12	Borno	Bama/Ngala/ Kala-Balge	Zainab Gimba		APC
13	Ekiti	Ijero/Ekiti West/Efon	Ogunlola Omowumi Olubunmi		APC
14	Gombe	Dukku/Nafada	Aishatu Jibril Dukku		APC
15	Ogun	Ikenne/Shagamu/ Remo North	Onanuga Adewunmi Oriyomi		APC
16	Osun	Ayedaada/ Irewole/Isokan	Taiwo Olukemi Oluga		APC
17	Oyo	Oluyole	Tolulope Tiwalola Akande–Sadipe		APC
18	Plateau	Langtang North/Langtang	Beni Butmak Lar		PDP
19	Yobe	Damaturu/Gujba/ Gulani/Tarmuwa	Khadija Bukar Abba Ibrahim		APC

Source: Nigeria Women Trust Fund.

Fig. 1: Nigerian Senate Gender Index (1999-2019)



Source: Nigeria Women Trust Fund

Fig. 2: Nigerian House of Representatives Gender Index (1999-2019)



Source: Nigeria Women Trust Fund

How to promote women's political participation

This section examines the role of men, mass movements, political parties, and the media in the promotion of women's political participation.

The role of men

A bird cannot fly with one wing; neither can a person clap with one hand. The piano needs both its black and white keys to produce music; Sierra Leoneans say one cannot eat rice with one finger. Thus, national development requires both sexes to participate in politics and governance. Male champions of gender equality must combat discrimination against women, especially in the political arena. Previous attempts to pass legislation to promote women's participation in politics failed for lack of support by male parliamentarians.

The National Human Rights Commission, under the leadership of its Executive Secretary, Tony Ojukwu Esq., has proposed a bill to enhance women active participation in politics. The House of Representatives began its second reading on 24 January 2019. The bill aims to create gender quotas for elections into federal and state legislatures "to support and enhance women's participation and representation in electoral politics." This all-important bill cannot become law without the support of male champions of gender equality. Therefore, a lobby group is necessary to solicit the support of male parliamentarians for it. The National Human Rights Commission, Women in Parliament Group, and civil society organisations must work together to achieve this.

The role of mass movements

To promote active female participation in politics, it is necessary to build networks and synergies. Civil society organisations working on gender issues must reach out to the labour unions to build a critical mass to demand positive change from the status quo. Other constituencies to reach out to include the student unions in public and private tertiary institutions: colleges of education, polytechnics, and universities. Further, the National Youth Service Corps also has a large crop of young people that civil society groups can engage in advocacy. Corpers can work with civil society organisations and Labour groups to advocate for positive electoral reforms.

Associations of market men and women, artisans, and farmers should work with labour and civil society organisation to guarantee equal participation of men and women in elections. Also, a broad coalition of artists, performers, and their organisations is necessary for this struggle, including the Performing

Musicians Association of Nigeria (PMAN), Nigeria Actors Guild, and Comedy Merchants.

The role of the political parties

Many of Nigeria's ninety-one registered political parties have provisions in their constitutions to promote gender parity. However, they observe these provisions in the breach. Many of the parties have no significant provisions to encourage female participation in politics. Now that the 2019 elections are over, it is time to begin advocacy for affirmative action to have women in party executive positions at all levels. The parties should adopt the policy of twinning for all positions: for instance, if a man is national chairperson, a woman is automatically the deputy and vice versa.

Furthermore, the parties should implement a gender quota policy in candidate nomination. Instead of robbing female aspirants of their victories in primaries, parties should encourage them by reserving seats for them. That is the policy of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Additionally, all ninety-one political parties in Nigeria should embark on mass recruitment of new members, especially women. Political party executives should eschew violence and money politics and mete out stiff penalties to members guilty of promoting violence and vote-trading. Nomination forms should be affordable and either free or subsidised for women.

The role of the media

Nigeria's vibrant print and electronic media should train their correspondents on gender-sensitive reporting. They should promote active female politicians and advocate against all cultural and legal barriers to women's participation in politics. They could publish editorials and commentaries on women politicians. Civil society organisations should engage successful media practitioners turned politicians to mentor aspiring female politicians. Such persons include Senator Abiodun Olujimi, Hon. Abike Dabiri Erewa, Senator Chris Anyanwu, former Governor Segun Osoba, and Senator Smart Adeyemi.

Also, the media should campaign against electoral violence and vote-trading because these practices hamper female participation in politics.

Conclusion

1. An electoral offences commission is necessary to prosecute perpetrators of electoral violence and fraud;
2. It is necessary to arrest and prosecution of perpetrators of vote-trading;
3. Voter education and mobilisation is imperative to shore up turnout;
4. A constitution amendment is necessary that guarantees at least 35% affirmative action for women. Uganda's constitution requires one female parliamentary representative for every district or city. It also gives special interest groups quota seats in the parliament. These are the military—which has ten reserved seats—and youths, workers, and persons with disabilities–with five each. One of the five seats for each civil society contingent and two of the ten for the military are for women;
5. Women will fare better under a proportional representation system. Women should support candidates who will respect the policy of 35% affirmative action. The INEC scheduled the first set of off-cycle gubernatorial elections in Bayelsa and Kogi states for 2 November 2019. The political parties and INEC must ensure fair competition for all contestants in those elections and the by-elections that will hold this year. Also, women must contest for party positions in the elective party congresses and conventions that will hold from this year;
6. My advocacy for women's participation in politics is for the credible and intelligent women who will be role model when elected. We should encourage every woman to participate in politics but elect those of exemplary conduct and who will be good ambassadors of their political parties.

Chapter 31 | 2019 Election Matters Arising: The Implications of Election Sequencing for Election Credibility and Gender Parity

Abdulhameed A. Ujo

Introduction

Like previous ones, the 2019 Nigeria general elections have passed into Nigeria's political history but left behind numerous challenges. This paper will focus on those concerning the sequencing of elections and its implications for election credibility and pertinent gender issues.

An election sequence that is known and acceptable to all stakeholders is an essential feature of free and fair elections. Elections in the United States of America and the United Kingdom are examples of this principle. The former has a fixed time for elections: for instance, presidential elections hold every four years on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Elections in the latter take place every five years in May, a schedule that Parliament can alter only if it votes to hold them sooner. This characteristic indicates a developed liberal democracy with free, fair, and credible elections.

Election sequencing impacts election credibility. For example, a ruling party might manipulate the sequence of elections, hoping to create a bandwagon effect. In the bandwagon phenomenon, voters usually favour in subsequent elections the party that wins the first. Thus, a ruling party is likely to win more races in a general election if it can sequence them so that those it is certain to win come first.

The role of gender is crucial in democratic elections. That is why women in the United States and the United Kingdom and some countries in Africa have the franchise. Women enjoy high levels of political representation in some African countries, as Table 1 shows.

Table 1: Women's representation in political office in some African countries

Rank	Country	Lower or Single House				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats	Women	W%	Elections	Seats	Women	W%
1.	Rwanda	03.09.18	80	49	61.3%	29.09.2011	26	10	38.5%
2.	South Africa	07.05.2014	393	168	42.7%	21.05.2014	54	19	35.2%
3.	Mozambique	15.10.2014	250	99	39.6%	-	-	-	-
4.	Ethiopia	24.05.2015	547	212	38.8%	05.10.2015	153	49	32.0%
5.	Tunisia	26.10.2014	217	78	35.9%	-	-	-	-
6.	Sudan	13.04.2015	481	133	27.7%	-	-	-	-

House: Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018

Sequencing of elections in Nigeria

Concerning Nigerian elections, Richard Emmanuel observes that:

> Events in Nigeria have shown that the Nigerian state and its political class are only satisfied with conducting elections…. To its political class, once elections are conducted—no matter how flawed, with rigging and violence—it does not matter to this class of people the cost of conducting such election in human and financial terms…

The military regime of General Abdulsalami introduced a transition to civilian rule in the late 1990s. The order of elections was:

1. Local government elections: 5 October–5 December 1998;
2. Governorship and state legislative elections: 7 January–6 March 1999;
3. Federal legislative and presidential elections: 27 February 1999.

The 1999 elections did not attract criticisms because a military government conducted them. Fourth-Republic elections under President Olusegun Obasanjo featured new developments: the liberalisation of party registration, political violence, and political assassination. The programme for the 2003 elections was:

1. Federal legislative elections: 12 April 2003;
2. Presidential and gubernatorial elections: 19 April 2003.

The schedule did not provoke any disagreement among political parties. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) issued a timetable for the 2007 general elections that included:

1. Gubernatorial and state legislative elections: 14 April 2007;
2. Presidential and federal legislative elections: 21 April 2007.

Certain events affected the elections adversely. They include Professor Maurice Iwu's appointment as INEC chairperson, whose administration of elections many regard as the worst in the history of election management in Nigeria. Another adverse event was the sudden death of President Musa Yar'Adua.

The 2011 general elections held on 9 April 2011. The INEC had originally scheduled them first for 2 April and then 4 April 2011. The Presidential election held on 16 April 2011 after its postponement from 9 April 2011. Likewise, the 2015 general elections, initially to hold on 14 February, held on 28 March 2015. The presidential and federal legislative elections held on 28 March 2015 and those for governorships and state legislatures on 11 April 2015.

Ahead of the 2019 general elections, a major conflict developed between INEC and the National Assembly regarding the order of elections. The INEC had scheduled the elections thus:

1. General elections: 16 February 2019; later shifted to 23 February 2019;
2. Presidential and federal legislative elections: 23 February 2019;
3. Gubernatorial and state legislative elections: 9 March 2019.

The conflict started when the National Assembly re-ordered the sequence of the elections, putting the federal legislative election first and the presidential last. The National Assembly's action was unconstitutional. The INEC's initial plan prevailed ultimately. The National Assembly's intention in reversing it was to deny the President the benefit of the bandwagon effect that we described in the previous section.

Nigeria can prevent such conflict by adopting the practice in the United States of America and the United Kingdom cited earlier. A constitutional provision that fixes the dates for elections will promote the credibility of its elections.

The gender issue in Nigerian elections

Nigerian women have poor representation in the parliament and other

institutions of representation. It differs in this from many African countries, as Table 1 shows.

A recent analysis by Premium Times and the Centre for Democracy (CDD) shows that the number of women elected to public office declined in the 2019 elections. The reasons include those we have mentioned above and various historical factors that have hampered their active participation in politics. These latter include social and psychological dependency, sociological factors, and gender-discriminatory legal frameworks and traditional values. The various programmes that Nigeria's successive First Ladies have run (see Table 2 below) have not promoted women's political participation and electoral representation. The First Ladies were interested only in promoting the regimes of their husbands.

Table 2: The First Ladies and their programmes

S/N	FIRST LADIES	PROGRAMME
1.	Mrs Maryam Babangida	Better Life for Rural Women (BLRW)
2.	Mrs Maryam Abacha	Family Support Programme (FSP)
3.	Justice Fati Lami Abubakar	Women's Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA)
4.	Mrs Stella Obasanjo	Child Care Trust (CCT)
5.	Mrs Titi Atiku	Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF)
6.	Hajiya Turai Umaru Yar'Adua	Women and Youth Empowerment Foundation (WYEF)
7.	Mrs Dame Patience Jonathan	A-Aruere Reachout Foundation (AARF)

The legal enactment of proportional representation seems to be the only way to improve women's political representation, as in South Africa and other Southern Africa countries.

The credibility of the 2019 general elections in Nigeria

Although Nigeria's electoral system is still developing, the discussion in the previous sections supports the conclusion that the 2019 elections lacked credibility.

The existence of a middle class that projects and protects democratic

values and political parties whose members support democracy are two prerequisites for credible elections. These do not exist in Nigeria. Other factors that impede the democratisation of elections in Nigeria include political godfathers who buy politicians and the use of unemployed youths as political thugs.

Samuel Huntington (1968) posits that democratisation can go into reverse.[11] For example, Nigeria's first wave of democratisation that started in the First Republic went into reverse when the military overthrew the Tafawa Balewa Administration. The same situation occurred when again they dismissed the Administration of President Shehu Shagari. Nigeria only returned to democratic rule with the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. Thus far, the democratic Fourth Republic has witnessed the Administrations of Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, and Muhammadu Buhari.

Conclusion

This paper has addressed the order of election, gender, and credibility of election in Nigeria. The National Assembly attempted to substitute its preferred order of elections in 2019 for the one that INEC had presented, bringing the federal legislative elections ahead of the presidential. That was to afford its members the benefit of the bandwagon effect. Ultimately, INEC had its way and the presidential and federal legislative elections held simultaneously.

The paper also addressed gender representation in political offices, demonstrating that the under-representation of Nigerian women in elective and appointments worsened with the 2019 elections. It compared this situation with that in other African countries. The paper recommends proportional representation as practised by South Africa because of its ease of operation.

Recommendations

Nigeria can resolve the crisis of election sequencing by legally fixing the dates of elections, as obtains in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Election credibility is crucial. The European Union election observation mission noted many inadequacies in Nigeria's 2019 general election and made thirty recommendations to improve election credibility in Nigeria. We present their seven-point summary below:

11. Huntington, S. Political Order in a Changing Society.

1. Strengthen INEC procedures for the collation of results to improve integrity and confidence in electoral outcomes;
2. Establish requirements in law for full results transparency, with data easily accessible to the public;
3. Considerably strengthen INEC's organisational and operational capacity and internal communication;
4. The inter-agency body responsible for electoral security must work more transparently and inclusively, regularly consulting with political parties and civil society;
5. Introduce a legal requirement for political parties to have a minimum representation of women among candidates;
6. Empower election tribunals to handle pre-election cases to improve access to remedy and prevent the duplication suits on the same matter;
7. Reform the licensing system for the broadcast media to provide for media pluralism and diversity in all states.

The reports of the Uwais and Nnamani Committees reproduced most of these recommendations. Unfortunately, the government has not issued a White Paper on them. Another challenge in INEC's operation is the government's inability to enact into law its electoral bill and pass its budget in time. These affected the credibility of the 2019 election. The government and the Commission must give these issues the urgent attention they deserve. That will enhance the credibility of elections in Nigeria.

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Chapter 32 | The Quest for Proportional Representation in Nigeria

Y. A. Zoaka

Introduction

Elections are important in a democracy because they promote political stability and continuity by making unnecessary the resort to violence to achieve leadership change. The subject of electoral systems—dry-as-dust or arcane to many—should be of central interest to anyone concerned with the operation of democratic systems. Elections are the defining moment in democracies and perform two fundamental functions. They confer authority upon those whom the electors have chosen to represent them and enable the latter to hold the former accountable for their actions in office (O'Neal, 1993:1).

Many electoral systems exist. Proportional representation is one that several countries have adopted, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxemburg, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (Britannica 2017:1). It is the focus of this paper. We will start by defining the concept of election and summarising the types of election systems.

An election is a formal decision-making process by which a population periodically chooses an individual to hold public office. Elections have been the most usual mechanism by which modern representative democracy has operated since the 17th century. Elections fill offices in the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Many private and business organisations, including voluntary associations, corporations, and student associations, also use it to select their officers.

Voting system

A voting system is a method by which voters choose between options, often in an election or referendum. It defined the rules for valid voting and the counting and aggregation of votes to yield a result. Common voting systems include majoritarian, proportional representation, and plurality voting, with variations such as the first-past-the-post and preferential voting systems. The study of these systems—social choice theory—is a sub-field in political science, economics, and mathematics.

Electoral systems

Electoral systems, i.e., the formal structuring of elections, are crucial to how an electorate chooses between options. They are the mechanisms that translate the preferences of citizens into seats in representative institutions. Therefore, they have a considerable influence on the political character of a society. For example, they condition the behaviour of political parties and electoral candidates. Some favour regional parties and others national parties.

How an electoral system translates votes into seats in elected assemblies may influence the degree of public support for democratic governance itself. Public support might decline, for example, if citizens perceive that the legislature's composition does not faithfully reflect their electoral preferences. Turnout during elections will drop off, respect for politicians and elected representatives will fall, and laws that the government enacts will lack legitimacy. The lack of legitimacy creates room for non-state actors with divisive and sometimes violent ideologies to disrupt and eventually collapse the state.

The electoral systems of contemporary democracies fall into two categories: majoritarian systems and proportional representation systems (O'Neal, 1993:1-3).

Majoritarian systems

The winning candidate in a majoritarian system is the one who received the most votes in an electoral district. Majoritarian systems differ by the number of representatives the electorate can elect in an electoral district and the type of majority (simple or absolute) that winners must achieve.

Single-Member Plurality Systems

Single-member plurality systems are common in countries of the British parliamentary tradition, such as Canada. In such systems, only one member of an elected assembly represents an electoral district. A simple majority suffices to determine the winner of an election. Each elector marks a single "X" (or impresses a thumbprint or other mark) beside the name of the candidate of their choice. Although several candidates may compete for the seat, the winner need only attract the most votes cast. Hence the description of such electoral systems as "single-member plurality" or "first-past-the-post." Countries that use it include Canada, the United States, Nigeria, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Multi-Member Plurality Systems

Some majoritarian electoral systems allow electors in an electoral district to send multiple representatives to the assembly. Voters in these systems mark off as many names on their ballots as there are vacant seats. As in single-member systems, the candidates with the most votes win.

Single-Member Majoritarian Systems

In contrast to the previous systems, single-member majoritarian systems ensure that the winning candidate has the support of an absolute majority of the voters in their district. It achieves this by two means: the alternative vote and two-ballot systems.

The alternative vote

The alternative vote (or *preferential vote*) system requires voters to rank their preferences on their ballots. Electors write 1 beside their first choice, 2 beside the second, and so on. If no candidate receives an absolute majority, the system eliminates the one with the least votes and redistributes their ballots according to the second choices marked on them. This process continues until a winner emerges with more than half of the total vote. Australia has used the alternative vote system for elections to its House of Representatives (the lower house) since 1918.

The two-ballot system

The two-ballot or second-ballot system is another means of ensuring that the winning candidate has the support of most voters. Under this system, balloting may take place in two stages. During the first, voters can choose among several candidates, only one of whom they may select. If no clear winner emerges from this round, the two candidates with the best showing go into a second ballot. (A variant of this system determines the winner by a simple plurality when over two candidates are on the second ballot.)

This system was most recently used in France for parliamentary elections in March 1993. The French replaced it briefly in 1986 with proportional representation but restored it shortly afterwards. Many countries, including France, use it for presidential elections.

Proportional representative system

The proportional representation system ensures that the number of a party's legislative seats is proportionate to its number of votes in the legislative elections. If 30% of voters support a party, it will have roughly 30% of the seats

in the legislature. Proportional representation is an alternative to single-member or bloc voting systems. These non-proportional systems tend to produce disproportionate outcomes and to have a bias in favour of larger political groups. Proportional representation systems encourage the proliferation of political parties while single-member systems encourage the development of two-party systems.

Advocates of proportional representation posit that an election is a census of opinion on how to govern the country. Therefore, they argue, only the decisions of an assembly that represents the diversity of opinions within a country is legitimate. Most of them insist that plurality systems can also produce unrepresentative minority governments. Critics of the system point out that it encourages the splintering of political parties and may make the government unstable.

Methods of instituting the PR system

A country may implement the proportional representation system through the single transferable vote, party list, or additional member system.

Single Transferable Vote

This version of the proportional representation system has several names: the *single transferable vote* among political scientists, the *Hare-Clark system* in Australia, etc. Ireland and Malta use it to elect parliaments and Australia to elect the Federal Senate and the legislature in several of its states. Some U.S. cities used it in the 20th century, including New York, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Toledo, and Bouldar, and Cambridge, Massachusetts still uses it for city council and school board elections.

How does it work? The ballot lists all candidates, and voters rank them in order of preference rather than vote for only one. For instance, if a voter's first and second preferences on the ballot are Adewale and Ikechukwu, respectively, they mark 1 after the former's name and 2 after the latter's. Voters fill in the ranking numbers as they would for standardised tests like in school, which allows for computerised vote counting and ballot transfers. The system can be more complicated than we have presented it. However, it allows for vote shifting until the voters identify with the winning candidate.

Party-list voting

Party-list voting accounts for over 80% of proportional representation systems in use worldwide. Most European democracies and many newly democratic countries, including South Africa, use it.

How does it work? Voters elect legislators in large, multi-member

districts. Each party presents a list of candidates equal to the number of seats in the district. Independent candidates may also run; the system lists them separately on the ballot as if they were a party. On the ballot, voters indicate their preference for a particular party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their share of the vote. Thus, if Party A wins 40% of the vote in a five-member district, they would get two of the five seats. The system would determine the two winning candidates of the party by their position on the list.

We have two broad types of list systems: the closed and the open. In the former—the original form of party-list voting—the party fixes the order of the candidates on the list. The voter votes for the party list and cannot choose among the candidates on the list; they must accept the list as the party has presented it. The system selects the candidates in their exact order on the party list. In the example below, if APGA won two seats, the first two candidates on the pre-ordered list—Emeka and Eze—would be the winners. The figure below illustrates this system in an election for the House of Representatives in a five-seat district.

Fig.1: Closed Party List Ballot

Official Ballot						
Election into the NASS for Members Representing Umuahia/Abia Federal Constituency						
Voting Instruction						
1)	**You only have one vote.**					
2)	**Place an X in the box under the party for whom you wish to vote.**					
S/n	**APGA**	**APC**	**PDP**	**PRP**	**APGA Candidate**	**Independent**
1.	Chukwuemeka	Adeleke	Abdullahi	Alhaji Sani	Sani Umaru	Anthony Jack
2.	Oliver Eze	Abimbola	Obinna	Zakari Bello	Onuoha	
3.	Obi Peter	Stanley	Celestine	Gana	Jeremiah	
4.	Ukwa C.	Emma Daniel	Zakari	Malik	Zawani	
5.	Hope Ngozi	Obi Ezenwa	Adewale	Mshelia	Bishop	

Source: Adopted and modified from footnotes on proportional representation 2015, p. 104.

Most European democracies now use the open form of party-list voting, which allows voters to choose among the candidates on a party's list. It gives voters a say in the list's ordering and, thus, which candidates win the available

seats. One version presents voters with unordered lists of candidates. They cannot vote for a party directly but must vote for an individual candidate. Thus, a vote counts for the specific candidate and the party. The final order of the party list depends completely on the number of votes each candidate on the list won. The most popular rise to the top of the list and have a better chance of winning their election.

In our example, the APGA won two seats and the APC and PDP received the highest and next highest number of individual votes. They would rise to the top of the list and win their seats. That is like the system in Finland, and many consider it to be the most open version of list voting.

Many formulas exist for accomplishing the actual allocation of seats to parties. One of the simplest seat allocation formulas is the "largest remainder formula." In this approach, the first step is to calculate a quota, determined by dividing the valid votes in the district by the number of seats. Table 1 shows 100,000 valid votes and ten available seats. The division of 100,000 by 10 = 10,000 = the quota. The system then divides the quota into each party's votes. That is 38,000 votes in APGA's case. Three seats would be the product of dividing those votes by 10,000, with 8000 left over. After the first allocation of seats, this system compares the remainder votes for the parties and allocates the remaining seats to the parties with the largest remainders. Our example has two seats remaining for allocation and the APGA, APC, Independent Candidate have the largest remainders. Therefore, they would get the seats. Ultimately, each party gets the number of seats that most closely approximates their percentage of the vote.

Table 1: The Largest Remainder Approach to Seat Allocation

Parties	Votes	First Allocation of Seats	Remainder Votes	Second Allocation of Seats	Final Allocation of Seats	% of Votes to % of Seats
APGA	38,000	3	8,000	1	4	38%/4%
APC	23,000	2	3,000	0	2	23%/20%
PDP	21,000	2	1,000	0	2	21%/20%
PRP	12,000	1	2,000	0	1	12%/10%
Independents	6,000	0	6,000	1	1	6%/10%

Adopted and modified to create local examples.

Mixed-Member Proportional Voting System

The mixed proportional representation goes by many names, including the additional member, compensatory proportional representation, two-vote, and German system. It attempts to combine a single-member district system with a proportional voting system. Voters elect half of the members of the legislature in a single-member district plurality contest and the other half by a party-list vote. This system adds the former and latter to give each party its appropriate share of legislative seats. Proponents promote it as the best of both worlds, combining the geographical representation and close constituency ties of single-member plurality voting with the representational diversity of proportional representation.

West Germany invented this system after World War II, and several countries, including Bolivia and Venezuela, have adopted it since. It is still one of the least used proportional representation systems but has attracted much attention recently. It is now one of the "hottest" systems among election designers. That is due in part to its character as a "compromise" between the two principal rival systems. New Zealand abandoned its traditional single-member plurality system for it in the 1990s. Hungary also adopted this approach. Most recently, the new parliaments of Scotland and Wales used this system for their first elections.

How does it work? People vote on a double ballot (see the figure below). First, they vote for a district representative on the left part of the ballot. This part of the ballot is a single-member district plurality contest to determine the legislative representative of the district. The person with the most votes wins. Typically, this system fills half of the seats in the legislature in this way. In a hypothetical one hundred-member state legislature, the winners of these district contests would occupy fifty seats.

Fig. 2: Ballot for the mixed-member proportional voting system

Official Ballot		
Election for the NASS of Representatives		
Mamhis/Federal Constituency		
You have 2 votes		
District Vote		Party Vote
This vote decides who will be elected to the House of Representatives from this Federal Constituency. Vote by putting an "X" in the		This vote decides the share of seats that each party list below will have in the House of Representatives. Vote by putting "X" in

box immediately before the candidate of your choice. Vote for only one candidate.			the box immediately before the party you choose. Vote for only one party.	
Vote here			Vote here	
	APGA			APGA
	APC			MRC
	PDP			PDP
	APDA			APDA
	Independents			

Source: Adopted and modified from footnote

On the right part of the ballot (the party list), voters indicate their choice among the parties. They fill the other half of legislative seats from each party's regional lists of candidates. The party lists are closed in the German version. The mixed-member proportional voting system counts the party-list votes nationally to determine the portion of the one-hundred-and-eight-seat legislature that each party deserves. It then adds candidates from each party's lists to its district winners until that party achieves its appropriate share of seats.

The following table illustrates how this process works for our hypothetical election. The APGA won 40% of the party-list votes in the 1,000-member state legislature; so they have a right to forty of the one hundred seats. Since twenty-eight of their candidates already won in the district elections, they would add twelve from their regional party list to come to their quota of forty seats.

Table 2: Allocation of seats in a mixed-member proportional voting system

Political Parties	**Number of District Seats Won**	**Percentage of the National party-list vote**	**Total Number of Seats deserved by party**	**Number of seats added own party list**
APGA	28	40%	40	12
APC	18	36%	36	18
PDP	11	18%	18	14
PRP	0	6%	6	6
Indepen dents				
Total		100%	100	50

Source: Adopted and modified from footnote

The German version uses two electoral thresholds, either of which a party must cross to get seats in the legislature. A party must either get 5% of the nationwide party-list vote or win at least three district races. In our hypothetical case, the new party did not win any district seats but won over 5% of the nationwide vote. So they will get their share of legislative seats, six in this case—all of which will be from the regional party list.

Advantages and disadvantages of the PR system

Proportional representation describes a range of electoral systems in which the distribution of legislative seats corresponds closely to the distribution of votes between parties or individual candidates.

Its advantages:

1. It offers advantages that would give minority parties and independent candidates a better chance of winning seats in Parliament;
2. Many consider the first-past-the-post system unrepresentative, as candidates can win elections with a small share of the votes and all the other votes go to waste;
3. Proportional representation ensures that the parties appeal to their core supporters, rather than a few so-called "swing voters" in marginal seats;
4. It is fairer to minority parties and independent candidates;
5. The system "wastes" fewer votes, as it accommodates the preference of a wider range of voters;
6. It potentially offers a wider and more representative range of choices to voters;
7. Proportional representation may encourage turn-out and reduce apathy;
8. Although it rarely produces an absolute majority for one party, ensures greater continuity of government and requires greater consensus in policy-making.

The disadvantages of the system:

1. Under first-past-the-post systems, legislators serve the constituency in which they campaign, making them more inclined to tackle local issues;
2. Proportional representation might provide a route for extremists to force their way into the political mainstream, an improbability under a first-past-the-post system;
3. Some say that it produces "weak" coalition governments rather than a "strong" majority governments, which can engender indecision,

compromise, and legislative paralysis;
4. Proportional representation can also reduce accountability to voters, as an ousted ruling party can remain in power by finding new coalition partners after an election;
5. It weakens the link between elected representatives and their constituencies;
6. Its greater complexity and range of choice can dissuade voters from voting because it requires them to have significant knowledge of individual and party positions.

Having analysed the proportional representation system, we must now present the quest for its adoption in Nigeria in place of the first-past-the-post system. Nigeria has employed the problem-ridden first-past-the-post system since Independence. Several attempts to improve it have failed because it promotes violence and a winner-take-all mentality. The adoption of the proportional representation system will generate less tension because it promotes inclusiveness and reduces the wastage of votes in elections. We will consider its key advantages next.

First, it will prevent the wastages of votes that the first-past-the-post system encourages. It will share votes in proportion to the available seats in multi-member constituencies. Instead of wasting votes in a winner-take-all arrangement, other parties contesting in an election will secure seats in the legislature. The first-past-the-post system unequally delineates constituencies, registered voters, and the number of votes a party must get to win in different constituencies even within the same state. For example, the winner of the 2003 House of Representatives election in Ukwa East/Ukwa West in Abia State scored 11,950 votes to coast home to victory. In contrast, his counterpart in Aba North/South came fourth with 11,936 votes. Several examples of similar disparities exist across Nigeria (INEC: 2003, 43 and 44). The 2003 Federal Constituency election in Abaji/G/Lada/Kuje/Kwali illustrates the waste of votes. Eleven parties participated in the election. The victorious ANPP candidate got 30,893 (45.66%) of votes cast and the other contestants collectively polled 36,761 (54.34%) (INEC, 2003: 64). In other words, the number of wasted votes was higher than that by which the winner prevailed. The proportional representation regime will prevent this.

Second, Olasupo(2011), Halidu (2011), Jega (2011), and others have noted that Nigerian elections are increasingly violent, "do-or-die" affairs. That

is because the electoral system leaves the losers in the cold and protects the winners, who even use state resources to prosecute their cases in court. Olasupo (2011) traces the roots of electoral violence from the pre-colonial through the different elections to date. The forms of this violence include kidnapping, assassinations, and the murder of over one hundred individuals across the country between 1999-2011 (Ujo 2012:403-409). This phenomenon arises from the winner-take-all mentality that the first-past-the-post system engenders and the politician's perception of public office as their ticket to a life of opulence. They approach politics using their political parties as "war machines cocked almost permanently to go into combat with perceived opponents both existing and potential." These enemies include not only "the opposition party but also the electorate who refuse to toe the party line" (Ikelegbe, 2014:323). Alemika (2011) also describes them as organised criminal organisations for seeking, gaining and retaining power. The proportional representation system will produce a more peaceful and inclusive governance model in place of the exclusionary and violence-prone first-past-the-post system.

Third, the proportional representation system will allow small parties to survive where they are strong and enable marginalised groups to participate in governance. For example, the number of women elected into legislatures from 1999 to date is negligible (Pogoson, 2012 and 2014; Afolabi-Akiyode, 2011). The proportional representation system will also promote party discipline and longevity of membership because it promotes inclusiveness. It will eliminate the decamping of party members to other parties and reduce cut-throat politics and violence because it will encourage inclusiveness.

Fourth, proportional representation will reduce fraud and corruption, common features of our electoral system. Adetula and Adeyi (2014:289) argue that "the illicit use of money by political actors for the prosecution of elections in Nigeria has inhibited democratic development in the country." A justification Gen. Ibrahim Babangida gave for annulling the 12 June 1993 elections was that the contestants spent a combined sum of ¦ 2.1 billion in their campaigns. Election campaign expenditure by presidential candidates kept increasing between 1999 and 2015 and is now reportedly over ¦ 1 trillion. Cash-for-vote exchanges rose from ¦ 500 in 1999 to ¦ 1,750 in 2003, ¦ 2,250 in 2007, ¦ 5,000 in 2011, and ¦ 10,000 in 2015 (Adetula and Adeyi, 2014). Godfathers and Godmothers now sponsor the election campaigns of their stooges, whom they install in office and expect to pay them monthly subventions from state coffers. This practice holds Nigeria's democracy hostage and prevents its

growth. Virtually all electoral officials have lost their integrity and aid election rigging by looking away.

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Part 10 | Political Education and Political Thinking

Chapter 33 | Political Education and Political Miseducation in the Social Media Age

Goodness C. Michael B.Sc. M.Sc.[1]

Introduction

Digital technology has made possible the use of social media in politics, education, business, and international relations (Valenzuela, 2013). Demographics and psychological factors determined political participation and education before the advent of social media and digital technology. Evidence suggests today, however, that Information and Communication Technology (ICT) plays an equally important role. Social media have become important tools for on-line political participation.

Political education is grossly lacking in Nigeria. Governments do not provide proper orientation for the people and the agendas the newspapers set for public discussion only produce endless debate without resolution. Moreover, the perspectives propagated in these debates are sometimes incorrect. What exists in Nigeria is a raw and cancerous form of political miseducation the extended propagation of which has been inimical to the very existence of the country.

Studies of youth political participation have yielded contradictory results, some finding a decline (Seongyi and Woo-Young, 2011; Whiteley, 2011) and others a significant increase via social media (Chun, 2012; Potgieter, 2013).

The average Nigerian is very political. They strain to disguise this, though, to disassociate themselves from the ugliness of politics, as evidenced by the frequent disclaimer "I am not interested in politics." Most who say this are actually unconsciously political; indeed, *everyone* is political, consciously or not.

The concept of cognitive engagement refers to the extent of willingness

1. A Paper presented at a Round-Table by the African Centre for Media and Information Literacy (AFRICMIL) in collaboration with the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, West Africa; 24 July 2018, University Of Abuja.

and ability to learn about and participate in politics. Applied to youths, it involves the amount and persistence of their effort to participate in politics (Charles, 2010).

The recent assent by President Muhammadu Buhari to the "Not Too Young to Run" bill will see young people scampering to snag political offices without having acquired adequate political knowledge. They are liable to burn out or grow weary in time—which is the greatest judge. The youths should certainly be in the forefront of governance; they need, however, to acquire the necessary capacities.

Definition of Terms

What is politics?

My favourite, of the many definitions of politics, is Harold Lasswell's: "Politics is who gets what, when and how." Were I to offer mine, it would be that politics is the art and science of decision-making. It is an art because it employs or exploits sentiments, feelings, strategy, word-play, attitudes, semantics, emotional intelligence or lack of it, conscience, leniency, good faith, flexibility. It is a science also because it deals in facts, numbers, logic, law and justice, metrics and analytics, and evaluation, among other things. Politics may be interpersonal or intrapersonal and, as I have posited, nobody is apolitical: everyone engages in politics.

Some misconceive politics as pertaining only to governance and the control of resources and human capital, to rewarding or punishing, providing or depriving, etc. On the contrary, it is a living, breathing phenomenon that permeates everything. It is present in families, where men claim headship and exercise authority—democratic or authoritarian—over their households. It is present between siblings, who engage in rivalry or the older of whom demand deference from the younger. Women practice it: everyday women who stoop to conquer—achieving their aims by feeding their men's egos with pretended submissiveness—and feminists who take it by right. We see it when children throw tantrums, wear long faces, or reject food so their parents would do what they want or to punish them for disciplining them. It is politics when relatives bad-mouth you for failing to grant their requests. Politics is there among peers. You find the Alpha, Beta, and foot soldiers in every group of friends, friends who bully, taunt, or nag, whose help is really only an investment from which they expect returns. Politics is present also in schools, student-union and departmental governments, workplaces and marketplaces, market unions, trade

unions, etc. It is there in religious organisations as well, where the leaders only surround themselves with friends or people their 'spirit agrees with'. Then, sadly, there is politics in the media, a pillar of society that should be devoid of it. Indeed, media houses thrive the most during elections, in which they feed fat on smear campaigns and public miseducation. Politics is present even within individuals, manifesting in internal conflicts and indecisions: whether to delay or immediately grant gratification of a desire, where to position a want on the scale of preference, etc. Our decision-making is an expression of politics.

Wikipedia defines education as the facilitation of learning or the acquisition of knowledge, skills, values, beliefs, and habits.[2] Political education specifically aims to equip young people and adults for active participation in the political process. It is vital to the development of a community given that the nature and quality of its people's political education determines their level of political participation and, thus, the community's political landscape.

Vincent (2011) has observed that most Nigerians are misinformed or uninformed about the workings, activities, and policies of the government. He has noted further that some participants in elections lack a clear understanding of the issues involved. Their voting behaviour is determined not by their independent and informed opinion but by orders from political leaders, or by bribery and cajolery. Some stay away entirely from electoral processes.

In conclusion, political education engenders political awareness by preparing people for political activity to enable them contribute to the development of their society.

New/social media

Social media are, according to Wikipedia, computer-mediated technologies that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, career interests, and other forms of expression via virtual communities and networks. Social media platforms include Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Whatsapp, YouTube, LinkedIn, and Pinterest. According to Nielsen, internet users spend more time on social media sites than on any other type of site and 3.196 of the 4.021 billion internet users are social media users (Global Digital Report, 2018).

A major attribute of these technologies is that they enable access to political information that the traditional media have not filtered in exercise of their

2. We may conclude by extension that to miseducate is to educate improperly or wrongly.

gatekeeper role (Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, 2011). Bae (2014) notes in support that the high levels of such information and limited state control over their flows on social media enable youths to encounter politically-engaging information while undertaking apolitical activities.

Theoretical Framework

Political education or miseducation is possible in small as well as large groups. The role of social media in this cannot be over-stated, because the information flows they generate transcend national boundaries. I will use in this section two theories from the behavioural sciences to explain the relationship between these media, political education, and political participation. These are the Agenda Setting Theory and the Cognitive Engagement Theory.

Agenda setting theory

The extent to which the media shape our perception of the world is evident from the profusion of vlogs, blogs, political analysts and critics, and 24-hour cable news channels. We depend on news producers for information that regulates how we think, live, vote, and behave. The media dictates what issues are important and why. This power of the media can distort the public agenda. For example, the details of Senator Dino Melaye's private life get more airtime than the killings in Plateau and Benue states. Often, also, royal weddings have greater prominence in the media than political upheaval in the Middle East or Nigeria. Is this a proper prioritisation of public issues? Nonetheless, the media's agenda-setting power is an important means of influencing the government and how people view it.

Introduced by Dr Maxwell McCombs and Dr Donald Shaw in 1972, the Agenda Setting Theory in communications studies states that the media set the content and direction of public thought and discourse, thus playing a key role in shaping political reality. According to Wikipedia the more frequently and prominently the media cover a news item, the more important the audience considers it. They determine the audience's knowledge and assessment of an issue by the facts and viewpoints they present about it. The print media further influence these by the space they allocate to stories on the issue as well as by the positioning of those stories in the publication. For instance, regarding positioning, they might place them on the front page, an inside page, or the back page; and it might be at the top, middle, or bottom of the page. The electronic media do the same by the amount of time they allocate to such stories and the

period of day in which they run them. Regarding period of day, they might choose to run the stories in the morning or evening rush-hours (when many listen to the radio as they commute to or from work). Also, they might run them at dinner time (when many watch television while having their meal), or late at night (when most are asleep and likely not to see the stories).

Agenda setting occurs through a cognitive process known as "accessibility." This phenomenon, according to Iyenger (1990) consists in the fact that the higher the frequency and prominence of an issue in the news media, the more accessible it is in the audience's memories. Thus, respondents in studies tend to name the most prominent issues in the news when asked to identify the most important problems facing the country.

The two basic tenets of the Agenda Setting Theory are that:

1. The media filter and shape reality, rather than simply reflect it. They do this when, for example, they headline and sensationalise a private vice but pay scant attention to an event with important implications for the public;
2. The media determines the public's evaluation of the importance of issues. The greater the attention the former pay to an issue, the more the latter tends to perceive those issues as more important than others. This is the town-crier-effect.

Advances in communication technologies provide new avenues to influencing the masses. Print and radio were the principal means in the early periods of the modern era, followed by film and television. There is a profusion of communication channels today, allowing for greater public engagement. This, in turn, has generated increased attention to the agenda-setting capacities of the media.

Cognitive engagement theory

Ronald F. Inglehart propounded the Cognitive Engagement Theory (CET) initially in 1977 as the Cognitive Mobilisation Theory. The latter proposed basically that political participation is a function of the education level of the youths with access to information (Inglehart, 1977; 1990). Hence the more educated a society's youths, the better informed they are and, in the long run, the higher their participation in politics. Also, the lower the cost of access to information the higher the information consumption and political knowledge and interest among youths, which results in their increased political

participation (Charles, 2010). Consequently, cognitive engagement results from access to information and the ability and willingness to use the acquired information to make informed choices.

Cognitively engaged citizens are critical citizens, who can mobilise themselves for unconventional forms of political participation (i.e., on-line activism) if dissatisfied with government policies. They are the good citizens historically: interested in politics, propelled to participate in it, knowledgeable in the workings of democracy. Then again, they might decide for the same reason of dissatisfaction to not participate in politics at all (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2003).

On-line political participation and cognitive engagement theory

On-line political participation is political participation on the internet, a digital mode of participation categorised as non-conventional. Also known as a non-electoral or non-institutional form of participation, it has been on the increase since 2010 (Shore, 2014) and has diversified the democratic experience. Today, people use several social media functionalities for direct forms of on-line political participation (e.g., instant messaging and wall posting) and indirect ones (posting notes, status updates). Since social media activism is part of youth political culture, the former clearly is pertinent to the Cognitive Engagement Theory.

Way Forward/Action Points

The absence of a professional monitoring system to authenticate on-line information makes it difficult to trust its veracity. The internet has made it easy for anyone with a laptop or phone and data to post items on-line that might make them liable to prosecution for libel, slander, malpractice, false representation, or miseducation. Even public officials and politicians engage in this practice. On-line political campaigns usually feature false promises, religious jingoism, tribal sentiments, half-truths, smears, ignorance and, sometimes, outright lies in a bid to discredit the opposition.

This is problematic for the political education of the youths given that they rely on the internet for political information. It is possible, however, to achieve a more transparent, accountable system of internet communication. We could begin with the institutions described in the following sections.

Family

Parents and family elders are a child's first models (Himmelmann, 2000, cited in Nwankwo, 2012) and the family the first and perhaps the most important agent of their socialisation. This importance of the family is because people spend most of their time with their family all their life. A person may leave a religion, country, school, or friends, they may decide to not view any more one or another television channel; but very rarely would they leave their family. The family is usually also the initial source of political education or miseducation. This education proceeds mostly unconsciously through the impartation of biases and insinuations or exhibition of certain dispositions towards others; however, it might also be through outright practices of hate speech. In either case, parents and older family members serve as models and examples for the child to emulate.

This education is so effective that people often adopt political beliefs similar to their parents'. Thus, a typical republican or democratic family generally remains so over generations. As such, hate speech, ethnic conflict, and other expressions of social disharmony are not likely to end until families begin genuinely to preach and practice love, tolerance, respect, and peaceful co-existence. This is true regardless of the number of conferences governments or civil society groups may convene to advance peace in the country.

This was why Plato advocated the expulsion from the city of everyone over the age of ten as a condition for the success of the good republic. He explored in *The Republic* (390 BC) the principles and prerequisites of a good aristocratic regime. Most of the book, however, dwelt on his ideal educational system and curriculum for the young because he thought their indoctrination with the values of the regime essential to its survival. He thought the attitudes of persons over ten—including all parents, therefore—were already formed, tended to be averse to those values, and could not be changed. Hence he advocated the banishment of such persons.

Educational institutions

Schools are powerful means of political education. To perform this function properly, however, they—especially the higher institutions—must develop and encourage objectivity in political analysis. They must recognise also that the essence of schooling is not to raise mindless robots. It is rather to teach students how to learn, unlearn, and relearn, to question the status quo and find solutions to such vexing problems as underdevelopment, dishonesty, oppression, etc.

It is not sufficient though for schools in discharging their function of political education to merely transmit to students knowledge about these issues and how the society works. They must work also to change their wards from observers into active participants in the political system. They should refrain therefore from silencing dissident students but instead create an environment where grievances are heard and resolved. It is a hallmark of effective political education that students are able to confront unresponsive school authorities, although the latter may find such capacity problematic.

Unfortunately, student repression has been common in tertiary educational institutions and student activists often have a bleak future as a consequence. This confronts us with the question of what the country wants: a docile or active citizenry?

Peer groups

The peer group is perhaps the most formidable agent of socialisation. Social media are today an important means by which peer groups, which operate also as interest or pressure groups, influence their members. They are therefore key vehicles of political education, as ideas and information—including biases and sentiments—are transmitted within the group during on-line discussions. It is necessary, therefore, to verify and authenticate such information to prevent miseducation.

Religious organisations

The politicisation of religion is perhaps the most divisive factor in Nigeria. The country's main organised religions, Christianity and Islam, wield enormous influence over their adherents. This influence is so powerful that even political leaders and aspirants to public office often seek spiritual guidance and blessings from their religious leaders.

Clearly, therefore, religious institutions play an important role in the political education of their members and determining the character of politics. The former would suffer if these institutions were apathetic or antipathetic to politics and the peaceful co-existence of religious communities would be endangered if they became too involved in it. In reality, however, these institutions have hardly actualised their potential as means of the positive political education of their members. On the contrary, they have often been instruments of the politicisation of religion, which has polluted the mind of the people with falsehoods many of which are propagated through social media.

To remedy this, religious leaders should align their religious messages with the social and political goals of the state. They should champion among their members those things that foster inter-religious unity rather than division.

Mass media (including social media)

Social media have revolutionised communication and work as well as social and political behaviour. However, they lack almost completely the gate-keeping function that governs information flow on traditional media, resulting in unprofessional and unethical conduct such as the flagrant invasion of privacy. This situation is compounded by the absence of definite policy on social media platforms regarding on-line bullying, spamming, advertisement pop-ups, and intellectual property theft (except on Facebook).

This near-complete absence of regulation on social media lends them both tremendous strengths and serious weaknesses.

On the one hand, they enable the extremely fast dissemination of information and thus the mobilisation of thousands of people within minutes. For example, it was the dissemination on social media of 26-year-old Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia that triggered the 2010 Arab Spring after decades of repression, corruption, and mismanagement. Just as citizens can use social media to demand state accountability so can governments too can take advantage of the low-cost and speed of information flows on social media to assess citizen satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their leadership. On the other, social media is a dangerous tool since it also can as easily facilitate the propagation of misinformation.

However, with the enhanced access and freedom of information that social media make possible come a duty of care in their use. The social media user must act with responsibility and respect, ensuring to verify information sourced on-line and uphold proper ethics in dealing with other users. The social media universe is like a trash-can. The onus is on the user to be careful in deciding what information to act on or disregard, to sort treasure from rubbish.

Government institutions

The government's performance in the political education of the citizens must improve. This cannot be achieved merely by running media campaigns but principally by the exemplary conduct, policies, and ideologies of political leaders. Such leadership has been lacking in Nigeria. In the face of a glaring national crisis, many of its leaders are concerned primarily with self-enrichment;

driven only by a primal need for power, they disdain political integrity and flit promiscuously from party to party.

Such visionless and unprincipled leadership has set the country back relative to its peers and rendered it unable to resolve the simplest of problems. For instance, there is little sense of national identity among Nigerians. Ethnic identities are far stronger than the national, and citizens consider themselves first Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, or of some other ethnicity, before Nigerian. Indigeneity is correspondingly stronger than citizenship. A family might migrate from one part of the country and settle in another, where for generations they live, marry, raise children, and bury their dead, and yet be regarded as non-indigene.

The Nigerian government has a duty to attend to such problems and the grievances of the populace, rather than ignore or cover them up. It must develop an approach to tackling them that is coherent and works for the good of all Nigerians. Finally, it must ensure consistency in its political messaging regarding these issues.

Conclusion

Two key conclusions from the foregoing are that:

1. Political education is vital for increased political participation by citizens; and
2. Social media are an important channel of political education.

Political education is vital: Political education is the preparation of citizens, especially the young ones, for participation in the political process. This participation involves taking part in governance, contributing to the development of the society, and protecting their rights from powerful interests. It is involvement in the processes of making, implementing, and monitoring the implementation of decisions as well as sharing in the benefits these processes. Such a politically-engaged citizenry recognises politics as an essential element of social life and is less vulnerable to negative influences in the political process. The government can benefit from this given that it is able to better harness the energies of the citizens to achieve social goals. As Nwankwo (2012 cited in Oladejo and Oni, 2017) has observed, however, the absence of effective participation by the people in matters affecting them is one of the basic problems confronting Nigeria's political system today.

Everyone requires good political education devoid of biases, sentiments, and manipulation. Such education is necessary so we can navigate through the internet maze and sift the useful from the useless in the mass of information

that flows through it. However, the political education of citizens is much more than political propaganda. It cannot be achieved merely by such tools of political propaganda as jingles, street spectacles, and political preaching. Political propaganda is an important element of any polity but cannot replace real political education. In contrast to the former, the latter is only effective when it is based on positive examples of conduct by the political leadership, when leaders serve as positive models for citizens. Also, political education is neither a single act (or the product of such an act) nor is it a state of affairs achieved in a single leap. It is, rather, a slow and continuous process of orientation that produces the whole-hearted internalisation of new values pertaining to every sphere of activity.

Social media are important tools: The emergence and development of social media are an instance of the perpetual human drive to invent solutions to problems, be these in the social, economic, or political spheres. These media, which facilitate the production and communication of information, are here to stay. Alongside the broad category of information technologies of which they are a part, they have permeated and play increasingly vital roles in education, economy, and politics. The task then is to use social media more effectively as instruments of political education. On-line political communication should not be an end in itself but a means to some real-life political goal—such as the political education of the citizenry.

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Chapter 34 | Political Education and Political Miseducation in the Age of Social Media

A. G. Umar Kari

Introduction

Pacho (2014) argues that politics governs our lives in society. It affects many aspects of our daily activities, particularly our interactions with others and responsibilities as citizens. It determines our social roles and statuses, regulates what we read, say, and watch, and significantly impacts almost everything that happens (or does not) in our community. Politics literally presides over us from birth to death.

Politics lurks around or features in most of what we do or not. It is a ubiquitous and inescapable feature of human social existence.

Most societies teach their members the ways, methods, essence, and manifestations of politics because of its immense importance. Political education is a compulsory element of their socialisation processes, which they perform through formal and informal socialisation agents: the family, peer groups, religious bodies, schools, the media, etc.

Schools and the mass media play a crucial role in political education. The former perform that role through the top-down transmission of knowledge from teachers to learners in a formal setting; i.e., they give political education directly in the classroom. They do this through a curriculum that includes civics, citizenship, government and governance, political history, comparative and contemporary politics, etc. The media perform their political education function by means that include messaging, news and features, programming, commentary, infotainment, audience discussion, advocacy, etc.

Recently, the emergence and increasing influence of the so-called new or social media has raised the media's role in political education to an unprecedented level. These new media present unique features that allow anyone to participate in conversations and even claim expertise in any subject. Those features include easy accessibility, user-friendliness, wide reach, almost unfettered freedom, etc. Social media thrive in robust and unregulated exchanges.

Political education sometimes slides into a crisis, as we are experiencing in the age of social media. Much of what emerges from social media sites today is pure political miseducation. It is unpleasant, unhelpful, deleterious, and injurious, the substance of negative socialisation. The information they disseminate misleads people and threatens the social fabric; it is antithetical to healthy political education and unhelpful to the citizen and the polity. Half-truths and outright falsehood, fake news, hate speech, propaganda in the garb of fact, fallacious and unverified claims, and down-right mischief hold sway on social media.

This paper briefly discusses the twin phenomena of political education and political miseducation, particularly on social media. It considers the rationale, sources, and solutions to political miseducation on those platforms, given that these questions bear directly on the growth and consolidation of democracy.

Conceptual clarifications

In this section, we explore the key concepts in this paper.

Politics

Etymologically, politics derives from the Greek word *polis,* which denotes *city-state*. Aristotle was reportedly the first scholar to use the word regarding the political organisation and administration of the Greek city-states of his day (Oyediran, 1998). Appadorai (2004) posits that politics deals with the state or political society, i.e., people organised for law within a defined territory. Therefore, politics is a state-centred phenomenon. The conception of politics today is broader and more complex, and centres on the struggle for power and influence. Thus, Nnoli (1986) defines it as "comprising all those activities [that] are directly or indirectly associated with the seizure of state power… [its] consolidation… and… use…." Lasswell (1980) posits that it is the determination of "who gets what, when and how." Similarly, Dyke (1965) argues that politics is the struggle between actors pursuing conflicting desires on public issues. This conception overlaps Easton's (1965) of it as the authoritative allocation of values in society, values being things that people desire to enable them to live comfortably.

Politics refers to the art or science of administrating states or other political units (Jones, 2003). However, its definition is in dispute. Durrel (1997) defines it broadly as the competition for and control over resources to achieve desired ends, those resources including human conduct. However, Boaz (2003: 24)

sees it as "the process by which communities pursue collective goals and deal with their conflicts authoritatively, by means of government." Charles (2003: 423) avers that politics occurs where people disagree about the distribution of resources and have some procedure for resolving their disagreement.

These submissions establish that politics pertains to:

1. Civil affairs and the state;
2. Human conflict and its resolution;
3. Sources and exercise of power;
4. Resource allocation.

All these bear directly on the issues under discourse.

Political education

Political education is "the cultivation of the virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation" (Gutman, 1987).

Tocqueville, a famous 19th-century philosopher, contended that the means of civic education, especially democratic education, should include formal and informal agencies.[1]

Political education is the continuous transmission of political culture across generations by which people acquire the political knowledge and skills that are essential for effective citizenship. It has a broad scope that is subject to debate and change. Rothe (1999) lists its aims as:

1. Developing and strengthening liberal democratic awareness;
2. Enhancing the citizen's understanding of the basic task of politics as being to solve problems by introducing binding decisions on contentious issues;
3. Imparting basic knowledge of the crucial political issues (including democracy and the threats to it) and the relationship between the economy and the ecology;
4. Equipping citizens with civic skills, such as how to access and assess information and use the mass media.

Gbue (2014) identifies them as including:

1. Transmitting understanding of the main political institutions (parliament,

1. The formal agencies include schools and the informal, families, communities, libraries, houses of worship, workplace, civic organisations, unions, sports teams, campaigns and elections, mass media, etc.

government, elections and voting, political parties) and the functioning of the political decision-making process;
2. Promoting basic knowledge of the most important political issues;
3. Teaching information, mass media, and communication skills, etc.

Several agents influence political education or socialisation. Political education is a conscious act and can only take place through agents and institutions, including the family, school, political parties, and governmental and non-governmental institutions. The family is the bedrock of a child's political education and determines the extent of their interest in political affairs. Many countries include political education in the school curriculum. The curriculum in Nigeria includes social studies, government, civic education, and citizenship education. Political parties also create political awareness through debates, campaigns, rallies, symposia, etc.; and the Nigerian government has established agencies for citizenship education, including the National Orientation Agency. The mass media (including social media) also play a significant role.

Political miseducation

The *Collins English Dictionary* defines miseducation as "wrong or deficient education", and the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* "poor, wrong or harmful education." Therefore, miseducation is education that misleads the student to accept erroneous information; it is deficient education in substance and veracity.

Thus, political miseducation refers to negative political socialisation. It comprises all categories of false or inadequate knowledge about politics and the political realm that agents (individuals, organisations, governments, etc.) propagate, teach, or peddle.

These agents sometimes deliberately undertake political miseducation to achieve particular goals. In such cases, political miseducation is a conscious, organised effort to indoctrinate, misinform, or brainwash target groups and individuals: youths, women, consumers, students, voters, believers, etc. That is where mainstream and social media play a harmful role.

Social media

Social media are web-based tools and services that allow users to create, share, and search for content and information without logging on to a specific portal. These tools have become "social" in that they enable users to share and communicate with one another; they facilitate social interaction, using highly

accessible and scalable publishing techniques. They transform monologues into dialogues.

These media comprise all new media technologies that offer interactive sharing of information through videos, pictures, and text. They include websites such as Twitter, Facebook, Myspace, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, and Blogs. Others are 2go, Badoo, WhatsApp, Ebundy, Nimbuzz, Sisters Zone, Skype, etc. These social media channels serve effectively in facilitating communication globally and locally. Facebook, for example, has today gained global prominence as the leading platform for the sharing of audio-visual and textual messages.

In 2004, Harvard student Mark Zuckerberg created Facebook to enable him to connect with fellow students. Initially adopted by high school and college students, the social network has grown to 845 million active users worldwide, according to its 2012 initial public offering filing. With approximately 161 million active monthly users in the U.S., it is the premier social media service in the world. If Facebook were a country, it would be the third-largest behind China and India. Launched in July 2006, Twitter, an online social networking and micro-blogging service, has exceeded 300 million users as of 2011, according to account tracker Twopcharts. It allows users to exchange photos, videos, and messages of one hundred and forty characters or fewer. Founded in 2005 by Steve Chen and Chad Hurley, YouTube provides a distribution forum for videos of everything from cute kittens sleeping and first-run television programmes to political protests.

Part of the attraction of these "Big Three" social media services is that anyone, with little or no computer skills, can use them. They can create and access content with only a smartphone, and they can interlink such content. They can embed in blogs links to videos on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. A Twitter post can appear on a Facebook page. In other words, users can reach many people easily and inexpensively via different services.

Theoretical framework

This paper employs the theory of political culture, whose proponents include David Sills, Gabriel Almond, Bingham Powell, Sydney Verba, and Lucien Pye. Eminue (2001) defines political culture as the knowledge or beliefs that citizens have about government. Almond and Verba (1965) view it as the individual's political orientations and attitudes toward the political system and their role in it. Indeed, political culture pertains to individual attitudes and

orientations towards the political system. Dowse and Hughes (1972), borrowing from the works of Talcott Parsons, posit that political culture comprises three internalised orientations. These are the cognitive (the citizen's knowledge about the political system), the affective (their sense of involvement in or alienation from it), and the evaluative (their assessment of it).

Almond and Verba (1965) identified three types of political culture: the parochial, subjective, and participant. Citizens fall under one of these cultures according to their knowledge, feelings toward, and evaluation of the political system. Those under a parochial culture have little knowledge of the existence and operation of the political system and expect little from it. Citizens under a subjective culture have some awareness that their political participation is important, and the government is legitimate. However, they are mostly apolitical because leaders impose public policies, causing citizens to lose faith in the political system's ability to provide for them. The participant political culture is the ideal type. Citizens know how to influence policy and do; they participate actively in the formulation of public policy and implementation.

Theoretically, political education is a function of political culture; thus, the political education or miseducation that citizens receive depends on the latter.

Social media: Agents of education or miseducation?

Social media perform most of the functions of mainstream media. Like the radio, television, and print media, they are agents of socialisation, purveyors of news and information, and sources of education and entertainment. They are potent means of social mobilisation, persuasion, and marketing; they set the agenda of public discourses and mould opinion.

According to Gbue (2014), social media allow users to share audio-visual messages within seconds with the click of a button. Therefore, they can facilitate political education and the sharing of information about political parties and their candidates, policies and programmes, and activities.

Rita (2012) observes that social media can transform individuals and give them new competencies that empower them politically. Yeoh (2012) agrees, noting that voters rely on the internet–and social media networks–to help them understand political parties and their positions on social issues. Thus, these media can serve as tools for electoral education. They can help educate voters about political parties, their candidates, and manifestos, thus facilitating their participation in democratic governance.

Empirical studies over the years leave little doubt that social media content

influences the socialisation, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of young people. Dwyer (2006), cited in Lewis (2010), posits that youths use social networking to maintain relationships with friends. Udende and Adisa (2010), cited in Gbule (2012), found a high level of social media use by students. They conclude that the emergence of Facebook and other discussion forums facilitating debate among Nigerians more than ever, especially youths. More voices are joining conversations about a wider range of social issues.

The interactivity of social media tools has moved communication from the delayed feedback that characterised traditional mass media to instantaneous dialogue. Teens and young adults are among the first to adopt these easily accessible tools; therefore, they are presumably among the most knowledgeable about their use (Lorretto, 2009).

A growing consensus is that social media have successfully integrated into mainstream culture and the lives of many people, especially youths. They are rich, readily available sources of diverse news, information, infotainment, and opinion.

The major positive uses of social media in political education include:

1. *Enhanced connectivity between and among citizens*. It is easier with social media than conventional media to reach friends, associates, and the public: it is faster (it takes just seconds) and cheaper. About 25 million Nigerians are on Facebook alone (Olorunyomi, 2018, cited in Ibrahim, 2018). This allows the easy and faster exchange of political ideas and information;
2. Social media is an enormous fountain and reservoir of knowledge and ideas on many subjects, including politics and democracy. It is much easier to use social media to access rich and useful knowledge and ideas necessary for political education. Some social media sites are rich sources of educative information, insights, news, documents, and data on politics and other subjects;
3. These media are convenient platforms for discussions, debates and controversies, which often border on political education. Such exchanges and encounters often enrich the awareness and competencies of those who partake in them;
4. Political parties and activists increasingly use social media as platforms for campaigns and advocacy. The voter's knowledge about electoral candidates comes chiefly from their social media profiles and portrayals;
5. Social media are full of diverse and illuminating perspectives on political issues and personalities that can influence public opinion about them;

6. These media often showcase the talent and creativity of users in the quality of dialogues and interactions and the videos, pictures, and texts they share. Politics becomes aesthetics, making it attractive and educative.

Social media are equally potent agents of political miseducation. This aspect of their power sometimes dwarfs their positive impacts. Gbule (2012) observes that Nigerian youths use these media massively. However, most use them more for social interaction than political education. Udende and Adisa (2010) found in their study of their use among undergraduates at a Nigerian university that most used social media for gossip, idle chatting and rumour-peddling!

Studies have also discovered that social media are sources of fake news, propaganda, and misinformation (Williamson, 2016 in Gbule, 2014). They also facilitate crime and deviance. This is a classic case of education dysfunction.

Evidence of the miseducation role of social media includes:

1. Some social media sites are bottomless pits of rubbish and foul materials, offering and encouraging users to share content with repugnant ideas, obscenities, and inanities. These also belong in the classic miseducation dysfunction. The discussions on these sites can only possibly miseducate, because they do not rest on facts, strive for truth, or educate the user. Users often converse in unacceptable language and espouse similarly unacceptable perspectives. It is worse when discussions involve pictures and videos: users often throw restraint and civility to the dogs. Anything goes on social media, as users have complete discretion over the choice of materials to post. Scandals and tragedies naturally trend well. The worst materials may go viral and trend best for days!
2. Social media often generate polarisation. Some users do not aim to unite society but to instigate ferment, conflict, and social crisis. They manipulate racial, class, religious, ethnic, regional, and political sentiments. Dangerous posts rule the web, posts that aim for society to go up in flames and openly invite Armageddon. In a fractious polity such as Nigeria's, dangerous agitators and anarchists unleash centrifugal forces and strain the country's tenuous unity;
3. These media now and again become a battlefield for dangerous and unhelpful controversies that over-heat the polity rather than educate. The absence of regulation allows users to promote any idea or claim however tendentious or specious, without regard for facts and propriety.

Such exchanges only miseducate the participants;

4. Social media purvey hate speech. Some users recklessly profile and defame individuals, groups, and communities, sometimes as a part of a grand plan of public miseducation for political ends. A political concept, *post-truth*, has come into being and entered the global political lexicon. In the post-truth world, objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to personal belief and emotion. If you can strike the right emotional pitch with people, they will disregard any fact that challenges their belief. They will find "alternative facts" that support their belief (Ibrahim, 2018). For example, a backer of President Goodluck Jonathan hired the British company Cambridge Analytica to spread false stories about Muhammadu Buhari, his opponent in the 2015 presidential election. They produced a video replete with scary footage, making allusions to what would befall Nigeria should a prospective President Buhari introduce Sharia. According to Phil Howard, people disseminate "large volumes of fake news stories, false factoids, and absurd claims" over social media networks. Today, social media are replete with images of allegedly "Fulani herdsmen" carrying sophisticated weapons with which they kill innocent farmers in the Middle Belt and seize their land;
5. These media are fast becoming the most successful sources of public pedagogy around the world.[2] Miseducation sometimes pollutes public pedagogy on social media. Some of their contents peddle fake news, hate speech, obscenity, inanities, falsehood, and malice.

Recommendations

The following recommendations aim to enhance the use of social media as instruments of political education rather than miseducation:

1. *Self-censorship*: Social media users should be responsible. They should avoid creating or disseminating content that is injurious to public health and safety or offend public sensibilities. They should post only those that unite and elevate society and foster peace, tranquillity, and integration. Users should refrain from abusing their unfettered access to and use of social media;

2. *Public pedagogy* refers to informal education through popular culture, informal schools, public spaces, dominant cultural discourses, and intellectual and social activism.

2. We should learn to ask questions and accept nothing we read and see in social media without ascertaining their veracity and the credibility of their source;
3. Users should be careful about what they share on social media, even where it is factual and the gospel truth. They must persuade themselves that it is healthy and appropriate to share, lest they become liable to charges of defamation or miseducation;
4. *Limited censorship*: The avalanche of miseducation on social media necessitates some regulation. The government should criminalise some social media practices, without unduly abridging the inalienable rights to freedom of speech, opinion, thought, etc.;
5. Political education should be an integral component of school curricula at all levels and include such subjects as Government, Civic Education, History, etc.

Conclusion

Political education is a major requirement for political development and democratic consolidation. No polity can develop and prosper unless the citizens are sufficiently knowledgeable about government and their roles and responsibilities. Without political education, political miseducation fills the void with deficient political knowledge and attitudes, to the detriment of society.

The acquisition of political education, a lifelong process, should begin from the home. The older family members should acquaint the young ones with the right political values, norms, behaviours, and attitudes. The media, including social media, are also important agents of political education, although they can become agents of political miseducation.

Ultimately, it is the collective duty of all stakeholders in the democratic enterprise to ensure that citizens receive proper political education rather than miseducation. These include politicians, political parties, the electoral management body, the electorate, media practitioners, and social media users.

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Chapter 35 | Critical Thinking and Political Activism: The Role of Students in National Transformation

Ernest Ereke

Introduction

Research on political activism investigates how citizens participate in politics, what causes them to do so, and the consequences of the act. The early seminal works in the socio-psychological tradition established the standard paradigm: Almond and Verba (1963), Verba and Nie (1972), Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978).

Political activism is a function of the peculiarities of the society, with its challenges and limitations. For instance, scholars posit that various vices bedevil national politics in Nigeria. These include political corruption (Hanson, 2007; Isaac, 2005; Iyayi, 2004); godfatherism (Adeoye, 2009; Isaac, 2005; Ogbonmwan, 2005); and political assassination (Akasike and Ameh, 2013; Nwokolo, 2011). Others are favouritism (Anyanwu, 2010; Premium Times, 2012); gangsterism (Iyayi, 2004; Nwora, 2008; The Guardian, 2000); and unequal electoral competition (Behrendt-Kigozi, 2013; Olaniyi, 2011). Yet others are unfulfilled electoral promises (Kuku, 2013; Royal Times, 2012), unaccountability (Osakwe, 2011, Umar, 2005); political apathy (Agbaje in Alechen, 2012 and This Day, 2011), etc. These peculiarities have moulded political participation in Nigeria.

The role of students in national transformation has generated serious discussions recently. Uhunmwuangho and Oghator (2013) argue that Nigerian students spend more time indulging in anti-social behaviour than exploring the opportunities and challenges of their country in a rapidly changing world. The constructive attitudes of students in twentieth-century Nigeria are things of the past (Aghahowa, 2006). Society has finally realised that our students have negative attitudes because millions of them live in poverty, although they are university graduates and have received entrepreneurship training.

Thus, countries have made considerable efforts to address the ever-increasing needs of the student population. These include empowerment and programmes, services, and advocacy to enhance students' capabilities and

harness them for national transformation. This shows the importance of student participation in national transformation, this paper's subject.

Student participation in national transformation is a relevant subject because students are most of the world's population. Udensi et al. (2013) aver that their numerical strength is a rich resource for national development. Hence, experts argue, side-lining them renders achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) impossible, particularly regarding extreme poverty and hunger, child mortality, maternal health, and environmental sustainability. Excluding them from national development today will have dire global consequences for decades. This paper examines the rationale for expanding student participation in national development.

Conceptual clarifications

In this section, we explain the concepts of *politics*, *political activism,* and *national transformation*.

Politics

What is politics? Etymologically the term *politics* derives from two Greek words; *polis* = city and *techne* = art, skill, craft, or method. Thus, politics or *politike* means the art of governing a city. In Ancient Greece, the term *city* designates an organised territory under the jurisdiction of a state, e.g., Sparta, Athens, etc. That is why Plato and Aristotle speak of city-states as political territories. It is from "polis" that we derive our modern "word" politics (Mutiullah, 2015). Aristotle (384-322 BC) in his book *Politics* first used the term politics to refer to the affairs of a Greek city-state. Aristotle observed that "man by nature is a political animal." He meant that the essence of social existence is politics and that interactions between two or more people are political relationships.

Aristotle went further to observe thus:

> Whenever men seek to define their position in society or… attempt to achieve personal security from available resources and… try to influence others to accept their points of view, they find themselves engaged in politics. In this broad sense, everyone is a politician (Mutiullah, 2015).

The word *politics* has become dynamic and elastic today. Some authorities hold that politics pertain to the daily communal activities in which we all participate. Others, including Harold Lasswell, equate politics with the study

of power or influence and the influential. In fact, Lasswell defines it as "who gets what, when, how," underlining power as the major ingredient of politics.

Politics goes beyond the activity of political parties and politicians. Politics is a universal phenomenon. It is present in the family, mosque, church, trade union or any form of human organisation. Albeit to different degrees, politics involves the same elements: the struggle for power and influence, disagreement, negotiation, reconciliation, resolution, and consensus, etc. A husband is exercising power over his wife when he says: "You must stop wearing short dresses when we go out, otherwise you will cease to be my wife." He backs it with sanction. Conflict arises if she resists, which they may resolve by agreeing that she would stop wearing those dresses *and* he would stop smoking. That is politics at the micro-level. Politics reconciles conflict.

For politics at the macro-level, we may refer to the conflicts for power between political parties to determine governance in Nigeria's Second Republic. Their governance failures resulted in the subsequent military usurpation of power and the acquiescence of Nigerians in it. Similarly, the political events in Sudan could be an empirical example of politics at the macro level. Sudan, once regarded as the largest country in Africa in land mass, broke into two countries on 9 July 2011 after decades of conflict (Azazi, 2012).

Therefore, we may define politics in three ways: first, it is the study of the general principles of the formation and functioning of government. Second, it concerns people and their decision-making process. Third, politics is a social science that investigates the foundations of the state, the principles of government, social and economic programmes, international relations, and organisation (Kapur, 1981).

Political activism

Activism comprises efforts to promote, impede, or direct social, political, economic, or environmental reform or stasis with the desire to make improvements in society. Forms of activism range from letter-writing, campaigning, boycotts or preferential patronage, rallies, street marches, strikes, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and art activism (*artivism*). Research has explored how activist groups use social media to facilitate civic engagement and collective action.

Therefore, political activism comprises efforts to promote, impede, or direct social, political, economic, or environmental reform or stasis with the desire to make improvements in society for political reasons.

Pippa Norris (2009) defines "political activism" as "the ways that citizens participate, the processes that lead them to do so, and the consequences of these acts." The study of political participation draws on Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal work, *The Civic Culture.* In disciplinary terms, research on political activism sits at the intersections of political science and psychology.

Types of political activism

Types of political activism include the judicial, environmental, internet (technological), and design. Historically, most activism has focused on creating substantive changes in the policy or practice of a government or industry. Some activists try to persuade people to change their behaviour directly (see also direct action), rather than to persuade governments to change or not to change laws. Other activists try to persuade people to preserve the existing state of things, i.e., to counter change. For example, the cooperative movement seeks to build new institutions that conform to cooperative principles and rarely engages in lobbying or political protest.

Schuler (2008) suggests the "activist road trip," which merges activism and road trips into an activity that activists can undertake from the neighbourhood to the international level.

Activism is not an activity in which only professional activists engage. An *activist* is anyone who engages in activism or, more narrowly, practises it as a vocation. We describe the various forms of activism in the sections below.

Judicial and citizen activism

Judicial activism involves the efforts of public officials. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.—American historian, public intellectual, and social critic—introduced the term in a January 1946 *Fortune* magazine article titled "The Supreme Court: 1947." Activists can also be public watchdogs and whistle-blowers who attempt to hold the government and its agencies accountable to the people. Activism involves an engaged citizenry.

Environmental activism

Environmental activism includes the efforts of activists who align themselves with EarthFirst! or Road Protesters. Local communities fighting to stop the sale of, or erection of buildings on, a park or green are part of a broader conservationist goal. The world witnesses over one hundred assassinations of environmental activists yearly. A Global Witness report found at least one

hundred and sixteen cases in 2014 and one hundred and eighty-five in 2015.

Internet activism

Activists have used the internet since the 1990s for mobilisation and communication. Specific platforms like MoveOn.org, founded in 1998, allow individuals to establish petitions and movements for social change. Protesters in Seattle in 1999 used email to organise protests against the WTO Ministerial Conference. Throughout the 2000s, protesters continued to use social media platforms to generate interest.

The Arab Spring protests brought the power of internet activism to global attention. Participants in the Middle East and North Africa used social media to communicate with each other and disseminate information about their struggles to an international audience.

Internet activists use different means to avoid political persecution, such as the Tor browser (which uses the Tor network to protect users' identity, IP address, network, or location). They also employ data encryption tools and encrypted mail to prevent governments or anyone else from intercepting their communications.

Design activism

"Design activism" occurs across communities of practice and practitioners often associate it with initiatives such as transition movement, speculative design, design futuring, activist systems, and bio-politics. By one definition, it is "design thinking, imagination, and practice applied… to create a counter-narrative aimed at generating and balancing positive social, institutional, environmental and/or economic change."

Instruments of political activism

Activists employ a wide range of methods, including agitation, art, civil disobedience, community building, conflict transformation, cooperative movement, *craftivism*, grass-roots, guerrilla gardening, voluntary simplicity, demonstration, dissident, and economic activism. Others are boycott, freeganism, veganism, vegetarianism, consumer activism, divestment, simple living, tax resistance, franchise activism, lobbying, media activism, culture jamming, hacktivism, internet activism, non-violence, peace activism, and petitioning. Yet others are political campaigning, propaganda, guerrillaism, protest demonstration, direct action, protest songs, sit-ins, social change

theatre, religious activism, strike actions, youth activism, student activism, and atheist activism.

National transformation

National transformation is historically crucial to the formation, growth, and demise of nations (Oghi and Ajayi, 2011). The building of the diverse peoples in a country into a nation is also part of national transformation (Wallenstein, 1961). Therefore, national transformation involves not only the implementation of political and economic policies to improve the lives of citizens. It is also a recognition of values and other aspects of the state that foster nation-building (Elaigwu, 1983). Culture—i.e., a people's way of life—is crucial to national transformation because it counters the fissiparous tendencies in society.

Irele (1999) defined national transformation as "the process whereby people transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages, or petty principality to the larger central political system." National transformation is also definable as bringing diverse groups together to develop their common land.

Eme and Onyishi (2014) note that it aims to unify the people within the state to make it politically stable and viable in the long run. It can employ propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and economic growth. It is also the development of behaviours, values, language, institutions, and physical structures that protect national identity and independence. We view national transformation as purposeful intervention to change a nation-state's governance and enhance its people's well-being and social equity.

The situation of students in Nigeria

National transformation is a dynamic process involving all segments of the locality, including the often-overlooked student population. Students represent a vast and often untapped resource for immediate and long-term community development efforts. They also provide an invaluable resource for the progress and development of any society. Students participate actively and contribute to decision-making at multiple levels when the country brings them into national issues and programmes (from which Nigeria often excludes them). Developing positive relationships between them, stakeholders, and national development programmes may enhance their skills, empower them,

and build their confidence. That will prepare them for active involvement in national transformation.

The population of Nigerians between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four, who are majorly students, was about 30 million in 1991, i.e., one in every three citizens. The projection was that this population would be about 38 million in 2000 (National Student Policy, 2001). The 2006 national population and housing census indicated that the student population had risen to 53 million (NPC, 2006). Besides the growing share of students in the national population, the global trend is towards emphasising the primacy of students in development. National governments are creating conditions to encourage them to utilise their energies and resourcefulness for the growth and sustainable development of their nations. Hence, the National Association of Nigerian Students maintained in their memorandum to the last National Political Reform Conference that:

> [The] Nigerian student must… play [a] greater role in leadership and governance, so that… he is properly equipped to assume the mantle of leadership, which inevitably must come someday (National Political Reform Conference, 2005:15).

However, the prevailing conditions in much of the developing nations, especially Nigeria, have seriously extenuated the potentials of the students as agents of social change. These challenges range from the economic and social to the cultural. The treacherous triangle of poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment has undermined the reasoning of Nigerian students and engendered in them a fatalistic resignation to their situation (Haralambos, 2001). The persistence of these social problems has created an environment where students are cheaply available for manipulation by self-seeking politicians. Poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment reduce people to destitution.

The students become reservoirs of pent-up emotions and untapped energies as they remain in this state. After graduation, they provide cheap labour to execute the design of political gladiators and ethnic champions, especially during leadership recruitment processes. Togbolo (2006) indicts Nigerian politicians thus: "They take advantage of [Nigeria's poverty] to exploit [its people]; politicians [exploit student restiveness] as a political strategy to have their way."

The importance of student involvement in national transformation

According to Gribble (2010), more than half of the world's population is

between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four years and in the greatest need of empowerment. Those who are younger will quickly come of age and share this same need. The fifteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds will grow faster than other population segments for at least twenty more years (Gribble, 2010). With the swelling wave of young people, access, empowerment, and their engagement in national transformation become critical if they are to contribute effectively.

Uhunmwuangho and Oghator (2013) suggested two principal factors that have put students on the policy agenda of national governments. The first is the global process of democratisation, beginning in Southern Europe, extending to Latin America, Asia and Africa, and Eastern Europe (Almond, 2004). The second is globalisation, which has challenged the capacity of nation-states to govern and, according to Heady et al., embodies a transformation of social relations (Heady, 1979). The combination of these factors has dismantled authoritarian regimes and rekindled the spirit of civil society in the political process (Suleiman, 2006). Students, as an important component of civil society, are undergoing self-rediscovery in an era of democratisation and globalisation. They are engaging with relevant political institutions and political processes to articulate their views and promote shared interests (Suleiman, 2006).

By equipping them with good decision-making skills, education positions students to participate effectively in national development.

Student activism and national transformation

It is impossible to tap the capacities of students without an all-inclusive, participatory approach. Therefore, involving them in national transformation is necessary. Student participation is the involvement of students in responsible, challenging action that meets genuine needs and provides them with opportunities for planning and decision-making that impact others (Cornwall, 2010).

Rajani (1999) notes that it is only through participation that students develop skills, build competencies, form aspirations, gain confidence, and attain valuable resources. This shows that student participation is a product and strategy of sustainable human development and national development.

Students, especially youths, comprise nearly 30% of the world's population. Therefore, they represent an opportunity and resource for their countries. Their participation in national transformation:

1. Strengthens young people's abilities to meet their own subsistence needs;
2. Prevents and reduces vulnerabilities to economic, political and socially

unstable environments;
3. Promotes ownership and sustainability of change interventions;
4. Helps gain entry into target communities and build up trust and social capital.

We offer the following recommendations towards building a student body that can help reposition the state for national transformation:

1. Nigerians must build a society and education system that produce responsible leadership and mutual respect and tolerance;
2. Governments and school managements should speedily resolve student issues affecting the student unions on campus by management and government. They should view unions as partners rather than adversaries (David, 2013);
3. Student union leaders should have representation in committees of the institution to democratise decision-making (Olayiwola, 1999);
4. Seminars and workshops on leadership training will enhance organisational effectiveness in tertiary institutions;
5. Being the voice of the student community, they should strive to instil discipline among students;
6. Government should increase the funding of Tertiary institutions to boost infrastructures on campuses;
7. Students union leaders should be alive to their constitutional responsibilities, including the organising of social and sporting activities, providing services, and protecting student well-being;
8. Union Executives must be exemplary in their actions, conduct free and fair elections, and be accessible, transparent, and objective;
9. They must embrace dialogue and negotiation in addressing issues with school management and deploy time-lines to stimulate responses. Violent protest should be the last resort;
10. Student union leaders must be astute, fearless, and courageous but civil in demanding the rights of students;
11. They must work with the leaders of other unions to cross-fertilise ideas and build solidarity.

Conclusion and recommendations

Nigeria, of whose 180 million people students constitute over 50%, cannot afford to exclude students from national development—not if it wishes to be competitive continentally and globally. It can build a strong nation only if its

people share common values, beliefs, attitudes, and a will to live together as a nation. That transformation requires that every group, especially student, participate in the economy, polity, and society.

Hence, we recommend that:

1. Students should have the opportunity to develop their capacities through balanced education and exposure;
2. Skills acquisition and entrepreneurship will help reduce idleness among students and keep them from being involved in crime and other activities that are counter-productive in national transformation;
3. Society should involve students in leadership and governance;
4. We must moderate our demands on our students and condition their behaviour in line with our cultural values;
5. Society should encourage students to know their rights and the implication of their actions and that they do not have to give bribes to get their entitlements;
6. The universities should fight cultism by encouraging the formation of elitist social clubs on campus to impart positive socialisation to students and train them in leadership.

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Chapter 36 | Critical Thinking and Political Activism: The Role of Students and Youths in National Transformation and Development

Magdalene Igbolo

Introduction

Governments, leaders, and policy-makers in Africa and Nigeria are wrestling with the challenge of providing employment for over 200 million youths so that they can live decently and productively. Estimates put Africa's 2010 population above 1 billion, with a growing youth contingent that accounts for most of it. The youth population is over 70% of the population of those thirty years or younger (United Nations, 2010). In 2011, youths aged fifteen to twenty-four constituted 21% of the over 1 billion African population, and another 42% was less than fifteen years old. Slightly more than half of the African youth population was female, and the continent had more rural than urban dwellers. This large body of youths suggests that Africa's population will probably continue to grow into the future, while projections are that those of the industrialised societies will shrink. (Brempong and Kimenyi, 2013).

The challenges facing African and Nigerian youths are many: unemployment, underemployment, political exclusion, insecurity, the lack of capacity, financial resources, and access to healthcare, etc. These issues differ between groups and among countries by gender, ethnicity, educational level, income, and health status. Thus, the innovativeness, dynamism, and size of the youth population are potential assets for development if African governments establish policies to resolve the issues facing them. These governments are aware of the challenges (Brempong and Kimenyi, 2013; Igbolo, 2017; Odoh and Emeh, 2014). However, several countries—including Nigeria—still have not developed comprehensive policies to deal with them effectively.

The role of students and youths in national transformation has generated debates. The students and youths are important in national transformation, considering that they comprise the vast majority of the world's population. The numerical strength of the youth is an unlimited avenue to which the social, economic, and political development of any country can thrive. Thus,

sidelining the youths makes development impossible. That is especially so regarding the Sustainable Development Goals on reducing extreme poverty, hunger, and child and maternal mortality, and environmental sustainability.

Therefore, we cannot overemphasise the role of the students and youths in national transformation. The burden of national development of any nation falls on the shoulders of young productive people. That is because they are the engine of growth and transformation and provide the labour force for the production of goods and services. They are the critical mass whose actions and inactions can develop or destroy the fabric of society. Thus, this population is a great asset for Nigeria if it harnesses its strength productively. The transition from one generation to the next is critical for the development of society. Hence, a society that develops its youths both secures its future and prepares its next generation of leaders. However, this has been difficult in Nigeria. Many of its energetic and creative young people are unemployed, in poor health, and lack support because of its defective social, political, economic, and educational systems. No nation can develop if the bulk of its population is idle.

Conceptual clarification

This section defines the operative elements of this paper's topic and establishes their relationships. These elements are:

1. Thinking and critical thinking
2. Political activism
3. The role of students
4. National transformation

Thinking and critical thinking

Thinking is the examination, analysis, contemplation, assessment, or understanding of events, phenomena, problems, situations about which data or evidence is available. Its processes, results, or conclusions depend on our personal experiences and social environment or the experiences of others (literature, history, religion). Critical thinking differs from non-critical thinking in that the latter does not query the premises, procedures, or substance of received knowledge. Some individuals and groups are so accustomed to their processes, data, and conclusions that they believe no alternatives exist. Therefore, critical thinking requires exposure through literature, contending opinions, travel, etc.

Political activism

Politics is the power to determine the allocation of society's resources: what to allocate, how much, to whom, where, and when. It is the manifestation of a society's economic relations. Political activism is the support of or opposition to decision-makers or decision-making. It may be altruistic (in the public interest) or derive from private or group interests. The first improves society, but the second breeds corruption and dependency.

The role of students

Students are people whose primary engagement is learning, the acquisition of knowledge merely to understand phenomena or to solve problems.

The problem of national transformation in the peripheries of neo-liberal globalisation has local, class and international dimensions. Nigeria's crisis produces profits and other benefits for certain international and local class forces and loss, disadvantages, and trauma for most working people.

As heirs to the crisis and committed intellectuals, students must seek the truth about Nigeria's situation to liberate the country's people. The purpose of all intellectual work is the liberation of the people. Sufficient information is in the public domain to enable us to interrogate dominant paradigms about who we are, why we are where we are, and how to transcend both. It is necessary to interrogate and overthrow the paradigm canvassed by national and international ruling circles.

Nigerian students have a long history of doing this. It was the students of King's College, Lagos, who called the rally where Nigerian nationalists formed the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. In the early 1960s, University of Ibadan students mobilised against and stopped the proposed defence pact between Britain and the newly independent Nigeria. The NANS mobilised all students in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s against the commercialisation of education. The organisation also produced a Charter of Demands in 1982, with elements that were like some in the Nigeria Labour Congress' Workers Charter for the 1981 general strike. By 1984, the student movement had built the quasi-political Patriotic Youth Movement of Nigeria that mobilised students and the public against the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programme. This movement worked closely with the labour movement throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, the strength of NANS and other youth and student movements has ebbed because of state repression and internal political wrangling.

National transformation

Scholars disagree over the definition of "transformation." (Okolie and Ajih, 2008). Development also has had competing meanings since the 1960s. The modernisation paradigm viewed development as the transformation of pre-modern societies into formations like those of Western "advanced," prosperous, and stable nations (Moore 1963:89). It saw the future of the developing world as already existent as the advanced societies of Europe and the United States (Aiyede, n.d.).

Modernisation theorists (Rostow, 1960; Coleman, 1968; and Pye, 1966; among others) conceptualise development primarily as economic growth and structural transformation. A country is developing when, from stagnation, its gross national product sustainably grows yearly at least 5% and benefits all social segments (Todaro and Smith, 2004, cited in Nwanegbo, 2006). Several other schools of thought later challenged this view, not on the goal of development but the achievability of the parameters that the modernisation school defined. For the modernisation school, development was achievable by the application of rational management techniques and planning.

However, scholars like seers (1969, 1977), Mabogunje (1981:6), Nnoli (1981), Ake (1972), Rodney (1982), Okolie (2001, 2003) among others disagree with the modernist perspective. They contend that modernists gloss over human factors as critical issues in development. These scholars perceive people as an essential ingredient in development. However, others perceive man as both the object and subject of development.

Okolie (2003) conceives development as the human-directed and propelled improvement of the self and the socio-economic and political structures of society. The primary objective of this transformation is the improvement of the living conditions and material standing of the citizenry. Thus, the UNDP (2004) avers that people are the real wealth of nations. The expansion of human freedom is the basic purpose of development, by expanding the range of choices available to enable people to live full and creative lives. People are both the beneficiaries and agents of change (UNDP, Human Development Report 2004:127). This conceptualisation of development sets the context of our discussion of the role of Nigerian youths in national transformation and development.

National transformation and development

We must begin with an understanding of national transformation. Human

conditions are in constant transformation. Some transformations improve the lives of most people and create conditions for social harmony. Others create fabulous wealth and comfort for a small minority and poverty, squalor, and hopelessness for the rest. The latter has happened in Nigeria over the last four decades.

The term national transformation/development refers to the sustainable growth and development of a nation into a more desirable one. National transformation is people-oriented and only successful if it improves the conditions of the masses. In defining the concept, the Third National Development plan of 1980 says:

> True development/transformation must mean the development of man, the unfolding and realisation of his creative potentials, enabling him to improve his material conditions of living through the use of resources available to him. It is a process by which man's personality is enhanced, and it is that enhanced personality that is creative, organised and disciplined-which is the moving force behind the socio-economic transformation of any society (FGN, 1980).

Accordingly, Onabajo and M'Bayo (2009) say "national transformation and development should be man-oriented and not institution-oriented, that is, individually in collectiveness and not individual." To Elugbe (1994), "national transformation refers, among other things, to the growth of the nation in terms of unity, education, economic well-being, and mass participation in government." In summary, development entails providing the necessities that guarantee a livelihood and meaningful life.

Anaeto and Anaeto (2010, citing Todaro and Smith, 2003) identified three objectives of transformation/development:

1. Increase availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health, and protection;
2. Raise levels of living and incomes, provide more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and human values. These will enhance material well-being and generate more individual and national self-esteem;
3. Expand the socio-economic choices available to individuals and the nation by freeing them from servitude, dependence, ignorance, and misery.

A truly transformed society guarantees the socio-cultural, political,

economic, and spiritual well-being of its people. A developed state provides a good quality of life and protects all human rights and the freedom to participate in the democratic process. Thus, transformation or development implies an improved quality of life, equity, and justice, as it considers the well-being, growth, and advancement of people.

Students, youths and political development

We make certain assumptions in discussing the role of youths in contemporary political participation and development (Suleiman, 2006). First, we assume that a significant portion of the youth population is well-informed and politically conscious. Second, the youths are organised and have well-defined objectives and various legitimate ways to participate in the political process. Third, the political system accommodates robust citizen participation in governance. It is debatable whether Nigerian meets these conditions. Over nineteen years of democratisation has allowed civil society actors to partake in the political process (Bornstein, 2005).

A recent report on government-civil society partnership in Nigeria observed that: "Civil society groups are reaching out and trying to work with various government agencies and parastatals in efforts to build their capacity for service delivery and be accountable to the citizens" (Chukwuma, 2005).

Given this opportunity, Nigeria youths now must redefine their role in the political process. The National Youth Policy might help in this. Its preamble states:

> The present administration, having given due consideration to the significance of the youths in socio-political, economic and sustainable development, has found it most desirable, necessary and urgent to initiate this National Youths Development Policy so that there will be a purposeful, focused, well-articulated and well-directed effort aimed at tapping the energy and resourcefulness of the youths and harnessing them for vitality, growth, and development of the country well into the 21st century (National Youths Political Reform Conference, 2005:17).

Thus, we must accord a top priority to creating an enabling environment for the youths to bring their productive capacity and resourcefulness to bear on politics and development. Given this environment, Suleiman (2006) defines the following as the political and development roles of Nigerian youths. First, youths should parade themselves as agents of political socialisation. We mean by political socialisation the formation of political values and diffusion of

political culture in society. This process ultimately determines the individual's political attitudes and, thus, how citizens collectively form their political culture (Almond, 1963). Nigeria's level of political culture is inadequate to support democracy because of over two decades of military dictatorship that militarised civil society and perverted civic life (Osha, 2000).

Youths often provide the workforce for general elections in Nigeria. They should leverage this to insist on due process and fair play, rather than allow selfish politicians to use them as thugs to pervert elections. Also, Nigeria has an array of youth organisations. They can explore the political space to influence decision-making. Recent studies have proved that:

> Unless young people are consulted and involved in the design of developmental strategies, [those strategies] are not… going to be youth-relevant or accurately (sic) factor in the contribution of youths to [the] national political and sustainable developmental process. [The] participation of young people in decision-making concerns more than integrating young peoples' issue into [the] existing policy paradigm (Amanda, 2003:6)

Active participation in governance at all levels, including the local government level, is another process through which youths can make their impact in the political and developmental process. The learning process that is so fundamental to political maturity must start from the grass-root. Grass-root politics will enable youths to identify with the masses, appreciate their problems and master the terrain. Grass-root apprenticeship offers the best training for youths in a nascent democracy like Nigeria's, rather than serving as glorified "messengers" of greedy political godfathers (Suleiman, 2006).

Finally, given their vulnerability, youths have the greater responsibility to promote peace, security, stability, and national unity. They can build understanding across ethnic, political, and religious divides through political education and public enlightenment campaigns, policy advocacy, and active involvement in elections. Democracy and good governance can only thrive in an environment of peace, security, and stability. Their absence undermines democracy and good governance and compromises social progress and the future of the youths (Suleiman, 2006).

Challenges of students and youths in national transformation and development

The socio-economic and political environment in Nigeria poses a

monumental challenge to youths. Economic and social statistics present a sombre picture that leaves much to be desired. More than half a century after flag independence, the primary sector—agriculture, oil, and minerals—still dominates the economy. This is partly because the country has not created an environment for high value-added economic activities. Domestic capital formation is low and direct foreign investment declining except in the oil and gas sectors. Nigeria, until recently, was heavily indebted, has high unemployment rates, and a vast and expanding informal economy where most of its people live in poverty. Nigeria performs poorly in global economic competitiveness. The country lacks basic social and physical infrastructure. Consequently, most of the populace lack access to basic amenities: potable water, electricity, good sanitation, roads, and healthcare. Also, the country has a high illiteracy rate, especially among women and girls. The lack of access to basic medical care occurs against a backdrop of ravaging diseases, a situation that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has exacerbated.

Authoritarianism, political instability, ethnic and religious conflict have reinforced the country's underdevelopment in the last decade. More than a decade after the return to democratic rule, the political system excludes the people from governance. It also features public unaccountability, lack of transparency in decision-making, electoral fraud, and elite colonisation and personalisation of the state and national resources. This situation presents particular challenges for the Nigerian youths.

Youths should become part of Nigeria's economic growth and development for several reasons. First, they are more educated than their older compatriots. Therefore, they can better absorb new technologies and ideas and adapt them to the African environment. Second, they take more risks. Finally, they are more likely to challenge norms and socio-political practices that hinder economic development. The challenge to African/Nigerian policy-makers is how to harness young people's desire for change that has the potential to translate into positive outcomes.

The Arab Spring demonstrated that failing to develop and harness youth potentials can have dire consequences, including economic decline, armed conflict, and socio-political upheaval. Youths are more likely to become frustrated because of legitimate grievances, including a lack of employment opportunities, low educational attainment, little participation in decision-making and low social mobility. Opportunistic politicians could exploit these grievances to involve these frustrated youths in the violent overthrow

of legitimate governments. That could create massive instabilities that might hinder the economic growth of Africa's countries (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Unemployment and underemployment

Approximately 70 million young people are unemployed worldwide. The economic growth rate has been insufficient to create employment opportunities to absorb the about 500,000 that join the labour force annually. Only about 25% of youths found jobs, and some of these have jobs that do not match their qualifications and personal development goals.

Employment creation is a major challenge that confronts all African countries regardless of their different levels of socio-economic development. Youths in Africa account for 60% of total unemployment (ILO, 2010). Youth unemployment remains a security issue for Africa, driving youth crime and violence. Just as youths are instruments of democratisation and development, so they can be instruments of violence and crime, engaging in armed robbery, violent conflict, kidnapping, and electoral violence. That is happening in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, DR Congo and other African countries. The UNECA Report (2015) attests that countries with large youth populations, weak economies, and poor governance are more likely to experience outbreaks of rioting and internal armed conflicts. One in two young people who join a rebel group cites unemployment as their principal reason (ILO, 2010; Smepler, 2010; Winer, 2011).

Financial resources and security

Another youth challenge is the lack of finances and security. The high rate of unemployment means that poverty is also high because youths lack financial resources—a crucial limiting factor for them. The expensiveness of election campaigns disadvantages youths, as most of them are unemployed or otherwise unable to raise the required funds. Nigeria does not control campaign financing and expenditure, which breeds unfair competition between the youth and older members of society. Again the problems of intimidation and violence during campaigns scare most young people from presenting themselves for election. The violence is often among the youth themselves who have divergent opinions or supporting different candidates.

Lack of capacity

The lack of capacity and expertise is another barrier to effective youth engagement in leadership and decision-making. Their lack of knowledge

derives from the weakness of capacity-building programmes and poor planning by the leadership. Some believe that this is intentional because these leaders are afraid that highly skilled youths may surpass them and take over political leadership. Also, cultural prejudices hamper women politicians: some communities require them to marry before they can vie for public office.

No culture of positive engagement

Scholars often use concepts such as patrimonial culture, generational conflict, and authoritarian leadership to describe the barriers to youth participation in politics and leadership. That is because the leadership in some countries is almost permanent and excludes young people except as party youth leaders in party executives. The leadership controls decision-making and is rigid. Weak communication between the older leadership and the younger base of the society complicates the situation, leaving young people with the perception of their leadership as aged. Closely linked to the generational gap is the lack of a culture of positive engagement, which excludes young people from decision-making. Positive engagement is a two-way process that produces effective communication and information exchange. Instilling democratic practices in schools and universities is an important step to improving the culture of consultation and engagement.

Increasing drop-out rates

According to the United Nations, youths are under-educated. In the developing world, nearly one-third of youths are illiterate. In the least-developed countries, only 13% of girls and 22% of boys enrol in secondary education. Many youths drop out of school due to the high education costs and poverty levels and low returns on education investment. Another factor is the lack of a re-admission policy for teenage mothers.

Crime and deviant behaviour

Youths are frustrated. Evidence suggests that youths with few economic prospects and limited political voice are more inclined to be radical, fundamentalist, revolutionary, or to abuse drugs or commit suicide. Due to idleness, especially after formal education, the youths become restless and try anything. Some end up in crime or with deviant behaviour.

Abuse and exploitation

Owing to their vulnerability, many youths suffer sexual abuse, child labour, and other forms of economic exploitation, and the authorities afford them little protection.

Limited access to information and communication technology (ICT)

Youths become parents. Some 17 million women between fifteen and nineteen give birth every year and have more children than women who start childbearing later. The risk of birth complications is twenty-five times higher for girls under age fifteen and two times higher for those between ages fifteen to nineteen. Despite their numerical superiority, youths are the least represented in political and economic spheres due to societal attitudes, socio-cultural and economic barriers, and lack of proper organisation.

Limited access to information and communication technology (ICT)

The youths cannot take advantage of career, business, and education opportunities because they lack access to ICT.

The way forward: what should we do?

In recognition of these challenges, governments must resolve youth issues in Nigeria, Africa, and globally. At the global level, the UN Programme of Action for Youths should assist governments in the fifteen priority areas of the youth agenda. At the continental level, the African Union has adopted the African Youth Charter. The charter provides a framework for developing and implementing youth policies and programmes in key areas. These include employment, sustainable livelihood, education, health, youth leadership and political participation, peace, security, and enforcement. It also calls on governments to guarantee participation by young people in government and other decision-making bodies at the national and local levels.

Other key development areas include:

1. Approval of a plan of action to accelerate the ratification and implementation of the Nigerian youth charter;
2. Declaration of 2009-2019 as the decade for youth development;
3. Approval of a plan of action on the priority activities identified during the youth decade;
4. Establishment of youth networks to serve as a channel for youth

engagement and conveying youth perspectives (AU, 2011).

Also, the African Union's Agenda 2063 has promoted youth rights in Africa. It resulted from debates and consultations with youths, women, and Diaspora representatives during the 2013 OAU/AU 50th anniversary celebration in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Youths are a vital component of the Agenda, as it links the past, present, and future to create a new generation of Pan-Africanists. That generation will employ the lessons learnt over the years as building blocks to realise the aspirations of our founders and a true African renaissance.

Several countries are also making progress in developing appropriate policies and allocating more resources to youth concerns. Nevertheless, Nigerian youths still face numerous challenges, including unemployment, underemployment, the lack of skills, capacity, and education, and exclusion from leadership and decision-making. Above all, young women in Nigeria face barriers that have persistently excluded them from leadership and development.

Conclusion

More than half of the world's people are below twenty-five, but get little recognition for their important role in shaping the future. More than any other group, today's young people will impact how we will live. Unfortunately, hundreds of millions of them lack education, skills, job training, employment opportunities, and access to healthcare. That limits their prospects. Therefore, youths may inflict harmful actions upon themselves or society.

Some perceive youths as contributors to societal problems. Actually, they are important assets for Nigeria's economic, political, and social development. Addressing key issues such as poverty, unemployment, and political and social instability will protect their rights and enable them to contribute to society's well-being.

Recommendations

The role of students and youths in national transformation and development depends on the openness of the government and other institutions to youth concerns and interests. Youth participation in governance also depends on whether they perceive the political process and its outcomes as sufficiently expressing their contributions.Many global problems have a powerful impact

on youths, including poverty, unemployment, and frustration due to political disenfranchisement. Focusing on youths will substantially boost efforts by Nigeria and other nations. Therefore, this paper recommends:

1. Socialisation and sensitisation of the youth on politics and their roles in a democracy could lead to improvement in youth support and participation at all levels. One option is to intensify civic education and sensitisation campaigns among the youths on the importance of party membership and maintenance of party loyalty. Equally important is the political education of youths in the early years of life through formal and informal institutions, through school curriculum, the media, among other agents of socialisation.
2. Integrate youth capacity building programmes into the polity's strategic plan. This plan should include capacity-building programmes to enhance youth understanding of political processes and their capacity to articulate their needs and advocate for policy responses to them. The students and youths should be the opportunity to develop their capacities through balanced education and exposure.
3. Provide vocational capacity-building programmes to help the youths advance in their careers and overcome financial struggles that may impact their focus and dedication. Skills acquisition and entrepreneurship will help reduce idleness among youths and keep them from being involved in crime and other activities that are counter-productive to national transformation.
4. Increase communication with the young people as this will expose them to strategic development plans and challenges faced by those in leadership and politics.

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Part 11 | Corruption

Chapter 37 | Corruption and the Challenge of Public Disclosure: The Whistle-blower Perspectives

Margaret Bahal

Introduction

Whistleblowing has received growing attention in the last two decades as a tool for improving transparency and reducing corruption. This has been evident in the attempts to institutionalise it via whistle-blower legislation. These laws are an important part of the framework for anti-corruption measures in many developed and developing nations (Miceli and Near, 1992; 2010; Lewis, 2010). Key to this is the protections offered for individuals who wish to provide information to expose, prevent and reduce corruption in society and particularly in public life.

Corruption is among the most debilitating challenges facing Nigeria and an impediment to its development (Egwemi, 2010; Ajibewa, 2006; Orngu, 2006; Saliu and Aremu, 2004). The Nigerian civil war spawned a clique of military and political adventurers who ruined the Nigerian state through sophisticated corrupt practices (Achebe, 2011). A culture of anti-intellectualism, arising from the under-funding of Nigeria's education system, has worsened this situation and encouraged primitive accumulation by public officers. Corruption is a global problem, but its prevalence, gravity, and persistence vary by country. Its effects are always negative, as it hampers development and leaves its victims gasping for breath.

It requires immediate counter-measures; its dire impacts do not permit the postponement of such measures. That is why most countries have established institutions to tackle it. Corruption is a discussion topic in Nigeria at seminars and in committees, academia, and the media (Abdul-Ismail, n.d.; Egwemi, 2012; Odekunle, 1986; Ibrahim; 2003).

This is all to solve the problem, but corruption has defied every solution (Egwemi, 2007). Mundt and Aborishade (2004: 707) describe this intractability thus: "each… regime comes to power promising to eliminate the practice and punish offenders only to fall into the same pattern."

Corruption in Nigeria

Corruption is as old as civilisation itself and, in Nigeria, as old as the country (Aluko, 2009). Omotola traces it to colonialism. He argues that colonialism in Nigeria rested on corruption:

> … Because of the colonialist's corrupt disposition to exploit the state for their exclusive benefit, they liquidated social structure against corruption associated with pre-colonial Africa and replaced or transformed them to their own purposes (Omotola, 2006:217).

Charges of corruption against civil servants and police officers characterised the colonial era (Aluko, 2009). This colonial legacy carried into the independence period. In some of his novels (1960, 1966, 1988), Chinua Achebe, the famous Nigerian novelist, explores corruption and its extent and damaging impact on Nigeria and its people.

The incidence of corruption is high in Nigeria. Since the return to democratic rule in the country in 1999, the country has ranked either first or second in Transparency International's global corruption rating. This has been a matter of deep concern for both ordinary Nigerians and the political leadership of the country. Nigeria made many attempts before 1999 to stem the tide of corruption(Faloore, 2010, Igbuzor, 2008). However, since 1999, there seemed to be a new determination to fight corruption, with the establishment of several anti-corruption bodies. For example, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB). Nonetheless, corrupt activities have continued in the country almost making nonsense of the activities of these agencies and the war on corruption. This is unfortunate because it seems to have become an established pattern, and presents Nigeria as a country whose national integrity system has effectively collapsed. As argued elsewhere, corruption in Nigeria seems to have defied every solution (Egwemi, 2009).

Whistleblowing: The Whats and Whys

What is whistleblowing?

Whistleblowing has several definitions, which vary according to the author's conception of whistleblowing's role in society. The most widely used academic definition of whistleblowing originated in an article by Maria P. Miceli and Janet P. Near in 1985. They define it as "the disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of the illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices

under the control of their employers to persons or organisations that [can take] action."This definition focuses only on the act of disclosure, rather than on whistleblowing as a process that needs to be examined before, during, and after disclosure. In a nutshell, whistleblowing raises concern about wrongdoing within organisations or through an independent structure associated with it.

Why is whistleblowing important?

Whistleblowing is, for some, seen as an anti-corruption tool with the emphasis on disclosure of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices. It is in this context defined as a "public interest disclosure", a "protected disclosure", or the disclosure of "public interest information." Other definitions see whistleblowing in a similar, but slightly more restricted vein as addressing corruption internally within an organisation. An example is the U.K. Committee of Standards in Public Life's definition: "Raising a concern about malpractice within an organisation or through an independent structure associated with it." The South African Constitution stands on the realisation of a "society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights." It seeks to "Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every person is equally protected by the law." Whistleblowing is central to these constitutional principles. It is key in the fight against corruption and mismanagement, especially of public funds, and to strengthening transparency and accountability within organisations and society.

Why is whistleblowing problematic?

Whistleblowing always involves two parties with opposing rights and interests. On the one hand is the whistle-blower who has a right to equality, freedom of expression and fair labour practices. On the other is the organisation against which they make an allegation and that has rights to a reputation and loyalty from its staff. The need for whistleblowing regulatory frameworks derives from the recognition that neither set of rights is absolute and that they need to be balanced appropriately and lawfully. The power imbalances between whistle-blowers and accused organisations require the governing framework to be especially strong to create a safe alternative to silence for the whistle-blower. The experience of whistle-blowers does not bear testimony to the successful provision of a safe alternative to silence (Martin, 2010). That is so even in countries with advanced whistleblowing laws, such as South Africa.

Whistle-blowers risk their livelihoods, reputations, and lives and even those of their families to expose information of significant public importance. Whistle-blowers are necessary given the elevated levels of corruption. Simultaneously, their livelihood is more at risk given the recessionary economy and significant job losses we have seen (Calland R. and Dehn G., 2004).

The significance of whistleblowing: The United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003

The General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) by Resolution no. 58/4 of 31 October 2003. The South African government ratified it in November 2004. The Convention posits whistleblowing as an anti-corruption tool.

The purposes of the Convention are to promote:

1. Measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively;
2. Integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property.

The UN Convention is not limited to the prevention of corruption in the public arena. Article 12 obligates state parties to take measures to prevent corruption in the private sector. Under Article 5, each state party must establish and promote effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption in the public and private arena. The Convention requires state parties to incorporate into their domestic legal system appropriate protection of whistle-blowers against unjust treatment.[1]

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) comprises thirty member countries, including South Africa. They share a commitment to democracy and the market economy. The OECD, much like the UN Convention, views whistleblowing as essential to fighting corruption in a democratic society. Member countries must establish:

1. Easily accessible channels for reporting of suspected acts of bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions to law enforcement authorities;

1. It defines a whistle-blower as "any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities in accordance with the Convention."

2. Measures to facilitate reporting by public officials… directly or indirectly through an internal mechanism, to law enforcement authorities of suspected acts of bribery…;
3. Adequate protection for employees who make good-faith and reasonable reports to the competent authorities about suspected acts of bribery in international business transactions.

The African Union Convention considers whistleblowing central to the fight against corruption and fostering accountability and transparency in public affairs and socio-economic development in Africa. It regards public and private sector corruption as damaging to economic development. It, therefore, commits member states to develop mechanisms to "detect, prevent, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and the private sectors."

One of the central mechanisms required by the Convention is whistleblowing legislation. Article 5 requires members states to take legislative and other measures to:

1. Protect informants and witnesses in corruption and related offences;
2. Ensure that citizens report instances of corruption without fear of consequent reprisals.

Combating corruption: The development of whistleblowing laws in the United States and Europe

Corruption is a persistent worldwide problem. It confronts post-communist countries as they transition to democracies and market economics (Liebert, Condrey, and Goncharov, 2013) and North American and Western European states, including EU members. Also, it afflicts those in Asia and South America (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). It seems almost as though its latent causes are in human nature, with perhaps greed, ambition, and a desire for power being the psychological forces propelling it. Yet corruption is not simply a trait of the human psyche. Instead, many institutional forces, such as bad governance, lack of transparency, flawed decision-making systems, and inefficiencies and scarcities, are possible reasons for its persistence (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

Luo defines corruption as an "illegitimate exchange of resources involving the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends" (Luo, 2005). Transparency International defines it as the "abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International). World Bank (1997) declares corruption to be "abuse of public office for private gain." The World Bank also

notes that the concept "covers a broad range of human actions." In this article, "corruption" is any individual, collective, or structural act or process that permits the use of public authority for private gain. This definition captures the many ways in which individuals and institutions abuse power and public trust.

While corruption persists, so do efforts to root it out or eliminate it. Mechanisms to address it have included increased criminal prosecution, civil service and government pay reform, increased transparency and reporting, and improved governance (Rose-Ackermann, 1999). They also include the expanded use, encouragement, and protection of whistleblowing. While whistleblowing alone is not a solution to corruption, it can improve governance and create ethically and legally healthy organisations and governments.

This article examines the role of whistleblowing as a tool to combat corruption. Methodologically, it examines the law and role of whistleblowing in a comparative context, focusing on the United States, the European Union, and Armenia. The paper will conclude with recommendations to strengthen whistleblowing as an effective weapon against corruption.

Whistleblowing: Definition and justification

Johnson (2003, p. 3) describes whistleblowing as dissent with four characteristics. First, it is an individual act to make the information public. Second, it discloses that information to someone outside an organisation who makes it public and part of a public record. Third, the information disclosed has to do with some non-trivial wrongdoing within that organisation. Finally, the person making the disclosure is a member of that organisation and not a journalist or general member of the public. In short, a whistle-blower is a person who exposes wrongdoing within an organisation. While Johnson's definition is good, it neglects the aspects of whistleblowing involving the reporting and correcting of corruption. This is the definition of whistleblowing in this article: An act of an individual within an organisation who discloses information to report and correct corruption.

The whistle-blower has two other attributes. One, their motivation primarily the desire to expose wrongdoing. The emphasis on the primary motive is important for two reasons. First, it excludes whistleblowing as primarily a vengeful act or done simply for embarrassing another. Second, it excludes individuals who potentially blow the whistle simply or solely for economic gain.

However, to discount financial gain is inappropriate because some individuals blow the whistle in part to receive some reward. Such rewards

compensate for the ostracisation and loss of job opportunities many whistle-blowers confront after going public. The increasing offer of such rewards in the laws in countries such as the United States incentivises individuals to look out for illegal or unethical behaviour. Whistleblowing is an alternative channel to report wrongdoings when internal chains of command prevent or hamper the reporting or correction of inappropriate behaviour.

An argument for whistleblowing is that some organisations are unwilling or unable to address wrongdoing. Whether it be fears of retaliation, refusal to comply with the law, or other reasons, whistleblowing may simply be the only mechanism to expose and correct wrongdoing.

The second justification is that whistleblowing is a mechanism to correct or reform organisations. Organisations—public, private, or civil society—can develop pathologies and do bad things. Whistleblowing exposes malpractice to force change. Whether whistleblowing has produced reforms is a matter of debate. Some specific wrong-doings may attract remedial action through exposure, but it is difficult to ascertain whether overall whistleblowing reforms organisations. Third, whistleblowing seeks to expose serious misconduct that the public needs to know about or needs correction. Bribery, illegal surveillance, misuse of organisational resources, and criminal conspiracies are acts that society should expose and correct.

A final justification of whistleblowing is as a way of promoting justice because it makes it possible to bring wrongdoers to justice. For these reasons, many increasingly see whistleblowing not as an aberration or an evil but as a necessary means to police unlawful behaviour. Its increasing recognition as a tool against corruption has caused many countries and international organisations to promulgate laws that legalise or encourage it. These laws do several things. First, they may create processes or mechanisms to enable whistleblowing, especially anonymously, such as through hotlines. Second, the laws may require organisations to promote whistleblowing. Third, the laws may create financial incentives to encourage whistleblowing. Fourth, the laws may offer shields to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation or reprisals. Overall, the justification for whistleblowing is that it helps to combat corruption.

The United States

The United States is perhaps the leading innovator in whistleblowing laws. Roberta Johnson contends that the U.S. is a major exporter of whistleblowing

principles and legislation through major conferences on corruption throughout the world (Johnson, 2003). It influences international agencies to adopt them, such as the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Organisation of American States. Also, it has pressured other countries to adopt them as domestic law. Its laws have been the subject of debate in emerging post-communist democracies such as Slovakia, Georgia, Albania, Romania, and Ukraine (Johnson, 2003, p. 116).

It would be impossible to document all the whistleblowing laws in the United States. This article will focus mainly on national or federal laws. Whistleblowing laws address three types of corruption. The first is government corruption, involving principally private parties defrauding the government but misuse of resources, bribery, and political favouritism by government officials. Here the issues include bribery, misuse of funds, improper book-keeping, and more generically, fraud. The second type of corruption involves the private sector or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Finally, whistleblowing in government aims to root out political abuse. This type includes situations such as Edward Snowden's release of information about an illegal surveillance programme and other reports of U.S. use of torture in interrogations.

Another dimension to classifying whistle-blower laws is to look at their purpose. Some laws legalise or mandate conditions under which whistleblowing should occur. An aspect of these laws is provisions that either reward whistleblowing or provide for compensation or legal protections against reprisals for those who blow the whistle. Such laws are necessary because of a culture that encourages team playing and discourages whistle-blowers (Weisband and Franck, 1975). Finally, other laws or legal doctrines impact whistleblowing. These laws and the issues that they address are important to the fashioning of an effective whistleblowing regime. However, it remains unclear whether the U.S. is using whistleblowing as effectively as it could to address corruption.

The Nigerian perspective on corruption and whistleblowing

Corruption is persistent across the world, including in the former communist states and former republics of the U.S.S.R. Whistleblowing is one tool to expose and combat it. The United States has a well-developed whistleblowing legal regime, and the evidence in this article suggests the regime has had some positive impacts. Europe, the EU, and the EEU too have made efforts to adopt and adapt a regime to facilitate whistleblowing. However,

they have had only a brief experience with it, and the data is inadequate to determine its effectiveness.

The whistleblowing programme is an initiative of the Federal Ministry of Finance to collect useful information on corrupt practices. It aims to incorporate Nigerians into the fight against corruption in the country. It encourages individuals or groups to provide useful information on violations of government financial regulations or procurement procedures. They can also report the mismanagement or misappropriation of public funds and assets, financial malpractice, fraud, and the theft of public assets. The programme also covers information on data or records falsification, bribery, undocumented expenditure, contract-splitting, conflicts of interest, and the diversion, under-reporting, concealment, or non-remittance of government revenues. The programme also wants information on any other form of corruption involving government funds and assets.

The federal government's policy of rewarding those who expose corruption and other financial crimes surprised many. That was because many versions of the "whistle-blower" bill were before the National Assembly that the body was yet to harmonise. The bill was one of the several that the 7th National Assembly passed but did not receive President Goodluck Jonathan's assent. It had to be re-presented before the current National Assembly (*Daily Trust*, 11 July 2017).

The whistleblowing policy is one of the several mechanisms of the federal government to deter corruption and the mismanagement of public funds, among other practices. The credit goes to the initiator of the 'Whistle-blowers' Protection Act, 2016', Dr George Uboh, an anti-corruption crusader. The current bill has also enjoyed the support of the 8th Senate, which has already passed it through second reading after Senator Kabir Gaya presented it to the floor.

The draft bill has seven parts. Part I is its interpretative section. The second part addresses the disclosure of impropriety, persons qualified to make them, persons and institutions to whom they must make them, and the obligation to receive them. Part III concerns the disclosure procedure and the reduction of disclosures to writing, and the fourth, the actions that persons who receive disclosures of impropriety must take. Part V deals with whistle-blower protection. The sixth part lists the offences under the Act: disclosing a whistle-blower's identity or details of their disclosure, victimisation of a whistle-blower, and making false disclosures. Part VII covers miscellaneous issues: failure to act on a disclosure, recoveries from whistle-blowers, funding

of the office of whistle-blowers protection, etc.

Section 19 of Part VII, which deals with recoveries, rewards, and funding of the office of the whistle-blower, has some interesting sub-sections. For instance, sub-section 2 reads: "out of the 10% received from the Attorney-General's office, any whistle-blower shall be rewarded for his or her disclosure 5% and 5% shall be for the running of the office of whistle-blowers protection." Sub-section 3 reads: "A whistle-blower shall be paid within thirty days after the receipt of funds premised by his or her whistleblowing from the Attorney General's office."

Some have observed that the whistleblowing policy has to do with fighting impunity and that the anti-corruption war requires the adoption and fast-tracking of a multifaceted approach. Also, reports say that Senator Olajumoke Olujimi's version of the whistle-blower bill seeks to encourage the reporting of graft and corrupt practices and aid the investigative agencies.

Globally, whistle-blower laws attempt to protect people who offer credible information of malpractice from victimisation. Another name for it is "protected disclosure."

Whistleblowing in combating corruption

Public and private sector whistleblowing is a key tool to detect and deter corruption and other wrongdoings threatening public health, security, and the environment. Many companies also consider it an important means for preventing and uncovering wrongdoing in the company that could otherwise lead to substantial financial and reputational damage. Society, therefore, should encourage and facilitate it. The existence of clear and accessible channels for reporting is essential for this. The country should also encourage reporting by protecting whistle-blowers from reprisals. Effective whistle-blower protection, which differs from witness protection, requires comprehensive legislation that establishes institutional frameworks and clear definitions of persons qualified for protection. It must also determine the subject of protected disclosures, the reporting of retaliatory actions, and robust protection and remedies.

To avoid frivolous and malicious reporting, only whistle-blowers acting in good faith and on reasonable grounds should get protection. Securing the anonymity of whistle-blowers or keeping their identities confidential is also vital.

Finally, Nigeria should strengthen the implementation of whistleblowing systems through awareness-raising, communication, and training.

Conclusion

It is becoming evident in Nigeria that public officials and politicians are corrupt, and that most people celebrate them. The upright Nigerian public is highly ambivalent about corruption, frequently complaining about and condemning it but resigned its presence. Corruption, therefore, has become a challenge, the meeting of which requires total commitment. Thus, confronted with a challenge, humans attempt as much as possible to overcome it. Overcoming a challenge like corruption is not child's play, especially in a society like Nigeria where corruption seems to have become "normal." In Nigeria, it would seem that incorruption is the aberration and corruption the norm.

What the war against corruption seems to lack is the political will and fear of being victimised or attacked. "Political will" here refers to the zeal and willingness by people at any level to fight corruption genuinely instead of half-heartedly. It would mean enthroning a regime without sacred cows, one that applies the law irrespective of the culprit's personality or status. Thus, the fight against corruption can succeed only if Nigerians stop paying it lip service, have a fear of reprisal, eschew corruption, and embrace integrity, transparency and accountability.

Good governance is important because it provides the greatest antidote to ending corruption. It promotes accountability, understanding, and control of social activities. It enhances confidence in people and the system and establishes an efficient framework of checks and balances.

The whistleblowing framework in Nigeria is developing as an anti-corruption measure since the inception of the new ruling party in power. It is yielding positive results although it is not yet in the nation's constitution. It should be in the constitution, as it is in the Republic of South Africa.

Addressing whistleblowing challenges and fighting corruption

Nigeria must make the following policy and implementation changes to its whistleblowing framework:

1. A whistleblowing framework is necessary that protects all whistle-blowers equally and imposes the same duties on public and private organisations to promote a culture of disclosure.
2. The law must be more comprehensive in the provision of an expanded scope of protection. It must draw all potential whistle-blowers into its protective field and allow disclosures to any person or agency that can

do something about the allegation concerned.

3. Knowledge, understanding, and information on whistleblowing must improve, especially among the most vulnerable—namely, less wealthy, working-class employees.
4. We must encourage or compel organisations to promote a culture of disclosure, interpret the whistleblowing bill expansively, and diligently implement the obligations and protections under the law.

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Chapter 38 | Corruption, the International Community and the Challenges of Whistleblowing: The Nigerian Perspective

Adeyinka Samson Adeniji

Abstract

This paper examines the nature of corruption in Nigeria and the reasons public disclosure of corruption has been a challenge. Corruption is a persistent global challenge. To solve the problem, trans-border bodies (such as the United Nations and World Bank) are promoting official probity and anti-corruption strategies in all countries. Nigeria lacks legislation that deals with whistleblowing specifically. Protection is not available to persons who want to blow the whistle. Research for this paper employed secondary data collection, and the analysis applied the critical state theory. The paper addresses the following aspects of internationalbestpractices: scope and clarity of legislation, mechanisms for disclosure, protection of identity, protection against retaliation, and remedies for wronged whistle-blowers. It finds that the whistle-blower policy alone cannot eliminate corruption, corruption is haemorrhagic in Nigeria, and the state loses many corruption cases because it lacks political will. Many Nigerians find it difficult to blow the whistle. This paper recommends the provision of incentives, proper investigation of corruption cases, imposition of deterrent sanctions, and non-disclosure of information about cases until the completion of investigations.

Keywords: corruption, challenges, international community, whistleblowing, Nigerian perspectives.

Introduction

Corruption is a persistent problem across the world. It knows no borders. It afflicts post-communist countries as they transition to democracies and market economics (Liebert, Condrey and Goncharov, 2013). Also, it confronts states within North America, Western Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa—Nigeria, in particular (Rose- Ackerman, 1999). Yet corruption is not simply a trait of the human psyche. Many institutional forces contribute to its persistence: bad governance, lack of transparency, flawed decision-making systems, and

inefficiencies and scarcities (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

Trans-border bodies, such as the United Nations and World Bank, are promoting official probity and anti-corruption strategies (Biallas, 1998; Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (eds.), 1999; OECD, 1999a; Caiden, Dwivedi and Jabbra, 2001; Henning, 2001; Transparency International, 2003, 2004; United Nations, 2003). The countries of the former Soviet Union are also reconstructing on democratic principles and participating in international anti-corruption programmes (Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative for South-Eastern Europe, 2000; Transparency International Russia, 2001; United States Embassy Slovakia, 2001; Centre Strategia, 2002). Similar developments are occurring in Africa (de Sarden, 1999; Holloway, 1999), Asia (Jayawickrama, 1998; Quah, 1999; ADB-OECD, 2001) and South America (Adelman, 2000). Foreign aid agreements and development contracts in those places increasingly include anti-corruption conditions (Hyden, 1995; Levine, 2001; De Maria, 2004b).

Paralleling the internationalisation of the fight against corruption in public administration is the internationalisation of whistleblowing. The facilitation and protection of such disclosures are becoming a well-established administrative goal, mainly for governments but increasingly for businesses, too. Starting as an American initiative, protected whistleblowing has spread far and is now a central anti-corruption strategy (OECD, 1999b; Johnson 2002; World Bank, 2003; United Nations, 2003). For example, the Council of Europe and the Organisation of American States (OAS) require member nations to pass whistle-blower protection laws (Devine, 2000). Similarly, Article 32(2)(a) of the newly endorsed United Nations Convention against Corruption requires signatory nations to: "Establish procedures for the physical protection of whistle-blowers (United Nations, 2003).

Corruption has become another name for Nigeria: the mention of the name Nigeria immediately conjures up the term "corruption." If Nigeria does not kill corruption, corruption will kill Nigeria. It is like a cancerous cell that, if not quickly removed, eventually removes the victim from the face of the earth. Therefore, a surgical operation is urgently necessary to remove this tumour that has become endemic in Nigerian society. Cancer is not contagious, but corruption is; an effective vaccine is necessary to reverse its life-threatening effects.

The problem is not peculiar to Nigeria, but other countries have tackled it effectively, including by whistleblowing—the subject of this paper.

Whistleblowing is one method of exposing corruption in the public and private sectors. Indeed, some count it among the most effective means to uncover and remedy corruption, fraud, and other types of wrongdoing**.** It is difficult to blow the whistle. It needs courage and moral evaluation, and the intending whistle-blower must be able to put the public interest above theirs.

This paper answers the following questions: What is corruption? Does it have historical antecedents in Nigeria? What is whistleblowing? Who is a whistle-blower? Why do people choose to blow or not blow the whistle? What are the international best practices? What are the features of these practices? Why is the public disclosure of corrupt practices a challenge in Nigeria? Does Nigeria have a whistleblowing policy? What are the ways out of this quagmire?

Conceptual issues

This section clarifies the following concepts: corruption, public disclosure, whistleblowing, and whistle-blower.

Corruption

The World Bank (1997) defines corruption as the abuse of public power for private gain. Its chief vigilance commissioner avers that corruption is like AIDS: whereas the latter is a product of uncontrolled sexual behaviour, the former arises from uncontrolled financial behaviour (Vittal, 2000). This implies that an influential individual uses it at the cost of others and by side-lining the institutionalised framework to further their personal financial upliftment. This may take many forms: bribery, extortion, influence-peddling, nepotism, fraud, embezzlement, etc.

Balogun argues that:

> … Depending on its form and gravity, corruption is capable of rewarding indolence and penalising hard work, undermining morale and *esprit de corps*, compromising a nation's external security, threatening internal order and stability and generally slowing down the pace of economic growth and sustainable development. (Balogun 2003).

He argues that corruption touches more than the participants in the corrupt transaction. For example, the illegal sale of drivers' licences exposes everyone to the risks of reckless driving. The purchase of places on a police force renders

police officers beholden to their benefactors, and law enforcement goes to the "highest bidder" (Balogun, 2003). This has dire implications. An applicant who has bought a place on the force might want first to recoup their "investment" and to do this by selling ammunition to robbers or taking bribes.

To Luo (2005), corruption is an "illegitimate exchange of resources involving the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends." Transparency International (1997) defines it as the "abuse of entrusted power for private gain." The World Bank (1997) describes it as the "abuse of public office for private gain."

Public disclosure

Public disclosure is the act of opening up on or revealing the corrupt practices of organisations or individuals.

Whistleblowing

Whistleblowing is an important element of accounting. It is an internal control mechanism to discourage illegal, immoral, and illegitimate practices in organisations. The most widely used academic definition of whistleblowing originated in an article by Miceli and Near (1995). They defined "whistleblowing" as "the disclosure by organisation members of the illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to persons or organisations that may be able to effect action." (Miceli and Near, 1985). This definition focuses only on the act of disclosure, rather than on whistleblowing as a process that needs to be examined before, during and after disclosure. Many academics have now embraced broader conceptions of whistleblowing. David Banisar, for example, "treats whistleblowing as a means to promote accountability by allowing for the disclosure by any person of information about misconduct while at the same time protecting the person against sanctions of all forms." (Banisar, 2011).In their study on public sector whistleblowing in Norway, Marit and Sissel (2010) identify several problems with Miceli and Near's (1985) narrow definition of whistleblowing. They advocate for a bifurcated definition that recognises whistleblowing as a process:

Thus, when whistleblowing is examined as a process it necessitates laws or policies that provide a clear description (1) of what types of perceived wrongdoing should be disclosed, (2) to whom such disclosures should be made initially and subsequently (if the initial disclosure does not prompt an investigation), (3) how and by whom the alleged wrongdoing should be

investigated, (4) the mechanisms and procedures that are in place to encourage persons to disclose wrongdoing while protecting the whistle-blower from any disciplinary action or adverse consequence for reporting the wrongdoing, and (5) the steps to be taken if adverse consequences are, or appear to be, imposed on the whistle-blower (Marit and Sissel, 2010).

Whistle-blower

The whistle-blower is an individual who exposes wrongdoing in a public or private organisation by reporting it to the authority that can press charges and investigate it further. When a government or private employee or independent contractor releases information about illegal or unethical conduct by their employer, that person has "blown the whistle" on that employer.

Combating corruption in Nigeria: An overview

Successive Nigerian governments have responded to corruption programmatically. They have created anti-corruption agencies to investigate wrongdoing, ombudsman offices to hear the complaints of citizens, internal anti-corruption units within public agencies, and independent public accounting offices. Governments have combated corruption through education and publicity, promises of reward, threats of investigation and punishment, and bureaucratic monitoring. (Roberta, 2003). They have also employed code of ethics commissions to inculcate new ethics in public employees and the public. Some scholars have argued that educating and changing the character of the public is the only way to reduce corruption (Lynch and Lynch, 2003; Balogun, 2003). Caiden et al. (2001) also maintain that in "today's globalised, democratised, informatised world, incorruptible governments can be constructed only using incorruptible citizens as their bricks and mortar." In the same vein, Balogun believes that "character formation," not leaders and monitoring agencies, "is the causative factor in public integrity (Balogun, 2003).

Every government in Nigeria since 1975 has fought corruption. The government of the late General Murtala Mohammed promulgated an anti-corruption decree. While downsizing in the civil service, it retired fifty-two officials in the federal public service and sacked fifty. About 2000 Nigerians lost their jobs in the exercise. President Shehu Shagari launched what his government termed an "ethical revolution" and established the Code of Conduct Bureau. The regime of Major-General Muhammadu Buhari launched the War

Against Indiscipline (WAI) on 20 March 1984, in which over fifty public servants, including state governors, went to jail. He declared the programme a holistic campaign against corruption. Its elements included the introduction of firing squads for armed robbery convicts and the death sentence for drug trafficking. The government also mandated queuing in public places and promulgated anti-money laundering decrees. The successor regime of General Babangida introduced national orientation and mass mobilisation agencies and the National Agency for Food, Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) in 1991. It also passed the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act in 1989. General Sani Abacha, who succeeded Babangida, launched a new War Against indiscipline and corruption. In turn, President Olusegun Obasanjo established the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Offences Commission (ICPC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and Budget Monitoring and Evaluation Unit.

International perspectives on whistleblowing

This section briefly reviews the stipulations in regional and global anti-corruption treaties regarding whistleblowing laws.

United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)

Article 33 of this Convention reads:

> Each State Party shall consider incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention.

However, this Article is optional, not mandatory. A state need only "consider" adopting "appropriate measures" to protect whistle-blowers. Further, the Article only protects from "any unjustified treatment" those who acted "in *good faith* and on *reasonable grounds.*" Thus, a State Party is free to deliberate, and then simply decide to not adopt any reporting protections (Björn and David, 2014).

Even with its obvious weaknesses, the protections under this section represent an expansion of previously recognised protections. Also, the UN has encouraged ratifying states in supporting documents to enact robust whistleblowing regimes under Article 33(UNCAC, 31 October 2003 at Article 33) (Banisar, 2011).

In comparison, Article 32 of UNCAC provides for the mandatory protection of witnesses, experts, and victims. It dictates that states:

> Shall take appropriate measures… to provide effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts who give testimony concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention and, as appropriate, for their relatives and other persons close to them *(UNCAC* at Article 32).

Unfortunately, this mandatory protection does not protect whistle-blowers from retaliation or intimidation unless they are "witnesses or victims" to the wrongdoing and testify in the prosecution of wrongdoers. Most potential whistle-blowers do not fall into this narrow group. Moreover, the objective of whistleblowing laws is not only to facilitate the prosecution of alleged wrongdoers but also to prevent wrongdoing. As Transparency International has observed, "the ideal situation is where a whistle-blower raises concerns in time, so that action can be taken to prevent any offence." (Transparency International, 2013).

Articles 32 and 33 address the protection of witnesses. They complement efforts to prevent public and private corruption, obstruction of justice, confiscation and recovery of criminal proceeds, and cooperation at the national and international levels. Although it is difficult to achieve this, the underlying rationale is obvious. The Convention's objectives are futile unless people feel free to testify and communicate their expertise, experience, or knowledge to the authorities. (Arnone and Leonardo, 2014). Without the protection offered in these provisions, countries attempting to operationalise UNCAC would be unnecessarily hobbled by difficulties in uncovering, investigating and resolving corruption issues.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Convention

The OECD Convention does not include provisions on whistleblowing. However, various subsequent OECD instruments encourage the adoption of whistle-blower protections. For example, in 1998 the OECD issued a Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service. That Recommendation urges states to encourage transparency and accountability in decision-making through "measures such as disclosure systems and recognition of the role of an active and independent media" (Public Governance Committee, 1998).The 2003 Recommendation on Guidelines for Managing

Conflict of Interest in the Public Service stipulates that states ought to:

Provide clear rules and procedures for whistleblowing, and take steps to ensure that those who report violations in compliance with stated rules are protected against reprisal and that the complaint mechanisms themselves are not abused. (OECD, 2003).

The 2009 Recommendation of the OECD Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions makes similar recommendations. It urges member states to establish:

Easily accessible channels… for the reporting of suspected acts of bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions to law enforcement authorities, in accordance with their legal principles. (Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, 2009).

Recommendations like these show a recognition of the importance of whistle-blowers in reducing public and private sector corruption.

Inter-American Convention Against Corruption

Arnone and Borlini (2014) note that references to whistle-blower protection are in several other regional conventions and agreements. For example, the first inter-governmental agreement to tackle whistle-blower protection was the *Inter-American Convention Against Corruption.* This Convention came into force on 6 March 1997, under the purview of the Organisation of American States (OAS), a group of thirty-five member states in the Americas. It suggests that signatories consider introducing or strengthening whistle-blower protections within their own legal and institutional systems to prevent corruption. Article III, section 8, provides that:

> State parties agree to *consider* the applicability of measures… and systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption, including protection of their identities, in accordance with their Constitutions and the basic principles of their domestic legal systems. *(Inter-American Convention Against Corruption*, 29 March 1996).

The agreement emphasises the role that each signatory's domestic legal context plays in the creation and maintenance of an effective whistle-blower protection scheme.

However, at least one regional Convention "requires" state members to have whistleblowing laws. Article 9 of the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, which came into force on 1 November 2003, states:

> Each Party shall providein its internal law for appropriate protection against any unjustified sanction for employees who have reasonable grounds to suspect corruption and who report in good faith their suspicion to responsible persons or authorities. (Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, 4 November 1999).

Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific

Another regional agreement is the *Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific,* a joint product of the Asian Development Bank and the OECD. Participating countries endorsed it on 30 November 2001. (3rd Regional Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and the Pacific).Pillar 3 of the Action Plan specifically identifies the protection of whistle-blowers as a critical element in encouraging public participation in combating corruption. (The Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific, 30 November 2001).However, the Plan's provisions are not mandatory. Its implementation section states: "…to implement these three pillars of action, participating governments… concur with the attached Implementation Plan and will endeavour to comply with its terms."

African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC)

The Preamble to the 2003 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC)recognises the detrimental effects of corruption on African states and their peoples. *(AUCPCC, 2003).*It recognises the anti-corruption potential of whistleblowing and seems to offer protection to ordinary citizens. Its language is mandatory: "State Parties *undertake* to:

(5) Adopt legislative and other measures to protect informants and witnesses in corruption and related offences, including protection of their identities.
(6) Adopt measures that ensure citizens report instances of corruption without fear of consequent reprisals.
(7) Adopt national legislative measures to punish those who make false and malicious reports against innocent persons in corruption and related offences. (AUCPC, Article 5, 2003).

Note that clause 5 that protects informants and witnesses requires "legislative" measures, but clause 6 that protects citizens who report corruption does not. It only requires that the state provide some form of non-legislative protection. Also, as Arnone and Borlini argue, it may deter truthful whistle-blowers, since its breadth could allow action against whistle-blowers who

"reasonably" suspect corrupt behaviour. (Marco and Leonardo, 2014). Finally, the absence of a credible enforcement or evaluation mechanism weakens the effectiveness of the Convention: each state simply self-reports on its Convention compliance *(AUCPC,* Article 7, *2004).*

Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption

Article 4 of the 2001 *Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption* encourages members to maintain "systems for protecting individuals who, in good faith, report acts of corruption." This provision, like that of the African Union Convention, contains mandatory language. Furthermore, both contain strongly-worded provisions denouncing individuals who make false reports. (SADC Protocol against Corruption 2001). That is problematic because it may have a chilling effect on information disclosures. Such provisions, which aim to prevent misuse of the Convention itself, might cause a general impasse in the investigation. That potentially chilling effect and the lack of oversight and monitoring makes it unlikely that these agreements will cause member states to create effective regimes of whistle-blower protection.

International best practices in whistle-blower legislation

Organisations and academics have developed suggestions for "best practices" and standards for drafting legislation to protect whistle-blowers. These best practices proffer ideas for countries attempting to develop or improve whistle-blower legislation (Transparency International, 2013).

Effective Whistle-blower Protection Can Only Exist in a Democratic Society

Paul and Brown (2008) note that effective whistle-blower protection can only exist in a democratic society that values accountability and transparency. In other words, "a precondition for whistle-blower laws is the rule of law, including an independent legal system and independent judiciary." (Paul and Brown, 2008). Countries will meet this precondition in varying degrees. Similarly, the efficacy of whistle-blower protection depends not only on the mere existence of the provisions of the legislation but also, and more importantly, on their implementation.

It is counter-productive simply to transplant successful legislative regimes

Also, it is seldom effective simply to transplant successful legislative regimes from one cultural or socio-economic setting to another (Heungsik, et al., 2008; Sajid, et al., 2011).Whistleblowing schemes in developed democracies may be inappropriate in "developing countries [without] an institutional framework… that supports the rule of law and… transparency and accountability…" (Marie, 2009).Thus, discussions of best practices must consider the cultural and institutional environments of countries that are considering legislation for whistle-blower protection. Otherwise, they will seriously undermine the efficacy of whistle-blower legislation.Brown (2008) warns that policymakers should carefully examine models of best practices in the legal, administrative, and political context of each country.

However, no single "ideal" or "model" law exists that most countries, let alone all, can adopt and adapt. This is due to the diverse and intricate ways in which such mechanisms must rely on, and integrate with, a range of other regimes in a jurisdiction (Brown, 2013).

Features of best practices

While the scope and significance of the elements of best practices are open to reasonable dispute, academics and organisations focus on five broad areas:

1. Scope and clarity of legislation,
2. Mechanisms for disclosure,
3. Non-disclosure of identity,
4. Protection against retaliation, and
5. Remedies for wronged whistle-blowers.

Scope and clarity of legislation

The scope of whistle-blower protective legislation, especially regarding the range of beneficiaries and type of disclosures covered, is an area of central concern for organisations and academics. Banisar (2011) suggests that most legislation dedicated to whistle-blower protection is too narrow and that the efficacy of these laws is difficult to measure (Banisar, 2011).Best practices in these laws favour wide coverage. Indeed, whistleblowing laws may have to adopt "a full 'no loopholes' approach, targeting public sector and private sector whistleblowing with sector-blind principles and practices"(Paul and Brown, 2008).Closing the "loopholes" in legislation involves increasing the range of people who fall within legislative protection. Transparency International, for example, suggests that legislative protections should apply to all whistle-

blowers, regardless of whether they work in the public or private sector (T. I., 2013). Some see the U.K.'s *Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998* (*PIDA*),which protects public and private sector workers and independent contractors, a model of expansive coverage. (Mark, 2013).In a 2013 Report, Transparency International emphasises *PIDA*'s broad coverage:

> In 1998, the U.K. passed one of the most comprehensive whistle-blower protection laws in the world, *the Public Interest Disclosure Act*. Known as PIDA, the law applies to the vast majority of workers across all sectors: government, private, and non-profit. It covers a range of employment categories, including employees, contractors, trainees and U.K. workers based abroad.… Several countries have used PIDA as a template for their own laws and proposals, including Ireland, Japan, and South Africa (Mark, 2013).

Also, the disclosures protected should cover a wide range of wrongdoing. That is, "protected whistleblowing should cover "any" disclosure that would be accepted in a legal forum as evidence of significant misconduct or would assist in carrying out legitimate compliance functions." (Devine and Walden, 2013).Under PIDA, whistle-blowers can disclose a broad range of crimes and wrongdoing. These include corruption, civil offences, miscarriages of justice, dangers to public health or safety, dangers to the environment, and covering them up.

Two problematic approaches in whistleblowing legislation are the sectorial and piecemeal. The sectorial approach offers protection to disclosures only in selected areas (such as public health), and many have criticised it as unnecessarily narrow. According to the OECD's CleanGovBiz guidelines, "the enactment of a comprehensive, dedicated law as the basis for providing whistle-blower protection is generally considered the most effective legislative means of providing such protection" (CleanGovBiz, 2012). The piecemeal approach, which protects different types of whistle-blowers in separate pieces of legislation, may similarly produce loopholes and a less effective disclosure regime. This was one of the major criticisms in a Transparency International review of whistle-blower protection in European countries. The organisation "found that whistleblowing legislation in the countries covered by this report is generally fragmented and weakly enforced" (Anja and Craig, 2009).

Transparency International recommends in the report that states should provide a "single, comprehensive legal framework" for protecting whistle-blowers. The consensus seems to be that dedicated legislation is preferable in

a whistle-blower protection regime. The consensus also is that broad coverage (regarding those protected and the types of wrongdoing that they may disclose) is vitally important.

A related best practices concern is the need to provide clarity in whistleblowing laws and policies, regardless of the scope and framework of the legal regime. Clarity of the legislation is crucial, and a review of whistle-blower protection in G20 countries (the "September 2014 G20 Report") repeatedly emphasises it (Simon *et al*., 2014).

Mechanisms for disclosure

Certain disclosure procedures are preferable. Based partly on Australian studies, Transparency International recommends the incentivisation of internal reporting through internal systems of disclosure.[1] That would offer potential whistle-blowers the benefit of access (T. I., 2009).Key to the efficacy of such internal mechanisms is ensuring "a thorough, timely and independent investigation of concerns… with adequate enforcement and follow-up mechanisms" (Smith, 2010).

However, external means of disclosure should be accessible, too. It should be possible also to disclose information to other bodies such as regulators or the media (albeit, possibly along different tiers of disclosure) (Paul and Michael, 2012). Transparency International states that "if there is a differentiated scale of care in accessing these channels, it shall not be onerous and must provide a means for reporting on suspicion alone" (T. I., 2009).Banisar (2011), too, recommends the encouragement and facilitation of internal disclosures. However, "procedures should be straightforward and easily allow for outside organisations to seek the counsel of higher bodies, legislators, and the media… where it is likely that the internal procedure would be ineffective."

The September 2014 G20 Report likewise called for:

> Clear rules for when whistleblowing to the media or other third parties is justified or necessitated by the circumstances… and clear rules for defining the internal disclosure procedures that can assist organisations to manage whistleblowing, rectify wrongdoing, and prevent costly disputes, reputational damage, and liability, in the manner best suited to their needs (Wolfe *et al*., 2014).

1. The first line of reporting should be to the organisation's authorities.

The report also indicates that legislation in these areas needed to be more comprehensive. The stepped or tiered approach can be observed in *PIDA*: PIDA uses a unique "tiered" system in which whistle-blowers can make their disclosures and get legal protection from retaliation. Employees can disclose information to their employer, regulatory agencies, "external" individuals such as members of Parliament, or directly to the media. However, the standards for accuracy and urgency increase with each tier, so whistle-blowers must heed this to qualify for legal protection (Mark, 2013).

Mendelsohn's model law

In an article comparing the U.K. and U.S. legislative regimes, Jenny Mendelsohn argues that a model law should be explicit in its preference for internal or external disclosure. She suggests that internal reporting is preferable and should get "almost automatic protection." However, this does not mean that external reporting should be subject to a multitude of preconditions (Mendelsohn, 2009). Mendelsohn's model law would allow for disclosures to the media only when reporting through internal and external channels has proven to be ineffective (2009).

Protection of identity

The protection of identity is an area of disagreement regarding best practices. While the need for whistle-blower confidentiality has widespread recognition, the role of anonymous reporting is controversial. Transparency International suggests that not only should the law protect (i.e., keep confidential) the identity of the whistle-blower, but that legislation should also allow for anonymous disclosure (T. I., 2009). Similarly, Banisar (2009) argues that anonymity may have a place in a model law on whistle-blower protection, despite the general exclusion of anonymous disclosures from current legislation. For example, "anonymity may be… useful in some cases, such as in jurisdictions where the legal system is weak or there are concerns about physical harm or social ostracisation." The 2014 G20 Report concluded that a central concern was the need for "clear rules that encourage whistleblowing by ensuring that anonymous disclosures can be made, and will be protected" (Wolfe et al., 2014).

In contrast, Latimer and Brown (2008) suggest that anonymous disclosures should be a "last resort," because anonymity could undermine whistle-blower accountability and encourage intentionally false reporting. Paul Stephenson and

Michael Levi (2012) similarly question the need for anonymous disclosures with confidentiality protection:

> Legal and social problems stem from anonymous disclosures; anonymous information is rarely admissible as evidence in courts. There have been cases where, because the whistle-blower has remained anonymous, another worker has been suspected and sacked…. Research results indicate that auditors attribute lower credibility and allocate fewer investigatory resources when the whistleblowing report is received through an anonymous channel.

Protection against retaliation and oversight of that protection

Robust protection against retaliation is a cornerstone of effective whistle-blower protection. Effective protection from reprisals is necessary, as is a broad understanding of what reprisals might entail: "The law should cover all common scenarios that could have a chilling effect on the responsible exercise of free expression rights" (Devine and Walden, 2013). A key element in ensuring whistle-blowers protection is the education of public employees on their rights and protections under whistle-blower legislation. That is because "whistle-blowers are not protected by any law if they do not know it exists" (Devine and Walden, 2013). Those in positions of power, who may receive protected disclosures or work with whistle-blowers, also need education on their legal responsibilities.

Legislative protection is crucial, but to provide whistle-blowers with effective shelter from retaliation the legislation requires enforcement. The Government Accountability Project, a U.S. based non-governmental organisation, notes that whistle-blower laws may be counter-productive if they do not have teeth. While whistle-blower protection laws are increasingly popular, the rights have often been symbolic and, therefore, counter-productive. Employees have risked retaliation thinking they had genuine protection when there was no real chance they could maintain their careers. (Devine and Walden, 2013).

Remedies for wronged whistle-blowers

When retaliation is unpreventable and whistle-blowers face reprisals, adequate and timely compensation is necessary. Compensation "must be comprehensive to cover all the direct, indirect and future consequences of the reprisal" (Devine and Walden, 2013). This may include reinstatement, compensation for lost wages, awards for suffering, or a range of other

reparations. It would be beneficial not to limit the amount of compensation, and "compensation should be broadly defined to cover all losses and seek to place the person back in an identical position as before the disclosure" (Banisar, 2011). An effective compensation scheme may require interim relief, given the high costs of time delays to whistle-blowers seeking the remedies promised in the whistleblowing legislation (Devine and Walden, 2013).

Rewards are not a substitute for strong legal protection. No reason exists against the recognition and reward of whistle-blowers in the workplace via remuneration and promotion, or by society (e.g., by public honours) (Public Concern at Work, 2013).

Whistleblowing policy in Nigeria

Nigeria has no legislation that deals specifically with whistleblowing. Identity protection for whistle-blowers is only available in Section 39(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 and Section 64(1) of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000. However, no additional protective mechanism exists against their disclosure. Implementation of the whistle-blower protection bill is, therefore, necessary. A single legislative instrument would be beneficial, as it would contain protective measures to bridge the gap where the other statutory provisions appear to neglect (Adeyemo, 2015). The bill therefore will provide a haven for whistleblowing.

The whistle-blower policy, which the Ministry of Finance eventually launched, is to incentivise Nigerians to provide actionable tips to track and recover stolen government funds. It encourages citizens to report the embezzlement of government funds, looting of assets and inflation of government contracts using text messages, phone calls, emails, and online forms. As part of the policy—a component of President Buhari's anti-corruption crusade—Finance Minister Kemi Adeosun said that the government would protect tipsters and keep their identities secret. Amendments to the Proceeds of Crime and Whistle-blower Protection bills to fulfil that promise have passed the second reading in parliament (Iyorah, 26 April 2017).

The Federal Ministry of Finance says that the programme is to encourage the reporting of violations of financial regulations, the mismanagement of public funds and assets, financial malpractice, etc. The FMF-Whistle is a secure, online portal for the disclosure of economic and financial crimes. The portal also permits the tracking of reports submitted. Anyone who has "authentic information about [a] violation, misconduct, or improper activity

[that] can impact negatively on the Nigerian people and Government" can report it through three channels:

1. Phone: 09098067946 (Monday–Friday 10.00am to 3.00pm except on public holidays),
2. Email: whistle@finance.gov.ng,
3. Web: http://whistle.finance.gov.ng. (Daily Trust, 13 July 2017).

A whistle-blower whose disclosure directly leads to the voluntary return of stolen or concealed public funds or assets may receive between 2.5% and 5.0% of the amount recovered. To qualify, they must provide the government with information it does not already have and could not otherwise obtain from sources available to it. The actual recovery must also be because of the information that the whistle-blower provided (*Daily Trust*, 13 July 2017).

Nigeria participated in the Anti-Corruption and Open Government Partnership Summit in London. Its communiqué expresses the international consensus on the importance of political goodwill in the fight against corruption. Such goodwill is crucial to the building of a consensus that encompasses the public. The whistleblowing policy is a temporary policy that allows the public to take part in fighting corruption. The law, still before the National Assembly, carries more weight than a policy statement. (Malami, 2017).

Nevertheless, the policy is already making those who have looted public funds, especially those under investigation or trial, uneasy. The federal government is trying to transform every Nigerian who is not culpable in the nation's looting into a whistle-blower. The short-changed are likely to take undue advantage of this policy. It will be a case of an accomplice exposing a smarter collaborator in a grand corruption conspiracy. The falcon gets a part of the loot and beats the falconer at his "fast game," when both should lose every claim to the recovered funds. So, the operation of the whistleblowing policy might reward corruption (Sufuyan Ojeifo, Punch, 9 May 2017).

Global Financial Integrity estimates that more than $157 billion has left the country illicitly in the past decade, often with the complicity or involvement of Nigeria's political leaders. A 2013 Transparency International survey showed that Nigerians unanimously believed that public-sector corruption was a problem in the country, with 78% describing it as a "serious problem." According to the same survey, 94% of respondents felt that Nigeria's political parties were extremely corrupt. Information Minister Lai Mohammed reported last year that fifty-five persons, including government ministers and bankers,

stole ¦ 1.34 trillion, or $6.8 billion, of public funds between 2006 and 2013. He gave the breakdown of stolen public funds at the launch of an anti-corruption awareness campaign in Abuja, Nigeria's capital (Iyorah, 26 April 2017).

According to Mohammed, fifteen former state governors stole ¦ 147 billion, while bankers stole ¦ 524 billion, and four ex-government ministers embezzled ¦ 7 billion in those seven years. Nigeria can scant afford to have its public funds siphoned off by corrupt officials. The National Bureau of Statistics reported in 2016 that about 112 million Nigerians (67.1% of the country's population of 167 million) are living in absolute poverty.[2] Nigeria's poor ranking on Transparency International's 2016 corruption perception index—28 on a scale of 100, ranking 136th of one hundred and seventy-six countries—reveals corruption's corrosive effect. However, the new approach to tackling corruption is off to a promising start. Three months after its introduction, the Nigerian government had received 2,351 tips. Of them, one hundred and fifty-four were actionable. Nigeria's information minister says the government recovered funds from three whistle-blower tips in February alone (Iyorah, 26 April 2017).

The staggering amount of cash recovered in a country with thousands of unemployed graduates, accident-prone roads, poor welfare package, and poor healthcare delivery for citizens is jaw-dropping. Sadly, a great country like Nigeria has well-educated youths with transformational ideas still suffering due to the lack of financial support. Yet, to the bewilderment of the world, we discover vast amounts of looted funds in cash in private houses.

The results of whistleblowing policy in Nigeria

The policy has yielded results. For instance, the government discovered $9.8 million in cash in a Kaduna slum residence in Sabon-Tasha. Also, the Economic and Financial Crimes (EFCC) found $38 million, ¦ 23 million, and £27,000 in a Lagos residence. At an exchange rate of ¦ 350 to $1, the cash recovered so far is over ¦ 14 trillion (Daily Trust, 13 July 2017). In another case, a woman whistle-blew on her husband when he refused to return certain public funds he had acquired fraudulently. Also, brothers have given information to the government on a similar matter. Some of these people made no demand for rewards (Malami, 2017).

Several former and current public officers who allegedly stole from the

2. That means they make less than $1 a day.

treasury hid the physical cash in safe houses. Others stashed the ill-gotten funds in bank accounts in the names of shell companies, friends, family members, or associates. These looters use several account names but usually operate the accounts themselves, a fact the bank officers who manage the accounts know well. Since the whistleblowing policy, however, several bank workers have been informing on them for the rewards it promises (Chioma Gabriel 15 April 2017).

The challenges of whistleblowing

Blowing the whistle on corrupt organisations or individuals can have powerful effects, both positive and negative, on those who step forward. Evidence shows that many whistle-blowers have suffered negative consequences, including the loss of employment, threats of revenge, and isolation (Tan and Ong, 2011). Nonetheless, many believe that they had to blow the whistle (Huang, Staley, Tsai, and Chui, 2013). Whistleblowing is not to cause harm but to protect and deter fraud and wrongdoing. Ethical persons with knowledge of the details of fraudulent activities have the responsibility to report them.

Financial fraud in many large corporations has enraged, stunned, and devastated the public in several countries. These companies include Enron, Halliburton, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco Parmalat, and Royal Ahold. The Malaysian company, 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), lost millions of dollars recently and faced accusations of financial malfeasance. Detecting financial misconduct is usually difficult. Therefore, the best hope is that insiders with a sense of responsibility will uncover it to the proper authorities (Eaton and Akers, 2007). The following sections address the risks they take when they do so.

Risks of whistleblowing

Adverse impact on career prospects

The attention that a whistle-blower case brings, both to the employee and the organisation, can have a downside. Media interviews, legal testimony and government investigations can affect the whistle-blower's career prospects. The public may view whistle-blowers as heroes for revealing corrupt behaviour, but hiring managers may see them as disloyal. The media attention may cause the industry in which they work to blacklist the whistle-blower.

Personal complications

Although whistle-blowers may understand that their revelations serve the greater good, they also often endure personal problems from their actions. Media outlets in search of a story will delve deeper into the whistle-blowers' personal lives. Legal complications from criminal investigations and civil lawsuits against the organisation might require them to hire attorneys to defend themselves. They may also receive threats of retaliation from former supervisors and co-workers. All of this added stress can cause severe health problems and fractures in their relationships.

Fear of the unknown

Many praise whistle-blowers for noble deeds; many also condemn them as malcontents, troublemakers, and misfits for exposing the misfeasance of their colleagues and management. Those who oppose it believe that employees have a duty of loyalty to their organisation and to eschew anything that can tarnish its image. Duska (2012) denies that such a duty exists because the supreme duty of any organisation's members is to protect it from threats to its existence.

Socio-cultural stigma

Many see whistleblowing as an aberration or evil that is only acceptable as a necessary tool in the policing of unethical and illegal behaviour.

Inadequate protection

The legislation for whistle-blower protection only protects whistle-blowers from retaliation or intimidation if they are "witnesses or victims" of the wrongdoing and testify in the prosecution of wrongdoers. Most potential whistle-blowers do not fall into this narrow group. Moreover, the ultimate objectives of whistleblowing laws are not simply to assist in the prosecution of an alleged wrongdoer, but also to play a preventative role. As Transparency International has observed, the ideal situation is where a whistle-blower raises concerns early so that the authorities can take *preventive* action.

The necessity of blowing the whistle

1. Whistleblowing is the only means to expose wrongdoing that the public should know about and correct or stop: bribery, illegal surveillance, misuse of organisational resources, and unlawful conspiracies;

2. It is a tool to correct or reform organisations by exposing their inappropriate behaviour to force change;
3. The practice promotes justice and accountability: society holds wrongdoers accountable for their actions.

Findings

1. The whistle-blower policy alone cannot solve the problem. A comprehensive approach is necessary to tackle corruption, which has left many people in perpetual poverty;
2. Corruption in Nigeria is haemorrhagic in the sense that the country is bleeding internally and externally, and cannot get blood donation any more;
3. The state loses many corruption cases because of a lack of political will, inadequate funding of anti-graft agencies, the premature publicising of cases, and, probably, poor quality of lawyers;
4. Many Nigerians still find it difficult to blow the whistle for fear of exposure and attack;
5. Anti-graft agencies do not investigate corruption cases adequately before making arrests. Therefore, they lose many of them and the whistle-blower goes to prison;
6. The agencies have not conducted adequate public education on the type of activities to report and the means.

Conclusion

The destructiveness of corruption has engendered worldwide support for whistle-blower legislation. This approach has yielded tremendous results in Nigeria and other countries. Whistleblowing has proven to be effective in curtailing corruption in all sectors of society. However, whistleblowing is new and rare in Nigeria. This may be due to the absence of a robust statutory framework that protects whistle-blowers. The absence of this framework may also raise difficulties in the promotion of good governance. Many countries and international organisations are adopting laws or policies that legalise or encourage whistleblowing because of its increasing recognition as a tool to expose corruption. Above all, the justification for whistleblowing is that it is a tool that authorities can use to expose and combat corruption.

Recommendations

Provide incentives

Provide incentives, financial and non-financial (cash rewards or extra holiday days), for whistle-blower reports that lead to the exposure of unethical or unlawful activities. Whistle-blowers and lawyers need to be provided with incentives to encourage them and for the lawyers to make the best cases possible. The EFCC should open its caseload to bids from a wider range of lawyers. To strengthen its cases, it should consider hiring lawyers from agencies outside Nigeria with a history of successful prosecution of corruption cases (FBI, Scotland Yard, etc.).

Investigate properly

To avoid embarrassment and false accusation, anti-graft agencies must investigate reports thoroughly before swinging into action. An example of such embarrassment occurred in the case of Sani Chindo who accused Dasuki Sambo of storing currencies in his flat in Kaduna. The ICPC invaded his residence without due investigation, only to find that the report was false. The agency subsequently prosecuted Chindo for providing false information. The presiding judge, Justice Aliyu Mohammed, ordered his remand in prison custody till 2 November 2017 to enable him to secure counsel before the next hearing. Would these developments not discourage other potential whistle-blowers? Further, internal collaborators within the agency possibly leaked information about the raid.

Learn from global best practices

The Nigerian government should learn from global best practices in whistleblowing legislation. Nigeria should emulate the rest of the world by promulgating legislation to encourage and protect whistle-blowers and prosecute corrupt persons.

Conclude investigations before disclosing information

Anti-corruption agencies must conclude investigations before disclosing information about them. While the recovery of stolen funds is commendable, these agencies need to exercise caution. Nigerians are quick at pronouncing guilt even before trials and fabricating stories that may hinder investigations. An instance is the EFCC's recovery of $38 million, ¦ 23 million and £27,000 from a flat in Ikoyi, Lagos State. Its agents took along journalists on the raid,

resulting in conflicting reports in the media during the investigation.

Deterrence is the point

Penalties for corruption must be high enough to be deterrent. The law must strip convicted officials of not only the funds they embezzle but also their charters and/or professional licences. It should bar them for life from participation in politics and appointment to positions of trust in the public or private sector. Also, it should bar them from participating in the formation, organisation, or management of political entities, and strip them of national honours that they hold. The forfeiture requirements for successful conviction must be total. These forfeiture requirements and punitive measures must also apply to plea deals, for agreements reached outside the courts.

Ensure anonymity and confidentiality

People should be able to give whistleblowing information anonymously or, at least, confidentially. Research indicates that whistle-blowers are more comfortable reporting suspected wrongdoing when such options are available. NAVEX Global reported in March 2014 that 60% of internal fraud tips in the U.S. were anonymous. The availability of anonymous and confidential reporting mechanisms encourages whistle-blowers to report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual wrongdoing without fear of retaliation.

Encourage internal reporting and prevent retaliation

Authorities must emphasise when establishing reporting procedures that they will not, and are under legal prohibition not to, retaliate against employees who make whistle-blower reports. The fear of retribution is strong among potential whistle-blowers and such fear may adversely affect the effectiveness of the internal reporting process. Trust in an organisation's whistle-blower processes is essential to motivate employees to report suspected unethical or unlawful conduct internally.

Fund anti-graft agencies adequately

The Nigerian government must ensure that the agencies that investigate and prosecute corruption cases have enough funds to perform their duties without undue interference.

Educate, publicise, and facilitate reporting

Anti-graft agencies should ensure that their publicity and ethics programmes include regular public education on the need for whistleblowing and publicising the means for doing so. They should dedicate a portion of the publicity department's budget to education on the type of activities they should report. Certain publicity experts note that a positive message may alleviate psychological factors that prevent or discourage tipsters from using the hotline. For example, words like accountability, transparency, responsibility, and citizenship are more effective than fraud, corruption, embezzlement, bribery, and crime (Janet and Beth, 2011). Further, anti-graft agents should make dedicated lines available daily.

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Part 12 | Crime and Mental Health

Chapter 39 | Substance Abuse, Violence and Crime: The Antithesis of Nation-building

Aishatu Yusha'u Armiya'u

Background and Context

Violence related to drug abuse harms society because they undermine the citizen's safety and security. Studies have richly documented the many relationships between drugs and violent criminal behaviour. Connections exist between crime and, on the one hand, the possession or sale of illegal drugs and, on the other, drug-related violence (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2014). Drug abuse plays a role in offences directly related to drug abuse (Baillargeon et al., 2009) or lifestyles that predispose the abuser to illegality (Binswanger et al., 2007).

Drug abuse is a health and social problem globally, but its particulars vary locally (WHO, 1987). Adolescent and young-adult indulgence in the vice has become a public concern worldwide partly because of its potential contribution to unintentional and intentional injuries (Whichstrom and Hegna, 2003); Daane (2003). Drug abuse, especially among young adolescents, has risen rapidly in Nigeria (Oyakhilome, 1990; NDLEA, 1992/93) despite counter-measures by the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency and other government agencies. Its impacts extend today across socio-economic, cultural, religious, and ethnic boundaries.

A close link exists between substance abuse and crime, and substance use disorder is a common factor in the criminal justice setting. Studies of prison populations report high rates of this condition (Pulay et al., 2008; Boden et al., 2012; Lundholm et al., 2013). They have also reported an association between substance use disorders and violence (Boles and Miotto, 2003; Grann and Fazel, 2004). A meta-analysis in 2014 examining homicide rates across nine countries reported that 37% of the homicide offenders were under alcohol intoxication when they committed their offences. Another 48% had alcohol in their systems (Duke, Smith, Oberleitner, et al., 2018). Violent crime—homicide, assault, manslaughter, etc.—causes great suffering and harm. The connections between it and substance use disorders necessitate the

specialised treatment of sufferers and special counter-measures to this crime category (Falk et al., 2014).

The United Nations on Drug and Crime (UNODC) in 2009 named Nigeria among seven high-risk countries of eight West African nations it designated as major crime areas. The crimes in question include drug trafficking, in which Nigeria is a transit point for cocaine from Latin America and heroin from Asia and a major supplier of cannabis. The UNODC is implementing a large-scale, European Union-financed project to address this problem, entitled NGAV 16 "response to drugs and related organised crime in Nigeria." The project supports the country's fight against illicit drug production, trafficking, and use, including psychotropic substances and counterfeit narcotics. The purpose of this is to curb organised drug-related crime.

Substance use, abuse, and dependence are more common in the criminal justice population than in the general population. A study of awaiting trial and convicted inmates at a maximum-security prison in north-central Nigeria reported that 60% had used alcohol and illegal drugs before their current offence. Thirty-seven point three per cent of them faced charges of armed robbery, and 28% had substance use disorder (Armiya'u et al., 2013). Another study in Nigeria found a significant correlation between the type of crime and the offender's level of substance intoxication while committing the crime (Armiya'u et al., 2017). Similarly, a study of jail detainees demonstrated that two-thirds were abusing or dependent on drugs before their detention. These findings are a major cause for concern, as they indicate that substance abuse is escalating rather than de-escalating. This escalation will impact the future of West Africa negatively.

Substance abuse problems are chronic relapsing disorders. They have many harmful and disabling effects, on not only the users but also their families and society. Some patients enter treatment during their withdrawal from drugs after having developed dependence on them. Individuals admitted to a rehabilitation service have often been using substances for many years and are frequently ill (UNODC, 2013).

Substances, Crime and Violence

The relationship between substance use and crime is complex. Most crimes result from many factors (personal, situational, cultural, and economic); hence, drug use is usually only one of many factors in their causation. In short,

no evidence suggests drug use alone inexorably leads to criminal activity. However, drugs and crime correlate directly and closely correlated at the higher levels of drug use. Among crime-prone individuals, illegal drug use intensifies criminal activity. As it increases in frequency and amount, so does criminal behaviour.

The criminally inclined tend to commit crimes in higher numbers and of greater severity when they have a drug dependency. Vice versa, they commit fewer crimes at lower use levels. Additionally, illicit drug use and criminal activity are often coincident and mutually reinforcing. Crime-prone, drug-using persons typically upgrade to violent crime only after crossing the threshold from drug use to abuse or dependence. Hence, many armed robbery suspects in a maximum-security prison in north-central Nigeria were alcohol- or drug-dependent and intoxicated when they committed their offence (Armiya'u and Adole, 2015).

The manufacturing, distribution and possession of drugs such as marijuana, heroin and methamphetamine, or the misuse of prescription drugs are illegal and have the potential for abuse. The law also prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. However, as mentioned earlier, the relationship between drug use and crime is much more complicated. Crime and drug use indicate an individual with low self-control. Those willing to try drugs are more impulsive and may turn to street crime because of addiction (Idaho State Police, 2010). Drug use does not create a criminal offender; however, it may intensify such actions. Drug users are less likely to have a legitimate occupation or the education necessary to find a good job (BRFSS, 2009 cited in Idaho State Police). Lifestyle choices, environmental factors, and genetics are determinants of the probability of an individual abusing drugs and committing crimes (Idaho State Police, 2010).

The link between substance misuse and violent behaviour

The pharmacological properties of a drug can affect an individual, particularly at a high dose. A substance might inhibit judgement and engender impulsivity, aggression, abusiveness, argumentativeness, agitation, and grandiosity. These might cause violent crimes. We can explore the link between illegal drugs and crime further by focusing on the criminal career (Makkai and Payne, 2003). Such a focus provides a mechanism for organising and structuring information, which describes patterns of offending over the offender's life course (Makkai and Payne, 2003). An analysis of criminal

careers in the United States found significant variations in criminal offending. However, criminological research shows that offenders tend to "mature out" of crime. The drug use literature indicates similar effects (Makkai and Payne, 2003). The failure of interventions to take diversity into account has an obvious consequence.

Goldstein (1985), in his major work on the theoretical modelling of drugs and crime, proposed three models of the links between drug use and violence. The Economically Compulsive Model involves an individual committing crimes to fund an expensive drug habit (Goldstein, 1985). Theft and prostitution are the most common types of drug-related economic crime. Goldstein (p. 257) avers that:

> Violence generally results from some other factor in the social context in which the economic crime is perpetrated. Such factors include the perpetrator's own nervousness, the victim's reaction, weaponry (or lack of it) carried by either offender or victim, the intercession of [a] bystander, and so on.

The Systemic Model argues that the drug distribution system engenders violence because it involves sizeable sums of money. Distributors provide their own protection since the illegality of their business excludes reliance on the formal security system. The regulation of the drug market in these conditions often breeds violence. The high levels of violence that characterised the U.S. crack cocaine market in the late 1980s was a clear demonstration of this association between drug markets and violence.

The Psycho-pharmacological Model implies that individuals commit crimes because of the short- and long-term effects of drugs themselves. Several researchers have found a high correlation between illegal drugs and violent crime:

> Research on the nexus of aggression and substance use has consistently found a complex relationship, mediated by personality and expectancy factors, situational factors and sociocultural factors that channel the arousal effects of substances into behaviour types [that] may or may not involve interpersonal aggression (Fagan, 1990, p. 243).

An extensive review of literature by Fagan (1990, p. 214) found "limited evidence that ingestion of substances is a direct, pharmacological cause of aggression."

The variability in the effect of substances themselves suggests that social,

cultural, and personality factors also influence the link between substances and violence. Crime-producing violence is more likely in certain settings and among particular people in those settings. Gang members may use certain substances to prepare for gang fights or to facilitate peaceful social interaction. These complexities suggest that the factors that govern the occurrence of violence include the effects and physical setting of substance use and the persons involved. Others are the rules regarding violence in that setting, their enforcement, and the cultural expectations that shape beliefs about violence. Substance use plays a critical role in this ecological dynamic.

Violence and crime related to substance abuse take different forms. These include violent crimes perpetrated by or against individual substance users and innocent individuals caught in the crossfire. Several studies demonstrate a relationship between substance abuse and crime, including violent crime. Case studies of offenders in armed robbery, homicide, and similar violent offences indicate that substance abuse is a critical factor. Other evidence suggests a relation between the rate of violence and the frequency of substance abuse. Evidence also indicates that whereas some substance abusers engage in violent offending, others engage neither in violence nor crime. Caution is, therefore, necessary in interpreting such reports. The violence in some communities and families is not a product solely of localised substance abuse. Their causes are more complex.

Substance abuse may be a cause or mediator of or response to diverse social behaviours, including interpersonal violence. We know little about its contribution to victimisation, however, because most studies focus on the link between violence/substance use and crime commission rather than victimisation. The sale of drugs often involves victimisation in robberies, assaults, and homicide (Goldstein, 1988). Victimisation in these last two often arises from a verbal conflict between the victim and the perpetrator that escalates into physical violence. Marvin Wolfgang (1957) defines victim-precipitated homicide as "homicide in which the victim was the initial aggressor" and noted that "these victims often have high blood-alcohol content upon autopsy." Studies of rape victims found high levels of alcohol in not only them but also their assailants. Alcohol might be a factor in these crimes but does not qualify as their cause. It may alter the perception of social cues and comprehension of verbal communication, thus increasing the risk of misinterpretation. It may impair the victim's judgement regarding the

perceived or actual threats other individuals pose at the time and location of the assault (Coid, 1986).

Understanding the Substance Abuse-Violence-Governance-Development Nexus

The World Health Organisation (2011) describes substance abuse as the harmful and hazardous use of psychoactive substances, including alcohol and illicit drugs. Psychoactive substance use can lead to dependence syndrome, i.e.,

A cluster of behavioural, cognitive, and physiological phenomena that develop after repeated substance use and that typically include a strong desire to take the drug, difficulties in controlling its use, persisting in its use despite harmful consequences, a higher priority given to drug use than other activities and obligation/increased tolerance, and sometimes a physical withdrawal state (WHO, 2011).

The organisation also defines violence as the intentional or purposeful use of power or physical force against oneself, others, or a community or group in an actual or threatened manner that could cause psychological harm, injury, deprivation, death, or mal-development (WHO 2002). Over 1.3 million people globally die each year due to various forms of violence, accounting for 2.5% of global mortality (WHO, 2014). Violence is the fourth leading cause of death worldwide for people aged fifteen to forty-four (WHO, 2014). Substance abuse is a cause of violence, especially when the actor is under intoxication or withdrawing from drugs. Its incidence and associated violence in West Africa are a cause for concern. The reasons include the pharmacological effects of drugs, armed conflict between drug gangs, and the ability of drug traffickers to intimidate even national governments in ECOWAS countries. Crime is an act that is harmful to the individual, community, society, and state ("the public wrong"). The law forbids and punishes such acts (Martin, 2003).

Different people understand the concept of governance differently. Its actual meaning depends on the level in question. Local governance is a set of local-level institutions, mechanisms, and processes through which citizens can articulate their needs and interests, mediate their differences, and exercise their rights and obligations (UNDP, 2014). Good governance is citizen participation and partnership among key actors at the local level. Shah and Shah (2006) posit that it involves providing local services as much as preserving life and liberty and facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life. Human development

entails all aspects of an individual's well-being—health, economic, social, and political (UN Human Development Report, 1996). It is clear from this definition that the negative consequences of substance abuse are the exact antithesis of development.

Africa is getting crowded, with its population density set to almost quadruple by 2100 (UNICEF, 2014) and rise to eighty persons per square kilometre by 2050 from thirty-nine in 2015. Nigeria ranks fifth among the ten most densely populated low-income countries in Africa (UNICEF, 2014). West Africa accounts for 45% of the continent's immense urban population, with most of its people living in towns and cities. Fifty-three per cent of West Africans live on less than $1.25 daily, and 74% on less than $2. The region's population explosion and high fertility rate necessitate counter-measures to the looming drug-abuse problem and its associated challenge of violent crime.

Urgent action is necessary given that several studies reveal that youths are the largest portion of both the drug-abusing and prison populations. Drug abuse has far-reaching effects on the progress and aspiration of youths and their ability to benefit from the opportunities that the home, community, and government provide. Constructive activities and mentoring programmes are necessary to build their capacity to reject it. Such programmes should reward performance in a range of indicators, including school performance and self-esteem. They should be central to drug use reduction campaigns among youths and young adults because they indeed work (Tierney et al., 1995).

Researchers have noted that adolescent youths, to establish their independence, reject traditional authority figures. Drug use may be a "default activity" among them in this period, especially where they have few opportunities to assert their independence constructively (Tierney, Jean, and Nancy, 1995). There should be youth-targeted educational campaigns employing scientifically accurate information so that they simultaneously achieve their goals and gain credibility with the younger generation. The federal government should have a special budget for reducing drug abuse by youths and young adults. That is because the war on drugs is tragically insufficient, despite the nobility of its aim to prevent child drug addiction (McCaffery, 1998).

Also, effectively addressing drug abuse and drug-related violent crime requires a strategy to reduce the drug supply and demand. A multi-dimensional approach, involving multi-professional assistance, is the way forward. Using law enforcement agents to reduce drug production and distribution has not

stopped or reduced drug abuse. A more robust approach is necessary involving collaboration between all parties working in the control of drug trafficking, treatment of drug abusers, drug law enforcement, and research in these areas. The cooperation must rest on the individual and collective responsibilities, directly or indirectly, of the parties involved.

The federal government must give priority to illicit drugs and should have a master plan. The plan should enable states to summarise their policies, define priorities, and assign responsibilities—including drug abuse control measures in the general framework of their social and economic development programmes. A coordinated approach is necessary that includes community involvement in the formulation of drug control policy, as most drug abusers live within communities. They should participate in the design and implementation of culturally acceptable and relevant community-based prevention and education programmes. The state and society should provide community-based organisations (CBOs) with the human, financial, and technical resources to actualise this.

Impact of substance use and crime on nation-building

It is imperative to note that nations do not happen by historical coincidence; patriots build them over time. Nation-building is a product of conscious statecraft, not happenstance. It is a process; each nation encounters new challenges daily in its search for reformation and restructuring. The process is a continuum, in which people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds develop a sense of *one-anothering*, becoming one nation, having one voice, one identity, one leader. Nation-building encompasses national integration and development, political development, and national consciousness. It entails building a political entity, erecting institutions, creating a common identity and citizenship.

Illicit drug use is a public health issue that jeopardises our well-being and economic progress. It does so by contributing to addiction, disease, academic under-performance, crime, unemployment, and low productivity (National Drug Control Strategy, 2015). Habitual substance use depletes our wealth of future nation-builders, people who selflessly develop their community. Wimmer (2018) identified three factors in successful nation-building. They are the early development of civil society organisations, a state able to provide public goods across its territory, and a shared medium of communication. We will focus on the second in this paper.

Substance use could present an arcane level of national identity. The Global Commission on Drug Policy has noted the human cost of misguided drug policies and their failure to reduce the production and consumption of illegal drugs and thwart criminal organisations. The body has also listed the measures required to correct the consequences of these failed policies. These consequences include the spread of infectious diseases, death from overdose, and the use of adulterated substances, violence associated with repression and gang turf wars, and corruption. Others are prison overcrowding and a shortage of the resources necessary for adequate drug treatment and pain relief. Another is the failure of the social integration of people with drug-related criminal records, including consumers and non-violent actors in illegal drug production or sale (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2017).

The antithesis between substance use and nation-building is noteworthy. Substance use, violence, and crime undermine nation-building. This relationship is not one-sided, however: this coin has two sides. The erosion of a nation's foundations by prejudice, double standards, and bias could lead to substance use and its consequences. The extolling of a failed system to young adults is possibly also a predisposing factor. Christopher and Abigail in 2016 analysed the Prohibition, the 1920 Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that banned the manufacture, sale, and transport of "intoxicating liquors" within the United States. Its proponents hailed it as a cure for myriad social ills. They argued that eliminating alcohol consumption would reduce crime and corruption and lower the tax burden to support prisons and poorhouses. Also, it would improve public health and prevent the disintegration of families.

Contrary to these noble expectations, however, alcohol prohibition was a failure on all fronts. Consumption decreased sharply at the beginning of the Prohibition but rebounded quickly and was between 60 and 70% of its pre-Prohibition level within a few years.The alcohol produced under the Prohibition varied in potency and quality, with disastrous health outcomes—including deaths from alcohol poisoning and overdose. Barred from buying legal alcohol, many users switched to opium, cocaine, and other dangerous drugs. Criminal syndicates formed to manufacture and distribute illegal liquors, crime increased, and corruption flourished.

Psychological and moral perspectives are dominant regarding substance use, the primary assumption being that users are "weak" or "immoral." Thus, the public often sees problematic drug use as an individual rather than a social

problem. They also see drug users as living on society's margins, neither equal to its members nor entitled to the same rights as them (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2017). These perceptions create an antithesis to nation-building. The question is, are we establishing or destroying the foundations of national integration? The acceptance or alienation of persons differentiates between those who should uphold a falling Olympus and who should stand aloof.

Substance users are in two groups: the post-colonial generation and the millennial. The predisposing factors to drug use vary for these groups. For post-colonial users in Nigeria, they include the 1966 events that initiated the collapse of democratic institutions, a subsequent bitter civil war, and the ripple effect of these developments. These predisposed this generation (age bracket of forty-five–seventy years) to the use and abuse of substances like tobacco, locally brewed alcohol, beer, and snuff. On the other hand, a failed and oppressive political system has predisposed Millennials (eighteen to thirty-five years) to the use of cocaine, marijuana, opioids, and other amphetamine-like substances.

There has been a global increase in the use and abuse of licit and illicit substances, giving rise to tensions. Some of these latter arise in part from the rapid changes in political alignment, rising unemployment and underemployment, weakening family and community cohesion, increased crime, and economic and social marginalisation.

Health impact

Health problems affect family life and productive employment; they diminish the quality of life and may threaten survival. Many addictive substances exist, and they share several characteristics. They disrupt brain functions and impact negatively, therefore, on behaviour, attitude, and thought. They are in use globally and a burden to society because they increase the economic and social costs of productive enterprises and draw upon the government's limited resources. Treatment and rehabilitation are essential components of demand reduction and should be a means of helping persons to overcome their addiction rather than punishment. Studies have shown that treatment carried out under proper conditions changes behaviour.

The treatment of substance use disorders is an important foundation for the rehabilitation and integration of sufferers into the community. However, the skills of the treatment providers and the types and processes of the treatment they employ are more important than the setting in which treatment

occurs. Specialised assistance for persons with substance use disorder is often unavailable in Nigeria or expensive when available. Therefore, the government should modify existing primary healthcare facilities to care for such people. Although most rural dwellers have no access to specialised healthcare, primary healthcare networks can provide contact and initial intervention. Acuda argued that general health workers in Harare should receive training in handling alcohol and drug problems, especially in rapid assessment, counselling, and early-phase crisis management.

Impact on education

Education is the principal instrument in substance abuse prevention; however, other settings are important also alongside educational institutions: the home and religious institutions contribute vitally to learning and socialisation. This is because most children are out of school in some countries, including Nigeria, and many who are in school stay only a few years. In these circumstances, it is necessary to adapt methods of drug prevention education to meet the needs of rural youths. These may include innovative out-of-school activities that are consistent with community values and standards. Formal and informal forms of education are necessary, especially where few children attend school or family systems are under disintegrative pressures.

Impact on the family and community

The rapid social, economic, and technological changes may weaken the sense of family under certain circumstances and reduce the sense of belonging to other people, groups, and places. Stable relationships, environments, and expectations are powerful formative forces in an individual's life, especially children and young adults. Families have a powerful shaping influence on the behaviours, attitudes, and values of children, but it is uncertain how this influence compares to peer pressure regarding substance abuse. The peer group influence is usually strong in the formative years of youths, sometimes stronger than that of parents. According to Kandel (1973), friends are more similar in their use of marijuana than in any other activity or attitude. As such, substance use by peers may have more influence than the attitudes of parents. Other studies report that peers are more influential only when parents do not perform their traditional supervisory roles (Blum et al., 1972).

It is necessary to employ knowledge of family dynamics in designing programmes to prevent substance abuse problems. This will help to address

the personal and social concerns of family members that might otherwise lead to substance abuse in dysfunctional and intact families.

Impact on crime

Substance abuse has a massive impact on law enforcement agencies. At each step of the path from production, distribution, to consumption, it diverts their time, energy, and resources from other responsibilities. These duties include intelligence gathering, surveillance, interdiction and seizure, prosecution and adjudication, sentencing, imprisonment, probation, and parole. Special drug courts are necessary in Nigeria to process drug cases. As mentioned above, most of the prisoners in a prison study were under the influence of intoxicating substances when they committed their offences, mostly armed robbery.

Another implication of drug-related crime is that the political agenda becomes flooded with substance abuse issues: the vulnerability of youths, fear of violent crime, and increased prostitution. Communities react differently. Some become resigned, some are indifferent, and some resist.

Impact on work and employment

Substance abuse occurs more frequently among young people than in older age groups. The risk factors for substance use often become active before entry into the workforce. Since the highest frequency of use is in the eighteen-to-thirty-nine-years age group—the peak age for employment—substance abuse problems enter the workplace with each new generation of workers. Current projections are that this same cohort is simultaneously those likely to experience growing unemployment, drug use, and drug use problems. This will worsen existing social problems since many available jobs are outside the worker's community and young workers cannot benefit from the family support network necessary to sustain them. Studies often advocate for knowledge and training as the solutions to unemployment. They may be the problem rather than the solution, however, since the supply often exceeds the demand for trained and educated persons in many countries, including Nigeria. Competition for jobs will probably increase, and employers may become even more selective in hiring young people. In Nigeria, currently with many employed, some graduated at twenty-three and went ten years without employment, making them now thirty-three years old. Most companies now set an age limit for employability.

Unemployment varies in its consequences, but it usually reduces the individual's ability to participate in the social, economic, and political life of their community. Unemployment is itself a marginal status so long as employment is the norm. The competition for jobs is more intense in Nigeria today because of increased migration from rural areas to cities. Young people without training and employment may find themselves idle and on the fringes of urban society. Social relationships may deteriorate when employment means separation from family and friends. If living at home, the unemployed may feel that they are placing an undue burden on the household—which already may find it hard to meet its needs.

Impact of substance abuse on governance

One cannot over-emphasise the negative impacts of substance abuse on individuals and communities; this paper has described them. That it is a major threat to human development is a fact, as it affects all aspects of life adversely. It undermines physical and mental health, which impacts negatively on the individual's physical and cognitive development. This is particularly among youths who begin substances abuse in their adolescence. Consequently, they perform poorly in their studies and eventually drop out of school at the critical stage of their development without acquiring the skills they need. Their early commencement of substance abuse prevents them from imbibing the values of society. These young people ultimately become a nuisance and a burden on the government at the local level.

Substance abuse with a co-morbid physical illness like HIV/AIDS or mental disorder leads to greater service utilisation and higher consumption of scarce health resources. This translates to increased budgetary expenditure on health at the expense of other sectors, leading to under-development. Frequent ill-health due to substance dependence causes absenteeism and poor concentration at work, which diminish productivity and, thus, retard local-level economic growth and development. If substance abuse by youths hinders human development, it arguably undermines governance and development at the state and local levels. A community cannot develop when disease plagues its vibrant population and renders them unproductive. This results in poor implementation or outright non-implementation of government policies. Substance abuse produces an unskilled active labour force through ill-health, school drop-out, and poor skill acquisition. This culminates in poverty and retarded economic growth at the local level.

Ekong (2010) avers that youths can aid community development by performing their social responsibilities. These include providing surveillance, vigilante services, and clean-up service and representing the community in football and other competitions. Therein lies the key to sustainable community and rural development in Nigeria. He also notes, conversely, that youths can hinder community development by playing roles with adverse effects on the community. These include opposing, sabotaging, or vandalising development projects in their communities. These are concomitants of substance abuse by youths.

Substance abuse robs the youth of effective and positive participation in community development, as it causes poor health, unemployment, and redundancy. We have noted earlier that local governance involves citizen participation. It fails in its obligation when most citizens, especially its active labour force, cannot participate actively in community affairs. Substance abuse has contributed significantly to social problems in Nigeria. These include divorce, domestic violence, arson, and wanton destruction of life and property—as reports from the Jos Maximum-Security Prison show (Armiya'u et al., 2013). Therefore, substance abuse by youths turns them into instruments of destruction, not only of life and property but of societal values and development. Consequently, they pose a great security challenge and retard development at all levels of governance, especially at the local level.

Way Forward

Society cannot leave to the government alone the task of addressing substance abuse. A partnership of all stakeholders is necessary: the state and local governments and civil society working in this field. Community and religious leaders and educational institutions in particular need assistance to better confront substance abuse in Nigeria. These governments, leaders, and organisations should create public awareness of its magnitude and adverse consequences on communities and governance. They should aim to enhance health promotion and the prevention, early detection, and management of substance abuse and dependence in communities. State and local governments would do well to ensure that their contractors execute some of their contracts through direct labour to engage unemployed youths. This would give the beneficiaries who are not government employees a sense of belonging and an opportunity to participate in development at the local level.

These governments should establish locally owned youth development

centres to provide vocational training, counselling, and basic treatment for substance abuse or dependence before referral to secondary or tertiary facilities. These measures would help engage the youths productively and improve societal well-being. Governments should develop more sporting activities and recreational centres to engage the youths and motivate them to spend their leisure time productively. This will promote their healthy development and channel their energy in the right direction. The government and society should encourage them to form groups—vigilante associations, young farmers clubs, youths against drugs and alcohol, cooperatives, etc. The government should engage these groups collectively in development programmes rather than individually. Also, to incentivise others to adopt a drug-free life, it should give priority to their members who do not abuse substances. This will give the youths and these organisations a sense of belonging and enable them to participate in community development.

Local and state governments should demonstrate more commitment to combating substance abuse by screening job applicants for drugs and alcohol. Other measures may include the sanctioning of personnel who use substances during working hours, banning smoking in public places, and discouraging substance use by government officials during official ceremonies. Yet other measures include providing educational opportunities for all citizens affordably. This will keep the restive youths in school for their studies, give value to education, inculcate discipline in them, and enhance their development. Further, school authorities should prevent the smuggling of drugs and alcohol into boarding schools, promote the establishment of drug-free clubs, and sanction substance-abusing teachers, particularly those indulging within school premises.

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Chapter 40 | Substance Abuse, Violence and Crime: The Antithesis of Nation-building

Piwuna Christopher Goson

Nation-building

Some describe a nation as a people united by common descent, history, culture, and language. Considering the challenges that divide Nigerians, one should add religion and ethnicity to this list of unifying factors, the two that threaten our national unity. Most nations face historical, demographic, cultural, and socio-economic challenges. Diverse peoples could become one by establishing common systems of education, transportation, language, security, infrastructures, etc. Many historians and philosophers emphasise the chronology of nations and democracy. The *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*[1] defines a nation as an ethno-cultural group or political organisation to which members hold civic loyalty. Ernest Renan [2] views a nation as a "soul" and its rise as a people becoming aware of their collective nationality. A nation comprises a people—the source of individual identity, bearer of sovereignty, central object of loyalty, and basis of collective solidarity.[3] Nation-building is the creation of a nation, or a socially constructed or "imagined" community.[4] It is the building of a civic domain and political systems, and the influencing and empowering of patriots to become better for themselves, their families, and society. Building a nation involves more than the election of political candidates, state sovereignty, or the erection of symbolic institutions. It is a conscious and continuous exertion of effort to actualise common interests and social identity.

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1. Virtue ethics. (2016). In E. Zalta (Ed.), *Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy*. Winter 2012 Edition. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu.
2. E. Renan, Was ist eine Nation?…und andere politische Schriften, 1995, 56 et seq. (58).
3. Max Planck. Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 9, 2005, p. 615-647.
4. Rosemarijn Hoefte and Wouter Veenendaal (2019) The Challenges of Nation-Building and Nation Branding in Multi-Ethnic Suriname, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 25:2, 173-190, DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2019.1602371.

Hoping to galvanise our people, many have named their buildings, newspapers, or businesses "The Nation". We emphasise again that nation-building is a process. It involves statecraft, patriotism, unwavering resolve, and a clear vision. It is not happen-stance; it never ends. Take the university where this workshop is holding. It is a part of nation-building, along with other institutions such as the judiciary, economy, civil society organisations, and traditional institutions. Nations are products of men and women of vision and exemplary character. They get their sustenance from institutions that promote good governance, such as the judiciary and legislature in a democracy. They have replaced empires and kingdoms. Emperors and kings led those political communities, but anyone can lead a nation. Nation-builders are like masons: they lay the building blocks one after the other carefully to ensure stability and strength. The bricks support one another and glue together to withstand any storm and roofed to protect from the rains and sun. With nations, it is to withstand violence, crime, and the ill effects of substance use or misuse, among other problems. Other challenges could be economic, social, immigration and border control or delivery of educational and health concerns of the citizens.

Some say that history is the holy book of a people. It is the record of their past, revelation, and morality, the legacy of their ancestors, a supplement to and an explanation of today, and an example for tomorrow. For instance, Nigeria has experienced turmoil since it gained independence from British Empire in 1960. The country is now striving to overcome the plague she suffered in the past or getting entwined by its history of poor leadership. Several factors, one of them is corruption, could undermine nation-building. Some believe the rise of public administration and discovery of oil and natural gas increased corrupt practices in Nigeria. Authorities estimate Nigeria has lost over $400 billion to corruption since independence.[5]

Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe was the first major political figure who became a subject of investigation for questionable practices. In 1944, a firm belonging to him and his family bought the African Continental Bank, reportedly mostly with proceeds from the Eastern Regional Financial Corporation. In General Yakubu Gowon's administration, defence ministry and central bank officials faced accusations in 1975 of falsifying ship manifestos and inflating cement

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5. Okoye, Rita (31 August 2012). *"Nigeria has lost $400 billion oil revenue to corruption since Independence—Oby Ezekwesili."* Daily Post Nigeria. *Retrieved 2019.*
6. Turner. The Nigerian Cement Racket, Africa Guide, 1976; p. 6

importation figures.[6] Former President Olusegun Obasanjo, whose government transited Nigeria from military rule to democracy, has issues, too. He rewarded cronies through the Operation Feed the Nation Programme and the land grab under the Land Use Decree of his government. Also, his Otta Farm Nigeria (OFN) was reportedly a project under the programme.[7]

Strengthening integrity and reducing corruption has been a priority for Nigeria for several years.[8] In 2014, UNODC launched a project to help combat corruption in Nigeria. The project will support the Government of Nigeria's activities by promoting good governance and by contributing to Nigeria's efforts in enhancing transparency, accountability and combating corruption. It aims to:

1. Provide effective support to anti-corruption coordination, policy formulation and legislation, based on a sound evidence base;
2. Strengthen institutional and operational capacity in the eight main anti-corruption agencies, with an emphasis on cooperation;
3. Enhance accountability, transparency and public engagement.

It is important to note the political, economic, and social context in which corruption thrives but also that ineffective governance breeds corruption, which undermines nation-building.

Substance misuse

A drug is a legal substance given to treat illnesses and diseases or to lessen pain. A psychoactive drug is any chemical substance that, when taken into the body, alters its physical and/or psychological functioning.[9]

People use substances or drugs for medical reasons under prescription by qualified medical professionals. It becomes abuse when its deliberate use is for purposes other than intended medical reasons, leading to impairment in physical, mental and social functioning. In Nigeria, the lifetime consumption of substances is 10.8% for cannabis; 10.6%, amphetamines; 1.6%, heroin; and 1.4%, cocaine (1). It is commoner in males (94.2%) than females (5.8%), the

7. Ojiakor, Desmond *(*6 December 2014*)*. Nigeria: The Gospel According to St. Obasanjo. *Daily Independent. Retrieved 2019*.
8. United Nations Office and Drugs and Crime. June 2016.
9. World Health Organisation. Geneva. 2001.
10. UN Population Database. 2010.

age at first use being between ten and twenty-nine years.[10]

Factors that fuel substance use include poverty, peer pressure, and emotional problems—such as chronic loneliness, loss of a loved one, academic failure, and environmental influences. A recent survey by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) found that Nigeria's rate of drug use was over twice the global average of 5.3% (UN Population Database 2010). Recently, the Federal Ministry of Health banned the sale of codeine-containing syrups following a public outcry and United Nations reports that 246 million youths of fifteen and above abuse drugs in Nigeria. As in most countries, substance use in Nigeria can lead to crime and violence, facilitate heavy and illicit substance abuse, and produce social disruptions and financial difficulties.

Substance misuse or abuse frequently falls in the class of experimental, recreational, or dependence that may cause adverse physical and/or psychological effects (i.e., harmful use). This is a wide spectrum of therapeutic drugs or substances with physiological and psycho-active effects, which professionals issue under legal or medical guidelines.[11] The DSM-IV-TR[12] describes substance abuse as a "maladaptive" pattern of substance use, leading to clinically significant impairment or distress. This impairment or distress manifests as one (or more) of the following within twelve months:

1. Recurrent use leading to failure to fulfil major role obligations (work, home, school, etc.);
2. Repeated use in situations where it is physically hazardous (e.g., drunk driving);
3. Recurrent substance-related legal problems (repeated disorderly conduct while drunk);
4. Persistent use despite recurrent social/interpersonal problems (e.g., arguments or physical fights with a spouse) because of the behaviour.

Substance misuse can take the form of anti-social or harmful behaviour and have harmful effects. These might be on their physical health (overdose, hepatitis, HIV, respiratory problems), mental health

11. United Nations Office and Drugs and Crime. January 2019.
12. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition. 2000. American Psychiatric Association.

(depression, anxiety disorders, suicide), and social relationships. They might also engender criminal and violence issues.[13]

Global increases in problems of illicit drugs both reflect and contribute to international tensions. The origins of some of these tensions are clear: rapid changes in political alignment, reduced family and community cohesiveness, increased unemployment and underemployment, economic and social marginalisation and increased crime.[14]

Drugs and crime: A dangerous liaison

Before the age of rapid urbanisation, substance use and misuse and their ill-effects were largely a phenomenon of dense city centres; their incidences were low in rural areas. Not any more: drug abuse has found its way into rural settings. Researchers posit a causal approach and correlational approach in understanding this phenomenon. Drugs and crime interrelate. Goldstein's[15] tripartite theory of the connection between drugs and violence suggests the:

1. Psycho-pharmacological model;
2. Economic compulsive model;
3. Systematic crime model.

A causal connection exists between drug misuse and crime. In any of these approaches, individual risk factors play a vital role, such as low social support, problems in school, and delinquency.[16]

The psycho-pharmacological model posits that substance use can arouse anger or aggressiveness in the individual, causing those with impulsivity traits to engage in violence or crime. This is easily visible in acute intoxication. The damage from substance abuse is not limited to the individuals involved; others also suffer indirectly because of drunk driving, fires, passive smoking, and drug-related crime and violence (World Development Report 1993).

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13. NCCMH -National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (2008) 'Drug Misuse; Psychosocial Interventions (NICE clinical guideline no 51)' The British Psychological Society and The Royal College of Psychiatrists.
14. United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). The Social Impact of Drug Abuse: World Summit for Social Development. Copenhagen, March 1995.
15. Goldstein, P. (1985). The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 39, 143-174.
16. World Bank, World Development Report, 1993: Investing in Health (Oxford University Press.

Involvement in drug use can increase the risks of being both a victim and/or perpetrator of violence.[17] Drug-related interpersonal violence can substantially damage the health of individuals and the cohesion and development of communities and shift resources from other health and criminal justice priorities. Mortality rates from violence also vary, from 14.4 per 100,000 of the population in high-income countries to 32.1 per 100,000 in low- to middle-income countries.[18]

The absence of data-collection mechanisms on the relationship between illicit drugs and violence compels us to rely on inadequate data from random studies. Also, many incidents of violence due to drug use go unrecorded in healthcare facilities and law enforcement agencies. Despite this, little international research has recorded the influence of drug-related violence on the well-being of individuals. Violence due to drug use is high in illicit drug markets, especially without a legal, social, and economic framework for resolving conflicts. Jungle justice becomes the only means of resolution.[19] The effects of substances vary. Therefore, some drugs predispose individuals to violent behaviours than others with the influence of other factors such as biological, personality socio-cultural, and situational.[20]

In the **economic-compulsive** model, drug users commit crimes to get money for drugs. This is common in drug addicts who struggle to fund their habits, especially those dependent on expensive drugs like cocaine. Under the powerful urge for the substance, they commit crimes—like drug trafficking, commercial sex work, theft, shoplifting, and fraud—to get money to buy it. In the past, political leaders have exploited drugs and crime to gain political mileage, as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair did in the 1994 British elections.[21] More recently, President Donald Trump of the U.S.A. has used drugs and crime to pursue his immigration debate, citing criminal gangs

17. Amanda Atkinso et al. (2009). Interpersonal Violence and Illicit Drug. Centre for Public Health. Liverpool John Moores University. Liverpool.
18. Krug, E. G. et al. (2002). World Health Report on Violence and Health. World Health Organisation. Geneva.
19. May, T., Hough M. (2004). Drug Markets and Distribution Systems. Addiction Research and Theory, 12:549-563.
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21. Bennett T. Holloway K. (2009). The Causal Relationship between Crime and Drugs. The British Journal of Criminology 49(4).

bringing drugs into the United States. Drugs and crime are political issues, but the upside is that it has led to the enactment of laws to address them and a review of imprisonment laws.

A 2010 UNODC[22] report described drug trafficking as a global trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and sale of substances that are subject to drug prohibition laws. This is what Goldstein described as the systematic crime approach in his conceptual framework for the liaison between drugs and crime. This model majorly studies drug cartels and how they pass illicit drugs through borders. The brutality of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram has links with substance use. The Nigerian military found evidence of drug abuse when they invaded Boko Haram camps in Sambisa Forest in Borno State. The illicit drug trade has also been used to fund terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Colombia.

Many terrorist and criminal organisations directly regulate the illicit drug market and are masters of the trade. The association of drugs and crime is the quest for wealth and influence according to the UN International Drug Control Programme (UN DCP). For example, the Colombian terrorists finance much of their operations through the drug trade, causing some conventional drug barons to retaliate.[23] Colombia has emerged as a centre for trafficking in cocaine, blending highly organised social and economic interests with an underground specialisation in drug crime.[24] Organised crime is not specific to one area of the world. Italy also faces entrenched, long-standing criminal elements. Authorities in nations with strong leadership have enacted laws against the Mafia to seize and confiscate property they illegally acquired. These laws, which aim to deprive organised crime of its supply of money, have reportedly had a positive impact.[25]

In the systematic crime model, violence is part of the market for illegal drug distribution. The market is rife with ferocious and unhealthy competition, clashes, and rivalries between dealers and big players. Reprisal attacks are a means of conflict resolution in the drug market. The trade requires face-to-

22. Stevens, A. (2011). Are drugs to blame? Centre for Crime and Justice Studies. (83).
23. LaMond Tullis. (1991)) Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socio-economic and Political Consequences New York, Greenwood Press.
24. Bruce M. Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs", Foreign Affairs 67 (I): 71-92.
25. Pino Arlacchi. (1984) "Effects of the New Anti-Mafia Law on the Proceeds of Crime and on the Italian Economy", Bulletin on Narcotics 36.4 (October-December): 91-100.

face interactions, in which the dealer tries to sell the lowest quality drugs at the highest price. The discovery of the fraud results in dispute and violence.[26] Violence and its threat are integral to the criminal exchange. Both are means to control members of the group, punish those who betray their commitments, and protect the group and maximise its power. Members are under obligation to commit, condone, or permit violent acts.[27] Lethal and sub-lethal violence appears to be endemic to illegal drug trafficking and illicit drug markets.[28] Many of these markets "are clearly very violent; many participants are at risk of being killed or seriously wounded by others in the same business, either as buyers or sellers, and there are shootings of innocent bystanders."[29]

The manufacture, production, supply, or possession of illicit drugs in some countries may be illegal. Also, drug use precedes and correlates with initiation into most criminal activities, such as theft, violence, terrorism, and money laundering.

Qualitative information summarised by UNDCP[30] shows that most governments report a much higher prevalence of drug abuse among men than women. However, abuse among women is reportedly increasing, often attributed to their recent gains in entering the labour market. Although drug abuse is common among all age groups, it occurs more frequently among young adults. Scholars in many countries debate whether to consider illicit drug use a crime, disease, social disorder, or some mixture of these. Often, public policy is ambivalent about the nature of addiction, with social attitudes towards drug abuse reflecting uncertainty about what causes abuse and who is ultimately responsible.[31]

To develop, a nation must have two things:

1. Quality leadership;
2. Excellent political and judicial institutions.

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26. D.C. McBride, "Drugs and Violence," in J. Inciardi, (ed.) The Drugs-Crime Connection, 1981, p. 113.
27. Stephen Schneider (2013). Violence, Organised Crime, and Illicit Drug Markets: A Canadian Case Study. Saint Mary's University, Department of Sociology and Criminology, Halifax, Canada.
28. Ibid.
29. Reuter, Peter (2009), "Systemic violence in drug markets", *Crime Law and Social Change*, 52 (3), pp. 275-284.
30. Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), General Household Survey, 1995/6.
31. www.thisdayonline, 09.08.2005.

The results of drug abuse range from prostitution, theft, and violence, such as terrorism in North Central Nigeria and kidnapping in the South. We cannot build a nation on this footing. These issues have broken our societies, and only resolving them can put us on the path of nation-building. We must, therefore, find resources in ourselves to fight bad leadership and confront the menace of drug abuse with human will and imagination that matches these challenges.

The role of leadership

The topic "substance use, crime and violence: The antithesis to nation-building" suggests that substance use is the problem and addressing it could lead us to greatness. That is not the case. While China and India may boast of their numerical size, Japan—with a smaller population—is a more developed nation, with good and working institutions. It is not about size and oil reserves but leadership.

In Nigeria, citizens lack good quality of life. Nigerians grapple with unequal educational opportunities, poor or lack of access to quality healthcare. School enrolment is unequal between the genders, less than 25% of women access antenatal care in North-West Nigeria, and over 95% of Jigawa State's population is poor. Even in the "better off" parts of the country, social protection and provision are inadequate by international standards. Socio-economic inequalities are widespread. These factors engender a sub-culture of drug use, delinquency, and crime, and provide the context and opportunity for drug dealing.

Access to education, food, and affordable housing is out of the reach of ordinary citizens. All these do not encourage citizens to support the nation, as their leaders are unconcerned about their welfare. Rather, monumental corruption and unemployment have driven young able-bodied men to their graves in the Mediterranean Sea and years of slavery and re-colonisation of most African countries. Countless youth lose their lives trying to cross the sea under perilous conditions. The mass media recently reported the auctioning of migrants who were trying to escape hardship in their home countries. One must acknowledge that these criminal activities are products of bad leadership. A study to see how many of such returnees are "hooked" on drugs would be interesting. None of this suggests nation-building or statecraft.

The World Health Organisation, UNODC, and other international bodies are battling this global problem, but that will remain insufficient until our

leaders awake to their responsibility.

The qualities of a successful nation include top skills, industriousness, productivity, competitiveness, and not the brazen opulence displayed by our leaders. Going back to my earlier statement about exemplary leadership and determined vision, we cannot build a nation that breeds a conducive atmosphere for drug use and crime. Bad leadership and grinding poverty—rather than their result, drug abuse—are the antithesis to our nationhood. Drug abuse will not be so great a threat to nation-building if we adopt universal health coverage, make education accessible, and create employment for our youths.

Developed nations have drug addiction and crime but are able to control them and make socio-economic progress because they have selfless leaders and strong institutions.

Conclusion

I served as a visiting consultant to two psychiatric hospitals in Bauchi and Gombe states. I encounter at least three new cases of substance abuse or dependence on my weekly visits. Unquestionably, poverty and poor governance are predisposing, precipitating, and perpetuating factors in each.

A forum is necessary for the exchange of knowledge between governments and civil society organisations on nation-building and the reduction of substance use. Public officials and politicians should promote a multi-agency approach in promoting national identity to tackle challenges social inequalities, political violence, poverty, and drug abuse. They should work in this with international organisations, government agencies, healthcare providers, legal practitioners, local authorities, civil society organisations, community gate-keepers, the academia, and the media.

Nations are the products of men and women who have the will and vision to achieve greatness—not for themselves, family, or friends—but the country. If we can find the will to offer and support such leadership by active citizenship, we can overcome the problem of substance use and achieve national greatness.

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3. Max Planck. Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 9, 2005, p. 615-647.
4. Rosemarijn Hoefte and Wouter Veenendaal (2019) The Challenges of Nation-Building and Nation Branding in Multi-Ethnic Suriname, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 25:2, 173-190, DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2019.1602371.
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18. Krug, E. G. et al. (2002). World Health Report on Violence and Health. World Health Organisation. Geneva.
19. May, T., Hough M. (2004). Drug Markets and Distribution Systems. Addiction Research and Theory, 12:549-563.
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21. Bennett T. Holloway K. (2009). The Causal Relationship between Crime and Drugs. The British Journal of Criminology 49(4).
22. Stevens, A. (2011). Are drugs to blame? Centre for Crime and Justice Studies. (83).
23. LaMond Tullis. (1991)) Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socio-economic and Political Consequences New York, Greenwood Press.
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27. Stephen Schneider (2013). Violence, Organised Crime, and Illicit Drug Markets: A Canadian Case Study. Saint Mary's University, Department of Sociology and Criminology, Halifax, Canada.
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31. www.thisdayonline, 09.08.2005.
32. Goldstein A. (2001) 'Addiction, from biology to drug policy: Second Edition' Oxford University Press.
33. Michael A. Powel (2011). A Comprehensive Analysis of the Drug-Crime Relationship. Southern Illinois University. Carbondale.
34. Jurg Gerber and Eric L. Jensen (2001) Drug War American Style: The Internationalisation of Failed Policy and its Alternatives. Routledge. New York.

Chapter 41 | Addressing Strategic Imperatives in Mental Health: Political Change and Collective Leadership

Bwatyum Annah Gyang

Introduction

The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines health as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.[1] We may also define it as the ability to adapt and manage physical, mental and social challenges throughout life.[2] Positively adapting or coping well with challenges and changes (internal and external) is health. Therefore, mental health is an important component of health, and the latter is non-existent without it.

Mental health is a state of well-being in which the individual realises their potential, copes with normal life stresses, works productively, and contributes meaningfully to their community.[3] It is clear from this definition that mental health goes beyond the common understanding of it. It is the optimal interaction with one's self and environment.

Mental health disorders or illnesses comprise a broad range of problems and symptoms that involve a combination of abnormal thoughts, behaviours, emotions, and relationships with others.[4] It is possible, therefore, for an individual without a mental disorder to be in poor mental health. We cannot say such a person is healthy.

The World Health Organisation reported in 2001 that about one in four people will suffer from a mental health disorder in their lifetime. It also

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1. World Health Organisation. The World Health Organisation: definition of health. Available from https://www.who.int>aboutwho. Accessed on 18 March 2019.
2. Huber M., Knottnerus J. A., Green L., Horst H. V., Jadad A. R., Kromh J. R. 2011. How should we define health? BMJ. 343: d4163.
3. World Health Organisation. 2014. Mental Health: A state of well-being. Available from https://www.who.int>features>factfiles. Accessed on 18 March 2019.
4. World Health Organisation. Mental disorders. 2018. Available from https://www.who.int>management. Accessed on 18 March 2019.

said that about 450 million people were living with mental health disorders, making it a leading cause of ill-health and disability worldwide.[5] In 2016 alone, reportedly over 1.1 billion people had suffered a mental or substance use disorder.[6] Depression—a common mental health disorder—is the third most common cause of morbidity after cancer and cardiovascular disease, and likely a leading cause of disability by 2020.

About 20 to 30% of Nigeria's population has a mental illness,[7] a significant figure since that population is over 200 million.

Common mental health disorders include; depression, anxiety disorders, and substance use-related disorders. Others include bipolar affective disorders, schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, etc. Mental illness results from an interplay between genetic and environmental factors. Genetic factors confer vulnerability to mental illness. However, an individual with such a vulnerability may not develop a mental health disorder if their environment is conducive to mental health. For example, if their stress is manageable, and they have good social support, socio-economic status, and physical health. Even without a genetic predisposition, one may develop a mental illness if their environment is unfavourable for maintaining sound mental health. Some adverse environmental factors are poverty, unemployment, poor social support, violence and psychoactive substance use. Other factors include birth injuries and chronic medical illnesses.

Reportedly, about two-thirds of people with mental health disorders do not seek care.[8] The situation is worse in Nigeria: less than 10% of the mentally ill seek care. When they do, their first port of call is usually not the hospital. Most people who suffer from mental health disorders seek care from spiritual homes and herbal practitioners before they even consider seeking professional care. This paper aims to x-ray the barriers to seeking and rendering care to those with mental health disorders in Nigeria and offering some practical solutions to overcoming these challenges.

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5. World Health Organisation. Mental Health. 2018. Available from https://www.who.int>pressrelease. Accessed on 18 March 2019.
6. Ritche H. 2018. Global mental health. Five key insights which emerged from data. Available from https;//www.who.int>whr>press release.
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Barriers to care

Poor knowledge

The English Oxford Living Dictionary defines knowledge as facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education, the practical understanding of a subject. Most Nigerians have poor knowledge of mental health and mental health disorders. They do not understand or refuse to believe the scientific basis of mental illness. Many attribute it to things or events, which ascription influences their treatment decisions when they or a close relative have a mental health disorder. Most commonly, they attribute mental health disorders to "spiritual attacks" by witches or wizards and punishment for sin. Therefore, they believe exorcism (or "deliverance") to be the proper treatment, often involving the chaining or beating of the ill or causing them to drink herbal concoctions.[7/8] They hope by these practices are to drive away the evil spirits causing the illness, do penance for sin, or gain fortification against attacks.

These practices often strip sufferers of all dignity, worsen their mental state, and cause other health complications (e.g., ulcers, malnutrition, organ failure, amputations, or even death). Often, their family or friends only bring them to the hospital because they have become unmanageable. They only want mental health providers to pacify them so that they can continue with their "spiritual management." Compliance with treatment is a problem in such cases even after treatment, resulting in a cycle of relapses.

Others believe that some mental health disorders, such as substance use disorders, are self-inflicted[9] and, therefore, their sufferers undeserving of help. Some also believe that persons with mental health disorders are different, incapable of performing "normally," and unpredictable.[8] The mass media often promote these views: many films that depict mental health disorders rest on misconceptions about their causes, presentation, treatment, and outcomes. The print media also portray them negatively.[9]

Most Nigerians also lack the skills to identify the early symptoms of mental health disorders, including social isolation, poor sleep, and odd behaviours. They also believe that those with mental health disorders are violent and dangerous, and, more worrisome, that mental illness is contagious. Therefore, they avoid close interaction with the mentally ill.

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9. Graham C. L. Mental health and stigma. 2013. Psychology Today. Available from https://www.google,com/articles.

In summary, poor knowledge causes a poor attitude towards those with mental health disorders. Most studies show that the common attitude is to keep a social distance from the mentally ill (Okpadauvaekwe U. etal. 2007)

Stigma

Stigma is a mark of disgrace associated with a circumstance, quality, or person. It describes the attitude towards persons with mental health problems. These persons struggle with two challenges: the stress of living with the illness' symptoms (e.g., hallucinations, mood swings, and thought disorders) and the stigma associated with the disease.

Despite advances in psychiatry and psychology, much stigma still attaches to mental health disorders. The stigma can be social (others stigmatise the mentally ill) or self-stigma (the sufferer feels ashamed of their condition).

Much of the stigma arises from fear and ignorance and results in:

1. Denial by sufferers and their families, which impedes their search for help;
2. Failure of medical practitioners (non-mental health practitioners) to address the debilitating medical conditions such patients may have;
3. Unemployability of persons with mental health disorders or, where they already have jobs, the practice of exclusion and discrimination against them.[10]

Studies show that the stigmatisation of mental ill-health is widespread regardless of education or association with sufferers (Graham C. C. etal 2013). Interestingly, it exists among medical practitioners, some of whom stigmatise even mental health practitioners—probably because mental health has low priority in their training. Some believe that most, if not all, mental health workers have some mental illness or another.

Stigma affects mental health outcomes negatively. It is a major reason some victims suffer in silence, delay seeking care, drop out of treatment, and relapse recurrently even when compliant with their treatment.

Religion

Religions are beliefs and traditions associated with ritual and ceremony. Religion can play multiple roles in mental health, and it is hard sometimes to

10. Armiyau A. Y. 2015. A review of stigma and mental illness in Nigeria. Journal of clinical case reports. 5:488.

say whether it is a resource or liability.[11] It can be a good coping mechanism, but can also affect a person's attitude towards seeking help, medication, and psychotherapy. Some religious sects find it difficult to accept illness. They believe illnesses like depression are a sign of failing or absent faith or loss of spiritual connection with God. If a member is courageous enough to admit they have a mental illness or, worse, seek care in a hospital, their religious community alienates or isolates them. This can cause the victim to suffer in silence and weaken their resolve to seek care.

Some also believe mental illness to be punishment for sin or affliction from devils. So they resort to prayer, fasting, or ritual, which might increase the sufferer's pre-existing stress, guilt, and sense of worthlessness. Some deeply religious persons will not take medication during fasts, thus compromising the treatment process.

Various scholars have studied the pathway to care and reported that the average patient visits at least two inappropriate places before presenting at a mental health facility.[12] These include traditional healers, spiritual homes, faith-based organisations, general practitioners, etc. That means that their families must have expended much money before bringing them to a mental health professional. Hence, presentation is often late, and the symptoms would have become severe. This malady significantly impacts the outcome or prognosis of mental health conditions.

Most psychiatrists and psychologists are less religious than their patients.[13] Therefore, they might not understand or sympathise with the patient's beliefs and are unlikely to incorporate spiritual elements in their treatment plans. This might make the patient lose interest in the plan and prefer to go to places that accommodate their spiritual needs.

Inadequacy of mental healthcare facilities and professionals

This is one of the major challenges affecting healthcare delivery in Nigeria.[14] Mental health professionals include psychiatrists, psychologists,

11. Roenig H. G. 2009. Research and religion, spirituality and mental health. Canadian Journal of psychiatry.
12. Ibrahim A., Hor S., Bahar O. S., Dwomoh D., McKay M. M. 2016. Pathways to psychiatric care for mental disorders: A retrospective study of patients seeking mental health services at a public health facility in Ghana. International journal of mental health systems. 10:63.
13. Behire P. B., Das A., Behira A. P. 2019. Religion and mental health. Indian Journal of psychiatry. 61(8): 5632.
14. WHO. 2018. Nigeria: mental health slowly devouring the heart of the society. Available from https://allafrica/stories.

psychiatric nurses, occupational therapists and social workers. The 2006 WHO Aims report says Nigeria had 3,115 mental healthcare professionals, which translates to about eleven mental healthcare professionals per 100,000 people. A disaggregation of that figure reveals that the country had about 0.15 psychiatrists per 100,000 people, and 0.07 psychologists per 100,000.[15] The situation has changed little since then: today, Nigeria has about 0.4 psychiatrists per 100,000 people and four psychiatric nurses per 100,000.[16] Most of these professionals work in the eight neuropsychiatric hospitals and the tertiary hospitals, mainly the teaching hospitals. They are virtually non-existent in secondary and primary healthcare facilities. Therefore, mental health services are non-existent or are the work of usually inadequately trained non-professionals.

Similarly, most tertiary health centres are in urban areas and, therefore, not accessible for most of the population. The 2001 World Health Report recommends the integration of psychiatric services into regular healthcare services. It also recommends the replacement of neuropsychiatric hospitals with psychosocial rehabilitation centres. That is because the latter "can provide better and earlier care, are more respectful of human rights and can help limit the stigma of mental health treatment (Eaton J. etal 2008)." Some improvement has occurred here, as most teaching hospitals now have a functional, if poorly staffed, psychiatric department.

However, a lack of coordination exists between general health and psychiatric services. Expertise to identify mental health disorders is still inadequate among general practitioners, especially where patients do not present with aggression or grossly abnormal behaviour. Even when they recognise these disorders, they lack the skills to discuss them with their patients for the proper referral. This might not be unconnected to the stigma associated with mental health disorders among non-psychiatric health professionals. The poor interest in psychiatry among medical students and doctors-in-training contributes to this.[17/18] Despite the dire need for psychiatrists and the growing

15. Nigeria Health Watch. 2018. Mental Health: The danger of Nigeria's single story.
16. Eaton J., Agomoh A. 2008. Developing mental health services in Nigeria: The impact of a community health awareness programme. Psychiatry Epidemiology.
17. Bawo J., Omoaregba J., Okegbenin E., Buhari O., Obindo J. T. 2013. Nigeria Medical Students' Opinions about the Undergraduate Curriculum in Psychiatry. Academic Psychiatry. 10:1176/appi.ap.11030054.
18. Bakare M. O., Tunde-Ayinmode M. F., Adewwuya A. O., Bello-Mojeed M. A., Sale S. 2015. Recognition of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) symptoms and knowledge about some other aspects of ASD among final-year medical students in Nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa. BMC Research Notes. 8:454.

prevalence of mental health disorders, medical doctors are uninterested in taking up psychiatry as a specialisation. This is probably because the stigma attached to mental ill-health undermines their interest in the subject in medical school. Thus, they graduate with poor knowledge and perception of mental health disorders.

Cost

Many who would otherwise access psychiatric care cannot because of transportation and medication costs. The fewness and farness of psychiatric health facilities compel many patients (especially those in the rural areas) to travel far to access mental healthcare. When they get to these facilities, they have to pay consultation fees and buy medication themselves. Even for those enrolled in the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) most of the psychiatric medications are not "covered." When admission is necessary, relatives who have to stay with the patients must provide for themselves for its duration. Those belonging to lower socio-economic groups often cannot afford these costs and are themselves at risk of developing mental health disorders. Hence, the direct and indirect costs of treatment are unaffordable to the average patient and increase the burden of mental ill-health.

Many who go into treatment default on their medication and other treatment because they drain their limited resources. That results in relapses. With increasing relapses, the person affected may lose their job or other sources of income due to low productivity. These result in a vicious cycle that is detrimental to the person living with a mental health disorder, their families, and society.

Non-implementation of policies

The Nigerian Federal Ministry of Health produced a beautiful mental health policy in 1991 and reviewed it in 2013. The Ministry's National Mental Health Action Committee drafted it after consultation with many stakeholders, including professional groups, government departments, non-governmental organisations, and service users.[19] The policy draws on models from other countries and evidence-based practice guidelines. It states that:

The government and people of Nigeria hereby affirm that health, including

19. Federal Ministry of Health. 2013. National policy for mental health services. Available from https://child.org/wp-content.

mental, neurological, and substance abuse (MNS) care shall be made available to all citizens at the level of primary healthcare (PHC) and in communities.

The policy recognises that mental health disorders are common and a major source of morbidity among the Nigerian population. It also stated that:

1. Support systems for service delivery are weak;
2. Psychotropic drugs are hardly available;
3. Incorporation of mental and neurological health in the health information system is poor;
4. Labour supply in the healthcare sector is inadequate.

The policy's drafters hope to achieve its vision and mission through governance and accountability, human rights and inclusion in social life, and inter-sectorial partnerships. They defined the healthcare pathway as passing from the primary through the secondary to the tertiary centres and made recommendations for the coordination of the different levels. Also, they recommended the:

1. Appointment of an executive to oversee its implementation who should be at the level of an assistant director;
2. Constitution of a mental and neurological policy team in the ministry of health to liaise with other directorates in the ministry, healthcare providers, and other stakeholders;
3. Integration of mental, neurological, and substance abuse care into primary healthcare.

The state of mental healthcare should be better, as the ministry of health has had this policy for about twenty-eight years and revised it about six years ago. Mental health service delivery has witnessed little improvement. Nigeria still has fewer than two psychiatrists per 100,000 persons, few clinical psychologists, and about five psychiatric nurses per 100,000 persons. It has even fewer psychiatric social workers and occupational therapists per 100,000 persons. A few neuropsychiatric hospitals and departments of psychiatry in teaching hospitals render their services in some primary healthcare centres. However, the federal government has yet to integrate psychiatric health services into the primary healthcare system. The ministry of health today has a mental health desk officer who is not a specialist and no mental and neurological policy team whose members are its employees. A few psychiatrists visit prison health facilities in some states, but psychotropic

drugs are not readily available. These and other facts indicate we are still far from implementing the policy.

Lack of political will

Nigeria's mental health law derives from the colonial-era Lunacy Act of 1958, which has existed for sixty-one years. There had been a sudden proliferation of the mentally ill on the country's streets around the time of its promulgation. This was because Britain had deported to Nigeria many formerly enslaved Nigerians who, unable to fit into British culture, had developed mental illness. Also, the colonial government had returned Nigerian soldiers home from Britain's foreign wars without adequate debriefing and attention to their mental health needs. The government thought it was necessary to rid the streets of these people to protect the populace from violence.

The Lunacy Act defined mental illness simply as "lunacy" and empowered magistrates and medical practitioners to determine who was a lunatic and to confine them. The Act had many problems and unaddressed issues, probably because the colonial government's primary concern was the safety of the populace. Its problems included:

1. The discriminatory and derogatory definition of mental health disorder as "lunacy;"
2. Non-separation of mental healthcare from justice administration;
3. Provision for confinement rather than treatment.

These lapses have resulted in those living with mental illness suffering stigmatisation and discrimination and the denial of their fundamental human rights. Mental health services received inadequate budgetary allocations, and the asylums holding sufferers were, therefore, filthy and unfit for human habitation.[20] These unintended consequences have continued to this day.

Senators Ibiapuye Martyns-Yellowe and Dalhatu Tafida first attempted to replace the Lunacy Act in 2003, but the then-president denied their bill his assent. Sani and others withdrew it in 2009. Honourable Samuel Adejare and Senator Anthony Manzo re-introduced it in 2013. It has undergone several revisions and received inputs from the Association of Psychiatrists in Nigeria (APN) and other association of mental health providers. The bill has just

20. Ude P. U. 2015. Policy Analysis on the Nigerian Lunacy Act (1958): The need for a new legislation. Journal of Psychiatry 19:343.

scaled the first and second readings in the senate and was for public hearing on 29 March 2019. However, the committee postponed the hearing because the senators "needed to concentrate on passing the national budget."

The bill is a significant improvement on the Lunacy Act of 1958, as it has replaced the concept of "lunacy" with that of mental health conditions. It separates and spells out the roles of the judiciary and mental healthcare system and protects the human rights of persons living with mental health disorders. It also addresses the funding of mental healthcare, care for those with mental health disorders, and their admission into and discharge from mental health facilities. The bill also has sections on the admission of patients involved in criminal proceedings, the property and affairs of patients, and immunity.

Its passage will cause many changes in mental healthcare in Nigeria. Why has it not received the attention it needs to complete the legislative process? Has there been enough publicity for it? Are Nigerians aware of its existence? Do they consider it important? Do the legislators think it is necessary? Anyone might develop mental, neurological, or substance abuse issues. Why then do the legislators act as though they were immune to them? If they develop these issues, would they wish to receive treatment under the Lunacy Act?

The way forward

To improve the current situation will require much zeal, will, and patience. The blame for the current status is not the government or any profession's alone. The origin of the problem, which has existed for a long time, is complex. Collective effort is necessary to achieve meaningful change. Nigeria will overcome most of the problems if it disseminates and implements the mental health policy appropriately and passes the mental health bill. Below are suggestions toward achieving this.

Dissemination and implementation of the mental health policy

The revised mental health policy is comprehensive and, if properly implemented, will address most of the challenges of mental healthcare. The government should constitute and activate the mental and neurological health policy team for which the mental policy act provides. It should also appoint a mental healthcare specialist to the mental health desk at the Federal Ministry of Health. It should constitute a monitoring team answerable to the mental desk officer. The country is only set to implement the policy when these key positions are functional.

The first step in implementing this policy is to create public awareness of it. Even healthcare professionals are unaware of it or not conversant with its provisions. The Federal Ministry of Health needs to circulate this policy document to each state ministry of health, who should circulate it further to the local government areas. This is because its successful implementation requires synergy between the primary, secondary, and tertiary health centres, which are under the control of local, state, and federal governments, respectively. Their awareness of it will enable them to take up their responsibilities and roles and implement the changes the policy will introduce in the health sector.

We must provide mental healthcare services in secondary and primary healthcare facilities. Nigeria has made some progress here, as some federal medical centres (FMCs) and state specialist hospitals now have at least one psychiatrist. As more psychiatrists graduate from post-graduate medical colleges, we should send them to secondary healthcare facilities. We should also get more psychologists and other mental healthcare professionals. This will engender a good mental health team in our secondary care facilities.

Medical officers, nurses, community health officers, and community health extension workers in primary healthcare centres should receive training on the identification of common mental disorders. Medical officers should be able to treat minor mental disorders like mild-to-moderate depression and refer major cases. Nurses and community health workers can get training on counselling and psycho-education for mental health disorders. The pathway to care can then remain from the primary health centres to the secondary and tertiary.

The WHO's Mental Health Gap (MHGap) manual for training non-specialists to identify and offer basic mental healthcare can provide the model for training primary care health workers.[21] Trials in South-West Nigeria have produced promising results. The Federal Ministry of Health can take that up and expand it to other parts of the country. This will bring mental healthcare closer to the people, thus reducing transportation costs.

Basic medications for mental health conditions should be available in all tiers of the healthcare system. To reduce the cost of medication and treatment further, it is necessary to include mental health management in the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). This will also eradicate "out of pocket"

21. Abdulmalik J., Kola L., Gureje O. 2016. Mental health system governance in Nigeria: Challenges opportunities and strategies for improvement. Global Mental Health (Cambridge). 3:PMC5314752.

expenses, enabling patients to access care even without money.

Psychotropic medications should be on the essential drugs list. Beyond that, the NHIS should extend beyond federal government workers, its largest group of participants, to include state and local government workers. It should also be mandatory for all private employers of labour to enrol their staff into the NHIS scheme. We should also encourage community insurance schemes. This will improve access to care for all health problems, including mental health disorders.

The government should incorporate mental health hygiene into the education curriculum starting from primary school, so that everyone recognises mental health as a fundamental component of health. After all, according to the WHO definition of health, health cannot exist without mental health. So health education is incomplete without mental health education. Awareness can also help reduce stigma and discrimination towards mental health and those living with mental health disorders.

Our mental health promotion and prevention programmes require improvement. The WHO defines mental health promotion as the "enabling [of] people to increase control over and improve their health." Mental health promotion often refers to positive mental health rather than mental ill-health. It involves promoting value for mental health.[22] Every individual needs to increase control and improve their mental health. So awareness promotion about mental health should target everyone. Special programmes and activities can also target vulnerable populations, such as victims of violence, rape, kidnapping, or natural disasters.

Mental health professional bodies, non-governmental organisations, and the government should have a strategy for focused awareness programmes for vulnerable groups. During natural or man-made disasters, the National Emergency Management Agency is often more concerned with the safety and physical health of victims and providing them with relief materials. It should also pay attention to their mental health needs. They should receive training on how to support each other and develop positive mental attitudes towards their situation, etc.

The government has much to do regarding security and empowerment. These are crucial in preventing mental health disorders.

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22. WHO. 2002. Prevention and promotion of mental health. Available from https://www.who.mentalhealth/media/en/545pdf.

Mental health professionals should do more to educate influential members of the community, such as the clergy, opinion political, traditional and community leaders. These persons can in turn educate their followers, thus spreading the knowledge and making the work of mental health professionals easier. It will also help in the development of a positive attitude towards mental health and mental health disorders.

Spiritualists, traditional practitioners, and herbalists are also important. They should get training in mental health first aid, so they can help those with mental health disorders who present to them. They should understand that they can refer such cases to health centres for attention. This is because it is difficult to separate people from their belief systems. Today, this group remains the first port of call for many Nigerians.

Finally, non-mental healthcare professionals need regular training on managing people with mental health disorders to improve case identification and referral and reduce patient stigmatisation and discrimination. They also need to feel comfortable discussing the mental health needs of their patients and be able to communicate basic mental hygiene principles to them. This will improve the outcomes of their physical health management.

Another critical issue that should receive attention is the post-graduate training of doctors in fields other than psychiatry. They all need exposure to mental health during their post-graduate training. Sadly, no surgical speciality has deemed it necessary to train their students in mental health. Yet these students become professionals many of whose patients have mental health challenges. They often do not identify these problems because they lack the training to do so and are usually uncomfortable discussing the mental health needs of their patients. Even for the medical specialities that come for psychiatry postings, the longest time spent is two months by the family physicians. Some sub-specialities come for two months postings and one wonders what they get to learn in two weeks. The authorities should review this, and they can only do so when psychiatrists reach out to their colleagues in other fields to win their support for it.

The National University Commission (NUC) recently revised the curriculum for medical students. The NUC has now made mental health courses mandatory from the pre-clinical level of study and again during clinical postings. It also expects students to pass an examination in mental health to move to the next level or graduate. The NUC should enforce this policy in all universities and sanction the non-compliant. The early exposure of students

to mental health will stimulate their interest and encourage more of them to specialise in it at the post-graduate level. Improvements are necessary in the teaching of mental health in nursing schools and colleges of health technology.

Psychiatrists in some teaching hospitals provide mental healthcare services to prisoners. We should replicate this around the country to identify, treat and refer prisoners with mental health disorders. Additionally, health workers in the prison service should undergo training to identify mental health disorders and offer basic mental health first aid. It should also equip them to call for the visiting psychiatrist, if available, or refer cases to the nearest health facility for proper treatment. The Nigerian police force also requires training on the handling of persons with mental health disorders who may be in their custody.

The mental health bill

As stated earlier, the Lunacy Act, a law older than Nigeria, is still operative. Efforts to replace it with a new mental health law over the past sixteen years have gone in a cycle of introduction, review, withdrawal, and reintroduction. The farthest it has reached is the second reading at the National Assembly. It is now awaiting public hearing. The key challenge now is to secure the passage and promulgation into law of this bill. Everyone has a role to play in this battle.

The Association of Psychiatrists in Nigeria, the Nigerian Medical Association, and the Medical and Dental Consultants Association of Nigeria have spearheaded the campaign for the bill's passage. They received inputs from stakeholders at a meeting before its review. All psychiatrists in the country have committed to creating awareness about the mental health bill everywhere and mobilising public support for it. The support of Nigerians is necessary to make this dream a reality. In recent times, social media has been a strong medium for influencing policies and laws in the country and getting government attention. A recent example is the case of an entire family that was roaming the streets last year. It only took a National Youth Service Corps member taking and putting pictures of them on social media for the government to take up their treatment and rehabilitation. This brings to the fore the role of social media. Legislators would speed up the passage of the mental health bill if only 10% of Nigerians took advantage of every case of suicide or rape to scream for it.

Mental health specialists also need to intensify their lobbying. This will help push mental health ahead of other issues before the government, which usually takes up what they believe are the people's pressing concerns. It is also important for mental health professionals to participate in politics. That

will move the goal of safe effective and affordable mental healthcare for all Nigerians closer.

Conclusion

Mental healthcare in Nigeria falls far below WHO standards. It faces many problems whose solutions lie dormant in a beautiful paper gathering dust in our ministry of health and legislature. Progress in mental healthcare requires the support of all Nigerians for passage of the mental health bill and implementation of the mental health policy.

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4. World Health Organisation. Mental disorders. 2018. Available from https://www.who.int>management. Accessed on 18 March 2019.
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21. Abdulmalik J., Kola L., Gureje O. 2016. Mental health system governance in Nigeria: Challenges opportunities and strategies for improvement. Global Mental Health (Cambridge). 3:PMC5314752.
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Chapter 42 | Addressing Strategic Imperatives in Mental Health: Political Change and Collective Leadership

Kingsley Mayowa Okonoda

Introduction

We have no health without mental health.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1948 defined health as a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, not just the absence of diseases and infirmity.[1] It also defined mental health as a state of well-being in which the individual can actualise their potentials, cope with life's normal stresses, work productively, and contribute to society.[2]

Thus, mental health is an integral and important part of health. It determines the quality of life and affects all areas of life: physical health, and social, occupational, and religious life. Conversely, ill-health has grave implications for the individual, community, and country. A healthy population is a happy and productive population, with positive implications for the nation's economy. Thus, serious governments make the health of the people a top priority.

The burden of mental illness

Mental, neurological, and substance use disorders contribute significantly to the burden of diseases both in Nigeria, Africa, and the world. These conditions are chronic, relapsing, and common, affecting at least one in five people in their lifetime.[3]. They usually require long-term care, with an attendant toll on the socio-economic well-being of sufferers, caregivers, and the healthcare system. They are also a major cause of disability, accounting for 14% of all disabilities among non-communicable diseases. Thus, they account for the largest cause of disabilities. Unfortunately, treatment for these disorders is not

1. World Health Organisation. Constitution.
2. World Health Organisation. Promoting mental health: concepts, emerging evidence, practice (Summary Report) Geneva: World Health Organisation; 2004.
3. Federal Ministry of Health, Abuja, Nigeria: National Policy for Mental Health Services Delivery Nigeria 2013 available at https://cheld.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/national_policy_for_mental_health_service_delivery__2013_.p. Accessed 31 March 2019.

easily available. Data suggests that only a third of people who need treatment can access it in high-income countries and as low as only 2% in low- and middle-income countries.[4].

Mental illness is a huge economic burden. For example, its indirect cost in the United States is about $79 billion, of which productivity losses account for $63 billion. The WHO estimates that mental health issues cost between 3 and 4% of the gross national product in European Union countries.[5]

The state of the mental health sector in Nigeria

In Nigeria, mental health services are available mostly in tertiary health facilities: the eight federal neuropsychiatric hospitals, teaching hospitals, and some federal medical centres. They are also available in some state-owned neuropsychiatric and specialist hospitals and private facilities. As these hospitals are mainly in urban areas, the services they provide are inaccessible to most Nigerians, who live in semi-urban and rural areas. Some non-governmental and faith-based organisations also offer mental health services. However, these services are mostly uncoordinated and of questionable effectiveness.

Nigeria has just above two hundred and fifty psychiatrists, not counting resident psychiatrists in training. This number is below the over four hundred Nigerian psychiatrists practising in the United States and over two hundred in the United Kingdom. Thus, Nigeria—despite having an abysmally low psychiatrist-to-population ratio of about 0.125 per 100,000 persons—suffers a brain drain of her trained psychiatrists. The chief cause of this drain is the government's failure to improve mental health services. The situation is worse in other West African countries.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, working with the Federal Ministry of Health and some civil society organisations, has been building Nigeria's healthcare capacity. It has also donated funds to establish some Drop-in-Centres to treat substance use disorders. However, these efforts are like a drop in a mighty ocean!

The lack of a policy and legal framework is a key problem of Nigeria's mental health sector. The country has a 2016 National Health Policy that recommends more emphasis on mental health and neurological and substance

4. Wang P. S. et al. Use of mental health services for anxiety, mood, and substance disorders in seventeen countries in the WHO world mental health surveys. *Lancet* 2007; **370:** 841–50. Thornicroft G. Most people with mental illness are not treated. *Lancet* 2007; **370:** 807–08.
5. Ngui E. M. et al. Mental disorders, health inequalities and ethics: A global perspective. International Review of Psychiatry. 1 June 2010; 22(3):235-44.

use disorder.[6] Nonetheless, healthcare in the country focuses on physical health. It is necessary to inform and educate the populace on the national mental health policy, which the country revised in 2013.[7] That document was an improvement on a 1991 version.[8]

The peculiarities of and stigma associated with mental health issues necessitate a separate mental health law to regulate mental healthcare in Nigeria. Unfortunately, despite years of effort by practitioners, the mental health bill is yet to become law. Still, in contrast to former times, the Federal Ministry of Health now has a mental health desk with a dedicated officer.[9]

The state of the mental health system in Nigeria and West Africa has engendered calls to:

1. Make mental health services more widely accessible;
2. Increase the range of services available;
3. Provide evidence-based services that have been effective in similar foreign settings;
4. Make such services sustainable through strong policies, legal frameworks, and adequate financing.

The barriers to the scale-up of mental health services in low- and middle-income countries include:[10]

1. Absence of financial resources and government commitment;
2. Over-centralisation;
3. Challenges of integration of mental healthcare into primary care settings;
4. Scarcity of trained mental health personnel;
5. Shortage of public health expertise among mental health leaders.

Overcoming barriers to scaling up of mental health services

6. http://www.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nigeria/draft_nigeria_national_health_policy_final_december_fmoh_edited.pdf Accessed 1 April 2019.
7. https://cheld.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/national_policy_for_mental_health_service_delivery__2013_.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2019.
8. *WHO-AIMS Report on Mental Health System in Nigeria,* WHO and Ministry of Health, Ibadan, Nigeria, 2006.
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10. Saraceno, B. et al. (2007). Barriers to improvement of mental health services in low-income and middle-income countries. The Lancet, 370(9593), 1164-1174.

The means of surmounting these barriers include those we describe below.[11]

Increased Political will

As earlier noted, many low-income countries (including Nigeria) give low priority to mental health issues in their healthcare policy and system. However, Nigeria took a step in 2013 to remedy this with the revision of its mental health policy. This policy had the input of major stakeholders in the mental health space, including the National Mental Health Action Committee under the Federal Ministry of Health. Much of it drew on examples from countries with socio-economic conditions like Nigeria's and the experience of its committee members as practitioners in different fields.

The policy states:

The federal, state, and local governments of Nigeria are hereby committed to [pursuing] the following declarations:

1. The MNS policy shall be based on the national philosophy of social justice and equity;
2. Individuals with mental, neurological and substance use (MNS) disorders shall have the same rights to treatment and support as those with physical illness and shall be treated in health facilities as close as possible to their… community;
3. No person shall suffer discrimination that compromises their ability to [participate fully] in community life on account of mental or neurological illness;
4. At all levels of healthcare, MNS services shall as far as possible be integrated with general health services. In this way the preventive, therapeutic, rehabilitative and social re-integration aspects of MNS care shall as much as possible be available to all Nigerians;
5. To achieve… comprehensive coverage of the population, delivery of MNS care shall be firmly established in the PHC setting and any other setting considered appropriate. The services shall be promoted by all healthcare personnel with [the] active participation of members of the community;
6. Appropriate training in MNS and psychosocial skills and [a] positive attitude towards the mentally ill shall be provided to all healthcare personnel. This shall be facilitated by the provision of adequate teaching aids;

11. Eaton J. et al. Scale-up of services for mental health in low-income and middle-income countries. The Lancet. 2011 Oct 29;378(9802):1592-603.

7. Inter-sectorial collaboration shall be fostered among those involved in the overall national development of quality of life. These include social development, agriculture, education, science and technology, housing, environmental protection, communication, and others. The attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) depends to a large extent on the MNS and mental capita of the populace. Collaboration with the office of the Special Adviser to the President on MDGs will be a particularly crucial one;
8. Healthy attitudes and positive socio-cultural attributes in the population, particularly among the youths, shall be promoted to prevent aberrant behaviour with adverse consequences for MNS;
9. To eliminate [the] social stigma often associated with mental disorders, encouragement shall be given to the promotion of positive attitudes towards the mentally ill among the general population. Government shall work to inform the public about the nature, causes, and treatability of mental disorders. [The] government will promote the integration of MNS services into every tier of health service delivery, in particular the general and specialist hospitals, and into programmes addressing physical health delivery (with which MNS is intricately associated);
10. Alcohol and drug abuse and their associated problems shall be reduced to the barest minimum by the use of appropriate preventive, therapeutic and rehabilitative measures;
11. Special care shall be provided for the vulnerable and disadvantaged members of the community such as children, women, the elderly, detainees and prisoners, and refugees;
12. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) shall be encouraged to assist in the promotion of MNS [and] in the preventive and rehabilitative aspects of MNS care services;
13. There shall be full collaboration with all international organisations whose objectives and programmes include aspects of mental, psychosocial, neurological [and] alcohol and drug abuse problems;
14. There shall be [a] periodic review of the legislation governing the care of the mentally [ill] in consonance with advances in… MNS;
15. Strengthen the evidence base for mental and neurological health and mental and neurological healthcare by vigorously encouraging, and funding research programmes aimed at enhancing our understanding of the risk factors and consequences of MNS mental disorders in Nigeria, and the development and implementation of effective interventions;
16. The necessary human resources to support the achievement of these

goals will be developed. This will include the production and retention of specialists as well as general clinicians in numbers adequate to address the burden of mental, neurological and substance use disorders in Nigeria. Trained professionals require a career pathway in order to be attracted to these specialities, and retained;

17. The outlined details of programmes on this policy declaration are contained in a separate document titled "The National MNS Programme and Action Plan for Nigeria."[12]

Thus, Nigeria has a well-articulated mental health policy. However, what is lacking is principally its conscientious implementation; it needs an implementation plan with a clear division of labour and a monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

Mental health legislation

Mental health legislation is an important component of mental healthcare governance, as it covers human rights protection, professional training, involuntary admission and treatment, guardianship, and service structure.[13]

Nigeria's Mental Health and Substance Abuse Bill (2019) is under National Assembly consideration and, hopefully, will become law. Several previous efforts to pass it failed without the required political will. The Lunacy Act of 1958 governs mental healthcare in Nigeria in the meantime.

Given Nigeria's focus on deadly communicable and non-communicable diseases, the following are necessary to put mental healthcare on the front burner.[14]

1. *Persistence* is necessary in public and government-targeted advocacy on the importance of mental health issues;
2. *Use of relevant evidence*: It is necessary to present persuasively to policy-makers and stakeholders existing evidence of the need for mental healthcare and the availability of effective interventions;
3. Seize occasions for impact: Advocates must exploit every opportunity to emphasise the necessity of mental healthcare and the gap in treatment options and accessibility. Media reports of suicide cases have increased. While caution is necessary not to sensationalise these reports, they

12. https://cheld.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/national_policy_for_mental_health_service_delivery__2013_.pdf.
13. WHO-AIMS WH. Mental Health Systems in Selected Low- and Middle-income Countries: a WHO-AIMS Cross-national Analysis. Geneva: World Health Organisation. 2009.

present stakeholders with an opportunity to reiterate the consequences of inadequate access to mental healthcare. Other opportunities include periods of disasters (natural or man-made) and days of mental health importance like mental health day, the international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking, etc.

It is also necessary to allocate responsibility for implementation through the existing management structure. Collaboration is crucial between the primary, secondary, and tertiary healthcare structures through their respective leaderships.

Stigma is an important barrier to prioritising mental health services, as it makes sufferers and their families reluctant to seek help. There must be programmes against misinformation and discrimination and to provide correct information through direct contact, advocacy visits, health campaigns, and the media.

Stakeholders must collaborate to build the advocacy capacities of non-governmental organisations and religious leaders. Key actors and stakeholders have devised many programmes that could help increase political buy-in. The Mental Health Gap (MhGap) is a WHO programme to increase the allocation of financial and human resources to treat mental, neurological, and substance use disorders.[15] The World Psychiatric Association's 2008-2011 Action Plan encouraged task shifting: the training of other health workers to perform tasks hitherto restricted to psychiatrists.[16]However, caution is necessary to prevent government abuse of this initiative. That is because of the recent phenomenon of unemployment among highly trained psychiatrists, some of whom leave Nigeria despite the pressing need for their services here. It may be necessary to include healthcare consumers and their families in task shifting, especially given the paucity of the mental health workforce in primary healthcare. This will forestall the brain drain of trained health workers.

Organisation of services

The best delivery systems for mental health services involve decentralised locations, the de-institutionalisation of treatment, community-hospital

14. Eaton J. et al. Scale-up of services for mental health in low-income and middle-income countries. The Lancet. 29 Oct. 2011; 378(9802):1592-603.
15. World Health Organisation. MhGap: Mental Health Gap Action Programme: scaling up care for mental, neurological and substance use disorders.
16. MAJ M. The WPA Action Plan 2008-2011. The World Psychiatric Association (WPA).:129.

integration, and a referral system that incorporates secondary and tertiary care.[17] It is necessary to establish more community-based psychiatric in-patient units. These could be psychiatric units in general hospital settings, allowing the integration of mental and other health services. The National Council on Health should make it mandatory for every state government to have psychiatrists and other mental health professionals in their employment. These governments should also have at least one psychiatric unit in every state specialist and general hospital and, possibly, a department of psychiatry.

Poor knowledge of mental illness and the scarcity of mental health specialists to train and supervise are reasons for concern. However, the adoption of task sharing—which has been highly successful in combating HIV and tuberculosis—could help solve these problems in mental healthcare. Incorporating mental healthcare into that of chronic non-communicable disorders with similar characteristics might mitigate the problem of over-loading primary health workers who already bear other healthcare burdens.[18]

The information system is another important part of the mental health system. Unfortunately, many health information systems draw on population-based (e.g., censuses and household surveys) or health facility-based (e.g., public health surveillance, health services data) sources. Therefore, they do not have data on mental, neurological and drug misuse disorders. This causes the underestimation of the demand for mental healthcare and undermines appreciation of its importance in the health system. Consequently, essential psychotropic drugs may be unavailable. So might psychological services, which are almost non-existent. The government should make these available in the primary healthcare system.

Resources

Financing

Nigeria has never achieved the allocation of 15% of the budget to healthcare, as the 2001 Abuja Declaration requires. Since then the highest achieved so far for health has been 5.95% in 2012.[19] Reliable data is unavailable

17. Kigozi F. Integrating mental health into primary healthcare—Uganda's experience: a review. *South Afr Psychiatry Rev* 2007:**10:** 17–19.
18. Eaton J. et al. Scale-up of services for mental health in low-income and middle-income countries. The Lancet. 29 Oct. 2011; 378(9802):1592-603.
19. http://www.healthnews.ng/heres-breakdown-nigerias-2018-budgetary-allocation-health/ Accessed 31 March 2019.

on Nigeria's mental health budget, but it is about 3.3% of the health budget.[20] Most of this goes to the eight federal neuropsychiatric hospitals, leaving little for the other parts of the mental health sector. It is difficult to access financing from other sources, like the private sector and international donors. However, it is doubtful if the amount of funding coming from those sources will make any significant impact on the mental health sector. One of the easier ways of ensuring better funding of mental health is to incorporate mental health services into existing healthcare structures. That way mental health will share from the pool of funding for the health system.

A good health financing scheme ensures that people have access to treatment without suffering financial catastrophe for paying out of pocket. Nigeria's National Health Insurance Scheme covers psychiatric disorders and psychotropic drugs for them.

The NHIS has strong government support, which will ensure its sustainability and ability to provide much-needed universal access to healthcare, including mental health. However, its low uptake among Nigerians—only about 4% of whom have registered for it—is a challenge.[21]

Human resources

Nigeria has a paradoxical problem in its mental health workforce. It has just over two hundred and fifty qualified psychiatrists to a population of between 180 and 200 million. Yet some of these specialists cannot find jobs because of the structure of the mental health system. Consequently, the country is experiencing a brain drain as it loses them to the high-income countries, which have better structured mental healthcare systems. However, their numbers would still be inadequate to meet the need even if all trained psychiatrists remained in the country. Other mental health professionals, like nurses and psychologists, are also insufficient.[22] It is necessary to train more mental health professionals. Moreover, in a resource-constrained environment such as ours, the psychiatrist and other mental health practitioners must be more than clinicians. They must

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20. Mugisha, J., et al. (2017). Health systems context (s) for integrating mental health into primary healthcare in six Emerald countries: a situation analysis. *International journal of mental health systems*, *11*(1), 7.
21. Aderounmu A. O. 2013. National Health Insurance Scheme in Nigeria. Available from: www.oauife.edu.ng/.../NATIONAL-HEALTH-INSURAQNCE-SCHEME-IN-NIGERI. Mgbemena E. National health insurance scheme in Nigeria. Available from: https://www.academia.edu/24448356/National_Health_Insurance_scheme_in_Nigeria.
22. Eaton, J. et al. (2011). Scale-up of services for mental health in low-income and middle-income countries. *The Lancet*, *378*(9802), 1592-1603.

also be public mental health professionals who advocate for better policies, training, supervision, support, and expertise.[23]

Several courses have sought to rectify this leadership deficit in the mental health sector, including one at the University of Ibadan.[24] Also, the UNODC—working with the Federal Ministry of Health and civil society organisations—has trained mental health workers.

Specialist mental health personnel are necessary in primary healthcare as part of multidisciplinary teams that include at least a prescribing physician.

Political change

It is obvious, therefore, that new approaches are necessary to the scaling up of mental health services in Nigeria.

What is political change?

Political change occurs when a country changes its government or type of governance. It is ideally a normal function of internal and external politics and occurs seamlessly, more so in developed than in less developed countries.[25]

It may arise from internal or external causes. External change results from the activities of forces external to the country, whereas internal change comes from the action of citizens.

How does this apply to mental health?

Our analysis shows that governance—i.e., the government's leadership and guidance in the mental health system—has been sub-optimal and ineffective. Therefore, actors and players in the sector should work together to re-jig it.

Studies have identified key factors that cause political change.[26] Shiffman and Smith propose the four below.[27]

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Factor 1: The strength of the actors involved in the initiative

"Initiatives differ in the strength of the actors that compose them, in the quality of linkages among these actors to confront opponents."

1. *The cohesion of the policy community*: the level of synergy or togetherness among the individuals and organisations involved with the issue;
2. *Leadership*: the presence of individuals with the ability to unite the policy community. Such individuals gain recognition as champions for the cause;
3. *Strong guiding institution*: the effectiveness of organisations or coordinating mechanisms with a mandate to lead the initiative;
4. Civil society mobilisation: the extent to which grassroots organisations have mobilised to press international and national political authorities to address the issue at the global level.

Factor 2: The power of the ideas used to frame the issue

Ideas and how advocates frame them for different audiences also influence the political support they attract.

1. *Internal frame*: the degree to which the policy community agrees on the definition of, causes of and solutions to the problem;
2. External frame: public portrayals of the issue in ways that resonate with external audiences, especially the political leaders who control resources.

Factor 3: The political contexts in which they operate

The contexts in which actors operate influence levels of political support, and it is necessary to consider external factors when developing advocacy programmes.

1. *Policy windows*: political moments when global conditions align favourably for an issue, presenting opportunities for advocates to influence decision-making;
2. Global governance: the degree to which norms and institutions operating in a sector provide a platform for effective collective action.

Factor 4: The characteristics of the issue

Some issues are easier to promote than others.

1. *Credible indicators*: clear measures that demonstrate the severity of the problem and that can help to monitor progress;
2. *Severity*: the size of the burden relative to other problems, as indicated by objective measures such as mortality levels;
3. Easy and cheap solutions: the clarity, cost-effectiveness, scientific basis,

simplicity, and inexpensiveness of proposed means of addressing the problem.

Mental health problems will not receive attention automatically. It is the framing and presentation of the issues and their solutions to decision-makers that generate momentum and achieve the desired results.

Duff Gillespie used these lessons to create a model for national-level advocacy. It included four key components that underwent testing in a series of pilot projects and are suitable for adaptation for mental health advocacy.

1. Building national advocacy networks

Key advocacy approach: Build a national advocacy network around a shared goal and joint activities to increase political and financial commitments for mental health and substance use disorders.

2. Researching and developing a baseline

Key advocacy approach: Research three areas:

1. Research the mental health and substance use disorder situation to identify pressing issues and provide the evidence base for advocacy messages and briefings;
2. Find out about national decision-making processes and protocols to highlight national and local policy and budgetary processes and identify key decision-makers to inform through advocacy activities;
3. Keep track of other ongoing advocacy campaigns to identify successful examples and possible partners.

3. Tailoring messages

Key advocacy approach: Develop and deliver persuasive and effective advocacy messages that resonate with the key target audiences who can implement change.

4. Working with key champions

Key advocacy approach: Champions are influential people who support the advocacy goal and help you achieve it. They are decision-makers or have access to decision-makers. Identify people who are familiar with government agencies and their procedures and can advise on advocacy opportunities and serve as advocates.

International organisations like the International Planned Parenthood

Federation have piloted this model and articulated its components into an advocacy process that includes:

1. Starting up;
2. Building networks;
3. Research;
4. Champions;
5. Planning;
6. Advocacy communication;
7. Evaluation.

Starting Up

1. Identify your advocacy issue;
2. Single out issues to address;
3. Define the outcome and outline concrete action needed to achieve it;
4. The result you want to achieve;
5. What you need to achieve it;
6. Have a realistic time frame;
7. Use brainstorming and communication;
8. Be realistic about what you can achieve;
9. Recognise that the environment might change;
10. Develop capacity.

Building Networks

An advocacy network is a group of like-minded organisations and individuals working together to achieve common goals through coordinated action. Members unite around a shared purpose and desire to bring about change. Stakeholders in the mental health sector disseminate the same advocacy message: civil servants, parliamentarians, journalists, professional associations, academics, and civil society organisations. The benefits of working together far outweigh the sum of the outcomes of individual efforts. Other benefits include resource sharing, compensating for individual weaknesses, multiplying individual strengths, etc. The elements of network-building are:

1. Identify Partners;
2. Approach Partners;
3. Build Trust and reciprocity;
4. Be aware of the challenges of networks, like participants having different levels of commitments to the cause and tasks assigned, leadership tussles,

conflicts of interest, etc.

Research

1. Research the advocacy issue;
2. Research the decision-making process;
3. Research relevant advocacy initiatives and partners.

Champions

They have influence, resources, information, etc., and can fill single or multiple roles: partners, advocacy targets, resource persons, and gatekeepers.

Planning

This sets out what you will do and how and when you will do it, with clear goals and objectives.

Advocacy communications

This involves preparing and deploying an advocacy message, a brief and clear message to persuade an audience to act. Activities involved in advocacy communication include sensitisation, the provision of information, and following up.

Evaluation

Advocacy may be difficult to evaluate, but simple indicators include improved policy outcomes, strengthened organisational capacities, strengthened alliances, etc.

Collective leadership

New challenges emerge constantly in mental healthcare. Therefore, the effective strategies and tactics of yesterday may not work today or tomorrow. The leadership that worked in the past may not work in the present, given the increasing complexity of the mental health sector. Sustainable leadership culture is a necessary condition for delivering safe, integrated and compassionate care within budget.[28]

Individual, team, or organisation effectiveness often depends on quality leadership. Therefore, leaders must challenge basic assumptions and emphasise collaboration as key elements of success. This applies to the stakeholders in the mental health sector. A culture of leadership is necessary, involving formal and informal leaders acting together for collective success. In keeping with the

28 West M. A. et al. Developing collective leadership for healthcare. London: King's Fund; May 2014.

saying that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, the results of working together outweigh the sum of the skills of individual leaders.

Need for collective leadership strategy in mental health

The demand for mental health services is rising with the increase in awareness about the true causes of mental illnesses. Given the paucity of psychiatrists and other mental health professionals, it is necessary to produce more of these professionals and improve service delivery and advocacy in the sector.

Developing a culture of excellence in the mental health sector

Culture is a set of taken-for-granted, implicit assumptions that members of an organisation share, which determines how they perceive, think about, and react to things.[29] For instance, it influences how healthcare personnel talk to or about patients or to each other. An organisation's culture reflects its values. These may be quality, safety, productivity, survival, power, secrecy, justice, humanity, respect for the individual, professionalism, and so on. New members of an organisation often learn the culture of that organisation as they interact with others. For example, if they observe aggressiveness in interactions between seniors and juniors, they soon pick up that attitude. We must be deliberate in nurturing the positive culture that we want to propagate.

Although an organisation's members co-create culture through their interaction and inter-communication, present and future leadership is the crucial determinant of the development and maintenance of cultures.[30] That is because leaders determine its structure: they control information and resources and can reward or punish, thereby shaping the work lives of others.

Therefore, its leaders must lead the mental health sector carefully to reinforce the values of high-quality care that should permeate it.

What is collective leadership?

Collective leadership is a new way of sharing power that correlates leadership and expertise at every level and in every task. It is also a strategy for integrating leadership across organisations. It means the allocation of leadership power to wherever capability, expertise, and motivation sit. All the members of the organisation share the responsibility of leadership. The emphasis here is

29. Schein E (1992). Organisational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. San Francisco. 1992; 42.
30. Barbera K. M. The Oxford handbook of organisational climate and culture. Oxford University Press; 7 May 2014. In West MA, Eckert R, Steward K, Pasmore WA. Developing collective leadership for healthcare. London: King's Fund; May 2014.

on developing a new mindset, not just new skills and individual competencies.

The purposeful, visible distribution of leadership responsibilities to every person in the organisation is crucial to creating collective leadership that nurtures the right culture in the healthcare sector.[31] In such a culture, roles of leadership and 'followership' shift depending on situational requirements. Collective leadership creates a culture in which the sector can deliver high-quality, compassionate care.

At a system level, collective leadership cultures for high-quality, compassionate care reach beyond the boundaries of individual organisations or stakeholders. They must exist across the system or sectors that work together to deliver high-quality care. Since no professional group alone can achieve the best possible care, cultures must foster interdependent working relationships within and across the system. That is a core argument for collective leadership, and the mental health sector needs to embrace this culture.

All the actors in the sector have an important role in putting mental healthcare a top priority of policy-makers. Each has a role: professional associations, civil society organisations, the academia and media, legal professionals, religious leaders, and consumers. Therefore, the culture of collective leadership must permeate the sector for effective collaboration.

In conclusion, we have no health without mental health. However, many issues bedevil the mental health sector, ranging from poor governance and inadequate human resources to inadequate funding and stigmatisation. Understanding and addressing the strategic imperatives of political change and collective leadership will bring the necessary positive change in the sector.

31 .McCauley C. Making leadership happen. A White Paper. Greensboro, NC: Centre for Creative Leadership. 2011.